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NIGEL WEST

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Nigel West

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Editor's Foreword

Although war and civil unrest have been around for as long as recorded history, it is only in the past century or so, and especially within the past few decades, that intelligence and counterintelligence have come into their own. Almost every country has an intelligence agency and operatives, and their activities have become increasingly varied and sophisticated. With the passing of the Cold War, it was hoped that worldwide intelligence operations might be scaled back. Alas, with the emergence of failed countries engulfed in continuous turmoil, rogue countries acquiring even more dangerous weapons, and terrorists committing increasingly bloody atrocities, the need has not disappeared. While high-tech gadgetry is often employed today, old-fashioned human intelligence is more often than not the key to success.

This Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence is the foundation volume of Scarecrow Press's new series of Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. In the chronology, it traces the accelerating spiral of intelligence and counterintelligence activities from their relatively modest beginnings to the consolidation of agencies with dozens, hundreds, and even thousands of employees. The introduction explains both how the field has evolved and what special constraints it faces as an indispensable but often unavowable form of government activity. The dictionary contains hundreds of entries on espionage techniques, categories of agents, crucial operations and those who ran them, and a broad circle of countries that have dabbled both effectively and ineffectively in this very tricky arena. The most intriguing entries, however, are those on specific spies, defectors, moles, double and even triple agents, and the tradecraft they apply. The bibliography then points readers in the right directions for further, in-depth information.

viii • EDITOR'S FOREWORD

This volume, like the first in the series on British Intelligence, was written by Nigel West. No one has studied intelligence and counterintelligence more exhaustively and written on it more extensively. He is known for the quality of his contacts in the field as well as his understanding of what makes the key players tick. While somewhat specialized in British, American, and Soviet intelligence, he has a broad knowledge of the field, including even some rather small and obscure agencies. Recognized as the "experts' expert" by a panel of spy writers and awarded the U.S. Association of Former Intelligence Officers' first Lifetime Literature Achievement award, Nigel West would seem to be the ideal author of this foundation volume.

Jon Woronoff Series Editor

Acronyms and Abbreviations

	AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations (United States)		
	AFSA	Armed Forces Security Agency (United States)		
	ANC	African National Congress		
	ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation		
	AVH	Allami Vedelmi Hatosag [Hungarian State Security]		
	BCRA	Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action		
		[Free French Intelligence Service]		
	BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [Federal German		
		Security Service]		
	BIS	Bezpecnostni Informacni Sluzba/Security Information		
		Service (Czech Republic)		
	BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst [Federal German Intelligence		
		Service]		
	BOSS	Bureau of State Security (South Africa)		
	BRUSA	Ango-American Signals Intelligence Treaty		
	BSC	British Security Coordination		
BVD Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (Netherlands)		Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (Netherlands)		
	CBFE	Combined Bureau Far East (Great Britain)		
	CESID	Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa (Spain)		
	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (United States)		
	CICI	Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq (Great Britain)		
	CNI	Centro Nationale Información (Chile)		
	COMINT	Communications Intelligence		
	CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain		
	CPUSA	Communist Party of the United States of America		
	CSE	Communications Security Establishment (Canada)		
	CSO	Composite Signals Organisation (Great Britain)		
	DCI	Director of Central Intelligence (United States)		
	DDO	Deputy Director for Operations (United States)		

DDP	Deputy Directorate for Plans (United States)	
DGI	Dirección General de Inteligencia (Cuba)	
DGSE	Direction Générale de Sécurité Extérieure	
	[French Intelligence Service]	
DHS	Department of Homeland Security (United States)	
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency (United States)	
DIB	Delhi Intelligence Bureau (Great Britain)	
DIE	Departmentude Informatii Externe [Romanian	
	Intelligence Agency]	
DINA	Dirección National de Inteligencia (Chile)	
DIS	Defence Intelligence Staff (Great Britain)	
DMI	Director of Military Intelligence	
DNI	Director of National Intelligence (United States)	
DNI	Director of Naval Intelligence	
DO	Directorate of Operations (United States)	
DOE	Department of Energy (United States)	
DS	Drzaven Sigurnost [Bulgarian Intelligence Agency]	
DSIP	Dirección de Seguridad e Inteligencia Political (Venezuela)	
DST	Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire [French Security	
	Service]	
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston/National	
	Organization of Cypriot Combatants	
ETA	Euskadi ta Askatascena [Basque Nationalist Organization]	
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)	
FBIS	Federální Bezpeènostní Informaèní Sluzba/Federal	
	Security Information Service (Czech Republic)	
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service (United States)	
FCD	First Chief Directorate [of the KGB]	
FLQ	Front de Libération du Québec	
FRA	Forsvarets Radioanstalt (Sweden)	
FSB	Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti [Russian	
	Security Service]	
GC&CS	Government Code and Cypher School (Great Britain)	
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters (Great Britain)	
GCR	Groupement de Contrôles Radio-éléctrique (France)	
GIS	General Intelligence Service (Palestine)	
GRU	Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenye (General Political	
	Administration) [Soviet Military Intelligence Service]	

HUMINT Human Intelligence

HVA Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung [East German

Intelligence Service]

IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority
IDB Inlichtingendienst Buitenland (Netherlands)

INLA Irish National Liberation Army IPI Indian Political Intelligence IRA Irish Republican Army

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)

ISLD Inter-Services Liaison Department (Great Britain)

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee

JSO Jamahirya Security Organization (Libya) KCIA Korean Central Intelligence Agency KGB Komitei Gosudarstevnnoi Bezopasnosti

[Soviet Intelligence Service]

KNIS Korean National Intelligence Service

KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschland/Communist Party

of Germany

MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MfS Ministerium für Staatssicherheit/Ministry of

State Security (East Germany) Security Service (Great Britain)

MI6 Secret Intelligence Service (Great Britain)
MIT Milli Istihbarat Teskilati/National Intelligence

Organization (Turkey)

MSS Ministry of State Security (China) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (United States)

NID Naval Intelligence Division (Great Britain)
NIE National Intelligence Estimate (United States)

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency (United States)

NKVD Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del' [Soviet

Intelligence Service]

NOC Non-Official Cover

MI5

NRO National Reconnaissance Office (United States)
NSA National Security Agency (United States)
NSC National Security Council (United States)

NURO National Underwater Reconnaissance Office (United States)

SHAEF SIFE

OAS Organisation Armée Secrète/Secret Army Organization (France) **OGPU** Obyedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenye (Unified State Political Administration) [Soviet Intelligence Service] Otdel Mezhdunarodnykh Svyazey [Comintern Foreign **OMS** Relations Department] Office of Strategic Services (United States) OSS **OTP** One-Time Pad **OUP** Urzad Ochrony Panstwa [Polish Intelligence Service] Opera Voluntaria per la Repressione Antifascisto **OVRA** [Italian Fascist Security Service] Passport Control Officer **PCO PHOTOINT** Photographic Intelligence **PIDE** Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado [Portuguese Intelligence Service] Provisional Irish Republican Army **PIRA** Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers Party PKK Palestine Liberation Organization PLO POW Prisoner of War PV Positive Vetting Political Warfare Executive (Great Britain) **PWE RAF** Royal Air Force (Great Britain) **RAW** Research and Analysis Wing (India) **RCMP** Royal Canadian Mounted Police RSS Radio Security Service (Great Britain) RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary (Great Britain) SAPO Säkerhetspolisen/Security Police (Sweden) Special Air Service (Great Britain) SAS SAVAK Sazeman-I Effelaat vaAmniyat-I Keshvae/National Organization for Intelligence and Security (Iran) SB Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (Poland) SD Sicherheitsdienst [Nazi Security Service] SDECE Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage [French Intelligence Service]

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

Security Intelligence Far East (Great Britain)

SIM Servizio Informazioni Militari/Military Intelligence Service (Italy) Security Intelligence Middle East (Great Britain) **SIME** Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (Peru) SIN SIS Secret Intelligence Service (Great Britain) SIS Special Intelligence Service (United States) SISDE Servizio per le Informazioni Generali e la Sicurezza Democractica [Italian Security Service] Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare **SISME** [Italian Military Intelligence Service] SOE Special Operations Executive (Great Britain) **SOSUS** Sound Surveillance System Statni Bezpecnost [Czech Intelligence Service] StB **SVR** Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki [Russian Foreign Intelligence Service] TELINT Telemetry Intelligence Urzad Bezpieczenstwa [Polish Intelligence Service] UB Anglo-American Signals Intelligence Agreement **UKUSA** Urad pro Ochranu Ustavy a Demokracie/Bureau for UOUD the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy (Czech Republic) **UZSI** Urad pro Zahranicni Styky a Informace/Bureau for Foreign Contacts and Information (Czech Republic) Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD

Wireless Interception

Y

Chronology

- 1908 U.S. Bureau of Investigation created.
- 1909 British Secret Service Bureau established.
- 1910 Siegfried Helm convicted of espionage.
- 1911 Official Secrets Act passed in Britain.
- 1912 Defection of Karl Hentschel.
- 1913 Basil Thomson appointed commissioner of the metropolis in London.
- 1914 MI5 arrests Carl Gustav Ernst's network.
- 1915 Internment of enemy aliens introduced in Britain.
- 1916 Sir Roger Casement arrested in Ireland.
- 1917 Zimmermann telegram decrypted.
- 1918 Police strike in London.
- 1919 Basil Thomson heads Directorate of Intelligence in Britain.
- 1920 Communist Party of Great Britain founded.
- 1921 Cable interception authorized in peacetime in Britain.
- 1923 Arthur Scherbius patents his Enigma cipher machine.
- 1924 J. Edgar Hoover appointed acting director of the Bureau of Investigation. Interception of Zinoviev Letter.
- 1925 Communist Party of Great Britain raided by police.
- 1926 International Lenin School opens in Moscow.
- 1927 Arcos headquarters raided by police in London.
- 1928 German Army adopts Enigma cipher machine.
- 1929 American Black Chamber closed by Henry Stimson.
- 1930 Richard Sorge sent to Shanghai.
- 1931 Publication of Herbert Yardley's American Black Chamber.
- 1932 Publication of Frederick Duquesne's biography.
- 1933 Conrad Patzig appointed head of the Abwehr.
- 1934 Decryption of MASK traffic begins at the Government Code and Cypher School.

- 1935 Donald Maclean joins the British Foreign Office.
- 1936 John Cairncross joins the British Foreign Office.
- 1937 Walter Krivitsky defects.
- 1938 Woolwich Arsenal spy ring arrested.
- 1939 John King arrested.
- 1940 Special Operations Executive position created.
- 1941 Kim Philby joins MI6.
- 1942 FBI SIS sends agents to South America.
- 1943 Work on Soviet traffic begins at Arlington Hall.
- 1944 FORTITUDE ensures success of D-Day.
- 1945 Alger Hiss attends Yalta Conference. Defection of Igor Gouzenko in Ottawa.
- 1946 Central Intelligence Group established in United States.
- 1947 U.S. National Security Act passed, creating the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
- 1948 Elizabeth Bentley gives evidence to Congress.
- 1949 Kim Philby posted to Washington, D.C.
- 1950 Klaus Fuchs convicted of atomic espionage.
- 1951 Defections of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean.
- 1952 CIA indoctrinated into VENONA.
- 1953 Ethel and Julius Rosenberg executed.
- 1954 J. Robert Oppenheimer loses his security clearance.
- 1955 Berlin Tunnel becomes operational.
- 1956 First overflight of the Soviet Union by U-2 aircraft.
- 1957 KGB illegal rezident Willie Fisher arrested in New York.
- 1958 Markus Wolf appointed head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung.
- 1959 Piotr Popov arrested.
- 1960 Francis Gary Powers's U-2 shot down.
- 1961 Defections of Michal Goleniewski and Anatoli Golitsyn.
- 1962 Oleg Penkovsky arrested in Moscow.
- 1963 Kim Philby defects from Beirut.
- 1964 Defection of Yuri Nosenko.
- 1965 Eli Cohen arrested in Damascus.
- 1966 Escape of George Blake from Wormwood Scrubs prison.
- 1967 Yuri Andropov appointed chairman of the KGB.
- 1968 Defections of Jozef Frolik and Frantisek August.
- 1969 Morris and Lona Cohen swapped for Gerald Brooke.

- 1970 Philip Agee volunteers to help the KGB in Mexico.
- 1971 Oleg Lyalin defects and Operation FOOT begins.
- 1972 Jim Bennett dismissed from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
- 1973 Gilles Brunet dismissed from the RCMP. Yom Kippur War.
- 1974 Church and Pike Committee begins hearings in Congress.
- 1975 James Angleton dismissed from the CIA.
- 1976 Rescue of Israeli hostages from Entebbe.
- 1977 Arrest of Christopher Boyce and Daulton Lee.
- 1978 William Kampiles arrested.
- 1979 Assassination of Afghan president Hafizmullah Amin in Kabul.
- 1980 David Barnett arrested.
- 1981 William Casey appointed U.S. director of central intelligence (DCI).
- 1982 Argentina seizes the Falkland Islands.
- 1983 Vladimir Vetrov executed in Moscow.
- 1984 Arne Treholt arrested in Oslo.
- 1985 Defection of Vitali Yurchenko. Exfiltration of Oleg Gordievsky.
- 1986 Execution of Adolf Tolkachev.
- 1987 Earl Pitts volunteers to the KGB in New York.
- 1988 Clyde Conrad and Zoltan Szabo arrested.
- 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Berlin Wall falls.
- 1990 GIDEON exfiltrated from Vilnius.
- 1991 Vladimir Kryuchkov leads coup attempt in Moscow.
- 1992 Exfiltration of Vasili Mitrokhin from Riga.
- 1993 Prosecution of Markus Wolf. Al-Qaeda detonates van bomb under the World Trade Center in New York.
- 1994 Aldrich Ames arrested.
- 1995 Declassification of VENONA.
- 1996 Arrest of Harold Nicholson, Earl Pitts, and Robert Lipka.
- 1997 George Tenet appointed DCI.
- 1998 Dr. Peter Lee convicted. India conducts nuclear test. Al-Qaeda attacks U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
- 1999 Publication of the Cox Report and *The Mitrokhin Archive*.
- 2000 Dr. Wen Ho Lee agrees to a plea bargain. Al-Qaeda attacks USS *Cole* in Aden with suicide boat.

- 2001 Robert Hanssen arrested. Al-Qaeda attacks New York and Washington, D.C., with hijacked airliners.
- 2002 U.S. Department of Homeland Security established. Al-Qaeda detonates car bomb in Bali.
- 2003 FBI Special Agent James J. Smith arrested.
- 2004 Porter Goss replaces George Tenet as DCI. Al-Qaeda attacks commuter trains in Madrid.
- 2005 John Negroponte appointed director of national intelligence. Suicide bombers hit London.

Introduction

Unsurprisingly, intelligence organizations prefer to conduct their operations away from the glare of publicity, and in some countries they have gone to considerable lengths to avoid official acknowledgment. For many years this arrangement suited both the professionals, who were responsible for gathering information from clandestine sources, and their governments, which found it expedient to disavow illegalities—and had the means to do so, with intelligence agencies invariably classifying their embarrassments in much the same way that doctors reputedly bury their mistakes.

The sometimes unpalatable truth is that—whatever restrictions and oversight are imposed by a Western liberal democracy (let alone a Third World country)—any security and intelligence apparatus can probably be effective only when it is participating in some illegality. One man's heroic defector is another's despicable traitor; an ingenious technical collection source may also be an appalling breach of another country's sovereignty; a skillfully concealed refuge or safe house might represent a disgraceful abuse of the Vienna Convention governing the conduct of diplomats. The contradictions are many, despite the modern, risk-averse environment that in all other areas has embraced transparency as an essential facet of modern governance.

But how has this state of affairs come about? Why is it that the U.S. Congress was indignant when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confessed publicly to numerous examples of lawbreaking, while the French National Assembly appeared disinterested when Greenpeace's *Rainbow Warrior* was sunk by French agents with the loss of the life of a photographer? How can a British government be toppled, or at least a minister obliged to resign, for the offense of having misled Parliament over his private life, yet a prime minister be able to take the whole country to war—as happened in Suez in 1956 and Iraq in

2002—on a fabricated agenda? Can an administration survive sponsorship of a covert assassination program, as occurred in Spain when a "dirty war" was waged against the ETA Basque separatists? Should a democracy endorse an overt policy of murder, for example, with Mossad exacting retribution successively from Black September, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad?

A modern and efficient security and intelligence structure is now an essential component of any country seeking to survive the threats posed by territorial claims from aggressive neighbors, international terrorism, or home-grown subversion. Failure to collect, collate, and distribute intelligence efficiently gives an opportunity to an adversary, and as the world's history since the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 has demonstrated time after time—in Saigon during the Tet Offensive in 1968, in the Sinai on Yom Kippur 1973, and in New York with the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, for example—a perceived failure to maintain vigilance may result in a surprise attack.

After each intelligence fiasco, panels of experts are convened to recommend improved procedures intended to prevent a repetition, and the suggested precautions make familiar reading, taking in tighter security measures, better language skills, more technical or human resources, greater coordination, easier exchange of information, enhanced vetting arrangements, wider recruitment, extended oversight, and stricter supervision. Commissions of inquiry, inquests, and numerous parliamentary and congressional committees have investigated, among other things, the Pearl Harbor attack, allegations of misconduct by the CIA, weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, massacres during the Mau-Mau campaign, Israeli bombings in Egypt, Royal Canadian Mounted Police abuses in Quebec, the failings of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II, the Stasi files in Germany, BOSS's excesses in South Africa, 9/11, Mossad's bungled attempt to decapitate Hamas in Amman, and even a French probe into the Greenpeace debacle.

Once under the spotlight, few agencies survive the experience intact, and many reputations have suffered as a consequence. James Angleton, Richard Bissell, Richard Helms, Admiral Pierre Lacoste, Pinhas Lavon, Jack Profumo, Sir John Sinclair, and Zvi Zamir have all undergone some degree of public humiliation for perceived shortcomings, yet gov-

ernments rarely thank their covert servants publicly or trumpet their triumphs. Moreover, almost by definition, a really successful coup will be kept under wraps in the hope of mounting a similar operation again. Thus we see from history that few learn the lessons of the past.

Certainly the history of intelligence is rich, and dates back to biblical times when HUMINT (human intelligence) was deployed by Moses to spy out the land of Canaan, and by Joshua who sent agents to Jericho on a mission to "spy secretly." But the advent of formal structures, of the kind that would be recognized today as an intelligence collection agency, probably dates back only to Sir Francis Walsingham, who in 1573 established networks in Europe in support of Queen Elizabeth I. His mail interception program provided the evidence that led to the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, in 1587. One of Walsingham's agents, poet Christopher Marlowe, undertook a mission as a penetration agent to Rheims in 1587 to identify Catholics plotting against Elizabeth, but the dangers inherent in such operations were demonstrated when he died of stab wounds in May 1593.

In more recent times the plight of nations has often depended on espionage, and the perils of war have provided the incentive to develop new methods and technologies to gain an advantage over an adversary. Cable interception proved vital during the Boer War, while trainwatching spy rings during World War I alerted the Allies to German troops concentrating in anticipation of a new offensive. The interwar period was an era of strong ideological pressures, and the Bolsheviks, set on a course of world revolution, exploited transnational sympathies to recruit adherents to their cause. Thus the concept of the "mole" was refined, with the Soviets trawling European universities for suitable candidates to infiltrate their local political establishments, and the counterintelligence authorities planting informants inside the Communist parties to learn more of the threat.

During World War II Moscow came to rely on the underground resistance founded by the party in Germany and nurtured by the Comintern, but the efficient Nazi security apparatus eventually identified and wiped out the entire organization, known as the Rote Kapelle, which was built on a series of interconnected cells, linked often by family and other ties. Compartmentalization—the separation of sources into independent units controlled centrally—was the obvious solution, but such remedies are vulnerable if their communications to and from the central

control are compromised. This was the lesson of VENONA, when the experience accumulated in such hostile environments as Nazi-occupied Europe was translated into practical security measures, or tradecraft, designed to insulate self-contained spy rings from the contamination of external surveillance or infiltration. Of course, whatever the procedures adopted to improve security or to isolate individual members of the orchestra, they will be impotent if an adversary gains access to the messages passing to and from the conductor. The Anglo-American cryptographic exploitation of the VENONA traffic identified hundreds of Soviet sources across the globe and once again demonstrated that however sophisticated the methodology—and the texts of encrypted cables had been given the added protection of supposedly invulnerable one-time pads—human frailty can undermine the most ingenious systems. For much of the Cold War, VENONA provided the West with an insight into the Kremlin's personalities, procedures, and intentions, thereby enabling many of its schemes to be neutralized.

World War II provided a unique intelligence environment for innovation, with some of the brightest intellects drafted into opposing security and espionage organizations. This was the era of significant developments and refinements in the fields of microdot technology, aerial reconnaissance, clandestine photography, signals interception, cryptography, and strategic deception. Both the Axis and the Allies relied heavily on SIGINT (signals intelligence) and double agents, yet each side fell victim to operations almost identical to those they had themselves mounted. While the enemy's wireless traffic was being decoded at Bletchley Park, the German Forschungamt was reading many of the Royal Navy's ciphers. As the Americans exploited the solved Japanese ciphers generated on the PURPLE machine, poor communications security exercised by U.S. Military Police checkpoints in Europe after D-Day enabled the Nazis to recover the daily returns of vehicle and troop counts from each monitored road junction. Just as MI5 and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were congratulating themselves on the scale of their famous double-cross schemes, the Abwehr was taking control of the entire Dutch resistance and adroitly penetrating many of Special Operations Executive's (SOE) circuits in France.

One might imagine that after the publicity given to the exploits of double agents and their contribution to the success of D-Day, it would be hard for a discriminating, well-read case officer ever to be duped again, yet the American experience in Vietnam, Cuba, and China proves there is no fool quite like a gullible, ambitious agent handler who succumbs to the vanity of overlooking the unmistakable signs that he is being taken for a ride by his source. Some wag in the CIA coined the acronym BOHICA, for "bend over, here it comes again," and the term could easily be applied to the repetitive nature of the intelligence cycle, especially in a culture where training is considered a dead-end career path reserved for officers who have no other posting suitable, or simply are awaiting their retirement.

An increasing reliance on technical sources, including reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, remote sensors, and miniaturized gadgetry, left the world's intelligence agencies too dependent on collection platforms that were highly effective against ill-intentioned states but impractical as a means of warning against a new transnational threat based not on political ideology but on religious zealotry. In the era of asymmetric warfare, with small groups of independent extremists who invariably conceal their conversion in much the same way that Comintern recruits had been taught the value of sublimating national loyalties, high-tech electronic wizardry offers no solutions. With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the subsequent spread of international terrorism, the security and intelligence experts have returned to the principle that some of the other experiences acquired during World War II had a contemporary relevance worthy of study. Whether it is aerial reconnaissance by Spitfire or U-2, signals intelligence using the Enigma or cell phones, or electronic intelligence dependent on Zeppelins or satellites, the fundamental principles of collection remain the same, and the best petri dish for laboratory analysis remains the concentrated, concertinaed periods of world war when unprecedented levels of resources and effort are devoted to the mastery of intelligence. Whereas in peacetime, intelligence can be a useful commodity, in war it can provide the means to national survival.

The intelligence trade is like no other, for the professionals have to accept a diminution of the employment rights other government workers might take for granted, endure considerable risks, operate in hostile environments, survive an unforgiving bureaucracy, and avoid political censure from oversight staffs, all in the hope of pulling off the coup that "makes a difference." The rewards, however, are very considerable, and it is only in recent years that the public has gained a glimpse of the scale of intelligence reaching policy makers and the influence that it has had

over them. In times of conflict, when politicians have made inordinate demands on the agencies they may previously have failed to invest in, this is only to be expected. The professionals invariably rise to the challenge, and occasionally they can provide the slight advantage that gives a perceptible edge against an adversary. This does not necessarily mean engaging in dirty tricks, but rather the imaginative application of purely intellectual skills to gain an insight into the enemy's plans. Certainly the whole area of cryptography falls into this category, and the impact of the code breakers on the course of history is well documented, from the disclosure of the Zimmermann telegram in 1917, which helped propel the United States into World War I, to the solving of the complex communications algorithms that gave the National Security Agency (NSA) temporary access to Osama bin Laden's satellite phone conversations in Afghanistan in 1999.

Good intelligence can tip the balance, but it can also prove a terrible handicap. The postwar arms race between East and West was largely a consequence of poor intelligence, with the myths of the bomber and missile gaps born out of poor analysis based on even more unreliable information. It was only after the Soviet collapse and independent scrutiny of Moscow's secret archives that some of the truth emerged. The parlous condition of the Soviet economy had been underappreciated for decades, the true story of the Cuban Missile Crisis was nothing close to the reportage of modern historians, the KGB's failure to cultivate objective analysts had encouraged the Politburo to acquire a wholly distorted view of "the main adversary," and ultimately the much-vaunted Red Army, the feared, ruthlessly efficient instrument of suppression in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, proved incapable of intervening in the Polish capital paralyzed by Solidarity activists or of saving Erich Honecker's despised regime in East Berlin. The wellarmed, air mobile brigades that had swept through Kabul over Christmas 1979 were forced to make a humiliating withdrawal on foot over Friendship Bridge into Uzbekistan in February 1989. The consequences of that particular defeat ultimately were to prove terminal for a totalitarian regime that had ruled the Russian Empire for the previous 62 years. Thus, a ubiquitous and feared intelligence apparatus proved powerless to save the Communist Bloc, with the exception of Cuba and North Korea, from total extinction, while the highly efficient British Security Service, which took on the Provisional Irish Republican Army

(PIRA) in December 1989 and finally defeated it in July 2005 was unable to protect Londoners against hitherto undetected religious zealots, some born and educated in England, who became suicide bombers in the same month that the Irish republicans abandoned what they had termed "the armed struggle."

Terrorism, especially the variety inspired by adherents to a worldwide jihad, represents a unique challenge to any security organization. The threat has metamorphosed from political extremists espousing violence, through the covert state-sponsorship of bombers and hijackers, to the development of a franchise system in which disaffected Muslims, influenced by fundamentalist imams, can gain lethal technical knowledge over the internet and communicate through text messaging and email to coordinate atrocities across the globe-in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and elsewhere. When Syria and Libya were caught red-handed engaged in the support of Palestinian and Irish terrorists, the overt "return-address" resulted in almost universal political and economic sanctions that labeled them as rogue states and part of an "axis of evil." But trade embargoes have no impact on devotees attending the religious schools in Pakistan's tribal areas or the mujahadeen camped in caves dug into Afghanistan's remote mountain ranges. Nor do such measures serve to deter the "new skins," the raw recruits who often have not taken sufficiently overt steps in their gravitation to violence to alert their families, their communities, or even their mosque elders. Such individuals are hard to catch on any radar screen designed to correlate minor criminal activity, overseas travel to a suspect madrasa, or conversion into a jihadist and therefore represent a potent, almost unquantifiable danger and an especially hard target for conventional security techniques usually based on orthodox surveillance, penetration, and international liaison.

Intelligence is now acknowledged as the hidden dimension to international diplomacy and national security. It is the concealed piece of the jigsaw puzzle of global relations that cements relationships, undermines alliances, and topples tyrants, and after many decades of being deliberately overlooked or avoided, it is now regarded as a subject of legitimate study by academics and historians. Anyone seeking to know what considerations lay behind particular political decisions, what compelled certain statesmen to act in the way they did, the unwritten backstage accounts of the newspaper headlines, or the scoops buried

on grounds of national security needs access to the secret files. Why did Archbishop Makarios change his mind and accept Great Britain's demand for sovereign bases in Cyprus on the eve of independence? How was Prime Minister Edward Heath so well informed on the French negotiating positions as he finessed his country into membership of the European Economic Community? Who sabotaged the Jewish refugee ships carrying survivors of the Holocaust to Palestine in the Adriatic? What advantage did President Ronald Reagan have when he confronted Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik? Once the classified archives are opened, these and many other murky corners of history will be exposed to public scrutiny.

Nor are such revelations confined to the whistleblowers. The Russian Federation has authorized the compilation of a massive, six-volume history of Russia's intelligence agencies since the October Revolution. Great Britain reluctantly commissioned Professor Sir Harry Hinsley and a team of Cambridge historians to prepare a magisterial sevenvolume official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War, apparently motivated by a desire to avoid being upstaged by revisionists and historiographers. However, such undertakings are rarely entirely free from controversy, which is probably why so many internal British intelligence histories remain under wraps, and the CIA has not even contemplated recording its history after 1955, the limit of the present, highly classified tome. Two of the most recent attempts to open the secret archives have almost collapsed amid acrimony. The joint Anglo-Polish study of intelligence cooperation between Great Britain and Poland, The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee, complete with a foreword by Tony Blair and Marek Belka, nearly foundered amid threats and recriminations exchanged between the participating academics. Similarly, Sir Lawrence Freedman's long-awaited official history of the 1982 Falklands conflict missed its proposed publishing date, on the 20th anniversary of the liberation of Port Stanley, by three years, with the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office failing to agree on the detail with which the author could refer to previously classified ground operations conducted by a saber squadron of the 22nd Special Air Service regiment on the Argentine mainland.

Some events, if they survive the "weeders," will be discreditable, while others may encourage the revisionists. Whatever the outcome, a much larger, more complex picture will emerge, and among the very

first in the queue to look at what really happened will be the participants themselves, anxious to see how they have fared at the hands of history. Standing in line will be former presidents, prime ministers, and other ministers who for years have complained either that they had been kept in the dark or had only learned recently of crucial maneuverings that had occurred *sub rosa*. Others waiting for the judgment of history will be members of the intelligence community, fascinated to see if their covert contributions have been recognized, if their covers have been blown, or merely if they did indeed "make a difference." For the rest of us, such disclosures give us a better possibility of understanding, and assessing, the current events that are shaping our future.

The Dictionary

- A -

ABSORB. The Central Intelligence Agency code name for a technical operation conducted in the Soviet Union until February 1986 when a search of a container on the Siberia Maru, docked in Nakhodka, revealed a hidden compartment containing remote sensors and other sophisticated equipment designed to detect nuclear warheads. The container was to be routed by rail across the entire country, during which time its advanced electronics would identify and monitor sites where plutonium was stored. The KGB's apparently fortuitous discovery was credited initially by CIA mole hunters to Edward Lee Howard, and later to Aldrich Ames.

ABWEHR. The German military intelligence organization created in 1928 and headed by Erich Gempp until 1933, when he was succeeded by Capt. Konrad Patzig. Decentralized and structured on Germany's military districts, the Abwehr assigned responsibility for intelligence collection in foreign countries to particular commands, with Great Britain and the United States being the targets of the Abwehrstelle in Hamburg, the country's main port and headquarters of the transatlantic Hamburg-Amerika Line, which provided a convenient courier route for clandestine communication to networks in the United States. In January 1935 Wilhelm Canaris replaced Patzig and developed what masqueraded as a military counterespionage organization, as allowed under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, into a global intelligence collection agency, which had been banned.

Before World War II the Abwehr was dependent upon German émigré communities for its foreign intelligence collection and established espionage rings in America and **France**, but it was prohibited

by Adolf Hitler from operating extensively in England where he was anxious to avoid any political or diplomatic embarrassments. Nevertheless, one did occur in 1935 when Dr. Herman Goertz was convicted of photographing Royal Air Force airfields in southern England and imprisoned. In another significant incident, Mrs. Jessie Jordan, a German-born hairdresser in Dundee, was found to have acted as a postbox, receiving and redirecting mail from agents across the world, including Sergeant **Gunther Rumrich** in New York. **MI5**'s **surveillance** of Jordan led to the arrest of Rumrich by the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** and the exposure of the first German espionage network in North America before the war.

During World War II the Abwehr established representatives in most of the world's neutral capitals and was successful in recruiting large numbers of agents to collect information in target countries. It also proved effective in running counterespionage operations in occupied territories, especially France and the **Netherlands**. The Abwehr **penetrated** the enemy's resistance organizations and took control of large parts of the **Special Operations Executive**'s (SOE) networks, manifesting considerable skill in Holland where the *Englandspiel* resulted in the manipulation of virtually all SOE's activities in the region.

Under the enigmatic leadership of Admiral Canaris, the Abwehr became a focus of anti-Nazi plotting, but it was the **defection** of the key personnel in Turkey to the Allies in early 1944 that prompted the absorption of the entire organization into Heinrich Himmler's Reich Security Agency. Following the 20 July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, Canaris and much of the rest of the senior Abwehr leadership were arrested and executed.

In 1972 the British Security Service revealed the extent to which the Abwehr's agent network had come under its control after it had compromised the organization's communications. Both the Abwehr's hand and machine ciphers, code-named ISOS and ISK, respectively, had been solved early in the war, which gave the Allies a formidable advantage in manipulating its activities. The Abwehr was also handicapped by high-level defections of staff in Lisbon, Istanbul, and Ankara and by agents in the United States and **South Africa**.

The Abwehr may also be said to have been disadvantaged by the political views of its personnel, fear of their Sicherheitsdienst rivals,

and the inherently insecure practice of allowing case officers to recruit and run agents for long periods without the discipline of rotating handlers who could exercise independent judgment, routinely conduct rigorous integrity tests, and be confident that their own careers would not end in a posting to the Russian Front in the event that one of their recruits had been "doubled" by the enemy.

ACTIVE MEASURES. A **Soviet** term denoting operations conducted to accomplish specific political goals, the principal one being the misrepresentation of Western policy on particular issues and generally discrediting the status of the "main adversary" in the Third World. The scale of the campaign, and the **KGB**'s involvement in the development and execution of specific items of disinformation, was disclosed by a KGB officer, Anatoli Golitsyn, following his defection in Helsinki in December 1961.

ADEN. This strategic territory at the entrance to the Red Sea was a British colony until November 1967, when a lengthy Egyptianbacked insurgency concluded with independence. During and after World War II, a series of MI5 defense security officers was posted to Aden, but when the disparate **terrorists** combined in 1966 to form the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), the local intelligence structure—represented by MI5's Sandy Stuart and the Secret Intelligence Service's John da Silva-established the Aden Intelligence Centre (AIC), which concentrated the limited resources of the local police Special Branch with the garrison and the governor's administration. Headed by Jack Prendergast, the AIC pooled information, ran double agents, and attempted to penetrate FLOSY, but it was frustrated by a ruthless campaign of assassination that eliminated most of the locally recruited Special Branch officers.

AFGHANISTAN. A remote, mountainous country that, because of its strategic geographic location and proximity to Russia and India, has been of disproportionate interest to the world's intelligence communities since Rudyard Kipling described the "Great Game" and British efforts to subjugate its tribes led to military disaster in January 1842.

The British had occupied Kabul in 1839, but three years later more than 16,000 troops and their camp followers were slaughtered as they tried to march to the fort at Jalalabad. Further conflict followed, but in 1881 all British troops were withdrawn to the Khyber Pass under a treaty that left Afghan foreign policy in British hands thereafter.

Afghanistan's neutrality during World War II made Kabul a center of **German** and **Soviet** espionage and the base of Axis operations against India. The best-known **double agent** case in the region, run by the British and Soviets against the Nazis, was that of DOUBTFUL, who supplied misleading information about military strengths in India and went undetected by the Germans and **Japanese**.

Afghanistan's significance in recent years developed as a result of the proxy war fought in the remoter regions following the Soviet occupation of the country in December 1979. The internal conflict that followed, funded and supported by **Pakistan**'s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), finally led to a Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 and a general collapse of the infrastructure, leaving the country in the hands of tribal warlords and the capital controlled by Taliban fundamentalists until the **United States** invaded in February 2002 and introduced democracy. *See also* AMIN, HAFIZMULLAH; BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW.

AGEE, PHILIP. After his resignation from the Central Intelligence Agency's Latin America Division in 1969, Philip Agee became its implacable foe and, because of his relationship with the KGB and its surrogate, the Cuban Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), can be described as the agency's first defector. Agee had left the CIA after a messy divorce and complaints about his behavior and poor financial records. Probably an incident in which he was reprimanded by his station chief in Mexico City, Win Scott, and the ambassador over his abduction of his children from their home in the United States acted as a catalyst, and in 1970 he volunteered his services to the KGB rezident in Mexico City (who initially turned him down). He then teamed up with the DGI to visit Cuba in May 1971 and research a devastating exposé, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, published in London in January 1975, in which he named 250 of his former colleagues still active in the Agency and many of their sources. Although not named in his book, Agee was blamed for having betrayed Col. Jerzy Pawlowsky, who was convicted of espionage in Poland and sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.

In June 1977, Agee was deported from England and the following year helped found Covert Action Information Bulletin, a publication dedicated to exposing CIA personnel operating abroad under cover and produced with help from two other former CIA employees, Jim Wilcott, a former finance officer, and his wife Elsie, once an Agency secretary. Agee also wrote Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe, naming more than 700 CIA officers, and then worked on Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa, which brought the total number of CIA personnel compromised to about 2,000. Congress was sufficiently alarmed by Agee's continuing vendetta to pass the Intelligence Identities Protection Act in June 1982 to outlaw the disclosure of the names of serving CIA officers. Although this helped dissuade Agee from inflicting further damage, he had revealed enough to force the withdrawal of a large number of officers and reduce the pool of experienced officers who could be sent on missions abroad. In terms of operational effectiveness, Agee had caused the Agency to pay a tremendously high price, including the life of Richard Welch, the chief of station in Athens who was shot dead outside his home by terrorists in December 1975 soon after his name and true role were publicized.

The Agency's apparent impotence in the face of an attack orchestrated by Agee and masterminded behind the scenes by the KGB, as later revealed by Oleg Kalugin and the defector Vasili Mitrokhin, undermined the CIA's authority and its ability to conduct operations away from the hostile scrutiny of the local security apparatus in any particular country. The last epithet any clandestine collection service seeks is "the world's most notorious spy agency," yet that is what the CIA achieved through the attention brought to it by its renegades, and the result was a loss in confidence on the part of potential collaborators who might otherwise have been willing to establish a covert relationship with the CIA.

Agee was never prosecuted by U.S. authorities and won a legal challenge to his right to a U.S. passport. He continues to visit the United States and runs a successful travel business in Cuba.

AGENT OF INFLUENCE. Individuals who act on behalf of the interests of a foreign power without openly declaring a political allegiance or affiliation, thereby increasing their power. Most commonly used as a term to describe covert supporters of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, agents of influence were often in positions of trust and not instantly recognized, through overt party membership as actively engaged in promoting the Communist cause. Until the United States joined World War II, Great Britain had succeeded in recruiting several significant agents of influence in the U.S. media, among them some well-known newspaper columnists and radio commentators such as Walter Winchell and Walter Lippman, who peddled anti-Nazi propaganda supplied for the purpose by British Security Coordination.

AGENT PROVOCATEUR. An agent deployed deliberately to entrap a target by pretending to be sympathetic to that person's cause or purpose. Usually regarded as a tactic of last resort because it has dubious legal status in liberal democracies, it is an instrument favored by totalitarian regimes unconcerned with ethical standards. *See also* PROVOCATION.

ALBANIA. This poverty-stricken corner of the Balkans acquired strategic significance during World War II following the Italian occupation and the Allied decision to support the local partisans led by a charismatic Communist, Enver Hoxha. After the war, an effort was made by the Secret Intelligence Service personnel with a knowledge of the country to destabilize the regime in the hope of detaching it from the Communist Bloc. Émigrés, known as "pixies," were recruited by the SIS and trained in Malta before being infiltrated into the country by boat during Operation VALUABLE between 1948 and 1951. Others, sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency, were parachuted into the country but none survived the experience. Hoxha's extensive security apparatus easily interdicted the hapless participants, many of whom were convicted at a show trial in Tirana in October 1951, and the project was abandoned.

ALGERIA. The savagery of the Algerian anticolonial war for self-government, with atrocities committed by both sides between the start of the uprising in November 1954 and independence from France in July 1962, set a standard for the French intelligence establishment, with the government in Paris disavowing operations conducted by military personnel assigned to its intelligence agency, Ser-

vice de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE). The ruthless campaign conducted by the barbouzes (literally, "the bearded ones") enabled the French to fight an ultimately unsuccessful rearguard action against the guerrillas and leave a legacy of anger at the tactics employed by the French military. Later President Charles de Gaulle found it expedient to deploy the SDECE against his opponents in the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète who believed he had betrayed the French settlers in Algeria after having publicly committed himself to supporting their interests.

In December 1991 the suppression of a democratically elected Islamic administration led to a bloody civil war that went largely unreported because Islamic extremists targeted members of the media and made the country unsafe for journalists and independent correspondents. The conflict was extended by the principal Algerian terrorist group, the Groupement Islamique Armé (GIA), to Paris in an attempt to exert influence over French support for the Algerian government.

ALIAS. Intelligence professionals often adopt an alias to insulate themselves from the consequences of operational failures. Often the choice of alias will follow an established pattern, probably utilizing the person's true initials, so the individual can be easily identified by the organization should the need arise. The use of an alias is different from a confidential pseudonym, which CIA personnel routinely use internally. In July 1963, when MI5 agent Stephen Ward protested at his trial that he had acted for the Security Service, he was disbelieved because he could not identify his case officer, "Mr. Woods of the War Office," and Keith Wagstaffe had taken the precaution of disconnecting his contact telephone number. Similarly, Paul Henderson, a Secret Intelligence Service agent and director of Matrix Churchill reporting on Iraqi industrial installations, was unable to name his handler in 1995, but under pressure the British government reluctantly admitted full knowledge of his activities and the charges of having supplied dual-use machine tools to Baghdad in breach of the arms embargo were dropped.

ALLENDE, SALVADOR. Elected president of Chile by a narrow majority in 1970, Salvador Allende Gossens attempted to transform the country into a socialist economy, but his disastrous measures led to widespread discontent that was supported by a **Central Intelligence Agency** program ordered by President Richard Nixon. The CIA supported a military coup led by Gen. Augusto Pinochet in September 1973, which resulted in the death of Allende in the Presidential Palace.

Later the **director of central intelligence**, Richard Helms was to plead *nolo contendere* on a charge of perjury when he testified to Congress that the CIA had not plotted to bring down the Allende government in Chile. Caught in the dilemma of whether to protect the Agency's secrets or give misleading sworn evidence to an open session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held to approve his appointment as Nixon's ambassador to Tehran, Helms opted for less than the full truth.

AL-QAEDA. Created in Saudi Arabia in 1992 by Osama bin Laden, a Wahabi adherent who opposed the deployment of U.S. forces in his country after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, al-Qaeda ("The Base") was intended to protect Islam's holy places from defilement by foreigners. Bin Laden, previously a supporter of the mujahadeen in Afghanistan, was exiled to Sudan by the Saudi government where he planned a jihad or holy war against the United States. This manifested itself in a series of attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998 and an attempt to sink the USS *Cole* in Aden in October 2000. On 11 September 2001 bin Laden masterminded the coordinated hijacking by 19 terrorists of four U.S. passenger aircraft from Boston, Newark, and Washington, D.C., two of which crashed into World Trade Center in New York and a third into the Pentagon.

In the four years following the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda has been responsible for bomb atrocities in Bali, Madrid, Casablanca, Istanbul, Sharm el-Sheikh, and London and has been linked to other attacks that were thwarted. In February 1992 American-led coalition forces occupied Afghanistan in an effort to remove the Taliban from power in Kabul, eliminate al-Qaeda training camps, and decapitate the organization's headquarters in the Tora Bora mountains. The operation was largely successful, with the capture of numerous detainees who were flown to Cuba for interrogation at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Interference with the organization's communications

and financial support network led bin Laden to adopt a "franchise" strategy, sponsoring disparate terrorist groups across the globe and offering them bomb-making expertise and advice on tactics, but minimal financial aid, leaving the terrorists to raise cash through credit card fraud and other criminal activity.

AMAN. The abbreviation of Agaf ha-Modi'in (Information Wing), Aman is the intelligence branch of the **Israel** Defense Forces and, with an estimated staff of 7,000, is the country's largest intelligence organization. Founded in 1948, it was headed initially by Isser Be'eri, who previously had headed the **Shai.** Born Isser Birentzweig, Be'eri adopted a Hebrew name and established a ruthless reputation, ordering the field court-martial and execution of a suspected spy, Capt. Meir Tobianski, who was later vindicated and posthumously declared innocent of the charges.

Be'eri was arrested in December 1948 and convicted of complicity in the torture and death of an Arab **double agent**. He was replaced by Chaim Herzog, an Ulster-born British intelligence officer who was later to be elected president of Israel, but Herzog's successor, Benyamin Gibli, was forced to resign in 1955 when Aman was implicated in a plot to plant bombs in Egypt.

Although less well known than the **Mossad**, Aman has undertaken many high-risk operations, including the acquisition of a cargo of 200 tons of uranium yellowcake aboard the *Scheersburg A* to supply Israel's covert nuclear program in 1968, and the removal of five missile boats from Cherbourg, France, in 1969 in breach of a ban on the sale of weapons to the Middle East. Aman was also responsible for the successful rescue of 96 Israeli hostages from Entebbe in July 1976 and the seizure and removal of an entire **Soviet**-made P-12 radar station from Egyptian territory in 1969.

The directors of Aman have been Be'eri (1948–49), Herzog (1949–50 and 1959–62), Gibli (1950–55), Yehoshafat Harkabi (1955–59), Meir Amit (1962–63), Aharon Yariv (1964–72), Eliyahu Zeira (1972–74), Shlomo Gazit (1974–78), Yehoshua Saguy (1979–83), Ehud Barak (1983–85), Amnon Lipkin-Shahak (1986–91), Uri Sagie (1991–95), Moshe Ya'alon (1995–98), Amos Malka (1998–2001), Aharon Ze'evi (2001–05), and Amos Yadlin (2005–).

AMERASIA. Articles in this academic journal published in January 1945, apparently drawn from a classified British report, prompted a counterespionage investigation by the Office of Strategic Services security branch that identified a large quantity of documentary material in Amerasia's editorial offices in New York. Eventually the investigation was taken over by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which arrested *Amerasia*'s editor, Philip Jaffe, and charged him with conspiracy to steal government property. Also arrested were his supposed sources, who included a naval intelligence officer, Lt. Andrew Roth, and two State Department officials, Emmanuel Larsen and John Service. Jaffe pleaded guilty and received a fine and a suspended sentence, but charges against his codefendants, although indicted, were dropped when they became aware that they had been the subject of illegal searches and wiretaps. Concerned that the legal principle of "the fruit of the poisoned tree" would compromise any prosecution, the case was abandoned, although many commentators believed influence had been exercised to avoid political embarrassment, allegations that were later pursued by the congressional Tydings Committee. Later study of the VENONA texts revealed that one of Jaffe's contacts, Joseph Bernstein, was an active Soviet illegal codenamed MARQUIS.

AMES, ALDRICH. The son of a Central Intelligence Agency officer, Rick Ames joined the Agency in 1962 as a trainee and, after graduating from George Washington University, was posted to Ankara in 1969, accompanied by his wife. Five years later he returned to the United States and was posted to New York, where he participated in the 1978 defection of Arkadi Shevchenko, a Soviet diplomat attached to the United Nations. In 1981 he was posted to Mexico City, where he developed a relationship with one of his Colombian agents, Rosario Casas, whom he later married.

Upon his return to Langley and a transfer to **counterintelligence** duties, Ames experienced financial difficulties, and in April 1985 he approached a **KGB** officer with the offer to sell classified information for \$50,000. At this initial meeting Ames named several agents who had been detected as **double agents**; Ames later rationalized his betrayal by claiming that no harm had been done, as they were being run by the Soviets anyway. However, at a second meeting, having

received his initial payment, he had named Sergei Motorin, Valeri Martynov, and Boris Yuzhin, thus condemning the first pair to their eventual deaths. All three had been recruited as sources by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in San Francisco and Washington, D.C., and might have been in a position to compromise him. Soon afterward, Ames supplied a list of other CIA assets, including **Dmitri** Polyakov and maybe Oleg Gordievsky. Almost all were arrested, and most were executed. Other assets, such as GT/BACKBEND, GT/GLAZING, GT/TAME, and GT/VEST also appeared to have been compromised, and by the end of the year, five assets run by the Counterintelligence Branch had been lost. By the end of the following year, another nine had been arrested.

In 1989 Ames was transferred to Rome, where he maintained contact with the KGB, helping to compromise a Bulgarian intelligence officer, GT/MOTORBOAT, but his relative inactivity insulated him against the mole hunt then under way at Langley following the losses suffered by the CIA's Soviet/Eastern Europe Division. However, a further investigation concluded in October 1993 that he was the most likely culprit and, after his bank deposits had been scrutinized and linked to Ames's declared meetings with Soviet personnel, he was placed under **surveillance** prior to his arrest in February 1994.

The mole hunt had been delayed by several distractions, including investigations conducted into two other likely candidates and a CIA officer denounced by his secretary for the suspicious acquisition of a gold Rolex. The delay in focusing on Ames had been exacerbated by the certainty he had never known of Adolf Tolkachev (later established to have been betrayed by Edward Lee Howard) and a belief that the culprit was a disgruntled retiree who had made a "single dump" before leaving the Agency. This theory had been supported by the view that if the mole were still in place, the KGB would never have jeopardized him by making so many arrests so obviously, thus pointing to a serious security breach. In addition, inquiries at the FBI revealed that up to 250 FBI employees knew the true identities of Martynov and Motorin.

Ames made a confession in return for a reduced sentence of five years' imprisonment for his wife, and he was imprisoned for life without parole. Some of the analysts who examined the case and studied Ames's interrogations suspected that he had not been solely

responsible for the losses suffered by the American intelligence community during the nine years between 1985 and 1994, and seven years after his arrest, in February 2001, the FBI's **Robert Hanssen** was charged with having engaged in espionage since 1979 and having betrayed some of the same individuals named by Ames. The **damage assessment** conducted by the CIA, with assistance from Ames, concluded that he had passed between 10,000 and 15,000 documents to the KGB but left unresolved whether he had betrayed **Oleg Gordievsky** and Sergei Bokhan. Both had been recalled to Moscow before Ames had made his first delivery to the KGB in April 1985. Bokhan had been suspicious and had taken the opportunity to defect from Athens, whereas Gordievsky had been assured by his handlers that he was in no danger and had returned to Moscow.

AMIN, HAFIZMULLAH. The American-educated president of Afghanistan, Hafizmullah Amin was shot dead during Operation OAK, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, over Christmas 1979, during which the KGB, supported by GRU Spetsnaz troops, had surrounded the Duralamin Palace in Kabul. The assassination had been authorized by Yuri Andropov, one of the four members of the Politburo on 12 December, the others being General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev himself, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov. As the elite 105th Guards Air Assault Division landed in Kabul and Bagram and four motorized rifle divisions poured over the Oxus River, two battalions of paratroops fought their way into the palace complex and took control while the KGB and Spetsnaz teams put Amin and his supporters up against a wall and shot them on 27 December.

The assassination plot, code named AGATE, was first disclosed by the KGB **defector** Vladimir Kuzichkin, himself an experienced Directorate S officer, who revealed that an Azerbaijani **illegal**, Mikhail Talybov, had been infiltrated into the palace as a chef with instructions to poison Amin's food, but the opportunity never arose. After Brezhnev had approved a full-scale invasion, the head of Directorate S, Vadim V. Kirpichenko, flew into Kabul to supervise the operation, together with the head of Department 8, Vladimir Krasovsky, and his deputy, Aleksandr Lazarenko. Unexpectedly, the Alpha and Zenith special forces, which had practiced for weeks at the KGB's training

center at Balashikha, encountered much stronger resistance than had been anticipated and more than a hundred of the elite troops perished in the firefight, among them the leader of the main assault, Col. Grigori Boyarinov. President Amin was replaced by the Kremlin's nominee, Babrak Kamal.

ANDROPOV, YURI. In April 1982 Yuri Andropov became the only chairman of the KGB to be elected secretary-general of the Communist party of the **Soviet Union**. He had established his reputation as a hard-liner during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and was appointed to lead the KGB in April 1967. An uncompromising cold warrior, Andropov had been incapacitated through ill health for more than a year before his death from renal failure in 1984.

ANGLETON, JAMES. The Central Intelligence Agency's chief of counterintelligence until his dismissal in December 1974, James Jesus Angleton's intelligence career had begun with the Office of Strategic Services X-2 branch in England in 1942. After the war, he remained in Italy, where the newly created CIA intervened in the elections on the side of the Christian Democrats to prevent the Communists from seizing power. Originally from Iowa, educated in England, Angleton was a literary scholar, an admirer of Ezra Pound's poetry, and a skillful cultivator of rare and delicate orchids.

Always the consummate counterintelligence professional, Angleton acted as the CIA's liaison with the Israelis until 1954 and was credited with acquiring from the Mossad a copy of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech in which he had denounced Josef Stalin. Following the **defection** of **Anatoli Golitsyn** in December 1961, Angleton became convinced that the West was in danger of succumbing to an ingenious disinformation campaign, and he devised the **CAZAB** series of conferences intended to provide an environment for the exchange of highly classified information with Allied security and intelligence agencies. Angleton's interpretation of the Soviet threat led him to doubt the authenticity of other Soviet intelligence defectors, particularly Yuri Nosenko, who arrived in the United States in February 1964 but was incarcerated in a specially constructed facility at Camp Peary for more than four years.

A former close friend of **Kim Philby**, Angleton exercised a malign influence over the CIA's Soviet operations for 20 years, to the point that every tentative approach made by potential sources to the CIA, including **Oleg Penkovsky**, was rebuffed as a likely **provocation**. At the height of his considerable control, his Counterintelligence Staff employed 300 analysts and case officers, a veritable private fiefdom inside the Agency, tolerated but later regretted by **Director of Central Intelligence** (DCI) Richard Helms. His controversial interpretation of Soviet espionage bordered on the paranoid and included the belief that the **Rote Kapelle** had been a massive disinformation scheme.

Angleton, who allowed Golitsyn to review the Agency's personnel files in an effort to identify **moles**, also expressed reservations about the loyalty of other CIA officers, including Peter Karlow, Paul Garbler, David Murphy, and Dick Kovich, and was instrumental in encouraging the **South Africans** to return a would-be KGB defector, **Yuri Loginov**, to Moscow following his arrest. Angleton also named an Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service officer, **Jim Bennett**, as a likely Soviet spy and set in motion a mole hunt that led the Canadian to be dismissed.

Angleton's evidence to the **Church Committee** during the investigation into alleged misconduct included a defense of misleading Congress to preserve the secrecy of CIA operations, when he had been recorded inadvertently after testifying to the Church Committee in September 1975 that "it is inconceivable that a secret arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government." His notoriety thereafter handicapped his ability to perform and did nothing to improve his reputation for alcohol-fueled paranoia and a devotion to Golitsyn's increasingly discredited theories about KGB-inspired disinformation.

Sacked by DCI William Colby, Angleton cooperated with an author, Edward Jay Epstein, who was sympathetic to his perspective and died in 1987. Before his death Angleton had been investigated himself as a possible mole on the grounds that he had effectively paralyzed the Soviet Bloc Division's operations in Eastern Europe and inflicted untold harm on the CIA. However, the officer assigned the task of conducting the investigation, Edward Clare Petty, never believed the allegation and concluded there was no substance in it.

ANGOLA. An African country of limited strategic significance, Angola achieved independence from Portugal in November 1975 and thereafter became the battleground for a surrogate conflict fought between the United States and Cuba. The Central Intelligence Agency saw the civil war as an opportunity to sap Fidel Castro's commitment to the Marxist guerrillas seeking to seize power. The CIA's covert involvement in Angola acquired worldwide attention following the publication of In Search of Enemies by a disaffected CIA officer, John Stockwell.

ARGENTINA. Always a strategic regional power, Argentina has a history of political instability, coups, and doubtful alliances. During World War II Ramón Castillo's regime was overtly pro-Nazi, and later President Juan Perón gave sanctuary to many former Nazis.

During much of the Cold War, Argentina supported American attempts to isolate Soviet and Cuban efforts to extend their influence in Latin America, but the "dirty war" conducted against the leftist Montoneros urban guerrillas in the 1970s by a series of military juntas isolated the regime from the world community. Nevertheless the Central Intelligence Agency continued to maintain a large station in Buenos Aires, and the Argentine military intelligence service collaborated to provide training facilities in Central America for Nicaraguan Contras.

The catalyst for change and democracy in Argentina was the wellexecuted but ill-fated invasion of the Falkland Islands by Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri's junta in April 1982. Planned in conditions of great secrecy, without the knowledge of the CIA, the long-disputed islands were seized from the British and occupied with a minimum of bloodshed. Britain responded with a naval task force, which assembled at Ascension Island, recovered South Georgia, and then landed on East Falkland to march into the capital, Port Stanley. The beleaguered Argentine garrison surrendered in June 1982 and the largely conscript troops were returned to the mainland. The political consequences of the humiliating defeat included the collapse of the junta, the arrest of General Galtieri, and the election of a civilian government.

ARTAMONOV, NIKOLAI. In 1959, at the age of 31, Nikolai Artamonov defected to Sweden with his Polish girlfriend in a motorboat stolen from the destroyer he commanded. He left behind his wife and son in Gdansk and was **resettled** in the **United States**, where he became a consultant for the **Defense Intelligence Agency**, specializing in the Baltic Fleet.

In 1966 the **KGB** attempted to recruit Artamonov, then living in Washington, D.C., under the **alias** Nicholas Shadrin. When he reported the pitch to the **Federal Bureau of Investigation**, he was run as a **double agent**. Though exceptionally risky, the operation was sustained because his **Soviet** handler, Igor Kochnov, had approached the FBI with an offer to spy and there was a desire to enhance his standing within the *rezidentura* by allowing him to appear to be receiving useful information from Artamonov. However, in December 1975 Artamonov attended an ostensibly routine rendezvous with the KGB in Vienna and was abducted.

Although Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev himself subsequently denied any Soviet knowledge of Artamonov's fate, the defector **Vitali Yurchenko** revealed that he had died accidentally, of an overdose of a sedative, while being driven over the Austrian border to **Czechoslovakia**. Naturally, the FBI and **Central Intelligence Agency** were anxious to protect Kochnov, but litigation brought against the U.S. government by Artamonov's widow Ewa Shadrin forced the admission that Artamonov had been used from the outset as a double agent.

ASCENSION ISLAND. Strategically located in the mid-Atlantic Ocean, Ascension Island is a British dependent territory, governed from St. Helena, which accommodates Wideawake, a large U.S. Air Force base. During the Cold War, it was the location of a GCHQ signals intelligence intercept station at Two Boats, which operated under Cable & Wireless cover. During the 1982 Falklands Conflict, Ascension was the assembly point for the British task force preparing to enforce the exclusion zone and liberate the islands, and it thereafter remained a vital part of the air bridge between Port Stanley and RAF Brize Norton.

ASSASSINATION. Once referred to in **Central Intelligence Agency** parlance as "termination with extreme prejudice" and within the **KGB** as "wet affairs," assassination has been considered an option by many security and intelligence agencies, although direct proof of

state-sponsored murder has been harder to find. Evidence relating to **Soviet** policy on the subject comes from Moscow, which openly acknowledged the existence, until March 1946, of a department known by the Russian acronym Smersh ("Death to spies") that used summary execution as its principal instrument in eliminating counterrevolutionaries. Thereafter testimony from two self-confessed assassins, Nikolai Khokhlov and Bogdan Stashinsky, confirmed the extent to which the Kremlin endorsed murder as a political expedient.

In 1954 Khokhlov defected to the CIA in Germany and revealed that he had been sent on a mission to Frankfurt to shoot the Ukrainian nationalist leader, George Okolovich, with bullets coated in cyanide and fired from an ingenious pistol concealed in a pack of cigarettes. Having been resettled in Switzerland by the CIA, Khokhlov was himself the victim of an attempt on his life, and he was poisoned with a powerful radioactive toxin, thallium, but survived the attack. In 1961, Stashinsky, another KGB defector, revealed that he had been responsible for the deaths of émigrés Lev Rebet and Stephan Bandera, both of whom hitherto had been believed to have died of natural causes. Stashinsky demonstrated a gas gun that released a lethal cloud of prussic acid, killing without leaving any trace. Both murders had been attributed to cardiac arrest, but Stashinsky provided compelling proof of the Kremlin's complicity in the assassinations. He was later sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in Germany and was released in January 1966.

The defection of Oleg Lyalin in 1972 provided the West with an account of the reforms imposed on the KGB's notorious 13th Department following Stashinsky's revelations and further evidence that the KGB's policy toward assassination had not changed. This was borne out in December 1979 when KGB Spetsnaz troops shot Afghan president Hafizmullah Amin in his palace in Kabul.

In contrast, despite numerous allegations, there is no evidence that the CIA has indulged in assassination, although President Dwight D. Eisenhower demanded the murder of the Congolese separatist Patrice Lumumba. On that occasion the CIA station chief in Kigali declined, and Lumumba was later hacked to death in August 1960 by assassins acting on behalf of the Belgian government.

During the Pike and Church Committee congressional hearings in 1973, testimony was given in relation to the deaths of President Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam, Abdel Kassem in Iraq, **Salvador Allende** of **Chile**, and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, but the CIA was exonerated in each case. Indeed, Senator Frank Church deliberated over the issues raised by assassination policies, citing the example of the failure to eliminate Adolf Hitler, and did not rule it out as a possible last resort, and President Gerald Ford did not publicly ban the assassination of foreign leaders until he issued his Executive Order 11905 in February 1976. That prohibition remained in force, confirmed by Jimmy Carter in January 1978 (Executive Order 12036) and by Ronald Reagan in December 1982 (Executive Order 12333), until President George W. Bush authorized the assassination of Saddam Hussein.

AUSTRALIA. Somewhat isolated geographically and politically, Australia made no significant contribution to the international intelligence community until World War II, when Combined Intelligence Far East (CIFE), evacuated from Singapore and Hong Kong, was accommodated in Melbourne and provided bases from which to prosecute hostilities against the Japanese in the Pacific. Australians provided many of the personnel deployed on coast-watching duties and engaged in clandestine operations for the Secret Intelligence Service, through the Inter-Services Liaison Department and Special Operations Executive. In 1942 the North West Mobile Force was raised to provide a stay-behind capability in the Northern Territory in the event of a Japanese invasion of Australia.

Australia did not create an independent security or intelligence apparatus until March 1949, when information derived from VENONA proved the existence of a large espionage network run from the Soviet embassy in Canberra, and the government established the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Leads supplied by VENONA's Canberra traffic assisted ASIO in identifying several Soviet spies, among them Communist activist Walter Clayton and his sources, Sergeant Alfred Hughes and Frances Burnie, journalist Jim Hill, and Dr. Ian Milner and Ric Throssell, both diplomats in the Department of External Affairs.

Upon the **defection** of the NKVD's Canberra *rezident*, **Vladimir Petrov**, in April 1954, a royal commission investigated his evidence of Soviet espionage in Australia and pursued some of those identified

in the VENONA traffic, but following Milner's defection to Prague, none was prosecuted.

Ironically, some of the VENONA messages had been recovered from Soviet embassy wireless traffic intercepted at Darwin, which had established Radio Direction Finding Station 31 at Shoal Bay, on the coast northeast of the city. In 1975, following the devastating Cyclone Tracy the previous December, the antenna field was moved to Berrimah, close to the airport. See also AUSTRALIAN SECRET IN-TELLIGENCE SERVICE.

AUSTRALIAN SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (ASIS).

Created in 1952 as an external intelligence collection agency, ASIS was modeled on the British Secret Intelligence Service and was a covert branch of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, disavowed until its existence was formally acknowledged in 1977. A relatively small organization, ASIS has concentrated on regional targets, especially Indonesia, and has been heavily dependent on the SIS for training and global reporting. Following the public embarrassment over a paramilitary counterterrorism training exercise conducted in November 1982 at the Sheraton Hotel in Melbourne and the appointment of a commission of inquiry, responsibility for mounting such operations reverted to the Department of Defence.

AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

(ASIO). Created in March 1949 under the leadership of Sir Geoffrey Reed to act on counterintelligence information supplied by MI5, ASIO was given statutory authority in November 1979. In 1986 it became the subject of parliamentary oversight.

During the Cold War, ASIO was responsible for exploiting the evidence of **Soviet** espionage contained in the Canberra VENONA traffic, which served to identify members of the rezidentura at the local embassy and a network of agents recruited largely from the Australian Communist party. ASIO also skillfully maneuvered an agent, Dr. Michael Bialoguski, into a position close to the *rezident*, Vladimir **Petrov**. In 1954 Petrov was persuaded to **defect** when recalled to Moscow. Quickly followed by his wife, Evdokia, who was also an experienced intelligence officer, Petrov supplied valuable information about Soviet operations and tactics in Australia and provided a convenient pretext for the issue to be explored by a royal commission, which took the opportunity to exploit VENONA material while attributing it to Petrov.

ASIO scored another significant success in February 1963 with the **expulsion** of a **KGB** officer, Ivan Skripov, who had worked under diplomatic **cover** and had been **cultivated** by a British-born **agent provocateur**, Kay Marshall. Information disclosed by **Vasili Mitrokhin** in 1992 revealed that ASIO had been **penetrated** by a senior analyst who volunteered to sell ASIO's secrets to the Soviets, but he was never caught. Although he was identified long after his retirement, no admissible evidence was ever found to launch a prosecution.

The present ASIO director is Dennis Richardson, who replaced David Sadhleir in October 1999.

AVNI, **ZE'EV**. Born in Germany to Jewish Russian parents, Ze'ev Avni was taken to Switzerland as a child to escape the Nazis, and during World War II he served in the Swiss Army. A friend of his parents recruited him as a courier for a **Soviet** espionage network, and although he was keen to continue after the war, he was not encouraged. In 1948, fluent in Russian and German, Avni traveled to **Israel** to join the new Foreign Ministry in Tel Aviv, which posted him to the embassy in Brussels to negotiate trade agreements. There he was invited by the **Mossad** to act as a **cooptee**, and having been recruited he made renewed contact with the Soviets and supplied them with information from inside the Mossad.

Avni has not been allowed to disclose the extent of his work for the Mossad, but he has acknowledged participation in a **false-flag** operation conducted in West **Germany**, in which he posed as a **Bundesnachrichtendienst** officer to recruit sources inside Egypt's ballistic missile development program. However, his activities were curtailed in April 1956 when, while on a visit to Tel Aviv, he was confronted by Isser Harel and charged with having supplied the **KGB** with Mossad secrets. He was convicted at a secret trial and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment, but was released after seven, in April 1963. He later served in the Israel Defense Forces as a medical aide and published his memoirs in 1999.

BACKSTOP. The process of enhancing **covers** supplied to intelligence personnel. Backstopping can range from provision of a telephone contact number that, when answered, will support the "legend" offered by the agent, to the more sophisticated establishment of front companies, often entire commercial enterprises, known in **Central Intelligence Agency** parlance as "**proprietaries**."

BALTIC STATES. Prior to World War II, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were important centers of espionage conducted against the Soviet Union and the British Secret Intelligence Service maintained stations at Stockholm, Sweden, and Helsinki, Finland, to supervise operations conducted from Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, usually with the cooperation of the local intelligence apparatus. Following the Soviet occupation of all three countries in 1945, the SIS attempted to infiltrate émigrés across the Baltic from Hamburg via a base on Bornholm Island, Denmark, but the scheme failed because of hostile penetration by the Soviets.

BAN-AN-NINH. The elite security and intelligence infrastructure of the Vietcong during the Vietnam War, the Ban-an-ninh had an estimated membership of 25,000 and was responsible for the enforcement of security measures within the Vietcong cadres. Feared because of its ruthless reputation, the Ban-an-ninh maintained a grip on discipline within the support groups upon which the provincial guerrillas depended for food and logistical supplies. Directed from Hanoi, the Ban-an-ninh succeeded in penetrating to the heart of the military and political establishment in Saigon and remains arguably the most effective intelligence apparatus of all time. Dependent on assassination, abduction, reprisals, and terror tactics, the organization was jeopardized only by its own defectors, who were amnestied to participate in the controversial PHOENIX program.

BARANOV, VYECHESLAV. A **GRU** colonel recruited in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 1989 by the **Central Intelligence Agency**, Baranov narrowly avoided a death sentence when he was betrayed by **Aldrich Ames** and instead served long terms of imprisonment at Perm 35, the

notorious **Soviet** labor camp in the Urals. Upon his release he was **resettled** in the **United States**.

BARIUM MEAL. The technique of providing a suspect with a traceable item of information and then watching to monitor its progress in the hope of tracing it to an adversary. The name comes from a medical procedure that allows physicians to follow the passage of mildly radioactive material through the body.

BARNETT, DAVID. Barnett, formerly a Central Intelligence Agency case officer assigned to Indonesia who had spent three years in Jakarta, resigned in 1970 to go into a local business, which subsequently had failed, leaving him with debts of \$100,000. Barnett offered to supply the KGB with information concerning a clandestine operation, code-named HA/BRINK, that had focused on the acquisition of examples of Soviet military hardware sold to the Indonesians, including an SA-2 guidance system, designs for the Whiskey-class submarine, a destroyer, a cruiser, and the Tu-16 Badger twin-engine bomber. He had supplied this information between 1976 and 1977, together with the identities of 30 CIA officers for a total of \$92,000.

In 1979 Barnett was identified as a spy by one of his KGB handlers, Col. Vladimir M. Piguzov, code-named GT/JOGGER, and in April the following year he was spotted meeting KGB officers in Vienna. He was questioned by the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** upon his return to the **United States**. In October 1980 Barnett pleaded guilty to espionage charges, admitting that he had sold CIA secrets to the Soviets. He was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment and was paroled in 1990.

BAYNES, VIRGINIA. A Central Intelligence Agency secretary in Manila, Baynes passed classified material to a former U.S. airman, Joseph G. Brown, who in turn sold them to Philippine government officials. Brown had joined the Air Force in 1966 but left two years later to work as a martial arts instructor for the Department of Tourism in Manila. Brown met Baynes in 1989 when she enrolled in one of his karate classes soon after her arrival in Manila, and their relationship developed to the point where, during the summer of 1990,

she agreed to remove three documents from the CIA station in the U.S. embassy.

When the Federal Bureau of Investigation learned that he had suborned Baynes into supplying him with CIA reports on Iraq and Filipino separatists, he was lured to the United States with the offer of a lucrative contract training CIA personnel. On his arrival at Dulles International Airport in December 1992, he was arrested and indicted on three charges of espionage. Baynes, who had joined the CIA in 1987, was convicted of espionage in May 1992 and sentenced to 41 months' imprisonment.

BAY OF PIGS. The location on **Cuba**'s south coast for an ill-fated invasion by émigrés in April 1960. It was planned and authorized originally by the Eisenhower administration as a dawn landing by 1,200 troops near Trinidad with full air support. After John F. Kennedy was elected president, he and his brother Robert insisted on radical changes to the original proposal, moving the location to the Bahía de Cochinos, a swampy area 80 miles from Trinidad. They also cut the air cover and demanded a night landing in an attempt to distance the United States from complicity. The invasion proved a disaster and Fidel Castro's forces counterattacked with tanks, killing 114 and capturing 1,189, who were held as hostages in appalling conditions until the U.S. government could negotiate their release. Code-named Operation ZAPATA, the invasion was not the subject of any congressional inquiry, although the dismissal of the director of central intelligence, Allen Dulles, conveyed the erroneous impression that the project had not been fully approved by the White House.

BELENKO, VIKTOR. The unexpected defection of a Soviet fighter pilot, Lt. Viktor Belenko, with his Mach-3 Foxbat high-altitude interceptor to Hakodate, Japan, in September 1976 gave the Central Intelligence Agency a technological windfall and compromised all the fighter's advanced avionics, including the Fox Fire radar firecontrol system, the ground-mapping Doppler radar, and the Sirena-3 warning and electronic countermeasure device. Belenko's escape from the Chuguyevka air base in eastern Siberia gave American analysts total, if temporary, access to his plane, thus forcing the Soviet air defense service to adopt new equipment and standards, every detail of which was later compromised by **Adolf Tolkachev**. Belenko was later **resettled** in the **United States** and wrote an account of his escape, *MiG Pilot*.

BELIZE. Formerly British Honduras, this independent Central American country has a disproportionate intelligence significance because of the long-term threat posed by neighboring Guatemala, which does not recognize the government, sends two members to the national assembly representing the province, and ensures it appears on official maps as an integral part of the country. In 1975 Royal Naval Buccaneer ground-attack aircraft were launched from an aircraft carrier to fly along the frontier in a successful attempt to deter an invasion, and since then jungle training for British Special Forces has been conducted close to the frontier and Harrier jump-jets have acted as an effective deterrent to Guatemalan aggression.

BENNETT, LESLIE ("JIM"). The son of a Welsh coal miner, Bennett was a former British intercept operator who served in Malta during World War II and joined GCHQ in 1945. He was posted to Istanbul to run a clandestine intercept station inside the British Consulate-General, a few doors away from Kim Philby's office. After his tour of duty in Turkey, Bennett was transferred as a liaison officer to the Defence Signals Directorate in Melbourne, Australia, where he met his wife, Heather, and in 1954 they emigrated to Canada. He joined the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service, having been rejected by his original intended employer, the Communications Branch of the National Research Council, and spent the next 18 years as an intelligence officer, running the FEATHERBED investigation of moles inside the Canadian government that led to the interrogation of a senior diplomat, Herbert Norman.

Bennett proved a success in the Security Service and ran Ops B, the **counterintelligence** branch responsible for maintaining **surveillance** on suspected **Soviet** spies, but he was identified by the **KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn** as a potential traitor. A lengthy mole hunt code-named GRIDIRON proved inconclusive, so Bennett was interrogated in 1972 and dismissed. After a divorce, he followed his ex-wife and two daughters to Australia and settled first in Perth and then in the Glenelg suburb of Adelaide.

In 1977 the Canadian solicitor-general publicly declared that there was no evidence against Bennett, and when another Mountie, Gilles Brunet, was exposed as having been the KGB's mole, he belatedly received compensation. Later, in January 1986, another RCMP mole, James Morrison, code-named LONG KNIFE, was convicted of having sold Security Service secrets to the KGB between 1955 and 1958. Brunet died in April 1984 before he was discovered, and Bennett succumbed to Alzheimer's disease in October 2000.

BENTLEY, ELIZABETH. Born and educated in the United States, Bentley was a Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) member recruited by the NKVD as a courier and run by an illegal, Jacob Golos, who became her lover. Upon his death in November 1943, Bentley's role as a courier, making regular fortnightly trips to Washington, D.C., to collect information from a well-placed network of spies inside the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, was reduced and she had disagreements with the NKVD rezident, Anatoli Gorsky. Fearing that she might have been compromised by another CPUSA defector, Louis Budenz, Bentley made a tentative approach to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, offering information, and in September 1945 made a lengthy statement in which she implicated dozens of her contacts. Three years later, in July 1948, she gave evidence to a congressional subcommittee about the extent of her involvement in **Soviet** espionage and identified 35 other spies, including Harry Dexter White and the Rosenbergs.

Much of Bentley's information was corroborated by VENONA, although she was never made aware of the source before she died in December 1963. For the latter part of her life, her testimony was branded the ravings of a fantasist, and her 1951 book, Out of Bondage, was condemned as unsubstantiated gossip, although the FBI knew her information to have been entirely accurate.

BERLIN TUNNEL. Constructed in 1955 from the American zone of occupation in Berlin to the site of a cable duct under the Schönefelder Chaussee carrying 28 Soviet telegraphic and 121 military communication channels to Karlshorst, the Berlin tunnel provided the Central Intelligence Agency and Secret Intelligence Service with access to Warsaw Pact planning for Central Europe. The information was recorded on magnetic tape, which was flown daily to London for processing at a dedicated center in Regent's Park staffed by specially recruited Russian linguists. The total take was recorded over three months on 50,000 reels of tape amounting to 368,000 Soviet and 5,000 **East German** conversations. Code-named STOPWATCH/GOLD, the project came to an end in April 1956 when the Soviets pretended to discover the tunnel for the first time. In reality, the plan had been betrayed at an earlier stage by **George Blake**.

BERMUDA. Strategically located off the coast of the Carolinas, at the then limit of the range of Soviet submarine-launched nuclear missiles in the Atlantic, Bermuda is a self-governing British dependent territory which during the Cold War accommodated a SOSUS base at Tudor Hill and a U.S. Naval Air Station at Kindley Field. P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft flown from Bermuda, capable of being armed with nuclear depth charges, extended the American ability to monitor the activities of, and challenge, potentially hostile submarines. Since the end of the Cold War, Bermuda's strategic significance has diminished and the United States has withdrawn its military assets from the island.

BEST, SIGISMUND PAYNE. A British Secret Intelligence Service officer in World War I, Captain Best joined the Z Organisation in The Hague, where he was a well-known member of the British expatriate community in the late 1930s, running a business importing the very popular Humber bicycles. Supposedly assigned the task of collecting information from agents in neighboring Germany, he instead padded his expenses and fabricated intelligence from notional agents. Upon the outbreak of war in September 1939, he was directed by London to identify himself to the local SIS head of station, Maj. Richard Stevens, who worked under semitransparent Passport Control Office (PCO) cover. The objective was for the two organizations to combine their resources and thereby avoid wasteful duplication, but this also eliminated the **compartmentalization** that had insulated the Z Organisation from the hostile **penetration** that the PCO had experienced. Stevens, on the other hand, knew that Best, though well connected in Dutch social circles, being married to the daughter of a general, had a poor reputation and was considered rather too shrewd a businessman. Others took the view that Best was the victim of discrimination, his background being Anglo-Indian.

When Best declared himself to Stevens, he learned that the PCO had been in touch with a group of officers who claimed to be anti-Nazis plotting to overthrow Adolf Hitler. Best later said he was suspicious of the intermediaries, but on 8 November he accompanied Stevens to the German frontier at Venlo to hold a rendezvous with representatives of the opposition. The meeting was a trap, and both Best and Stevens were abducted at gunpoint and taken into German captivity, where they remained for the remainder of the war, each undergoing lengthy interrogation.

Upon their release in 1945 Best and Stevens blamed each other for having disclosed too much detailed information about the SIS, unaware that the real culprit had been an SIS colleague, Dick Ellis. The SIS did not become aware of Ellis's duplicity until 1966, by which time Stevens had died in ignominy and a bankrupt Best had tried to make some money by publishing his memoirs, The Venlo Incident. Their interrogations had been handled with considerable skill by the enemy, who deliberately gave each the impression that the other was cooperating, without revealing the true source of the information.

The loss of two such well-informed SIS officers so early in the war was a considerable blow for the Service and a significant coup for the Sicherheitsdienst, which had masterminded the operation. When he was questioned in 1945, Walter Schellenberg acknowledged his role, as he did later in his memoirs, The Schellenberg Papers, but was unable to identify Ellis as the SIS officer who had caused so much damage.

BETTANEY, MICHAEL. On Easter Sunday 1983, Bettaney, a middleranking MI5 officer attached to the Soviet counterespionage branch. wrote a letter to the KGB rezident in London, Arkadi Gouk, and delivered it to his home, confident that the Watcher Service did not have it under surveillance after midnight. In his note Bettaney supplied sufficient information about the recent expulsion of three KGB officers to impress Gouk that he had access to classified information and suggested an elaborate plan of signals and dead drops for further communication.

An Oxford graduate who had joined MI5 in 1975, Bettaney had served in **Northern Ireland** but had received a final warning regarding his personal behavior after a conviction for being drunk and another for fare-dodging on the train on which he commuted to London from his home in Croydon. After a further criminal conviction, which he failed to declare, Bettaney knew his career would last only until his next routine **positive vetting**, which would be bound to reveal his further offense and lead to his dismissal. Accordingly, he opted to sell information to the Soviets, unaware that Gouk's deputy at the London *rezidentura* was **Oleg Gordievsky**, in whom the *rezident* confided. Naturally Gordievsky concurred with Gouk's judgment that the offer was a rather crude MI5 **provocation** and should be ignored. Thus, when Bettaney made a second approach, offering still further material, he was ignored.

Frustrated at Gouk's attitude, Bettaney decided to make a separate approach to the KGB in Vienna and was planning to fly there when he was arrested in September 1983 and charged with breaches of the **Official Secrets Act**. At his trial in April 1984 Bettaney claimed to have become disenchanted with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Conservative administration. He was convicted and sentenced to 23 years' imprisonment. While in prison, Bettaney converted to Roman Catholicism and considered taking holy orders. He was also suspected of having leaked information about MI5's activities in Northern Ireland to a Republican fellow prisoner. Upon his release, Bettaney moved to Hertfordshire to live with a woman who had been a prison visitor.

authorized to learn the exact time and place of the invasion were known as "bigots" and their names were included in a "bigot list." Because of the dangers inherent in such a major amphibious operation—the largest of its kind ever attempted—security was tight and measures were taken to ensure no news of it leaked to the enemy. Since the end of World War II, the term has been applied to individuals cleared for specific classifications of secret material.

BISMARCK. In May 1942, when the German Kriegsmarine pocket battleship *Bismarck* completed her sea trials in the Baltic, she repre-

sented a potent threat, being the fastest, most heavily armored warship in the world. Escorted by the *Prinz Eugen*, the *Bismarck* slipped into the North Sea unnoticed, although the British naval attaché in Stockholm heard from his Norwegian counterpart that two unidentified enemy warships had been spotted in the Skagerrak. The Admiralty soon found the pair as they headed for the Atlantic, and a force was detached from the Home Fleet's anchorage at Scapa Flow to intercept them. At this first encounter, HMS Hood was sunk, and the Bismarck headed for the open ocean, maintaining radio silence. There followed a debate about the surface raider's intentions, but an indiscreet signal to the Luftwaffe's chief of staff in Italy, whose son was aboard the Bismarck, advised him that the ship was bound for the French port of Brest. Tipped off to this, a British naval group succeeded in finding the elusive Bismarck, slowing her down with an airlaunched torpedo and then finishing her off with gunfire.

- **BLACK BAG.** The term applied to clandestine entries of premises containing information that is likely to be of exceptional importance. The material may range from **cryptographic** data to the membership rolls of target organizations.
- BLACKBIRD. The SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft, used by the United States and introduced in January 1964 as a successor to the U-2, is a two-seater twin jet designed to fly at 85,000 feet at a speed of Mach 3, making it the world's fastest, highest-flying plane. In a record-breaking flight in September 1974, an SR-71 flew from New York to London in under two hours. Less than 30 SR-71s—eight of which were destroyed in accidents—had been built by Lockheed by the time it was withdrawn from operations in March 1990. It could map 100,000 square miles each hour, and the aircraft's extraordinary characteristics, including its innovative design, astonishing speed, and low radar profile made it virtually invulnerable to attack from the ground.
- BLACK CHAMBER. In March 1929 the newly appointed United States secretary of state, Henry Stimson, reportedly remarked that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail" when he closed down the State Department's cryptographic unit. He had been shown Japanese

intercepts and had been shocked to learn how they had been acquired. At that time the Black Chamber consisted of the veteran code breaker Herbert Yardley and a staff of five. Appalled by Stimson's behavior, Yardley published his book, *The American Black Chamber*, in 1931 and revealed that his code breakers had for years read Japanese diplomatic telegrams. The Japanese Foreign Ministry promptly changed its cipher systems.

BLACK OPERATIONS. High-risk covert operations, usually of an unavowable nature, are termed "black operations." The most common circumstances in which such operations are mounted concern the burglary of diplomatic premises. The term implies a degree of illegality that, if discovered, would be difficult to conceal or could result in an incident with political ramifications.

BLACK RADIO. The term given to ostensibly conventional broadcast stations that deliberately misrepresent their status and purpose to deceive listeners. Having acquired an audience by guile, the programming can be manipulated to achieve a particular objective, the best examples being Soldatensender-Calais, Atlantik-sender, and Radio Livorno, which purported to be authentic Axis stations during World War II providing a service to troops in Nazi-occupied countries in Europe. In reality the staff was made up of Britons fluent in German and anti-Nazi defectors and émigrés who provided commentaries intended to undermine morale and sap confidence in Adolf Hitler's regime. Although very little research has been undertaken to determine the effectiveness of black radio, it is believed that it has a greater impact than orthodox propaganda of the type conveyed by Tokyo Rose and William Joyce.

BLACK SEPTEMBER. A Palestinian terrorist group created after the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan in September 1970 and considered an exceptionally ruthless adversary, whose membership was the subject of a lengthy campaign waged by the Mossad following a massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. The then prime minister of Israel, Golda Meir, chaired a secret cabinet subcommittee, known as Committee-X, which in September 1972 authorized the Mossad to pursue and as-

sassinate the terrorists responsible for murdering members of the Olympic team.

Over the months that followed, eight members of the Black September leadership died. In mid-October, Wael Zwaiter was hit by 12 bullets fired at close range in the entrance hall of his apartment building in Rome; in December PLO representative Mahmoud Hamshari was killed in Paris by an ingenious bomb that detonated inside his telephone; in January 1973 Al-Fatah's Hussein Abad al-Chir died in an explosion under his bed in his room at the Olympic Hotel in Nicosia, Cyprus; in April, Dr. Basil Raoud Kubaisi was shot in a Paris street; three days later Kamal Nasser, Mahmoud Yussuf Najjer, and Kamal Adwan were assassinated separately in their three Beirut apartments by 30 commandos who had slipped ashore from six darkened Zodiac inflatables; three days after that raid, Ziad Muchassi was killed by a bomb in his Athens hotel room; and finally, in July 1974, a Mossad team was arrested in Norway after a Moroccan waiter had been shot dead in Lillehammer in front of his pregnant wife.

Until this last, disastrous shooting, when an entirely innocent Arab, Ahmed Bouchiki, was gunned down in a quiet residential street, nobody publicly had linked the killings. But the .22 Beretta used to kill Bouchiki with 14 bullets was linked by ballistics to the weapon that had killed Zwaiter in Paris and Kubaisi in Rome. Although the Norwegian Overaaksingstejeste estimated that at least 11 Israeli agents had participated in the **surveillance** on Bouchiki, which had incorrectly identified him as Ali Hassan Salameh, only seven were arrested. One, Yigal Eyal, who was listed at the **embassy** as a security guard, claimed diplomatic immunity and was expelled; Michael Dorf, the communications expert, was acquitted; and the other five (Zwi Steinberg, Marianne Gladnikoff, Sylvia Raphael, Dan Arbel, and Abraham Geimer) were convicted of murder and imprisoned.

The last chapter in this extraordinary chronology was the death in a massive car bomb in Beirut of Ali Hassan Salameh in January 1979. Sometimes known as "the Red Prince," Salameh had been Black September's chief planner, and he was thought to have masterminded the Munich attack.

BLAKE, GEORGE. Born George Behar in Rotterdam, Blake possessed British nationality through his father, who had become a

naturalized citizen following his war service in World War I. He was educated in Holland and Egypt and joined his mother and sister in London after an escape from the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands. In 1943 Blake anglicized his name by deed poll and the next year was recruited by the Secret Intelligence Service as a conducting officer in the Dutch Section. At the end of the war, Blake remained in the SIS and, having completed a Russian language course, was posted to Seoul where he was interned at the outset of the Korean War. In captivity Blake volunteered to spy for the KGB and did so upon his release until he was finally denounced in 1961. At his trial Blake received a record sentence of 42 years' imprisonment, but in October 1966 he escaped to Moscow with help from a fellow prisoner, Sean Bourke, and a group of British leftwing sympathizers, who publicly acknowledged their role and were subsequently prosecuted and acquitted of having assisted a fugitive. They claimed they had received no support from the KGB, but instead had been financed by film director Tony Richardson.

Following his escape from Wormwood Scrubs in 1966 and his successful exfiltration to East Berlin, Blake took up permanent residence in Moscow, where he now lives in failing health with his second wife. Blake wrote an autobiography, No Abiding City, which was read by a few Western publishers but rejected by all on the grounds that it was too boring, so Blake prepared a second memoir, No Other Choice. Despite the British government's legislation to prevent former intelligence personnel from disclosing details of their professional work, Blake's book was released in England, and it contained names of numerous former SIS colleagues whose identities had never previously been published. Surprisingly, no action was taken to prevent the book's circulation, and in one passage the traitor claims that he was trapped into confessing his duplicity by a skillful interrogator who suggested that he had been coerced into becoming a spy. This version was contradicted by one of those present in the room at the time of his confession, who insists that Blake was spotted by surveillance experts while trying to telephone his Soviet contact in an apparent hope of a rescue.

BLETCHLEY PARK. The estate in Bedfordshire purchased in 1936 by the **Secret Intelligence Service** chief, Adm. Sir Hugh Sinclair, as

a war station for his organization. The first full dress rehearsal took place during the Munich Crisis of 1938 when the SIS and the Government Code and Cypher School established themselves in the mansion and a few huts constructed in the grounds.

In September 1939, following **cryptographic** success with **Abwehr** hand ciphers, the staff at "BP" or "Station X" was increased significantly, and by the end of the war 12,500 mathematicians, linguists, analysts, engineers, couriers, and support personnel were working on **intercepted** enemy communications traffic at the site in three eight-hour shifts.

In 1945 the renamed Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was transferred to Eastcote in Middlesex, leaving only a training unit at Bletchley, which remained in one of the purpose-built offices on the estate until 1988.

BLOCH, FELIX. On 22 June 1989, Bloch, formerly the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Vienna and currently director of regional economic and political affairs in the European Bureau, received an early morning telephone call at his apartment in Washington, D.C., from "Ferdinand Paul" who warned him that "Pierre" was "ill" and that "a contagious disease is suspected." Thereafter Reino Gikman, a suspected Soviet illegal masquerading as a Finnish businessman—who had come under the Central Intelligence Agency's surveillance and called himself "Pierre"—disappeared from Austria, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation concluded that their investigation into a high-level leak from the State Department had been compromised. Gikman's relationship with Bloch had been under the FBI's scrutiny since 28 April 1989, following a tip from the CIA. Soon afterward, in May, he was identified in Paris by the French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire as the person to whom Bloch had twice handed over a briefcase. When Bloch returned to his home in Washington, his calls were monitored, and he had received the somewhat transparent warning from the Soviet embassy within five weeks of the FBI initiating its investigation.

Under interrogation by the FBI the same day that he received the warning call, Bloch explained his visits to Paris and Brussels as opportunities to buy stamps for his collection and to spend time with his girlfriend, Tina Jirousek, a woman he had met through the escort

section of the Vienna telephone directory's yellow pages. When the blonde was interviewed, she revealed a bizarre relationship with Bloch over seven years in which he had paid her an estimated \$70,000 to participate in sado-masochism and bondage rituals on Saturday mornings when he had told his wife he was working at his office.

Bloch subsequently was interrogated at length but made no further admissions, and in December 1990, after 30 years in the Foreign Service, he was fired and denied a pension. The case was to have wide ramifications, not least because it convinced the FBI and the CIA that there had been a high-level leak that had compromised the investigation at a very early stage. Ironically, the senior CIA counterintelligence officer, Brian Kelley, who had initiated and supervised the CIA's surveillance of Gikman, himself became the subject of a secret **mole** hunt. It was only after a KGB **defector**, AE/AVENGE, provided the evidence against **Robert Hanssen** that Kelley was cleared and it became evident that the further leak had occurred in the FBI and not the CIA.

BLOWBACK. A widely used slang term to describe the political fallout following the unintended disclosure, unusually in the media, of an intelligence operation that has political consequences. *See also* SUEZ CRISIS.

BLUNT, ANTHONY. See CAMBRIDGE FIVE.

BOMBER GAP. As a consequence of observations made during the fly-past of Myasischev M-4 aircraft during the 1954 May Day parade in Moscow, the United States overestimated the Soviet bomber strength and predicted 800 of the strategic bombers with the NATO designation Bison would be operational by 1960. Similarly, the production level of Tupolev Tu-16 Badgers was miscalculated at 25 a month. In fact, only 150 of the Bison's bomber variant were built, as U-2 reconnaissance eventually demonstrated. However, the miscalculation led to the "bomber gap" theory that suggested the United States was at a serious disadvantage.

Air attaché reports that the Bisons counted at a subsequent 1955 Red Air Force Day display at Tushino amounted to four times the U.S. strength in B-52s led to concern that was presented during con-

gressional hearings in April 1956. Evidently the Soviets had flown the same aircraft back and forth before the Western observers in a deliberate effort to exaggerate Soviet aircraft numbers, and the ruse succeeded. *See also* COLD WAR.

BOND, JAMES. Created by the pen of Ian Fleming in *Casino Royale* (1953), this fictional character was a member of the British Secret Service who undertook clandestine missions for his chief, known only as "M." The books proved an immediate best-seller, and more than 20 movies since *Dr. No* in 1961 have made the series the most successful of all time, having been seen by an estimated half of the world's population.

The extent to which the fiction was based on fact has been the subject of much debate, and several candidates have been suggested for the basis for Bond—including Fleming himself, who served in the Naval Intelligence Division during World War II and worked closely with the **Secret Intelligence Service**. The parallels between Bond's organization and the real SIS are many, and the author undoubtedly drew on his own experiences, and those of his contacts, for his plots. His closest friend throughout his life was Ivar Bryce, a wartime **British Security Coordination** officer who completed secret missions in South America during World War II, and a **double agent**, Dusko Popov, whom he encountered in the gaming rooms of Estoril, Portugal, in 1941 may have been the inspiration for *Casino Royale*.

Although intelligence professionals are sometimes quick to disown Bond's adventures as unrealistic, his gadgetry is studied with interest by technicians anxious to develop new communications and **surveillance** equipment. *See also* Q.

BOOT. The code name applied to the Secret Intelligence Service operation to remove the radical Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh from power in Iran in 1953 and reverse his policy of nationalizing the country's oil assets, exploited hitherto by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Executed jointly with the Central Intelligence Agency, BOOT initially faltered, but huge demonstrations, financed by the plotters, eventually turned the tide and enabled Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who had earlier fled to Rome, to return to Tehran and install a government acceptable to Great Britain and

the United States. Undertaken with minimal bloodshed, the coup resulted in Mossadegh being placed under house arrest, where he remained until his death in 1967. In 1979 the shah was himself forced to flee Iran.

BORNEO. On the island of Borneo, which was the focus of the jungle war fought against Indonesian insurgents between 1966 and 1968, British Special Forces developed tactics that were to transform military doctrine and provide the foundation for strategies later adopted in fighting Yemeni guerrillas in the Radfan Mountains. The 22nd Special Air Service regiment undertook small-scale, four-man patrols into the rain forest, usually accompanied by a doctor, to win over the indigenous populations by establishing medical clinics. The trust gained, and the intelligence acquired, enabled long-duration missions to be conducted to monitor the border area, ambush enemy infiltrators, and mount deniable raids into Indonesian territory to destroy bases and assembly areas. The principle of winning the "hearts and minds" of the local villages proved the key to a successful campaign that defeated the Communist-inspired guerrillas. See also COUNTERGANGS.

BOSS. The acronym for the **South African** Bureau of State Security. BOSS acquired a reputation as an instrument of political repression, known to have conducted a "dirty war" against the military arm of the African National Congress (ANC) in Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Tanzania. BOSS waged a global campaign against the opponents of apartheid, and some of its operations were disclosed by Gordon Winter in *Inside BOSS* (1981).

BOYCE, CHRISTOPHER. The son of a **Federal Bureau of Investigation** special agent, Boyce worked for TRW in California between July 1974 and December 1976 and had access to highly classified **satellite** manuals. He stole dozens of secret documents, removed from a communications bunker, and handed them to his friend, Daulton Lee, who was a drug addict and acted as an intermediary with the **KGB** in Mexico. It was while Lee was attempting to reestablish contact with the KGB at the **Soviet embassy** in Mexico City in January 1977 that he was arrested by the local police and discovered

to be in possession of classified data. The FBI promptly arrested his accomplice, and Boyce admitted having compromised the Rhyolite and Argus satellite systems. In April 1977 Boyce was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment, but he escaped in January 1980 and remained a fugitive until August the following year. In April 1982 he received a further 20 years for 16 bank robberies that occurred while he had been on the run. In May 1977 Lee was sentenced to life imprisonment, having been convicted on eight counts of espionage.

BRANDON, VIVIAN. In August 1910 Royal Navy lieutenant Vivian Brandon and Royal Marines captain Bernard Trench were arrested by the German police while undertaking a survey of the forts in Heligoland. They had already completed one mission, to Kiel, the previous year, but on this occasion their photography of the fortifications on the island of Wangerooge attracted the attention of the sentries, and they were taken into custody. Their arrest caused "rather a panic" at the War Office. The director of naval intelligence, Admiral Bethell, decreed that the Whitehall line would be complete disavowal: "We had ascertained that the two unfortunately were not military men, not connected in any way with any C.C. work. We knew nothing at all about them." Bethell thereby established a position intended to protect the British government from the embarrassment of association with officially sponsored espionage, and maybe offering the two defendants an opportunity to portray themselves as hapless, harmless tourists. However, the seizure of pictures of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, Borkum, and Wilhelmshaven sealed the fate of the two officers at their trial in Leipzig in December 1910; they were each sentenced to four years of imprisonment. Although they admitted only to having been in contact with a naval intelligence officer named "Reggie" (actually the Naval Intelligence Division's Capt. Cyril Regnart), Brandon and Trench were actually agents of Mansfield Smith-Cumming, code-named respectively BONFIRE and COUNTERSCARP. Brandon and Trench served their sentences in the fortresses of Konigstein in Saxony and Glatz in Silesia, respectively, but were released in an amnesty to celebrate the marriage of the kaiser's daughter to Prince Ernst Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland, and resumed their normal duties upon their return home.

BRITISH SECURITY COORDINATION (BSC). The wartime umbrella organization created in 1940 and located in New York to provide cover in the Western Hemisphere for the Secret Intelligence Service, MI5, Political Warfare Executive, and Special Operations Executive. Located in Rockefeller Center on Fifth Avenue and headed by Canadian businessman William Stephenson, BSC conducted operations within the United States to counter Nazi propaganda and bring pressure on the German-American Bund. It also ran agents against neutral diplomatic missions in Washington, D.C., much to the dismay of the Federal Bureau of Investigation director, J. Edgar Hoover, and maintained security in ports visited by British shipping.

BSC played a significant role in influencing U.S. public opinion prior to Pearl Harbor through the supply of British propaganda to newspapers and radio commentators. This was achieved by the bribery of compliant journalists; the establishment of a news agency that provided low-cost, ostensibly independent reporting, especially to Jewish-owned newspapers; and the acquisition of a shortwave broadcast station to act as a platform for a pro-Allied viewpoint. Other clandestine efforts included the dissemination of bogus public opinion polls and the harassment of businesses trading with **Germany**. BSC's remit terminated in 1945 and it was not replaced.

BRIXMIS. The British Military Mission, created by treaty, allowed American and British occupation forces in Germany to move freely throughout the country for the purpose of observing the 400,000 Soviet troops stationed in the Soviet zone. Although the teams were small, amounting in total to just 32 unarmed officers and men, equipped with cameras but no radios, they roamed at will, limited only by "temporary restricted areas," which had to be announced. By declaring such an area along the frontier with Poland in 1981, the Red Army attempted to exclude the BRIXMIS cameras and thereby inadvertently drew attention to armor and troops assembling in anticipation of an invasion.

BRUSA. The acronym for the security agreement concluded between **Great Britain** and the **United States** in May 1943, which set the terms of the Anglo-American exchange of **cryptographic** techniques

and products, the reciprocal cross-posting of liaison personnel, and the standardization of procedures. BRUSA was enhanced in the postwar era with UKUSA, signed in 1947.

BRUSH CONTACT. Probably the most dangerous moment in the career of any spy is the moment when he or she is engaged in a personal meeting with a case officer. To minimize the risk and keep the contact short, operational personnel are trained to undertake a brush exchange, where an item, perhaps microfilm or money, can be passed between the parties swiftly without any hesitation, mutual acknowledgment, or overt sign of what is happening.

BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW. In February 1980 President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski visited Pakistan's President Muhammad Zia Ul-Haq in Islamabad to restore relations that had become strained over the Carter administration's suspension of aid in April 1979, following the discovery that Pakistan was developing an atomic bomb. Carter had been committed to nuclear nonproliferation, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December had altered the regional geopolitics. During a visit to the Khyber Pass, Brzezinski offered a resumption of economic and military aid, which was to amount to \$3.2 billion, if the Pakistani authorities would allow a few of the two million Afghan refugees camped on their territory access to Chinese and Soviet weapons donated by the Saudis in a *jihad*, a holy war, against the Russian occupation. This event, supported by a presidential national decision directive, marked the beginning of a campaign that would drive the Red Army from Afghanistan, act as a catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, and ultimately embolden Muslim political extremism.

Taken to Canada at the age of three by his father, a Polish diplomat, Brzezinski was always committed to dismantling the Soviet Bloc and had warmed to his lifelong commitment that "there is no supranationalism in the Soviet Union" while preparing his dissertation at McGill University. He saw the crushing of the Prague Spring in August 1968 as "the beginning of the end" and in his thesis, "Inability to Renovate," he expanded on the same theme. As the U.S. national security adviser, Brzezinski saw détente as simply a method of getting Moscow to lower its guard and had masterminded numerous secret presidential findings, the most significant of which was a still-classified **covert action** program aimed at the "delegitimization of the Soviet Union," which involved detaching some of the component states by encouraging nationalism and separatism. As well as channeling money to émigré organizations, this policy also meant developing conduits into the most vulnerable regions to fund dissidents and opposition groups.

BUBBLE. A soundproof environment—typically built of transparent Plexiglas and elevated off the floor—in which sensitive conversations may be conducted without fear of eavesdropping. There are many variations in design. Most premises, such as diplomatic missions, that are known to be the subject of hostile technical **surveillance**, are equipped with such enclosures.

BULGARIA. During the Cold War, with the totalitarian dictator Todor Zhivkov in control of the country since 1956, the Bulgarian Darzhavna Sigurmost (DS) was a feared security apparatus; RUMNO was its military counterpart. The DS, implicated in the assassination of Georgi Markov in September 1978 and an attempt on the life of Vladimir Kostov 10 days earlier in Paris, was dismantled in 1990 and replaced by a National Security Service, now headed by Gen. Atanas Atanasov, and a National Intelligence Service led by Gen. Dimo Gyanov.

BUNDESAMT FÜR VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ (BfV). Created in 1950 in Cologne under the leadership of Dr. Otto John, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution is the principle Federal German security agency responsible for domestic security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. During the Cold War, the BfV was regularly penetrated by the East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA). In August 1985 another senior officer, Hans-Joachim Tiedge, defected to East Germany and compromised many more current operations, prompting the BfV's director, Herbert Hellebroich, to be transferred to the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), but after a month he was replaced by a career diplomat, Hans-Georg Wieck, a former ambassador in Moscow. In June 2000 the BfV's director, Peter Frish, was replaced by Heinz Fromm.

BUNDESNACHRICHTENDIENST (BND). The principal Federal German intelligence agency was established in the Munich suburb of Pullach in April 1956 under the leadership of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, and he ran the organization until his retirement in May 1968. During the Cold War, the BND suffered penetration at the hands of the KGB, and in October 1961 Heinz Felfe, Gehlen's trusted chief of counterintelligence and a former wartime Sicherheitsdienst officer, was convicted of having spied for the previous decade, and another mole, Hans Clemens, was also arrested. At their trial they admitted to having passed films containing more than 15,000 classified documents to their Soviet handlers. In 1998 Dr. Hans-Georg Geiger was replaced as the BND's president by Dr. August Hanning.

BURGESS, GUY. See CAMBRIDGE FIVE.

BURMA. Independent from Great Britain since 1948, Burma was the scene of a bitter guerrilla war against the Japanese, who occupied the entire country in 1941. Force 136 and the Office of Strategic Services armed and trained the fierce northern Karen, Kachen, and Mong tribesmen, who continued to campaign for their autonomy. The military junta that took control of the country in 1988 and renamed it Myanmar has suspended the constitution and its leader, Gen. Khin Nyunt, has also headed the local security organization, the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), since 1984. His appointment followed a terrorist attack, sponsored by North Korea, of a ceremony at the Rangoon Martyrs' Memorial in October 1983 attended by the South Korean cabinet. Thereafter, the junta became heavily dependent on the National Intelligence Bureau and the DDSI.

General Nyunt was deposed in October 2004 in a major purge that removed 2,000 of his subordinates from their posts, and much of the apparatus that had given him so much personal power was dismantled, restoring the role of military intelligence collection to the branches of the armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw.

BURN NOTICE. When a **Central Intelligence Agency** source has proved unreliable, a warning known as a Burn Notice is distributed, alerting personnel with responsibility for the recruitment or running of sources not to have any further contact with that individual.

BURST TRANSMISSION. A method of compressing a signal and transmitting it in a short concentrated burst so as to avoid **interception** by direction-finding equipment. An example of a miniaturized device pioneered by the **Central Intelligence Agency** is the **Discus**.

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CAIRNCROSS, JOHN. See CAMBRIDGE FIVE.

CAMBRIDGE FIVE. Following his graduation from Cambridge University and a visit to Vienna, where he married **Soviet** agent Litzi Friedmann, **Kim Philby** was recruited by an NKVD **illegal**, Otto Deutsch. On his recommendation his friend Guy Burgess agreed to become a spy, and Burgess then approached Anthony Blunt, a don at Trinity College, and Donald Maclean, who had graduated from Trinity Hall in October 1934. Maclean joined the Foreign Office in 1935 and continued to supply information to his Soviet contacts until he was obliged to escape to Moscow in May 1951. Meanwhile Burgess, who graduated from Trinity College in 1935 and the following year joined the BBC as a radio talk show producer, gravitated toward the **Secret Intelligence Service**.

Blunt acted as a "talent spotter" for the group and identified another Trinity College student, John Cairncross, as a potential member. Having excelled in both the Home and Foreign Civil Service examinations, Cairncross joined the Foreign Office in October 1936 and for a time shared an office in the Western Department with Maclean, unaware that he too had become a Soviet spy.

In 1940, having worked as a war correspondent in Spain and France for *The Times*, Philby joined the **Special Operations Executive** to train agents in propaganda techniques, having been suggested by Burgess, who was himself working for SIS's Section D as an expert on broadcasting. In September 1941 Philby was transferred to the SIS, where he worked throughout the war as a **signals intelligence** analyst, studying the enemy's organization in the Iberian Peninsula. At the end of the war, Philby, having established himself as an intelligence professional, in 1946 was posted to the SIS station in Istanbul. Three years later he was sent to Washington, D.C., where he

learned that Maclean had become the focus of an MI5 investigation, based on VENONA texts, into the leakage of classified documents from the British **embassy** in 1944. On his tip, Burgess conveyed a warning to Maclean, by then promoted to head of the Foreign Office's American Department, and both men fled the country in May 1951.

Upon the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean, suspicion fell on Philby, who was interrogated and dismissed from the SIS in November 1951, and then onto Blunt. Blunt had joined the Intelligence Corps on the outbreak of war, and in 1940 had been recruited into MI5 but had gone back to academic life at the end of hostilities. Under suspicion following the **defections** of Burgess and Maclean, he eventually confessed, in return for an offer of **immunity**, in April 1964 to having spied for the Soviets since his recruitment by Burgess in 1935.

Blunt confirmed that he had recruited Cairncross, who had resigned from his post in the Ministry of Supply in 1951 when questioned about his prewar contacts with Burgess. Although on that occasion Cairncross had denied having passed classified information to Burgess from the Foreign Office, he had hemorrhaged secret documents to the Soviets when he was a junior diplomat, and later from the Cabinet Office and from **Bletchley Park**, where he had worked during the war as a linguist. In 1944 he had been assigned to the SIS, and after the war had joined first the Treasury and then the Ministry of Supply.

Although popularly known as the "Cambridge Five," only Burgess and Blunt had been recruited at the university, and not all of them had been aware of the full extent of the spy ring—Cairncross was unaware that either Kim Philby, whom he had encountered briefly in the SIS, or his colleague Maclean was also a Soviet spy.

When the evidence against Philby mounted, he was confronted in January 1963, and in return for immunity from prosecution, he supplied a bogus confession before vanishing from his home in Beirut, only to emerge years later in Moscow. While Philby, Maclean, and briefly, until his death in May 1963, Burgess maintained a miserable existence in Moscow, Blunt continued to live as an academic in London until his public exposure as a traitor in November 1979.

CANADA. Prior to World War II, Canada's embryonic security and intelligence apparatus was limited to operations undertaken by the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to monitor the activities of potential subversives and to infiltrate the Canadian Communist party. Experience acquired from the covert **surveillance** conducted against radicals, usually émigrés, proved helpful when, during the war, the RCMP was called upon to engage in counterespionage against Nazi spies landed by **U-boat**. Two good **double agent** cases were run with guidance from **MI5**, and in 1946, as the RCMP investigated leads originating from the **Soviet defector Igor Gouzenko**, a **Special Branch** was established.

The RCMP Special Branch was renamed the Directorate of Security and Intelligence in 1956, but in 1970, following the Mackenzie Commission Report, was reestablished as the RCMP Security Service. In 1984, following a royal commission conducted three years earlier by Justice David McDonald into allegations of misconduct during the Quebec crisis in 1972, the Security Service was separated from the RCMP and absorbed into a new civilian organization, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. During the McDonald Commission hearings, it had been alleged that during the terrorist campaign conducted by the Front de Libération du Quebec (FLQ) in 1970, the RCMP had intercepted mail without warrant, burned down a barn near Montreal suspected of having been an FLQ meeting place, and burgled offices to trace the FLQ's membership.

During World War II, Canada made a significant contribution to the Allied **interception** and decryption of Axis signals, and in June 1941 the Examination Unit of the National Research Council (NRC) employed the controversial American **cryptographer** Herbert O. Yardley to exploit enemy broadcasts that had been monitored by the Royal Canadian Signals Corps at Rockcliffe Barracks in Ottawa. Under Yardley's supervision, the Examination Unit concentrated on **Japanese** broadcasts. In January 1941 he was replaced by Oliver Strachey, who had broken the **Abwehr**'s hand ciphers at **Bletchley Park**.

After the war the Examination Unit continued in its covert role as a cryptographic organization under the guise of the NRC's Communications Branch. In 1975 it was moved to the Department of National Defence and became the Communications Security Establishment.

As a member of NATO and a party to bilateral agreements with the **United States** and **Great Britain**, Canada has played an active but not entirely reliable role in the West's **signals intelligence** architec-

ture. Prime Minister Lester Pearson's refusal in October 1962 to allow Canadian personnel to assist the American enforcement of the quarantine imposed on Cuba almost led to the loss of a crucial direction-finding contribution from Daniel's Head, the Canadian wireless base in Bermuda, thereby undermining confidence in the Canadian commitment to the UKUSA partnership, which was enhanced by a separate CANUS agreement in September 1950.

During the Cold War, Canada's other significant contribution to the intelligence community was to host two SOSUS terminals, at Massett on Queen Charlotte Island and at Shelburne, Nova Scotia.

CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (CSIS).

Created in 1984 on the recommendation of a lengthy royal commission conducted by Justice David McDonald into allegations of abuses committed during a period of political unrest in Quebec, CSIS has acted as a **Canadian** domestic security apparatus with responsibility for screening employees, conducting investigations, and countering terrorism. The preference for so many émigré extremists to organize in the relatively benign, liberal cosmopolitan environment offered by Toronto and Montreal has led to a significant internal security problem posed by Croatian, Ukrainian, Sikh, and Punjabi extremists who have raised funds and planned atrocities with minimal interference. The sabotage of an Air India jet over the Atlantic with the loss of 329 lives in June 1985 prompted a lengthy but inconclusive CSIS investigation into a Babbar Khalsa cell, illustrating the challenge presented by émigré terrorist groups.

Although widely regarded as a purely domestic agency, CSIS's former director Ward Elcock disclosed to the Security and Intelligence Review committee that the organization had posted security liaison officers at diplomatic posts in nine unnamed countries abroad and has also deployed personnel under "non-official cover." Jim Judd was named as Elcock's successor at CSIS in 2004. See also BENNETT, LESLIE.

CANARIS, WILHELM. A German naval officer who escaped from internment in Chile during World War II, Canaris was appointed chief of the Abwehr in January 1935. He proved an assiduous spymaster, and under his supervision extensive networks were developed in **Great Britain** and the **United States** and representatives were posted under diplomatic **cover** to most of the capitals of Europe. His organization grew very large, adopted the Brandenburger Grenadier regiment as a military adjunct, and trained saboteurs to disrupt industry in the United States. Although personally an anti-Nazi, Canaris employed many zealous Nazis, but some of those closest to him were to be implicated in the 20 July 1944 plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler.

Prior to the invasion of the **Soviet Union** in June 1941, Canaris disclosed details of the plan to his **Polish** mistress, Halina Szymanska, whom he knew to be in touch with Polish, and presumably therefore British, intelligence officers. Canaris was dismissed following the **defection** of Erich Vermehren and was arrested in the aftermath of the 20 July plot. He is believed to have been hanged at Flossenberg concentration camp in February 1945. After his death, rumors abounded about the extent of his contact with the Allies, but no credible evidence has emerged to support assertions that he held a wartime meeting with the British **Secret Intelligence Service** chief Stewart Menzies in Spain. In February 1940 **GRU** defector **Walter Krivitsky** claimed to **MI5** that Canaris has been on the Soviet payroll before the war, but again the allegation is unsubstantiated.

CASEY, WILLIAM. As a young naval lieutenant handicapped by poor eyesight, stagnating in the Office of Naval Procurement dealing with the construction of landing craft during World War II, Casey used his connections with Washington law firms to get an invitation in late September 1943 to join the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), where he was introduced to William Donovan. Casey, then age 29, and Donovan, age 60, were both the sons of Irish immigrants, devout Roman Catholics, and Wall Street lawyers and shared the same first and second given names. Casey joined Donovan's OSS secretariat, a group of other young well-connected lawyers, but within a couple of months he had acquired a posting to London to run David Bruce's secretariat. Soon after the D-Day landings, on D+19, Casey was at Bruce's side as he stepped ashore in France on an inspection tour.

Casey acted as Donovan's eyes and ears, visiting OSS units and writing reports. One such report was the result of a study undertaken by an OSS committee, for which Casey had acted as secretary, into America's postwar intelligence requirements. Casey drafted the doc-

ument and then hand-delivered it to Donovan in Washington for presentation to the president. Later to be dismissed as essentially a plea for OSS's job security, the paper concentrated on the **Soviet Union** and the need to collect, collate, and distribute intelligence—a crucial function of government that had been wholly neglected by the administration prior to Pearl Harbor.

Upon his return to London, enhanced by a growing reputation as a blunt, impatient, and very sharp staff operator with a direct line to Donovan, Casey prompted a new study, running to eight pages and completed on 12 October, on OSS's role in running agents into **Germany**. Donovan then appointed Casey as the new chief of OSS Secret Intelligence in Europe, and by March 1945 Casey's first team, a pair of Belgian **Special Operations Executive** (SOE) agents, was ready to be dropped into Kufstein in the Austrian Tyrol from Dijon in Operation DOCTOR. There followed more than a hundred missions which, according to his own after-action report dated 24 July 1945, divided up as 29 failures, 11 unknown, and 62 successes, with a casualty rate of 5 percent—which compared very favorably to SOE's experiences in France or the attrition suffered by Bomber Command, which was considered a standard benchmark for high-risk operations.

At the end of the war in Europe, Casey intended to go to the Far East, but his plans were dashed when the atomic bomb brought about the Japanese surrender. Casey, already a civilian, returned to the United States and resigned from the OSS in August 1945, thus narrowly avoiding having to share Donovan's humiliation the following month when President Harry S. Truman signed the executive order to close the organization. Casey returned to his law practice in Washington, D.C., and prospered, relying heavily on the many contacts he had developed during the war. Casey's networking brought him plenty of business and ultimately brought him tremendous support behind the scenes as he took over the director of central intelligence's (DCI) desk at Langley on 28 January 1981 as President Ronald Reagan's nominee, having received unanimous approval from Congress. One of his first actions upon his arrival was to place an autographed portrait of Donovan on the wall, leaving no doubt about how he wanted to run the Central Intelligence Agency, which, having had no less than five DCIs in the prior eight years, he believed lacked only strong leadership and a renewed sense of confidence.

During his first two years, Casey called on 23 station chiefs, cramming in 11 during one particularly hectic fortnight. Even in terms of political influence, the contrast with his predecessor, Adm. Stansfield Turner, could hardly have been more marked. Casey not only had instant and continuous access to the Oval Office but was also a member of Reagan's cabinet. Unlike his predecessor, Casey became immensely popular with his troops, beguiling his station chiefs on his frequent whirlwind tours by calling informal staff meetings to introduce himself and whispering in his host's ear, "How am I doing?" The easy Irish charm rarely failed to work its magic.

While Casey came to the DCI's job with an agenda, his first task was to redirect the CIA onto what he considered to be the key strategic targets. On 24 February 1981, within four weeks of taking over, he proposed a new **covert action** program to interdict the flow of weapons from **Cuba** and Nicaragua to the guerrillas in El Salvador. President Reagan approved the new intelligence finding on 9 March and thus set in motion a plan to confront the Soviets around the globe. As far as Central America was concerned, Casey on 6 April produced a national intelligence estimate entitled *Cuban Policy in Latin America*, which acted to explain the new approach to policy makers and assert that the Sandinistas had expanded their ambitions and were now receiving aid from **Bulgaria**, **Czechoslovakia**, Hungary, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and the **Palestine Liberation Organization**.

However, the real catalyst was Casey's visit to Panama in mid-July, when he realized that the Sandinistas had stepped up their subversion in the region. Some 70 Nicaraguan pilots had been dispatched to Bulgaria to undergo conversion courses on various models of MiG fighters, and it was known that Cuba had been equipped with two squadrons of the impressive MiG-23 interceptor. Although banned by Congress from using federal funds to finance the Nicaraguan Contras, Casey found a way of circumventing the restrictions and channeling money to them from funds paid by the **Iranian** government for embargoed weapons. This became known as the **Iran-Contra** scandal, but Casey succumbed to a brain tumor in January 1987 before he could be held to account by Congress.

CASTRO, FIDEL. The charismatic leader of a land reform program in **Cuba**. Castro led his rebels into Havana in January 1959 and swiftly

introduced a Marxist regime, with catastrophic economic consequences. Having originally enjoyed an advantageous relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency while conducting guerrilla operations in the Sierra Madre mountains, Castro soon became a target for assassination, and attempts were made to recruit Mafia hit men to administer botulism and a variety of lethal toxins. None of the plots succeeded, and following the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, his future as the permanent leader of Cuba's revolution was guaranteed. Castro was encouraged by the Soviet Union to export Cuban military expertise to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Bolivia, and Angola.

CAVELL, EDITH. Conventional distaste of the employment of women as agents in wartime and concern about placing them in great personal danger were exploited in October 1915 when a British nurse, Edith Cavell, was sentenced to death by the German occupation forces in Belgium after she had confessed to assisting the escape of Allied soldiers to neutral Holland. Her execution by a firing squad created a worldwide revulsion and was a propaganda triumph for the British.

CAZAB. A highly classified forum in which selected counterintelligence personnel from Canada, Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and Great Britain met periodically to exchange counterintelligence information relating to the KGB and GRU. Created in 1964 by James Angleton, then the Central Intelligence Agency's chief of counterintelligence, the CAZAB conference met periodically in different secure locations sponsored by the participating sponsoring agency. Membership of this exclusive group was governed by strict rules that excluded a candidate with a single blackball. CAZAB's existence was revealed publicly for the first time by Peter Wright in 1986 in SpyCatcher, and when more was revealed by **Stella Rimington** in her memoir *Open Secret*, its name was changed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA). Created in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency was headed by the director of central intelligence (DCI) until 2005, when the title was changed to the director of the CIA to reflect the introduction of the new **director of** national intelligence. The Agency has been divided into three divisions, dealing with operations (once called Deputy Directorate of Plans), analysis (Directorate of Intelligence), and research (Directorate of Science and Technology). Based initially in Washington, D.C., the headquarters moved to Langley, Virginia, in November 1963 and now occupies many buildings both on and off the main campus. At the heart of the CIA is the Clandestine Service, the traditional name of the Directorate of Operations (DO), headed by the deputy director of operations, who supervises the Agency's collection effort. DO personnel are deployed abroad either under official cover—usually diplomatic, consular, or military—or non-official cover as businessmen and other expedients.

The CIA, as a deniable instrument of often undeclared White House policy, has undertaken numerous operations in pursuit of goals set out in classified presidential national decision directives, and until the resignation of President Richard Nixon in 1974, the president's authority to authorize the CIA's intervention on national security grounds went unchallenged. During the administrations of Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy, the CIA was active in supporting non-Communist political parties in election campaigns, undermining hostile foreign countries, and backing friendly governments. Among the operations made public are the success of the Christian Democrats in Italy and coups in Guatemala, Indonesia, and Iran.

Public embarrassment over the **Bay of Pigs** invasion in **Cuba** and, in May 1960, the loss of a **U-2** reconnaissance aircraft served to highlight the potential for political **blowback**, but it was the revelation in 1974 that the CIA had conducted domestic **surveillance** operations in breach of its charter that resulted in the congressional investigations known as the **Pike Committee** and **Church Committee**. During those hearings, the CIA acknowledged a catalog of misconduct, including attempts to assassinate **Fidel Castro**, mind control experiments, domestic surveillance of Vietnam War protestors, mail intercepts, and the incarceration of Yuri Nosenko. These and other "skeletons," including the PHOENIX program in Vietnam and evidence that contradicted earlier testimony given by Richard Helms concerning CIA operations in **Chile**, left the Agency's reputation in tatters, but with the organization essentially still intact. The result was the in-

troduction of comprehensive congressional oversight, which had the effect of relieving the DCI from any soul-searching concerning the legitimacy of dubious instructions from the White House.

To the CIA's continuing credit, to be balanced against the allegations of misdeeds, were the successes: the discovery of offensive missiles deployed in Cuba in October 1961; the recruitment of Oleg Penkovsky, Adolf Tolkachev, and several other Soviet sources who had tipped the Cold War in the West's favor; and the recovery of the Soviet submarine K-129 from the Pacific. The very fact that the Cold War never developed into a shooting conflict, apart from the proxy campaigns fought, with Third World surrogates, in Angola, Laos, Tibet, El Salvador, and Nicaragua reflects credit on the CIA, even if it failed to anticipate the invasion of South Korea, the Hungarian uprising, the suppression of the Prague Spring, the Tet Offensive, the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, 9/11, and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Inevitably the CIA has been a victim of political expediency, with Adm. Stansfield Turner reflecting President Jimmy Carter's appetite for technical sources of intelligence, in preference to enhancing the stable of human assets, thus leaving it to William Casev to restore the lost morale of the Clandestine Service, which had been decimated during his predecessor's tenure as DCI. Then, having won the Cold War, the politicians were anxious to reap the "peace dividend" by dismantling Casey's handiwork, thereby leaving the United States vulnerable to a surprise attack from an unexpected but impressively organized religious adversary. In the wake of the recriminations surrounding the Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 and the very flawed intelligence produced prior to the second Iraq War, the CIA was subordinated by an unnecessary Intelligence Reform Act to one of many collection agencies coordinated by the director of national intelligence. Whether the associated wholesale restructuring improves the effectiveness of a CIA suffering from a risk-averse culture remains to be determined.

CHAMBERS, WHITTAKER. The appearance before the House Un-American Activities Committee of Elizabeth Bentley in 1947 prompted former *Time* journalist Chambers, who had confessed to having acted as a courier for a Soviet spy ring, to give further testimony relating to Harry Dexter White and to name **Alger Hiss** as an agent. Having denied the allegations, Hiss eventually was convicted of perjury.

CHEZ ESPIONAGE. The nickname for La Niçoise, a French restaurant in Washington, D.C., which became the venue for a regular weekly lunch during the 1960s attended by **Central Intelligence Agency** veterans who took the opportunity to discuss their **Soviet** cases.

CHILDS, MORRIS. A senior member of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) in Chicago, Childs and his brother Jack had come to the United States from the Ukraine in 1911, changing their surname from Chilovsky. Both men became prominent in the Communist movement, and Morris's first wife, Roz, was an NKVD agent who was later to appear in the VENONA traffic.

In 1954, as part of an operation code-named TOPLEV by the **Federal Bureau of Investigation**, Morris Childs was approached by a special agent on the street in Chicago and invited to cooperate. Surprisingly, he agreed to do so, and for the next 30 years he, his brother Jack, and his second wife Eva Leib supplied detailed information from the heart of the CPUSA to their handlers. From April 1958 they made annual visits to Moscow to channel **Soviet** funds into the CPUSA, and in total received an estimated \$30 million.

Never in good health, Childs had needed frequent medical care, and his hospital bill for one life-saving medical procedure was paid by the FBI when the CPUSA refused to do so, thereby earning his gratitude and loyalty. Code-named SOLO, the three traveled across the globe meeting other Communist leaders and undertook more than 50 foreign visits, on which they submitted lengthy reports. The operation came to a conclusion in August 1980 with Jack's death.

In their retirement in Miami in 1986, Morris and Eva were obliged to go into hiding in an FBI **safe house** in the suburb of Hallandale. Following Morris's death in June 1991, author John Barron was authorized to write *Operation SOLO*, an account of their collaboration, which was published soon after Eva's death in June 1995. Both men were awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Soviets and the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Ronald Reagan.

CHILE. During the long period of military rule between 1973 and 1990, Chile's principal security and intelligence apparatus was the feared Dirección National de Inteligencia (DINA), which underwent a name change in 1977 after its personnel were implicated in the assassination in Washington, D.C., of the former ambassador, Orlando Letelier. The new Centro National de Información (CNI) was dismantled with the restoration of democracy in 1990 and has been replaced by a domestic National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Dirección de Seguridad Pública e Informaciones (DSPI), which fulfills a coordinating role for the Carabiñeros, the police and antiterrorist squads. See also ALLENDE, SALVADOR.

CHIN, LARRY WU-TAI. In November 1985 Chin, a naturalized American citizen, was arrested after a **defector** code-named PLANES-MAN revealed that the veteran Central Intelligence Agency translator had been supplying CIA secrets to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chin had retired from the CIA in 1981 at age 63, having joined the Agency in 1952, and was believed to have sold information to the PRC for more than a million dollars over a period of 33 years, longer than any other spy known to have worked against the United States. Decorated for his distinguished service, Chin had been so highly valued by the CIA that after his retirement the Agency had tried to persuade him to come back to work full-time.

Born in Beijing, Chin had worked for the U.S. Army's liaison office in southern China in 1943 and then joined the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai as an interpreter. During his early career, he worked as an interrogator in 1952 for the State Department questioning Chinese POWs in Korea and with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) in Okinawa. This had led to a FBIS posting in California and finally to an appointment as a CIA case officer based in Virginia. With access to the CIA's national intelligence estimates on China, he had met his MSS handlers on trips to London, Hong Kong, and Toronto and not only had compromised thousands of classified documents but had also betrayed the sources upon which the CIA had depended for information from inside the PRC. The sheer volume of the material he sent to Beijing required the MSS to take two months to translate and process it.

Chin, who claimed that his additional income was derived from a successful blackjack gambling method, was found to have maintained meticulous records and was challenged about his travel to China, in particular being questioned about a specific hotel room in which he had stayed, that was known to have been under the control of the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Confronted with what appeared to be incontrovertible evidence against him, Chin offered to act as a **double agent** and was then invited to describe the extent of his contacts with the MSS. For just over an hour Chin elaborated on his espionage, mentioning that he had supplied the Chinese with sensitive CIA material relating to Henry Kissinger's historic visit to Beijing in preparation for President Richard Nixon's momentous change in U.S. foreign policy on China. After Chin completed his exposition, he was arrested, and his confession was the basis of his prosecution.

At his trial on 17 counts of espionage, the prosecution intended to show, with the aid of color charts, that Chin had influenced almost every facet of Sino-American relations over several decades. It was never established precisely when he was recruited by the PRC or the full extent of his substantial real estate investments. Certainly he had met his Chinese contacts in Toronto, Hong Kong, and London and had most recently kept a rendezvous with them in the Far East in March 1985.

Rather than face a long prison sentence after he was convicted by a federal jury in February 1986 of espionage, conspiracy, and tax evasion, Chin suffocated himself in his cell in the Prince William County jail with a plastic garbage bag. His widow, suspicious as to why Chin had access to the shoelaces he used to secure the bag around his head, later claimed in a book printed in Chinese and published privately that he may not have taken his own life. However, those who knew him well were sure that he anticipated two life terms, but was most frightened of losing all his rental properties, and killed himself before being sentenced to forfeit his assets, thus preventing the Internal Revenue Service from taking any action that would impoverish his family.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (PRC). China's principal foreign intelligence agency is the Ministry of State Security (MSS), an organization shrouded in mystery until the **defection** of **Yu Zhensan** in November 1986. Since his debriefing, much more has become

known about the MSS, its concentration on technology transfer, and its exploitation of ethnic Chinese across the world. It seems that the MSS's operations, which are organized very unconventionally, tend to be dependent on recruits of Chinese ancestry and rely on a concept of obligation, rather than any financial or ideological motivation. Instead of running operations from diplomatic premises like most of its counterparts, the PRC tends to manage its activities centrally, from Beijing, and makes extensive use of ethnic expatriate Chinese communities.

Uniquely, the MSS takes full advantage of a Chinese cultural tradition known as *guanxi*, which is an effective social relationship built on personal favors, gifts, undertakings, and obligations. Guanxi is really a network of social contacts built on interpersonal relations that have been cultivated over long periods, and the patrons dispensing favors develop what could be described as a capital that can be called upon later. Thus in the Chinese system someone might readily go to considerable effort on behalf of an individual he or she has never met. purely on the basis that an intermediary has made a demand on that accumulated capital. In China itself guanxi is an accepted route to circumvent the stifling bureaucracy to achieve a specific objective. In an espionage context, guanxi can be the key to access.

This distinctive methodology has the advantage of isolating diplomatic personnel from espionage, but it does make its agents very vulnerable to arrest and interrogation. However, there have been rare exceptions that may have served to fashion the MSS's unusual tradecraft. In December 1987 Hou Desheng, the PRC military attaché in Washington, D.C., and Zang Weichu, a consular official based in Chicago, were arrested in a Federal Bureau of Investigation sting as one of its informants, ostensibly with access to National Security Agency documents, handed them classified material in a Chinese restaurant. Both diplomats were expelled, the first to be declared persona non grata since formal relations had been reestablished in 1979. The case illustrated the PRC's interest in the NSA and appeared to confirm that, to some extent, the Chinese conformed to the orthodox **Soviet** and Western style of espionage, with "legals" operating under diplomatic cover to recruit potential agents. However, as the FBI was to discover, the example of Hou was more of an exception than the rule in Chinese intelligence collection.

The MSS concentrates on technology transfer, with a distinct focus on nuclear knowledge and illicit acquisition of military equipment, rather than the collection of political information. In addition, the MSS appears to exercise total control over all aspects of the operations conducted by its agents, right down to the detail of companies operated as cover firms. A hallmark of MSS operations is their unorthodox construction, their highly ambitious objectives, the preference for personal meetings instead of using more routine tradecraft, the absence of financial motives, and the participation of Chinese émigrés, often working under entirely authentic business covers, such as restaurants, normally associated with Chinese expatriate communities. While such backgrounds might not, at first glance, give much opportunity for access, this is merely a function of generation, and the real concern is that the next generation of the Chinese diaspora, with the advantage of college education, is much more likely to find government jobs and employment in fields of great interest to the MSS. Add to this group the very large number of students from the PRC who have chosen not to return home at the conclusion of their studies, and a picture emerges of a very large pool of potential talent available for possible cultivation and maybe recruitment.

In the nuclear field, the evidence of Chinese espionage is overwhelming, although little effort was made by the Clinton administration to limit or monitor scientific exchanges with physicists from the PRC. An investigation conducted by the General Accounting Office in 1988 estimated that over the previous two years as many as a hundred PRC scientists had been welcomed into U.S. weapons laboratories, and that information leaked from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory outside San Francisco had contributed to the successful Chinese test of a neutron bomb in 1988.

In December 1993 a restaurateur, Yen Men Kao, was arrested at his home in Charlotte, North Carolina, and charged with conspiring to procure and export embargoed military hardware, including the U.S. Navy's Mk 48 advanced capability torpedo, General Electric jet engines for the F/A-18 Hornet fighter, and the fire-control radar for the F-16 Falcon. The investigation into Kao lasted six years, and his organization succeeded in passing oscillators used in satellites to his PRC handlers, although this matériel had been sold for \$24,000 by an FBI informant. Kao was never prosecuted, apparently to avoid up-

setting Beijing at a sensitive period in Sino-American relations, but instead was deported to Hong Kong, leaving behind his wife, who had become a naturalized U.S. citizen, and their two children. According to the FBI, Kao had been paid more than \$2 million by PRC agents for the illicit procurement of embargoed technology, but this money had actually been used to feed his gambling addiction. A citizen of Hong Kong, Kao had first visited the United States in 1971, claiming that he had a small import business there.

The FBI was tipped off to Kao's espionage in 1987 by an Army veteran and private investigator in Charlotte, Ron Blais, who was approached by Kao to help him with his procurement projects as his grasp of English was poor. Blais was promised \$100,000 for an example of the Mark 48 torpedo, and during a meeting in Beijing was offered a further \$4 million for the F/A-18 engines. During the investigation into Kao, attention focused on Bin Wu, ostensibly a philosophy instructor from Nanjing who received a visa to study in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1990 but subsequently dropped from sight, only to emerge two years later as the proprietor of the Pacific Basin Import-Export Company of Virginia Beach. His partner in the business was Li Jing Ping, a former PRC official in the Ministry of Finance who also ran Comtex International in the same town. Also linked to Comtex was Zhang Pin Zhe, a former PRC diplomat. In March 1992 the trio used their firms to buy military technology, such as image intensifiers from Varo, Inc., and export them to a purchaser in Hong Kong. These transactions breached the export ban on sensitive military equipment and after a surveillance operation conducted by U.S. Customs, all three men were arrested in October 1992. They were convicted of money-laundering offenses in June the following year, and Wu received 10 years' imprisonment.

Prior to the mid-1980s, the overt characteristic of Chinese espionage had been the relatively low-echelon effort made in the illicit procurement of banned matériel, a process known in the jargon as technology transfer, but in reality there had been an incident in the late 1970s that had gone unreported. The design of the W.70 nuclear warhead, used on the Lance missile, had been stolen from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the FBI had identified an Asian-American suspect who was believed to have passed the data to the PRC, which had used it to develop a neutron bomb, subsequently

tested successfully in 1988. On that occasion no charges had been brought, through lack of evidence, and he was allowed to resign in 1981, but later he was monitored making several trips to the PRC, although again no action could be taken against him.

The news in April 1995 that the most recent series of Chinese nuclear tests, which had commenced in 1992, had benefited from American designs of advanced thermonuclear warheads served to reopen the 1981 investigation. Whereas the Soviets and Americans had conducted thousands of tests to achieve their respective levels of sophistication, the Chinese had been monitored conducting only 45 such experiments since 1964, and their efforts had been handicapped by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, which had removed scientists from their laboratories and sent them to work in the fields. However, according to a report written by two senior scientists, Larry Booth and Bobby Henson, the Chinese must have had access to the blueprints of the W.88, a miniaturized warhead created for the submarine-launched Trident D-5 missile system which was the most advanced in the U.S. arsenal. But how had the Chinese acquired this highly secret information? A research group code-named KINDRED SPIRIT was empaneled to review the evidence, and it came close to reaching a consensus that the Chinese must have had foreign help when the CIA revealed that in 1995 a walk-in had produced a Chinese document dated 1988 that not only contained a comparative analysis of seven American nuclear weapons but also contained the most secret details of the W.88. When the authenticity of the document was verified, it amounted to convincing proof that the Chinese had penetrated the U.S. weapons development program, and an intensive investigation followed. The consequence of the leak was that the Chinese had gained a 10-year leap in research and would be able to deploy the warhead on the DF-31, a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) scheduled to enter service with the Peoples' Liberation Army in 2002.

In 1996 a further study of Chinese nuclear espionage concluded that the compromised warhead technology included the W.87 (used on the Peacekeeper ICBM), W.78 (Minuteman III), W.74 (Trident C-4), W.62 (Minuteman III), and the W.56 (Minuteman II), as well as high-performance supercomputers used to conduct simulated tests. The only successful espionage prosecution concerning the loss of nu-

clear secrets to China was that of Dr. Peter Lee, which was linked to another, more notorious investigation, that of Dr. Wen Ho Lee.

Combined with the Cox Report, which documented the Clinton administration's unhealthy courtship of Beijing at the expense of America's national security, the Lee case revealed the vulnerability of the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons facilities and proved beyond a doubt that the Chinese had achieved significant penetration at minimal cost. It also provided an opportunity for the release of some uncomfortable statistics which hitherto had been hard to come by, the most recent published figure being a total, from 1978, of 25,000 official PRC delegations visiting the United States in a single year. Quite apart from the escalating numbers of official, overseas visitors to the country's most important sites, it also revealed that 25 percent of the nuclear weapons development program's employees from foreign countries came from Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, and other places on the DOE's list of sensitive countries. As for sending vulnerable personnel overseas, technicians from the U.S.'s most secret weapons laboratories routinely traveled abroad to attend academic seminars in some very high-risk destinations.

Indeed, security and counterintelligence appeared to be such a low priority that even the most fundamental measures to ensure the laboratories' physical integrity had been overlooked. Wen Ho Lee had often slipped into the secure area at Los Alamos National Laboratory, even when he had lost his clearance, simply by "slipstreaming" through barriers with colleagues. Incredibly, no logs had been maintained on who had gained access to the security vaults or had removed the nation's most precious secrets. Almost no attention had been paid to recommendations of improvements to security procedures, and consequently the blueprints of at least seven American nuclear weapons had been received in Beijing.

As the FBI learned, the MSS regularly used the tactic of sponsoring visits from ethnic Chinese to their homeland, and sometimes even to the villages of their families, and then asking them to attend, and speak at, scientific symposia where classified issues would be raised. Having been softened up with reference to their ancestors and appeals to their ethnic loyalty, the target would then be pitched, and none too subtly. Numerous identical reports reached the security authorities of flattering behavior, followed by an unmistakable plea to help China's research. Among those who acknowledged having succumbed inadvertently into the transparent strategy was George Keyworth, President Ronald Reagan's chief scientific adviser, who had been tempted unwisely to expound on implosion principles as applied to the neutron bomb. In short, the Chinese pitched everyone indiscriminately, regardless of stature, and the only suspicion really attached to those scientists who either failed to report the approaches or later denied they had taken place. *See also* CHIN, LARRY WUTAI; LEUNG, KATRINA.

CHINA, REPUBLIC OF. The proximity of Taiwan to its principal adversary, the People's Republic of China, has provided the National Security Bureau (NSB) with a large target since it was established in March 1955. Staffed by veterans of the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Chinese NSB had plenty of experience in combating Mao's Communists and collaborated closely with the Central Intelligence Agency station in Taiwan. Together, the CIA and NSB managed an overflight program of U-2 aircraft to monitor missile and atomic weapon tests, and a balloon project designed to drop propaganda leaflets across the Taiwan Strait.

CHURCH COMMITTEE. In 1973 Senator Frank Church, a Democrat from Idaho, chaired a Senate committee that investigated allegations of misconduct by the **Central Intelligence Agency** based upon a document—the so-called **family jewels**—provided by the **director of central intelligence**, William Colby, which catalogued various abuses. Church described the CIA as a "rogue elephant," an oftquoted remark which he later regretted and withdrew.

CHURCHILL, WINSTON. Probably more than any other politician of his era, Winston Churchill understood how to exploit, and benefit from, secret intelligence. His experience as a London *Times* correspondent in **South Africa** made him aware of the importance of timely and accurate intelligence, and his appointment as home secretary in 1910 gave him his first access to the classified reports drawn up by **MI5**. As first lord of the admiralty Churchill saw at first hand the impact of the **cryptographic** breakthroughs achieved by the code breakers of Room 40, who were his ministerial responsibility. The

Admiralty's success in reading many of the enemy's communications, and the Royal Navy's development of **intercept** and direction-finding techniques, severely handicapped the kaiser's fleet and allowed his Zeppelin airships to be intercepted by British fighters. Perhaps more significantly, the coup of supplying the Americans with the key to the **German** diplomatic cipher so they could read the content of the **Zimmermann telegram** for themselves proved to be a turning point in the war and led to the entry of the **United States** into the conflict in 1917.

As well as appreciating the need for secret intelligence and the importance of protecting its often fragile sources from compromise, Churchill enjoyed the company of those who worked in the shadows and understood the advantage their inside knowledge gave him. During the interwar period, he came to rely heavily on a **Secret Intelligence Service** officer, Desmond Morton, and Churchill's campaign to rearm Great Britain stemmed largely from his access to SIS assessments of the growing military threat from the Nazis.

Although many in the British intelligence community were deeply suspicious of Churchill and his motives, he was quick to grasp the potential significance of the early research undertaken on the **Enigma machine**, and when he was elected prime minister, Churchill insisted on a daily personal briefing from "C," **Stewart Menzies**, so he could read a selection of the latest intercepts before they had been processed and sanitized.

Churchill would refer to the cryptanalysts at **Bletchley Park** as "the geese who didn't cackle" and responded instantly when a group of senior staff complained to him about a lack of resources. Their ULTRA product gave the Allies a decisive advantage in sweeping the Afrika Korps from North Africa, in the Battle of the Atlantic against the **U-boats**, and in the elimination of German surface raiders. While ULTRA may not have won World War II, it certainly shortened the conflict by as much as two years, and Churchill's determination to protect its integrity, while extracting the maximum from it, was critical.

CICERO. The code name given by the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) to Elyesa Bazna, who photographed documents taken from the safe of the British ambassador in Ankara in 1943. Employed as a valet, Bazna evaded detection and resigned from his post before he was identified

as a **German** spy. After the war, he was imprisoned in Turkey for passing the counterfeit Bank of England notes with which he had been paid. He was later to write his memoirs, *I Was Cicero*, as did his SD handler, Ludwig Moyszisch (*Operation Cicero*). Bazna died in 1971. His role was played by James Mason in the movie *Five Fingers*.

- **CLANDESTINE SERVICE.** When the **Central Intelligence Agency** was created in 1947, the organization's operations branch was designated the Directorate of Plans, and in 1975 was renamed the **Directorate of Operations**, but internally it has always been known as the Clandestine Service.
- **COAT-TRAILING.** The procedure of deploying an agent, known as a "dangle," close to an adversary in the hope that the target will make a recruitment pitch and thereby develop into a double agent.
- COHEN, ELIAHU. Born in Alexandria, Egypt, to orthodox Jewish parents, Eli Cohen attended Cairo University. He was arrested in 1952 when a series of bombs detonated outside American businesses in Alexandria. This episode became a political scandal in Israel when it emerged that the defense minister, Pinhas Lavon, had personally authorized the attacks to undermine American confidence in Egypt. Cohen was expelled from Egypt in 1956 and, after undergoing training by the Mossad in Tel Aviv, was sent as an illegal to Syria, where he established himself in Damascus as a wealthy Arab businessman from Argentina, while reporting by radio on military targets and troop deployments on the Golan Heights. His transmitter was eventually traced in January 1965 and he was arrested while on the air. Cohen was hanged in public in May the same year.
- COLD WAR. The term applied to the period of superpower confrontation between the end of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992. The conflict was marked by small regional wars conducted by proxy, primarily in Africa and Southeast Asia, and a continuous engagement of Eastern Bloc intelligence agencies against their NATO adversaries. The opening salvo of the Cold War in the intelligence field is often considered to have been the **defection** in September 1945 of cipher clerk **Igor Gouzenko**, who revealed the exis-

tence of a wide-scale Soviet espionage offensive. Thereafter, the West's objective was to monitor the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces so as to predict accurately the scale of any threat. Clandestine operations, including the construction of the Berlin tunnel and the development of an aerial reconnaissance capability—first dependent on aircraft, then on sophisticated satellites—were intended to give sufficient warning of any planned aggression so suitable countermeasures could be taken. Whereas United States policy, as articulated by President Harry Truman, had been to contain Soviet hegemony, President Ronald Reagan decided to confront it and authorized massive military aid to Afghan resistance organizations that eventually succeeded in forcing the Red Army into a humiliating withdrawal in February 1989. The Cold War effectively came to an end in November 1989 with the election of a non-Communist government in **Poland** and the destruction of the Berlin Wall.

- COLOMBIA. Long considered a center of narcoterrorism and a source of regional instability, Colombia has been the focus of American and British intelligence-led efforts to interdict the processing and transshipment of cocaine and to disrupt associated money-laundering.
- COMBINED BUREAU FAR EAST (CBFE). Prior to World War II, British **cryptographic** operations in Asia were concentrated at Hong Kong and Singapore. Operating under the auspices of the Admiralty, CBFE provided intercept facilities and distributed processed signals intelligence to authorized recipients. Upon the evacuation of Hong Kong and Singapore in 1941, CBFE was reestablished at Melbourne, Australia
- COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTRE IRAQ (CICI). Before and during World War II, security intelligence operations in Iraq were conducted by this British-staffed unit based at the Royal Air Force's regional headquarters at Habbaniyah. Control of the country was exercised through the threat of air raids and the use of gas against recalcitrant tribes
- **COMBINED INTELLIGENCE FAR EAST (CIFE). Great Britain's** postwar intelligence organization in Singapore was designated CIFE

and encompassed the regional network of **Secret Intelligence Service** stations.

COMINTERN. The Third Communist International—so called because it followed the "first," Karl Marx's International Working Men's Association, founded in London in 1864, which had lasted only nine years, and the "second," created in Paris in 1889, the Labour International, which had been condemned by Vladimir Lenin as having sold out to the social democrats—came into being in March 1919 to promote the Bolshevik objective of world revolution. Initially headed by Grigori Zinoviev until he was replaced in 1926 by Nikolai Bukharin, the Comintern was run from July 1935 by a Bulgarian Communist, Georgi Dmitrov. Its dissolution was announced in 1943.

Although intended to support, coordinate, and direct individual national Communist movements, the Comintern actively engaged in espionage and its International Directorate communicated in code to trusted members of the organization across the globe. These agents, usually vetted by the leadership in their own countries, often had attended the Lenin School in Moscow for up to two years, taking overt classes in political ideology while also attending parallel courses in **tradecraft** and clandestine communications. Created in October 1926, with up to a thousand students in residence, the International Lenin University acted as an espionage finishing academy for candidates drawn from mainly English-speaking countries (chiefly **Great Britain**, Ireland, **India**, **Canada**, and the **United States**), mixed with smaller groups from **Spain**, **France**, **Germany**, and **China**. All returned to their countries of origin as indoctrinated organizers and propagandists, if not fully-fledged professional spies.

The Comintern's Otdel Mezhdunarodnykh Svyazey (OMS, Foreign Liaison Department) acted as an adjunct to the two main **Soviet** intelligence services, but there was often an overlap in their separate networks. In Great Britain this became apparent when the enciphered communications exchanged between Moscow and OMS spy rings in Great Britain were read by the Government Code and Cypher School. Because the OMS had full confidence in its cipher system and never learned that its integrity had been compromised, the messages were quite informal, if not indiscreet, with only some of the correspon-

dents taking the trouble to adopt cover names to conceal their true identities. Even when they did so, their security procedures were appallingly lax by modern standards, thereby allowing the cryptanalysts to exercise their arcane skills and between 1934 and 1937 to circulate the traffic to selected recipients under the code name MASK. See also ZINOVIEV LETTER.

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT). A category of signals intelligence covering the entire spectrum of interception, signals and traffic analysis, and decryption of all communications, but usually limited to electronic communications. See also CRYP-TOGRAPHY; ECHELON; INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICA-TIONS; WIRETAPS; Y SERVICE.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREAT BRITAIN (CPGB). The myth that the CPGB was an independent political organization free of the Kremlin's control was dispelled through surveillance and penetration conducted by MI5 from the party's creation in 1920 to its dissolution in 1991. The CPGB's external radio communications with Moscow were **intercepted** and read between 1934 and 1937, and the resulting decrypts, code-named MASK, demonstrated that the party was effectively controlled by the Comintern and revealed the existence of underground cells operated under a rigid discipline enforced by a Control Commission. Penetration by MI5's mole Olga Gray resulted in the conviction in January 1938 of the party's national organizer, Percy Glading, on espionage charges.

During World War II the CPGB was obliged to reverse its policy of opposing a "capitalists' war" when the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact collapsed with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, but the Soviets continued to develop espionage networks in Great Britain with the CPGB's assistance. In 1941 Oliver Green gave MI5 an account of an undiscovered spy ring based on volunteers recruited during the Spanish Civil War, and in 1943 the CPGB's national organizer, Douglas Springhall, was convicted of receiving classified information from an Air Ministry employee, Olive Sheehan, and from a Special Operations Executive officer, Capt. Ormond Uren.

The NKVD regarded the CPGB, like other Communist parties, as a useful operational surrogate, and activists such as James Klugmann (later the CPGB's official historian) and Bob Stewart were harnessed to act in various capacities, including couriers, talent spotters, and recruiters.

During the postwar era, Moscow sought to disassociate the CPGB from involvement in espionage, although two of the most serious prosecutions—of ideological spies **Allan Nunn May** and Klaus Fuchs—implicated the party. Similarly, all the **Cambridge Five** spies were found to have had covert CPGB links in the past. After the end of the **Cold War**, **Russian** intelligence continued to exploit its CPGB links, as evidenced by the conviction of Michael Smith, a defense contractor who was entrapped in a sting operation after he had been identified by a **KGB defector**, Col. Viktor Oschenko, as having been an important source of scientific and technical information from Thorn-EMI. Smith was arrested in August 1992 following an MI5 **false-flag** operation. He admitted selling details of the fuse for the We.177 nuclear bomb and was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(CPUSA). Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation was slow to appreciate the scale of the overlap between Soviet-inspired espionage and the CPUSA, intensive surveillance and the recruitment of sources within the party established a pattern of activists, members, and fellow travelers being approached to undertake clandestine duties on behalf of the NKVD. Moscow's exploitation of the party became apparent in the 1930s when the CPUSA's general secretary, Earl Browder, was himself directly implicated in the work of the underground cells. He went on a mission to China on behalf of the party, and both his sister Margaret and his common-law wife Kitty Harris operated in Europe as illegals. VENONA intercepts proved that Browder was anxious that he could be compromised by the illicit activities conducted by members of his own family. Simultaneously, the defections of Whittaker Chambers, Louis Budenz, and Elizabeth Bentley provided the FBI with proof that the CPUSA, which at the height of its popularity achieved a membership of an estimated 75,000, accommodated a massive spy ring.

The FBI's investigation into atomic espionage revealed that numerous CPUSA activists had engaged in espionage, and a network run by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, two CPUSA members in New York,

was almost entirely dependent upon his party contacts. Similarly, surveillance on the NKVD *rezident*, Vasili Zarubin, in 1944 identified his West Coast contact as Steve Nelson, a senior party organizer in California who was engaged in the recruitment of party members and fellow travelers at the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley and the weapons development facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Once the FBI had established the overlap between the party, volunteers who had fought in Spain with the Abraham Lincoln Battalion of the International Brigade, and Soviet espionage, whole chapters were placed under intensive surveillance, and informants were recruited or planted inside the organization. In addition, an operation code-named TOPLEV was initiated to **cultivate** sources within the hierarchy, which ultimately resulted in the recruitment of **Morris Childs**, code-named SOLO. Thereafter the CPUSA was rendered impotent as an instrument of Soviet espionage, with the FBI effectively taking control of some of the party's activities.

The Smith Act, which in 1948 outlawed any political party's advocating the violent overthrow of the **United States** government, enabled the FBI to convict 109 of the CPUSA's leadership, leaving the organization impotent and of no significance in future Soviet intelligence operations.

COMPARTMENTALIZATION. The procedure of creating cell-like, insulated semi-independent units within a larger organization so as to control and limit the spread of sensitive information. The objective is to ensure that valuable knowledge is tightly held within strictly confined groups, thereby preventing unauthorized leakage.

CONRAD, CLYDE. A U.S. Army retiree, former sergeant Clyde L. Conrad was arrested in August 1988 at his home in West Germany following information discovered in Sweden during the interrogation of two doctors, Sandor and Imre Kercsik, who had acted as couriers for the Hungarian intelligence service, the AVH (Allami Vedelmi Hatosag). They had been caught after a tip from a GRU source in Budapest, Vladimir Vasiliev, code-named GT/ACCORD. Under interrogation, they implicated Capt. Zoltan Szabo, a former Hungarian army officer who had joined the AVH in 1967 before emigrating to Germany where, in 1973, he admitted he had recruited Conrad.

Prior to his retirement in 1985 Conrad had served at the Bad Kreuznach headquarters of the U.S. Eighth Infantry Division, where he had enjoyed access to highly classified military information concerning NATO troop deployments that he had sold to Szabo for more than \$1 million. In the decade prior to his retirement, Conrad had sold classified documents from a custody suite he supervised and had received an estimated \$1.2 million. He had also recruited some of his subordinates, among them Sergeant Roderick J. Ramsay, a clerk who had also supplied secret documents, and then had participated in the illicit procurement of embargoed computer components by exporting them through a dummy company in Canada.

In October 1988 the two Kercsiks were sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment in Sweden. The following year, Szabo was convicted of espionage in an Austrian court, but he was released in return for his evidence against his agent, Conrad, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in West **Germany** in June 1990. In January 1998, he died in prison of heart failure.

When the 29-year-old Ramsay was arrested at his mother's home in Tampa, Florida, in June 1990, he was unemployed, having been discharged from the Army for drug use. He was accused of having sold classified information to Conrad for \$20,000 soon after his transfer to West Germany as a clerk, in June 1983. Ramsay agreed to cooperate with the investigation, describing how he had initially photographed secret documents using a 35mm camera, but then had relied on a videocamera, recording a total of 48 hours of tape. Among the items he recalled having sold was NATO's plan for the defense of Central Europe and the conditions under which tactical nuclear weapons would be deployed. In August 1992 Ramsay was sentenced to 36 years in prison.

Another of Conrad's subordinates to be imprisoned was Kelly Therese Warren, a former soldier from Georgia who had been posted to the Eighth Infantry Division headquarters at Bad Kreuznach between 1986 and 1988 and had been recruited to maintain Conrad's access to secrets after he left the Army. Warren pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage and was sentenced in February 1999 to 25 years' imprisonment.

Two others in Conrad's network were sergeants Jeffrey S. Rondeau and Jeffrey E. Gregory, both recruited by Ramsay. According to court

testimony, Rondeau at Ramsay's direction had photocopied hundreds of documents, which Gregory had stuffed into a military flight bag for delivery to the Hungarians. He estimated the bag weighed 20 pounds when it had been filled. In June 1994 both men were sentenced to 18 years in prison.

COOPTEE. An individual, often an **embassy** employee, who willingly agrees to collaborate with his country's intelligence agency and undertake minor assignments, usually of limited operational importance, is known universally as a cooptee. Their usefulness may be disproportionate, perhaps confusing hostile **surveillance** in assessing the strength of the organization, acting as a **decoy** to draw away the unwelcome attention of the local security apparatus, or just surveying sites suitable for **dead drops**. *See also* HONORABLE CORRESPONDENTS.

COPLON, JUDITH. In 1943 Coplon, a 21-year-old graduate of Barnard College, joined the Department of Justice in New York; two years later she transferred to headquarters in Washington, D.C. In 1948 she was identified as the spy code-named SIMA in the VENONA traffic, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation placed her under surveillance. Her office telephone was tapped, and she was arrested as she met her Soviet contact, Valentin Gubitchev, in New York.

Coplon's subsequent conviction of theft of government documents was quashed on appeal because she had been arrested without a warrant and because the wiretap evidence had not been disclosed to the defense. When the VENONA traffic was declassified, it became clear that the FBI had been anxious to conceal the true nature of the original lead that had prompted the investigation. An employee of the **United Nations**, Gubitchev was deported from the **United States**, but Coplon was freed and later married her lawyer. Although the conviction was set aside, the Coplon case was an important milestone in the development of VENONA and acted as the catalyst for Congress to pass a law allowing warrantless arrests to be made where espionage is alleged.

COPPERHEAD. MI5's code name for an imaginative deception operation conducted in 1944 to persuade the enemy that British general

Bernard Montgomery had been posted to the Mediterranean prior to the Normandy **D-Day** invasion scheduled for June. Capt. Clifton James, a British army officer from the Royal Pay Corps, who in civilian life had been a stage actor, volunteered to impersonate the deputy supreme commander and was flown to **Gibraltar**, where it was confidently believed that the arrival of his entourage would be reported to the enemy. The charade proved a success, apart from a drunken celebration in Algiers, reports of which irritated the teetotaler Montgomery. James later wrote a book, *I Was Monty's Double*, which was made into a fictionalized movie in which he himself starred.

CORONA. The U.S. code name assigned to the first photographic **satellite** program, which became operational in February 1959. The satellites jettisoned gold-plated capsules that were collected by aircraft deployed over the Pacific to snag the parachutes and recover the canisters containing 3,000 feet of 70mm film. The size of a small car, CORONA provided crucial coverage of the **Soviet Union** following the termination of the **U-2** overflights in May 1960. After four failed attempts, the first successful CORONA flight, on 1 August 1960, was launched as *Discoverer 14*. It was in orbit for a single day and photographed more of the Soviet Union—1.6 million square miles—than the previous 24 U-2 overflights combined, disproving the "**missile gap**" theory in the process. The last of 95 successful CORONA launches took place in May 1972, and the resulting **imagery** was declassified in 1995. *See also* KEYHOLE.

COUNTERGANGS. A counterinsurgency strategy, originally adopted by the British in Palestine, that employs small, self-contained paramilitary units called countergangs that engage an adversary with unorthodox tactics. In 1947 the target was the Irgun and the Stern Gang, Jewish terrorist groups that resorted to abduction and the bombing of civilians. Pioneered by Gen. Sir Bernard Fergusson, the Palestine Police deployed two teams of 10 men each, led by Alistair McGregor and Roy Farran, but the organization was disbanded following the murder of an Irgun suspect, Alexander Rubowitz. Farran was charged with his murder and acquitted, leaving the crime unsolved.

Countergang tactics were refined further during the Mau-Mau campaign in Kenya, where hooded **defectors** identified fellow ter-

rorists. The policy of removing suspects to detention camps far from their villages served to reduce the power of the ringleaders, who were tracked relentlessly in the bush by small, specially trained teams that achieved better success than the more conventional deployment of large-scale sweeps conducted by regular infantry.

The development of unorthodox tactics in Kenya and in the **Malaya Emergency**, where "white areas" were established entirely free of the influence of Chinese insurgents, played a role in the defeat of the Indonesian guerrillas in **Borneo**. However, although the principles expounded by Brigadier Frank Kitson in *Low-Intensity Operations* became recognized as an essential component in modern warfare, they were rejected by U.S. strategists who invited Sir Robert Thompson to advise on pacification of the villages in Vietnam.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. The discipline of studying and **penetrating** an adversary's intelligence organization. Counterintelligence is arguably the acme of the intelligence profession. The orthodox approach is to use physical and technical **surveillance** to study the opposition's **order of battle**, identify the internal structure, and then seek to take control of it, either by infiltration, which requires the introduction of external assets, or by penetration, which is dependent on an ability to attract **defectors**, recruit sources, or "turn" individual agents.

The cases of **Kim Philby** and **Karl Koecher** are good examples of the long-term preparation required to infiltrate a dedicated individual into a target organization, but quicker results can be achieved by "**pitching**" a candidate considered susceptible, as happened with **Vladimir Petrov** and **Oleg Lyalin**. The recruitment of **double agents** offers considerable scope for compromising case officers and persuading them to cooperate, but the management of such operations requires considerable skill and experience. However, once accomplished, the contamination of an agency may spread to the point that its effectiveness has been neutralized, as happened to the **Abwehr** during World War II and to the **Central Intelligence Agency**'s **Cuban** operations in the 1970s.

COVER. Intelligence personnel, both officers and agents, deployed operationally are unable to undertake their work by declaring their

true role, and accordingly they adopt covers to assist in the completion of their duties. Categories of cover include commercial, diplomatic, academic, journalistic, or religious, but only diplomatic (or consular) cover offers any protection under the terms of the Vienna Convention from arrest and prosecution. U.S. agencies distinguish between **non-official cover** (NOC)—posts either made available by well-disposed businesses or created for the purpose within fronts or proprietaries—and official slots made available by the State Department. In order to avoid suspicion of espionage falling on missionaries and aid volunteers, the Central Intelligence Agency is prohibited from using either religious cover or the Peace Corps and may not recruit American journalists as agents. However, it is free to recruit foreign journalists and clerics as agents and to place its own personnel under journalistic cover. Similarly, British intelligence agencies were banned from using journalistic cover in Northern Ireland, following protests from the media when army personnel were discovered to have been issued with forged press cards.

COVERT ACTION. A uniquely American term applied to unavowed paramilitary operations undertaken in pursuit of United States foreign policy goals that may not have been declared. These projects are rarely clandestine in nature and often take the form of surrogate wars fought by local guerrillas or militias but supported by personnel drawn from the Special Activities Division of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. Covert action is, by its nature, an oxymoron, and such duties in other countries are usually performed by Special Forces.

CRABB, LIONEL. A pioneer scuba diver, Lt. Comdr. "Buster" Crabb was an expert in the removal of underwater munitions who was decorated for his work in Gibraltar during World War II. He died in April 1956 while undertaking a clandestine mission for the Secret Intelligence Service in Portsmouth Harbor, surveying the hull of the visiting Soviet cruiser *Ordzhonikidze*, prompting a diplomatic incident and protests from the Kremlin. The episode was a major embarrassment for Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who had banned potentially risky operations during the official visit to London by Nikita Khrushchev and Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, and he

ordered an investigation headed by the former cabinet secretary Lord Bridges. The inquiry, which was never published, established that SIS's Foreign Office adviser had given his consent to the mission while distracted, minutes after he had learned of his father's death. Crabb's fate remained a mystery, although a badly decomposed body was recovered from the sea a year later and buried under a gravestone bearing his name.

CRETE. During World War II the Greek island of Crete acquired a strategic significance because of the German determination to capture it and the Allied decision to defend it. Through ULTRA, the Axis plan to drop paratroopers and seize the airfield became known to the New Zealanders who were preparing to resist an amphibious assault, but they were still overwhelmed and there was a disorderly evacuation. In 1943 a daring operation was undertaken in Crete to abduct a senior German officer and bring him to Egypt for interrogation. The operation was carried out by Billy Moss and Paddy Leigh-Fermor. The hapless victim was Gen. Karl-Heinrich Kreipe, who was not the intended target and had only recently arrived.

CRYPTOGRAPHY. Invariably the target of hostile intelligence interest, cipher machines, code books, and other related signals equipment can provide an opportunity to read an adversary's communications. The removal of a German code book from the German light cruiser Magdeburg, which ran aground in the Baltic in October 1914, enabled the British Admiralty to read much of the kaiser's naval wireless traffic, thus tipping the war at sea in the Royal Navy's favor, and the **interception** of the **Zimmermann telegram** in 1917 changed history by helping to bring the United States into the conflict. During World War II, cryptanalytical attacks on Japanese, German, and Italian cipher systems proved immeasurably valuable and played vital, if unpublicized, roles in the Battle of Midway, the North African campaign, and the Battle of the Atlantic fought against the U-boat wolf packs and in ensuring the success of the **D-Day** landings.

Accordingly, most countries take elaborate precautions to protect vaults containing "crypto" material and the personnel handling it. During the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency ran a highly secret unit, designated Staff D, that concentrated on the **penetration** of target crypto accommodation. Similarly, the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** concentrated on suborning Eastern Bloc cipher staff and gaining access to cipher spaces using "second-story men," a euphemism for burglars. Few cases have reached the public domain, but the **defection** of Jozef Simonic, who left the **Polish** mission to the **United Nations** with a suitcase full of secret documents, and the similar case in 1958 of Frantisek Tisler, a cipher clerk based at the **Czech embassy** in Washington, D.C., were disclosed eventually. However, such revelations may take years to emerge so as to prevent countermeasures being taken. Probably the most serious breach of cryptographic security took place between 1965 and 1983 when submariner John Walker sold American crypto secrets to the **KGB** and thereby compromised the movements of the United States Navy's underwater fleet. *See also* ENIGMA MACHINE.

CUBA. Considered a Caribbean playground until 1959, when **Fidel Castro** seized Havana and established a Communist regime, Cuba was transformed from a resort island into a major regional military power, equipped and trained by the **Soviet Union**. An attempt in 1961 to recover power by landing émigré troops at the **Bay of Pigs** proved disastrous and served only to enhance Castro's increasingly totalitarian grip on the depleted population.

Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's decision to deploy intermediaterange ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads on the island led to the **Cuban Missile Crisis** in October 1962, but the subsequent negotiations for their removal included a guarantee of nonintervention from Washington, which effectively ensured Castro's survival for more than 40 years as the world's longest-serving Communist leader. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, Moscow terminated economic aid to Cuba and withdrew from the **intercept** station at Lourdes, leaving the **People's Republic of China** to equip and run it.

Having established himself in power, Castro created the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) in 1961 as part of the Ministry of Interior, under Manuel Pineiro Losada, who was replaced in 1969 by José Mendez Cominches. As the DGI developed, **KGB** general Viktor Simenov acted as an adviser, ensuring it would act as a Soviet **surrogate**, and both organizations collaborated closely when the

Central Intelligence Agency renegade Philip Agee visited Havana in 1969 with an offer of information.

The organization's operations were compromised in March 1970 by the **defection** of Orlando Castro Hidalgo in Paris and of Maj. Florentino Azpillaga Lombard, a DGI officer based in Prague who defected in June 1987 to Jim Olsen, the CIA station chief in Vienna. Azpillaga had turned up unexpectedly with his teenage girlfriend at the U.S. **embassy**, demanding **resettlement** in return for information about DGI operations. He was able to reel off the names of many CIA case officers, proving that their sources had been skillfully managed double agents and thereby proving his bona fides. By the time he had arrived in the United States, having been flown out of Austria in a black operation, the CIA had been persuaded that virtually all its Cuban assets were double agents.

In 1982 a senior officer, René Rodriguez Cruz, was convicted of dealing drugs, and in July 1989 Luis Barreiro resigned as the DGI's director, having been implicated in a cocaine-importation ring.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. The discovery of characteristic trapezoidal surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba in October 1962 led to an intensive program of high-altitude U-2 overflights and lower-level aerial reconnaissance missions that provided imagery suggesting that Soviet land forces were in the process of constructing launch sites for medium-range ballistic missiles and digging bunkers to store nuclear warheads. Presented with this evidence that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had taken a provocative act, President John F. Kennedy created an Executive Committee at the White House to advise him on how the situation might be resolved. He opted to impose a marine and air quarantine of the island to prevent any further shipments of offensive military matériel.

This unilateral action, supported in principle by Great Britain, France, and Germany but not Canada, resulted in a dangerous confrontation in which merchantmen of various nationalities were threatened in international waters, and three Soviet Foxtrot submarines, of a force of four, each armed with nuclear-tipped torpedoes, were forced to the surface. The fourth Foxtrot, the 911, designated C-20 by the U.S. Navy, evaded the quarantine line until it exhausted its air supply and came up beside the USS Cecil after it had been identified by the **SOSUS** station on Grand Turk. Meanwhile, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down and the pilot killed.

Anxious negotiations were conducted via a teleprinter hotline linking the White House to the Kremlin as freighters carrying missiles approached the quarantine line, and the **KGB** established a back channel through the Washington *rezidentura*. The result of the talks was a Soviet commitment to dismantle the missile sites and to openly withdraw the offending ballistic missiles and their warheads in such a way that the action could be verified, in return for an undertaking from the **United States** to remove nuclear missiles from NATO bases in Turkey and Italy and to give an unpublicized, binding guarantee that no attempt would be made in the future to remove **Fidel Castro** from power.

It was not until a conference was held at Key West in 1992, with many of the surviving participants present, that the **Russians** disclosed that their submarine flotilla had been armed with nuclear weapons and that, long before the intermediate-range ballistic missiles had been discovered, the Soviet Union had armed the Cubans with tactical nuclear missiles for use against another invasion. The existence of these weapons, concealed in caves, had remained a closely guarded secret and was never suspected by the Americans. Furthermore, the Russians revealed that no ballistic missile warheads had reached the ballistic missile launch sites, although they were aboard ships at the docks waiting to be unloaded.

CULTIVATION. The process prior to the recruitment of an agent by a case officer, when a handler makes apparently innocent contact with a target, perhaps exploiting a social opportunity, and assesses whether there is any prospect of making a **pitch**. A skillful handler may be able to conduct a cultivation without compromising his or her own position.

CYPRUS. Strategically located in the eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus has long had significance for competing intelligence agencies, and during the **Suez Crisis** it was the headquarters for the British Middle East Headquarters. Later, during the **Cyprus Emergency** between 1955 and 1959, both principal British intelligence agencies were deployed in support of troops attempting to suppress separatist **terror**-

ism. Intelligence played a large part in enhancing the British government's determination to retain two permanent sovereign base areas in the south of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia-against the wishes of the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios—and to grant independence only on that condition. At the very last moment of the final negotiations in London, Makarios unexpectedly conceded the bases, having succumbed to pressure over the threat of disclosures concerning his private life, and also allowed Great Britain to retain a strategically important **intercept** site at Ayios Nikolais in the Troodos Mountains. The intercept station, manned by the Royal Signals and staff drawn from GCHO and the National Security Agency, provided invaluable information about Soviet missile tests in the southern Ukraine and from Arab communications in the Middle East.

CYPRUS EMERGENCY. During the campaign conducted between 1955 and 1959 by EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston/ National Organization of Cypriot Combatants) to establish a Greek government in Cyprus, British forces successfully interdicted consignments of weapons sent from Greece to the guerrillas and conducted a surveillance operation to find the EOKA leader, Col. George Grivas. The interception of the caiques carrying arms was achieved by a technical operation undertaken by the Secret Intelligence Service in Athens to monitor EOKA plans to send matériel to Cyprus, for which the local station commander was decorated. On instructions from Prime Minister Anthony Eden, a separate scheme was prepared to isolate Grivas and shoot him, and an experienced former Special Air Service officer was flown to Nicosia to complete the assignment, but the matter was dropped when political negotiations appeared likely to bear fruit.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Before World War II the Czechs had developed an impressive military intelligence structure, headed by Gen. Frantisek Moravec, that succeeded in recruiting several useful German sources, among them an Abwehr officer, Paul Thümmel. Codenamed A-54, Thümmel provided high-quality information to Moravec, who moved to England shortly before the Nazi occupation of Prague in 1938. Moravec skillfully negotiated considerable independence from the British because of A-54's value and was able to supervise an organization that extended into Czechoslovakia and **Switzerland**.

From its creation in 1948, the Czech security apparatus, the Statni Bezpecnost (StB), established a reputation for the ruthlessly efficient suppression of dissidents and the management of sophisticated, long-term agent operations that were often dependent on exploiting family contacts among émigré communities. The extent to which the StB had succeeded in recruiting expatriates emerged when Nicholas Prager was convicted of passing RAF technical secrets to the Czechs, after he had been identified as a spy by a **KGB defector**. More evidence was provided in 1969 by two StB defectors, **Jozef Frolik** and Frantisek August, who exposed several British members of Parliament as having succumbed to pressure, among them Sir Barnett Stross, Will Owen, and John Stonehouse. In addition to Frolik and August, the StB suffered a further seven defectors in the three years following the **Soviet** invasion.

The StB was also responsible for the only known **penetration** of the **Central Intelligence Agency**, with **Karl Koecher** who posed as a refugee in 1965 and succeeded in obtaining employment as a CIA translator. He and his wife were StB officers and at the time of their arrest in New York in November 1984 were believed to have been responsible for compromising the true identity of a valuable CIA source code-named TRIGON.

Whereas Koecher and his wife operated under their own authentic identities, the StB was adept at developing **illegals**, as was demonstrated when Erwin van Haarlem was arrested in April 1988, having adopted the identity of a Dutch hotelier. A true professional, van Haarlem never revealed his real name and served his full prison sentence without making any admissions. Ironically, by the time he was deported back to Prague, the regime he had served had been replaced in the "Velvet Revolution." Although **MI5** asserted that van Haarlem had been caught because his wireless transmissions had prompted complaints from neighbors, in reality he had been denounced by an StB defector, Vlastimil Ludvik.

In February 1990 the StB was dissolved and a new, democratically controlled security apparatus, the UOUD (Urad pro Ochranu Ustavy a Demokracie/Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy), was established under the leadership of Zdenek Formanek.

Soon afterward, in July 1991, this was renamed the FBIS (Federální Bezpeènostní Informaèní Sluzba/Federal Security Information Service), while the StB's foreign intelligence branch became the UZSI (Urad pro Zahranicni Styky a Informace/Bureau for Foreign Contacts and Information). Currently headed by Petr Zeman, it is a civilian organization that answers to the Ministry of the Interior.

In July 1994 in the newly formed Czech Republic, the BIS (Bezpecnostni Informacni Sluzba/Security Information Service) was created, and in 1999 the former head of military **counterintelligence**, Jiri Ruzek, was named as its director.

- D -

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. The postmortem study undertaken at the conclusion of any legal proceedings in espionage cases, intended to measure the impact of a particular spy, enabling the appropriate damage limitation measures to be taken. Damage assessments are usually highly classified, so as not to give further assistance to an adversary, and are completed after any appeal so no motions for discovery can be filed by the defense. In most environments such studies are unpublished, although in **Great Britain** some reports have been made by the Security Commission and the unclassified portions have been released. Similarly, in the **United States** responsibility for compiling damage assessments rests with the National Counterintelligence Executive and redacted versions are declassified for public scrutiny.

DANGLE. An operational term applied to an agent who is deliberately deployed close to a target hostile intelligence officer in the expectation that he or she will be the subject of recruitment, thereby allowing a **double agent** case to develop. This procedure is also known as "**coat-trailing**" and was a tactic often used during the **Cold War**.

DAYAN, MOSHE. Dayan, the legendary **Israeli** general who achieved considerable fame during the 1967 Six-Day War, had been trained by the British in World War II as a member of a **stay-behind** network to conduct sabotage operations, collect intelligence, and harass the enemy in the event of a Nazi occupation of **Palestine**, a prospect that appeared quite likely in the event that Egypt fell to the Afrika Korps.

- **D-DAY.** The code name for 6 June 1944, when 150,000 Allied troops landed on the French coast at Normandy in the largest amphibious operation ever undertaken, and arguably the riskiest. As the Supreme Allied Commander was unwilling to accept military orthodoxy—which militated in favor of an invasion across the shortest stretch of the notoriously rough English Channel and the capture of a port to assist in the immense logistical supply—several innovative measures were taken to ensure success and prevent a counterattack while the troops were at their most vulnerable while establishing a beachhead. A massive, integrated **deception** campaign code-named **FORTITUDE** was mounted to enhance the enemy's confidence in the mistaken belief that the true Allied target was the Pas-de-Calais and that the Normandy attack was a mere diversionary feint.
- **DEAD DROP.** To minimize the risk involved in conducting personal meetings or engaging in potentially dangerous **brush contacts** with agents, case officers may exchange information by means of an ostensibly innocuous site that both parties can visit without arousing suspicion. Complex **tradecraft** may require signals to be sent to indicate that a particular site has been selected and is ready to be serviced. Dead drops can range from convenient crevices in walls and matchboxes hooked behind radiators to carefully crafted items such as hollowed-out bricks, lumps of coal, and other natural-looking items adapted to conceal documents, microfilms, or cash.
- **DEBADGING.** The process undertaken by British army personnel who are assigned clandestine duties and may be detached from their units temporarily to enhance their **cover**.
- **DECEPTION.** Now acknowledged as an essential part of military and associated operations, deception is as old as the Trojan Horse and ranges from simple expedients to highly complex, integrated schemes. Deception can best succeed when comprehensive measures are taken to coordinate all the conventional sources of intelligence, including open sources such as independent news reporting, **signals intelligence**, diplomatic reporting, aerial reconnaissance, and agent observation. When all five components can either be controlled or monitored, an adversary's ability to verify intelligence is diminished

to the point where deception may play a significant part in the success of a particular undertaking. During World War II some highly imaginative schemes were developed to mislead the enemy, including MINCEMEAT, intended to suggest that the Allies would invade Sardinia in 1943; COPPERHEAD, to convey the impression that Gen. Bernard Montgomery had been in Gibraltar in 1944; and FORTITUDE, which successfully diverted attention away from Normandy as the focus of the Allied D-Day landings. More recently, Saddam Hussein in 1991 was the victim of a cover plan that implied his occupation forces in Kuwait would be attacked from the sea.

DECOYS. Intelligence personnel conducting clandestine operations in adverse environments may seek to confuse an adversary by deploying decoys, often **cooptees**, who will adopt the manner and behavior of their professional colleagues with the intention of drawing attention to themselves, confusing hostile **surveillance**, or participating in a scheme to mislead an opponent.

DEFECTOR. Individuals who physically switch sides in a conflict and change their allegiance to an adversary. This has been perceived as pejorative, although invariably the receiving authorities welcome their guest as a hero, whereas a defector will be regarded as a traitor in his or her country of origin.

During World War II, Allied servicemen who threw in their lot with the enemy were described as "renegades." There were no Allied intelligence defectors to the Nazis, although both victims of the Venlo incident were treated with great suspicion and were thought, wrongly as it turned out, to have been guilty (*see* BEST, SIGISMUND PAYNE). Some British intelligence personnel actively collaborated with their captors, but the element of duress probably excludes them from this category.

By far the largest group of people regarded as defectors are those Eastern Bloc intelligence officers who, during the **Cold War**, chose to accept **resettlement** in the West. Leaving aside the low-level line-crossers, some 40 **KGB** and **GRU** officers defected, following the example of **Igor Gouzenko**, who may be regarded as the first of the Cold War, having accepted resettlement in **Canada** in September 1945. GRU defectors were outnumbered by KGB defectors, and most

opted to seek **political asylum** in the **United States**. Indeed, between the receipt of Grigori Tokaev in 1946 and **Oleg Lyalin** in August 1971, not a single Soviet intelligence defector chose to go to **Great Britain**. Three that considered doing so—Konstantin Volkov, Ivan Skripkin, and **Yuri Rastvorov**—ultimately did not. Volkov and Skripkin were arrested before they could switch sides, and Rastvorov opted to go to the United States at the last minute.

In intelligence terms, among the most significant Soviet defectors were Walter Krivitsky in the prewar era and, during the Cold War, Vladimir Petrov, who defected from Canberra in 1954; Lyalin in London in 1971; Vitali Yurchenko in Rome in 1985; Oleg Gordievsky, who was exfiltrated from Moscow in 1985; and Vasili Mitrokhin, who arrived in London from Tallinn, Estonia, in 1992. Each supplied important information, as did Michal Goleniewski, a Polish UB officer who defected in Berlin in 1961; Arkadi Shevchenko, the most senior Soviet diplomat to defect, who was received by the Central Intelligence Agency in New York in 1978; and Gen. Jan Pacepa, the chief of the Romanian Departmentule Informatii Externe, who was resettled in the United States in July 1978. Defectors are expected to bring a "meal ticket"—information of sufficient importance to earn them a home and pension in the West. Many defectors find the process of resettlement hard to cope with and contemplate redefection.

The motives of defectors are many, but although most claim they were prompted by ideological reasons, almost all seem to have experienced professional or family setbacks in the weeks and months prior to their decision to switch sides. The one exception was Vladimir Kuzichkin, a KGB Line N **illegals** support officer who acknowledges that he feared the consequences of the accidental loss of a vital document in the Tehran *referentura* where he worked when he approached the British in June 1982. Although Gordievsky asserts that he was influenced by the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, his decision to collaborate with the British did not occur until 1974, soon after he had been told that his career had been compromised by an extramarital affair.

American intelligence defectors to the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War are limited to Victor Hamilton, a **National Security Agency** cryptanalyst of Arab descent, who took up residence in Moscow in

1963, four years after he had resigned; and **Edward Lee Howard**, who escaped **Federal Bureau of Investigation surveillance** in 1985 just as his arrest was planned.

British intelligence defectors to the Soviets are rather more numerous and include Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Kim Philby. See also CAMBRIDGE FIVE: DEFECTOR IN PLACE: FALSE DEFECTOR.

DEFECTOR IN PLACE. An oxymoron but nonetheless a term that has entered the intelligence lexicon to describe a spy who opts to remain at his post, supplying secrets to his controllers, rather than physically leaving his or her country and accepting resettlement. The two CIA agents most frequently described as defectors in place are Oleg Penkovsky and Adolf Tolkachev, both of whom turned down the opportunity to leave the Soviet Union and live in the United States under the sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency.

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE STAFF (DIS). Created by Great Britain in 1964 as an amalgamation of the Naval Intelligence Division, Air Intelligence at the Air Ministry, and the Directorate of Intelligence at the War Office, the triservice DIS is headed by a single director. The unit is essentially an analytical organization staffed by personnel on temporary assignment from the services, along with some permanent civilians, and handles intelligence from defense attachés posted overseas and imagery. The director sits on the Joint Intelligence Committee.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA). Established by the United States in October 1961 with a staff of only 25, DIA coordinates all the military intelligence branches under the Department of Defense and now employs more than 4,000 personnel, more than half of whom are civilians. It consists of the National Military Intelligence Production Center, the National Military Intelligence Collection Center, and the National Military Intelligence Systems Center. The DIA directors have been Gen. Joseph Carroll (1961–69), Gen. Donald Bennett (1960-72), Adm. Vincent de Poix (1972-74), Gen. Daniel Graham (1974-75), Gen. Gene Tighe (January-May 1976 and 1977–81), Gen. Samuel Wilson (1976–77), Gen. James Williams (1981–85), Gen. Leonard Perroots (1985–88), Gen. Harry Soyster (1988–91), Dennis Nagy (September–November 1991), Gen. James Clapper (1991–95), and Gen. Kenneth Minihan (1995–).

DELHI INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (**DIB**). During World War II Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) evolved from a police organization into a military unit and was responsible for all security intelligence operations in **India** and the region. The DIB acted as the competent British authority, liaising closely with its counterparts, the **Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq** (CICI) at Habbaniyah, Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) in Cairo, and **Combined Intelligence Far East** (CIFE) in Singapore.

DE MARENCHES, ALEXANDRE. Chief of the French Service de Documentation et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) from 1970 to 1981, de Marenches was a career intelligence officer who had worked in the Resistance as a courier during the **German** occupation of **France**, passing messages across the demarcation line. He later fled to Spain and joined the Free French Forces in Morocco and fought in Italy before being assigned to intelligence duties on Gen. Charles de Gaulle's staff in London.

De Marenches was appointed the SDECE's chief in 1970 by the newly elected President Georges Pompidou who was wary of the organization's dubious reputation for involvement in every kind of illegal activity from drug trafficking to political blackmail. De Marenches conducted a purge to eliminate suspected **Soviet moles** and promoted professionalism by concentrating resources on the Middle East and Francophone Africa. During the decade he ran "La Piscine," de Marenches transformed SDECE into an effective collection agency staffed mainly by military personnel assigned from the armed forces. In his retirement de Marenches coauthored *The Fourth World War*, in which he articulated the threat from Islamic fundamentalism, and an autobiography.

DENIED AREAS. Hostile environments in which conditions are difficult to conduct conventional intelligence operations. In denied areas, special measures have to be taken to avoid the attention and **surveil**-

lance of the local security apparatus. See also MOSCOW RULES; PIPELINERS.

- DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS). Created under the leadership of Governor Tom Ridge and formally established in 2002, DHS was an amalgamation of 20 separate agencies, including the Coast Guard, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs, the Secret Service, the Border Patrol, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS is the United States' third largest cabinet department, headed by Michael Chertoff.
- **DIGRAPH.** The term applied in the **Central Intelligence Agency** for the two-letter prefix attached to the code names of its sources that identifies the internal division within the Directorate of Operations responsible for their management.
- **DIPLOMATIC BAGS.** Consignments exchanged between diplomatic missions and protected from inspection under the terms of the Vienna Convention. Although referred to as "bags," they may range in size from small packages carried by diplomatic couriers to large containers. To avoid the danger of interception, intelligence agencies often rely heavily on this method of communication for non-timesensitive material.
- **DIPLOMATIC COURIERS.** Officials who carry dispatches between diplomatic missions, enjoying the protection of the Vienna Convention from search and seizure. The function has often been adopted by intelligence personnel as a convenient **cover** for their overseas travel. See also DIPLOMATIC BAGS.

DIRECTION DE LA SURVEILLANCE DU TERRITOIRE (DST).

France's internal security agency, created in 1944 and first headed by Roger-Paul Warin, alias Roger Wybot, then age 32. Wybot ran the organization until he was replaced in 1958 by Christian Fouchet, supposedly because President Charles de Gaulle suspected his hotel accommodation in Paris had been the subject of DST surveillance. Subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and based in the rue Nelaton near Les Invalides, the DST fulfills counterespionage and counterterrorism roles. In June 1975 two unarmed DST officers, Raymond Doubs and Jean Donatini, were shot dead and Jean Harranz was wounded when they attempted to question Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, known as "Carlos the Jackal," at his apartment in the rue Toullier.

In 1979 the DST successfully recruited a **KGB** Directorate T officer, Col. Vladimir I. Vetrov, and ran him in the **Soviet Union** under the misleading code name FAREWELL, chosen deliberately to attract attention away from the French assistant military attaché who had been assigned the task of handling his communications in Moscow. Vetrov's value as a source, hemorrhaging scientific and technical data, came to an end when he was convicted of murdering his mistress in November 1982, but his detailed information about the Paris *rezidentura* enabled the DST to identify 47 KGB officers, who were expelled from France in April 1983.

The other heads of the DST have been Jean-Gabriel Eriau (1959–61), Daniel Doustin (1961–64), Tony Roche (1964–68), Jean Rochet (1968–72), Marcel Chalet (1975–82), Yves Bonnet (1982–91), Philippe Parant (1991–97), and the current director, Jean-Jacques Pascal.

DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE SÉCURITÉ EXTÉRIEURE

(DGSE). Created in April 1981 following a series of scandals that had hit its predecessor, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), the DGSE is France's principal foreign intelligence agency. It is based at 128 Avenue Mortier, close to a public swimming pool from which it derives its nickname, "La Piscine." Staffed mainly by military personnel on temporary assignment, the SDECE had acquired a ruthless reputation during the Algerian campaign, when Ahmed Ben Bella's plane was hijacked in 1955 and Mehdi Ben Barka was abducted a decade later. Allegations from Soviet defectors that the SDECE had been penetrated at high level by the KGB undermined the organization and prompted the defection to the Central Intelligence Agency of Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli, the SDECE's bureau chief in Washington, D.C., who suspected that there was little enthusiasm to root out the Soviet moles.

The French reputation for ruthlessness was enhanced in July 1985 when Greenpeace's *Rainbow Warrior* was sabotaged by a DGSE team in Auckland Harbor, a scandal that prompted the resignation of Pierre Lacoste. Following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the DGSE, always

active in Francophone Africa, has concentrated on the collection of commercial intelligence in support of French business interests.

The directors have been Henri Ribière (1946-51), Pierre Boursicot (1951–57), Gen. Paul Grossin (1957–62), Gen. Eugene Guibaud (1966-70), Alexandre de Marchenches (1970-81), Pierre Marion (1981–82), Adm. Pierre Lacoste (1982–85), Gen. Rene Imbot (1985– 87), Gen. François Mermet (1987–89), Claude Silberzahn (1989–93), Jacques Dewatre (1993–99), and Jean-Claude Cousseran (1999–).

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS (DO). The operational branch of the Central Intelligence Agency, known as the Clandestine Service, was formally titled the Deputy Directorate for Plans (DPP) until it was renamed the Directorate of Operations in 1975. The DPP had been run for years by Richard Helms as deputy to Frank Wisner, who was posted to London in 1958. Wisner was succeeded by Dick Bissell, but when he resigned after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the new director of central intelligence (DCI), John McCone, chose Helms to succeed him. A former journalist, Helms had met Adolf Hitler before World War II and was the consummate intelligence professional, becoming DCI in June 1968.

The deputy director for operations is the CIA's senior spymaster, and since Helms the post has been held by Desmond FitzGerald, Max Hugel, Tom Karamessines, John Stein, Clair George, Tom Twetton, Ed Juchniewicz, Dick Stolz, and Ted Price.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI). The post of DCI, which has been held by 22 men since Adm. Sidney Souers was appointed in January 1946, was the senior post in the United States intelligence structure until December 2004 when the Intelligence Reform Act introduced the position of director of national intelligence. As well as heading the Central Intelligence Agency, the DCI was responsible for coordinating the activities of 43 separate U.S. intelligence agencies until the consolidation of the **Department of** Homeland Security, which reduced the total number of U.S. intelligence agencies to 15.

The DCIs have been Rear Adm. Sidney Souers (January-June 1946), Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg (1946-47), Rear Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter (1947–50), Gen. Walter Bedell Smith (1950–53), Allen **Dulles** (1953–61), John McCone (1961–65), Vice Adm. William Raborn (1965–66), Richard Helms (1966–73), James Schlesinger (February–July 1973), William Colby (1973–76), George H. W. Bush (1976–77), Adm. Stansfield Turner (1977–81), **William Casey** (1981–87), William Webster (1987–91), Robert Gates (1991–93), James Woolsey (1993–95), John Deutsch (1995–96), **George Tenet** (1997–2004), and Porter Goss (2004–06).

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DNI). A post created in 2005 with the passage of the Intelligence Reform Bill to coordinate the activities of the 15 U.S. intelligence agencies, set their budgets, and be responsible for the daily briefing of the president on intelligence issues, largely supplanting the role of the director of central intelligence. President George W. Bush appointed a veteran State Department diplomat, John Negroponte, as his first DNI, with Gen. Michael Hayden, the former director of the National Security Agency, as his deputy.

DISCARD. When a spy is arrested to attract attention away from another agent, the victim of the deliberate sacrifice is known by **counterintelligence** professionals as a discard.

DISCRIMINATION. A basic **signals intelligence** discipline, discrimination is a preliminary **signals analysis** process applied to raw **intercept** data to separate them from other material that is not of any intelligence interest. "Discrim," as it is often known, compares the parameters of new traffic to the frequencies, wavelengths, locations, and call signs of target stations. *See also* ECHELON; TRAFFIC ANALYSIS.

DISCUS. A small, portable transmitter that could transmit and receive an alphanumeric message, designed by the **Central Intelligence Agency** to squirt encrypted signals of up to 2,300 characters over distances of up to a mile in a **burst transmission** lasting less than three seconds in order to minimize the risk from hostile **interception**. The device, developed in the Short Range Agents Communications (SRAC) project, was first publicly acknowledged as having been used to assist communications between the CIA station in Warsaw

and Col. **Ryszard Kuklinsky** in **Poland**, but was also used by **Adolf Tolkachev** in 1979.

DISINFORMATION. The technique of conveying false information to an adversary. Disinformation, a translation of the Russian word dezinformatsia, was regarded by the KGB as a separate discipline and a key component in a coordinated strategy to achieve specific political goals. Disinformation can include the Soviet use of active measures or dirty tricks, which may include the smearing of political opponents, the fabrication of documents, and the manufacture of bogus news stories prepared for planting into the pages of sympathetic newspapers and journals by compliant journalists. Modern examples of disinformation include the claim that AIDS had originated as an experiment with a dangerous virus conducted at Fort Detrick, Maryland; that the Central Intelligence Agency had imported cocaine to destroy disadvantaged black communities in Los Angeles; and, most successfully, that President John F. Kennedy had been the victim of a CIA assassination plot.

DONOVAN, WILLIAM. Donovan, a partner in the New York law firm of Donovan, Leisure, was a hugely successful corporate lawyer; the charismatic leader of the "Fighting Irish," the 69th Infantry Regiment, with whom he had ended World War I as America's most highly decorated war hero with the Medal of Honor; and in 1942 President Franklin D. Roosevelt's choice to head the Office of Strategic Services. He died in 1959.

DOUBLE AGENTS. The designation given to agents who turn against their original controllers and switch their allegiance to their supposed target. Some agents may arrange for their recruitment by their intended, ultimate target, and whatever their motivation the description remains valid. The fact that a spy happens also to be an intelligence officer does not make him (or her) a double agent, so it is erroneous to apply this term to Kim Philby, George Blake, Geoffrey Prime, Oleg Penkovsky, Aldrich Ames, or Robert Hanssen. In all those cases, the spies were run as agents by a hostile intelligence agency.

Triple agents are usually double agents who are deployed against an adversary for the precise purpose of having them ostensibly recruited as double agents. *See also* DOUBLE CROSS.

DOUBLE CROSS. The term applied in the management of **double agents** when their activities are coordinated and supervised by a single authority, which thereby acquires the potential for exercising a strategic influence over intelligence events. In January 1941 double agents run by the British intelligence services were brought under the control of a Double Cross Committee, better known as the **Twenty Committee**, a play on the Roman numeral XX. This development was mirrored in the Middle and Far East theaters, where similar structures were established to ensure maximum advantage.

DULLES, ALLEN. The Central Intelligence Agency's director of central intelligence (DCI) from 1953 to 1961, Dulles was a New York lawyer who had served in the State Department as a diplomat in Vienna, Paris, and Berlin. He was in Switzerland in both world wars and in 1943, as the Office of Strategic Services representative in Bern, had recruited a German Foreign Ministry official, Fritz Kolbe, who supplied him with copies of secret high-level telegrams. Dulles was mystified by a lack of British enthusiasm for his coup, unaware of ULTRA. After the war, Dulles ran U.S. intelligence operations in Germany from Frankfurt and advised on the reorganization of the newly created CIA before being appointed DCI. He was considered the archetypal intelligence officer and, with his brother John Foster Dulles as secretary of state, exercised considerable influence over U.S. foreign policy, but was forced to resign following the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.

DUQUESNE, FRITZ. An extraordinarily colorful character whose career bordered on the bizarre, Duquesne claimed that he had once been young **Winston Churchill**'s jailer and had witnessed British troops maltreat his mother and sister during the Boer War. Originally from the Cape Colony in **South Africa**, where allegedly he had spied against the British, Duquesne claimed in a sensational book—*The Man Who Killed Kitchener: The Life of Fritz Joubert Duquesne*, writ-

ten by journalist Clement Wood and published in New York in 1932—that he had been responsible for the loss of the cruiser HMS Hampshire in the North Sea in June 1916, while the ship was carrying Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener to Petrograd. Although the British Admiralty had always believed that the cruiser had hit a mine, Wood reported that Duquesne had slipped aboard, disguised as a Russian officer, to signal a U-boat waiting to torpedo her and then had made his escape before she sank.

Wood also claimed that Duquesne had been arrested for espionage during World War I but had escaped from custody. According to his version, he had sabotaged an Allied freighter, the Tennyson, which sank after suffering a catastrophic fire, and then had wriggled out of a murder charge by feigning a nervous illness and slipping out of Bellevue Hospital. He also acknowledged having used the aliases of "Captain Stoughton of the West Australia Horse," "Piet Niacoud," and "Frederick Fredericks," among many others. Since then he had become a writer, and lived with his mistress, Evelyn Lewis, who was a sculptress from a wealthy Southern family, at West 76th Street in New York City calling themselves "Mr. and Mrs. James Dunn," but he had also volunteered his services to the **Abwehr** as a professional spy to work against the United States.

Surprisingly, his offer had been accepted and he had established himself in a small, one-room office at 120 Wall Street operating under the name Air Terminal Associates. It was here that he received William Sebold and took delivery of his microfilmed questionnaire. which had been read and copied already by the Federal Bureau of **Investigation**. Soon Sebold was acting as his communicator, and in May 1941, using the call sign CQDXVW2-after several false starts—contact was established with AOR, the Abwehr's call sign in Hamburg. It was this channel that became Duquesne's preferred method of sending urgent messages to Germany, instead of through the accommodation addresses in Portugal and Brazil, although he continued to rely on a large team of transatlantic steamship couriers for bulky items that needed delivery to Hamburg.

When he was eventually arrested, Duquesne retained his sense of humor and appeared amused to watch the FBI's surveillance footage of his incriminating visits to Sebold's office. A clock on the wall and a flip-over calendar placed on Sebold's desk made an accurate, verifiable

record of every conversation. He said he always wanted to be in the movies, but had been disappointed by his performance. The film was shown in court and proved to be damning evidence.

The leads from the Duquesne case covered the entire country and the hemisphere and resulted in follow-up visits to **Cuba**, **Chile**, and **Argentina**. It was possible to identify other Nazi spies in Mexico, which led to further investigations. Unquestionably it was the most important case of that time and resulted in 19 pleas of guilty and a total of 32 convictions, with Duquesne receiving the longest sentence, 18 years.

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EAST GERMANY. Although a geographically small and economically insignificant state, the East German regime sustained a disproportionately large intelligence apparatus that included the notorious Stasi—an abbreviation of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS; Ministry of State Security)—which employed 90,000 personnel and ran an estimated 150,000–180,000 informants. Within the Stasi, the largest branch was the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), the overseas collection agency headed until 1986 by Markus Wolf, with a staff of 4,000, and then by Werner Grossmann. Although the HVA concentrated primarily on the Federal Republic of Germany, achieving considerable success in infiltrating agents into the government, it also operated worldwide, often as a surrogate for the KGB, with representatives posted overseas under diplomatic cover, with a special interest in Zanzibar.

Following the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989, the Stasi's massive headquarters on the Normannenstrasse were looted, and a special commission, headed by Joachim Gauck, was created to process the vast collection of files and to declassify them. Keys to the most sensitive, encrypted dossiers were deposited in Moscow to keep them from falling into Western hands, but they were promptly sold to the **Central Intelligence Agency**, which code-named them ROSE-WOOD. When word leaked to the Federal Republic that the CIA had acquired the ROSEWOOD data, a formal request was made for access to them, to which **George Tenet** eventually acceded in 2003.

ECHELON. Code name for a **signals intelligence discrimination** program developed by the **National Security Agency** and GCHQ that identifies individual target telephone numbers from data streams exchanged between ground stations and geostationary communications **satellites**. The computer program isolates and analyzes the embedded electronic signals that identify and route international calls, making it possible to concentrate recording resources on specific numbers. *See also* INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS.

EICHMANN, ADOLF. The abduction of Eichmann, a former senior Nazi officer, from his home in Buenos Aires in May 1960 by a Mossad team led by Isser Harel was an intelligence coup that helped establish the organization's reputation for undertaking daring, highrisk missions and pulling them off successfully. Eichmann had sought refuge in Argentina after World War II, changed his name to Ricardo Klement, and found work at a local Mercedes-Benz factory. He was traced by the Israelis, who were determined to place him on trial for war crimes committed during the Holocaust, and was abducted outside his home on Garibaldi Street by a Mossad team that included Zvi Milchman. Eichmann was held for 10 days in a nearby safe house, where he was interrogated to see if he knew the whereabouts of Dr. Josef Mengele. He did not, so he was drugged to make him appear drunk, dressed in the uniform of an El Al steward, and taken aboard an airliner bound for Israel.

Considered an architect of the Holocaust, Eichmann was tried in April 1961, convicted of crimes against humanity, and hanged in May 1962. Harel later wrote an account of the operation, *The House on Garibaldi Street*, and Milchman, who adopted the name Peter Melkman, wrote *Eichmann in My Hands*.

- **ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT).** A specialized category of technical **signals intelligence** that includes the collection, processing, and **signals** or **traffic analysis** of information acquired from electronic media, usually radio, wireless, or radar emissions.
- **ELLIS, DICK.** Born in **Australia** in 1895, C. H. "Dick" Ellis joined the **Secret Intelligence Service** in Paris in 1923, after graduating from the Sorbonne. He was posted to Istanbul briefly and then was

attached under **Passport Control Office cover** to Berlin, where he also wrote articles for the *Morning Post*. In 1938 he was brought back to **Great Britain** to supervise the technical coverage of the **German embassy**'s telephone lines. Curiously, within a short period of his appointment, Ribbentrop's staff began to exercise uncharacteristic discretion in their telephone conversations. He was later dispatched to Liverpool to establish a mail censorship center, and in 1940 was appointed deputy to William Stephenson at **British Security Coordination** in New York.

After the war Ellis acted as controller Western Hemisphere and controller Far East, and upon his retirement in 1953 returned to Australia to advise on the creation of the **Australian Secret Intelligence Service**. However, in 1966, following a lengthy investigation codenamed EMERTON, William Steedman confronted him with the allegation that he had sold SIS secrets to the Nazis through a contact in Paris before the war. Ellis made a limited confession, admitting his links to the Germans and claiming to have been kept impossibly short of money, but denying that he had ever succumbed to pressure from the **Soviets**, although he acknowledged it was likely they had learned of his treachery.

The fact that the SIS had first learned from Walter Schellenberg in 1945 that a man named Ellis had betrayed the organization, but had failed to identify him for two decades, was a major embarrassment for the SIS. Ellis was never charged with any offense and died at his home in 1975.

EMBASSIES. The highest status of a diplomatic mission is the embassy, headed by an ambassador, largely replacing the prewar distinction between legations, headed by ministers, and the more senior embassies. Embassy buildings, including the ambassador's residence, come under the protection of the Vienna Convention and invariably conceal an intelligence function, both human and technical. Many diplomatic premises contain clandestine intercept equipment to enable skilled operators to eavesdrop on local targets, and the telltale antennas may be disguised as flagpoles or hidden inside fiberglass radomes to prevent detection from neighboring structures.

Intelligence personnel assigned to embassies mask their true role by adopting diplomatic **cover**, although internally the **Soviet** organization was known as the *rezidentura*, with the British and American equivalents being called stations. See also DIPLOMATIC BAGS; DIPLOMATIC COURIERS.

ENGULF. A British code name for a technical breakthrough in which sound recorded on listening devices planted inside the communications room of target embassies assisted cryptographers to read the traffic generated on cipher machines. This methodology proved effective against the Egyptian embassy in London during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and was exploited in a refinement code-named STOCKADE, which helped break French diplomatic codes.

ENIGMA MACHINE. A cipher machine developed by Arthur Scherbius in **Germany** in 1923 and made available commercially to banks and other financial institutions on the continent. It was adapted by the German military in 1928, and various versions of the electromechanical device were developed and distributed until May 1945. An estimated 40,000 Enigma machines were manufactured for use by the Germans, and it was used as the model for the British equivalent, the TypeX machine.

Boasting an unbreakable cipher generated by passing an electrical current through three moving, interchangeable rotors, each with 26 starting positions, and a complex plug board, the Enigma was a portable, easy-to-use machine which, when operated properly, offered an unprecedented level of security. Mere possession of a machine, without a knowledge of the exact settings chosen for a particular text, made a solution practically impossible, Nevertheless, work undertaken by the Polish Cipher Bureau before World War II indicated that certain intrinsic flaws (such as the inability of the machine to select an identical letter of the alphabet as a substitute) and common operator errors could be exploited with the assistance of perforated sheets of paper acting as a rudimentary computer to calculate the original settings of the rotors. Study of the Enigma and a reconstruction of the plug-board wiring enabled British cryptographers to read some Luftwaffe traffic in 1940, building on a coup with **Abwehr** signals achieved in 1939 after compromised hand ciphers had been found to have been reencyphered on the Abwehr's Enigma circuits.

Access to the enemy's Enigma ciphers gave the Allies a tremendous advantage, which shortened the conflict by an estimated two years. The sanitized summaries, distributed on a very limited basis and code-named ULTRA, had a significant impact on the war, especially in North Africa, the Battle of the Atlantic, the search for the Kriegsmarine's surface raiders, and the success of **D-Day**.

When the Germans recovered British TypeX machines at Dunkirk in 1940, they recognized them as modified Enigma machines and, believing their ciphers to be impregnable, assigned only a handful of cryptographers to work on the British machine cipher traffic. In contrast, more than 15,000 people based at **Bletchley Park** concentrated on the Enigma traffic.

At the end of the war GCHQ refurbished many of the enemy's captured Enigma machines and distributed them to Commonwealth and other countries as a secure means of communication. When Fred Winterbotham revealed the scale of GCHQ's cryptographic success in *The ULTRA Secret* (1974), some were still in use by the Nigerians and the Swiss military.

ENORMOZ. The Soviet code name for the joint NKVD and GRU operation conducted against the Manhattan Project, with the intention of acquiring Anglo-American atomic secrets and thereby assisting the development of a Soviet weapon. Supervised personally by Lavrenti Beria, ENORMOZ was initiated in 1940 following information received from the rezidentura in London indicating that the War Cabinet in **Great Britain** had decided to embark on a major research program to produce a viable device. Technically unqualified Soviet personnel in London encouraged their sources to supply further material, but in 1943 their colleagues in New York and San Francisco were able to exploit agents, usually members of the Communist Party of the United States of America, who submitted reports on highly classified work then under way at Oak Ridge, Berkeley, Chicago, and Los Alamos in the United States. The full extent of ENORMOZ became evident only with the declassification in 1995 of the VENONA texts, which identified the code names of more than 40 participants, among them Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, Klaus Fuchs, and Ted Hall.

EPSILON. The code name for a British operation conducted at the end of World War II at Farm Hall, Godmanchester, in Cambridgeshire, to extract information from 10 captured German physicists. The scientists were accommodated for six months in a large country house that had been wired for sound, and the most private conversations conducted among the detainees were recorded for analysis. The transcripts proved the enemy had not come close to developing an atomic bomb, had not misled their interrogators, and had been shocked by the news that the Allies had dropped nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

EXFILTRATION. The process of the clandestine removal of an individual from a particular country. Exfiltration may require either that the regular exit controls be duped, by use of false documents and disguises, or evaded altogether. Examples of the former include the rescue of American diplomats from hiding in Tehran in 1979 when the U.S. embassy had been occupied by Iranian radicals, and the exfiltration of Ryszard Kuklinsky and Oleg Gordievsky, who were driven out of Poland and the Soviet Union, respectively, in black operations by intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover.

EXPULSIONS. Under the terms of the Vienna Convention, the only sanction available to a host country that suspects a foreign diplomat has abused his or her privileges is a declaration of the diplomat as persona non grata with a requirement to leave within a specified period. Expulsions may be ordered on an individual basis or occasionally in larger groups, an example being Operation FOOT in 1971 following the **defection** of **Oleg Lyalin**, a **KGB** officer based in London who revealed the extent of the intelligence professionals operating under diplomatic cover.

- F -

FALKLANDS CONFLICT. The unexpected seizure of the Falkland Islands or Islas Malvinas in April 1982 by the **Argentine** junta led by Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri was a failure of intelligence brought about by the **Secret Intelligence Service**'s inability to collect intelligence in Buenos Aires and Argentine guile in not deploying troops monitored by GCHQ. In 1981 the Argentine government had misinterpreted the public announcement that the Royal Navy intended to withdraw HMS *Endurance*, GCHQ's sole **signals intelligence** collection platform in the area, from the South Atlantic, and this led to the mistaken assessment that **Great Britain** would not fight to recover the disputed islands if there was an invasion. The junta also miscalculated that the **United States** would remain neutral in any conflict and that the **Soviet Union** would veto any resolution critical of Argentina.

During the conflict, which was never formally declared a war in order to avoid declarations of neutrality from strategically important countries in West Africa, the SIS conducted an effective operation to prevent Argentina from acquiring any further reloads of the lethal French-built Exocet missile, and GCHQ **intercepted** enemy wireless traffic which disclosed the exact location and strength of the occupation forces. A landing by British troops, followed by a swift advance to the capital, Port Stanley, resulted in a humiliating surrender of the garrison, which—following the loss of the cruiser *General Belgrano*, sunk by the nuclear **submarine** HMS *Conqueror*—was isolated from the mainland and supported only by Argentine aircraft.

Following the liberation of the Falklands, a committee of inquiry headed by Lord Franks investigated the failure of intelligence, and the British government's lack of advance notice of Argentine aggression, but only part of the final report was published.

The prosecution of the war was studied with interest by military analysts, as it was the first occasion in which a surface vessel had been sunk by a nuclear submarine (except in practice on exercise), the first time the Royal Navy had engaged an enemy since the Korean War, and the first time a nuclear submarine had been bombed (albeit accidentally by returning Argentine aircraft jettisoning ordnance before landing) by aircraft. The loss of HMS *Sheffield* to a debilitating internal fire carried by cable ducts following an Exocet missile attack prompted a redesign of wiring aboard all naval vessels.

FALSE DEFECTOR. An individual who purports to be a **defector** offering valuable information to an adversary while in fact retaining his or her original loyalty. This unusual concept was first promulgated by

Anatoli Golitsyn, who warned that following his own defection to the Central Intelligence Agency in December 1961 attempts would be made to discredit him by the dispatch of other defectors from the KGB who would bear elaborately fabricated information. No such person was ever identified, although Yuri Nosenko underwent a lengthy interrogation when discrepancies were discovered in his declared background.

The only known example of the KGB deliberately dispatching an officer to the West posing as a defector was Oleg Tumanov, who does not appear to have been used as a conduit for disinformation but simply as a penetration agent; he succeeded in his low-level objective of being accepted as genuine and then gaining a job with Radio Free Europe in Munich before redefecting. However, according to Oleg Kalugin, Tumanov was never a false defector, but simply someone who changed his mind. See also DOUBLE AGENT.

FALSE FLAG. The recruitment of a source by a case officer who misrepresents his own allegiance. This expedient may be the only way of acquiring cooperation, and it was a favorite strategy of intelligence agencies that would not otherwise expect active assistance from targets. For example, in the early 1950s Israel's Mossad ran a false-flag office in the Federal Republic of Germany with the assistance of Ze'ev Avni to cultivate Germans employed on missile development projects in Egypt. Similarly, **Robert Thompson** posed convincingly as a Central Intelligence Agency officer in East Berlin to persuade NATO diplomats to collaborate in what he claimed were highly secret operations.

FAMILY JEWELS. The term applied to a list of highly compromising projects originally drawn up on instructions from Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger a few days before he was replaced by William Colby in May 1973 in an effort to identify past abuses of the Central Intelligence Agency's charter. The final catalog amounted to 693 closely typed pages and was disclosed to the congressional Armed Forces Committee in open session during Colby's confirmation hearings. Some of the items listed were connected with the recent Watergate scandal, but others were ancient history, dating back to the Office of Security's decisions to tap the telephone of journalist Jack Anderson to trace his sources, to intercept incoming and outgoing **Soviet** mail, and to run training courses for certain domestic and foreign police forces. Also mentioned were plots to **assassinate** Patrice Lumumba, **Fidel Castro**, and Rafael Trujillo and evidence that Richard Helms may have misled Congress when he had denied any Agency involvement in overthrowing the **Chilean** government.

The result of Colby's disclosures was a climate of distrust of the CIA and the introduction of congressional oversight intended to prevent the CIA from acting independently and without the approval of the relevant Senate and House committees.

FAPSI. The **Russian** acronym for the Russian Federation's principal **signals intelligence** organization, Federalnoie Agentsvo Pravitelsvennoi Sviazi i Informatsi (Federal Agency for Government Information and Communications), formerly the **KGB**'s Eighth Chief Directorate. Western knowledge of this highly secret agency is largely based on information supplied by a **defector**, Viktor Sheymov, who was **exfiltrated** from the **Soviet Union** in 1980. He had joined the unit in 1971 and his defection was not disclosed until 1992.

FAPSI's two principal overseas **intercept** bases, at Lourdes in **Cuba** and at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, were closed in December 2001 and February 2002, respectively, on grounds of cost. The site at Lourdes had been opened in 1964 and was run jointly by FAPSI's Third Directorate and the **GRU**'s Sixth Directorate; it had employed an estimated 1,100 personnel at an annual cost of \$300 million.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI). Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation came into existence, under that title, as part of the Department of Justice in 1935, it did not enter the counterespionage field until January 1938 when MI5 provided leads regarding Sergeant Gunther Rumrich, the FBI's first case of Nazi espionage in the United States. A Sudetan German who had become a naturalized American citizen, Rumrich—a deserter from the U.S. Army who had absconded with the sergeants' mess funds from Fort Missoula, Montana—confessed under interrogation that he had been recruited as a spy by Germany in May 1936 and ever since had communicated with his controller in Wilhelmshaven through a Mrs.

Jessie Jordan in Scotland. In addition, he named the other members of his network, including two couriers working on the SS Europa and four other spies, among them an aircraft mechanic and a draftsman working for the Sikorsky plant at Farmingdale, New York.

This case was followed in 1940 by a lengthy investigation into the contacts of a reluctant Nazi spy, William Sebold, who led the FBI to a large network in New York headed by Fritz Duquesne. FBI director J. Edgar Hoover's considerable success in breaking up Duquesne's organization, which resulted in more than 30 convictions, mostly from guilty pleas, encouraged him to negotiate President Franklin D. Roosevelt's consent to the establishment of a **Special In**telligence Service to counter an Axis threat from Latin America.

The FBI was late to appreciate the scale of the threat of Soviet espionage and only learned of the true role of the NKVD rezident in New York, Vasili Zubilin, after he had been denounced in an anonymous letter mailed to the FBI in August 1943 by his deputy, Vasili Mironov. Having previously demonstrated considerable complacency in its assessment of the Soviet Union's efforts to build a network in the United States and recruit agents, the FBI mounted a vast surveillance operation to link the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) membership to espionage directed from Moscow. Initially the evidence came from CPUSA defectors, including Louis Budenz and Elizabeth Bentley, but their testimony was to overlap with wiretap evidence, surveillance reports, and VENONA intercepts. Both of the FBI's first major postwar Soviet espionage cases, those of *Amerasia* in 1945 and **Judith Coplon** in 1949, were compromised by legal constraints on the admissibility of wiretap evidence.

Following the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, several FBI Special Intelligence Service veterans moved to the new organization, and the FBI was left with an overseas network of legal attachés (legats) based at U.S. embassies. Although the agency with the lead role in counterespionage, the FBI deliberately avoided developing a cadre of dedicated counterintelligence personnel and instead moved staff around from law enforcement to national security duties.

The FBI has experienced hostile **penetration**. A spy recruited in the New York Field Office and handled in 1968 by the KGB's Oleg **Kalugin** was identified after his retirement but never charged with a crime. In October 1984 **Richard Miller**, a special agent with 20 years' experience in the elite Foreign Counterintelligence squad in California, was arrested and charged with selling classified information to the KGB.

A year later the FBI closed in on Randy Miles Jeffries, a former support employee who had worked for the Bureau between 1978 and 1980. Jeffries had been spotted entering the Soviet Military Office in Washington, D.C., in December 1985 and was quickly identified as a messenger employed by the Acme Reporting Company, the stenographic firm contracted to record and provide transcripts of the closed hearings of the House Armed Services Committee. He was approached at home by an FBI special agent posing as a Soviet intelligence officer, who obtained confirmation that the former addict with a conviction for possession of heroin had given the Soviets a sample of 60 pages of a classified transcript on the procurement of military nuclear systems. A further meeting was arranged in a hotel, where Jeffries was arrested. A search of his home revealed that he had removed material intended for destruction and had smuggled it out of the building with the intention of selling it to the Soviets for \$5,000. Jeffries admitted that, using the code name DANO, he had passed the Soviets transcripts concerning nuclear weapons, the vulnerabilities of U.S. computer and telephone systems, and information about the Trident submarine. In March 1986 he was sentenced to between three and nine years of imprisonment.

In October 1991 another former FBI employee, Douglas Tsou, went on trial, accused of having contacted the government of the Republic of **China** in 1986 and disclosed the identity of a People's Republic of China (PRC) intelligence officer who had been recruited by the FBI. The unnamed PRC officer had approached the FBI in Taiwan, and Tsou passed this information on to a Taiwanese representative in Houston. Originally from Taiwan, Tsou had emigrated to the United States in 1949 and become a naturalized citizen 20 years later, going to work for the FBI in San Francisco in 1980. According to the prosecution, Tsou had passed huge quantities of classified information to Taiwanese contacts throughout the six years he had worked for the Bureau. Convicted on one count of espionage, Tsou was sentenced in January 1992 to a 10-year federal prison term.

In December 1996 **Earl Edwin Pitts**, a 43-year-old FBI special agent with 13 years' experience, was arrested at the FBI's training academy in Quantico, Virginia, and in June 1997 was sentenced to 27 years in prison. The prosecution conceded that all the material he had compromised had been below the level of Top Secret, so he did not have to face a life sentence.

The cases of Miller, Jeffries, Tsou, and Pitts all paled into insignificance when compared to the damage inflicted by **Robert Hanssen**, who was arrested in February 2001 and in July the same year sentenced to life imprisonment.

In April 2003 a recently retired FBI supervisory special agent, James J. Smith, was arrested in Los Angeles and charged with gross negligence, having allowed a known Chinese agent, **Katrina Leung**, whom he had been handling, to copy classified documents. However, the charges against Smith were dropped, and this had the effect of the compromising Leung's prosecution, which was dismissed.

Clearly the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been vulnerable to hostile penetration by both the Russians and the Chinese, but in the post-9/11 political environment, the National Security Division's priorities have been **terrorist** oriented, leaving the organization to fight a turf war in Washington, D.C., to retain a responsibility for counterintelligence and counterespionage operations.

FELLOW TRAVELER. A Communist sympathizer who is not a formal, card-carrying member of the party, but who exercises influence to assist the party's objectives.

FERRET. Clandestine flights conducted during the **Cold War** to test **Soviet** and other hostile countries' radar response to incursions of their airspace. The objective was to penetrate the hostile territory, monitor the local air defenses, and identify the location of radar stations, surface-to-air missile sites, and airfields operating interceptor aircraft. Ferret flights into Soviet airspace resulted in the loss of 12 aircraft and 69 aircrew between 1945 and 2000. A further 81 Americans died in incidents involving North Korean and **Chinese** air defenses over the same period, and in 1992 the **National Security Agency** confirmed that 64 **cryptographers** had died on air reconnaissance missions during the Cold War.

FLAVIUS. Code name for an MI5 surveillance operation conducted in March 1988 that resulted in the deaths of three well-known Provisional Irish Republican Army terrorists—Danny McCann, Seán Savage, and Mairéad Farrell-in Gibraltar. Savage was a bomb maker who had served a month in prison in 1982; McCann, imprisoned for two years for possession of a detonator, had shot two Special Branch officers dead and wounded a third in a bar in August 1987; and Farrell had served 10 and a half years for a hotel bombing in 1976. The three were members of a team of four bombers who planned to detonate a massive car bomb in the center of Gibraltar at the Changing of the Guard. With many tourists there, the atrocity would have claimed many lives, but MI5 had been monitoring the movements of the team since they left republican West Belfast, Northern Ireland, carrying false travel documents. All four were seen conducting a reconnaissance of their intended target. Their parking of a suspect vehicle, a white Renault 5, nearby was assessed erroneously as it later turned out—to be a remotely controlled device that would be initiated by a wireless signal. As three of the terrorists walked toward the border with Spain after parking the car, a four-man 22nd Special Air Service patrol, believing they had been spotted, opened fire on the three, killing them. It later emerged that the trio were unarmed and were not equipped with a remote detonator. The real car bomb was found 30 miles away in an underground parking garage in Malaga; it had been packed with a record 145 pounds of Semtex explosives, with an unattached timer and detonator set to the precise time of the guard change in Gibraltar.

FOLEY, FRANK. Having joined the Secret Intelligence Service after fighting and being wounded with his regiment in World War I, Maj. Frank Foley was posted to Berlin under Passport Control Officer cover in 1920. His task was to represent SIS, liaise with the local authorities, monitor the subversive activities of the Indian nationalists based in Germany, and recruit useful agents. His star source was a disaffected Comintern agent, Johann de Graff, later known as Jonny X, but increasingly his time was dedicated to handling an increasing number of visa applications from Jews seeking to reach Palestine. In 2003 Foley's distribution of entry permits, which saved many thou-

sands of lives from the Holocaust, was acknowledged at Yad Vashem in **Israel**.

Foley remained at his post until the outbreak of war, when he was withdrawn and posted to **Norway**, where he played a vital role in the evacuation by maintaining a radio link with England. Later he would interrogate **Rudolf Hess**, following his unexpected arrival in May 1941, and represent the SIS on the **Twenty Committee**. After the war Foley returned to Berlin to work with the Control Commission. He died in May 1958.

FORTITUDE. Allied code name for the **deception** campaign designed to conceal the true objective of Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of **France** on **D-Day**, 6 June 1944. Certainly the most comprehensive and sophisticated undertaking of its kind ever attempted, the operation consisted of FORTITUDE NORTH, intended to imply an imminent threat to **Norway**, thereby tying up valuable Axis troops there, and FORTITUDE SOUTH, which conveyed the impression that the Allies intended to land in the Pas-de-Calais a couple of weeks after a diversionary feint in Normandy.

Conceived by Roger Hesketh and executed by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force's deception staff, FORTITUDE passed information about a nonexistent First U.S. Army Group, commanded by Gen. George Patton, assembling in East Anglia in anticipation of an invasion to be launched from Dover. The real forces, concentrated in the west of England, were heavily camouflaged, while Luftwaffe aerial reconnaissance flights were allowed to photograph what appeared to be huge numbers of aircraft, tanks, and landing craft in East Anglia—all of whichwere rubber and plywood dummies. Bogus wireless traffic was generated to support the deception, and supposedly indiscreet newspaper stories were published indicating the presence of foreign troops in the southeast. In addition, MI5's double agents inundated the enemy with reports of men and armor moving toward the Channel ports, with the final touch being given by GARBO, who transmitted a message on the eve of the assault warning that an imminent, minor attack on Normandy would be followed a fortnight later by a massive offensive across the shortest stretch of the English Channel.

Enemy documents recovered after the war proved that the **Germans** had accepted a greatly exaggerated Allied **order of battle**, including the First Army Group, and had readily believed that the Pasde-Calais had been D-Day's true objective, to the point that the First SS Panzer Division had been prevented from counterattacking in Normandy and was ordered back to the Franco-Belgian border on D+3.

FRANCE. Prior to World War II the principal French intelligence agencies consisted of the Deuxième Bureau, headed by General Gauché, and Col. Louis Rivet's Service de Renseignements. After the collapse in June 1940, Charles de Gaulle created a new organization in London, the Bureau Centrale de Renseignements et d'Action, headed by André Dewavrin, alias Colonel Passy. It was amalgamated in January 1942 with Captain Lagier's Service Action, and in November 1944 became the Direction Générale des Études et de Recherche. After the war Dewavrin was appointed the first chief of the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) but was arrested on embezzlement charges and replaced in 1946 by a socialist politician, Henri Ribière. In April 1982 the SDECE was renamed the Direction Générale de Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) following a series of scandals that implicated the Elysée Palace in high-risk clandestine operations and drug smuggling.

Top-level political interference in French intelligence operations has been a characteristic of the DGSE, and the two internal security agencies, the **Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire** (DST) and the police Renseignements Generaux, have frequently undertaken illegal investigations of the political opponents of successive presidents. Such activities had become institutionalized to the point of establishing a secret telephone-tapping center, located under Les Invalides in Paris, which monitored targets nominated by the president's private office. *See also* GROUPEMENT DE CONTRÔLES RADIOÉLÉCTRIQUE; *RAINBOW WARRIOR*.

FROLIK, JOZEF. A Czech Statni Bezpecnost (StB) officer who defected to England in 1968, Frolik identified as spies several of his former contacts, from when he had been based in London under labor attaché cover, among them three members of Parliament—Sir

Barnett Stross, Will Owen, and John Stonehouse—and trade union leaders Jack Jones and Ted Hill. He also named Nicholas Prager, a former Royal Air Force radar technician, as a valuable agent codenamed MARCONI, and Prager was convicted and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment. Frolik was **resettled** in the **United States** but returned to **Great Britain** to give evidence against Owen, who was acquitted of having breached the **Official Secrets Act**, but later made a private confession of his espionage.

FRONT. An entity that supplies **cover** to conceal a clandestine operation. Fronts may be commercial, journalistic, or some other expedient that enables intelligence personnel to perform their duties without attracting unwelcome attention or adverse **surveillance**. Fronts may also be **backstopped** to ensure that they offer effective protection. Fronts are routinely exploited by all intelligence agencies, although uniquely the **Central Intelligence Agency** refers to their own wholly owned subsidiaries as "**proprietaries**." Among the best-known fronts have been the Federated Press of America, developed by the **Soviets** between the wars to provide journalistic **cover** to their agents operating in London and Paris; the Foreign Excellent Trenchcoat Company, formed before World War II by the **GRU** in Brussels; and the Four-Square Laundry, created by the British army in Belfast to assist in surveillance and the acquisition of household linen for forensic testing.

Political fronts, being organizations with ostensibly laudable, harmless objectives, act in much the same way. Many intelligence agencies have created, sponsored, or covertly supported pressure groups, unions, or bodies with cultural objectives to pursue their own narrow interests, which may range from the dissemination of propaganda to the **penetration** of other larger organizations. Among the organizations now known to have been manipulated by external intelligence interests are the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the *Tribune*.

FSB. The Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service) is the **Russian** successor to the **KGB**'s Third Chief Directorate. In

1992 President Boris Yeltsin appointed Mikhail Barsukov as its head, but replaced him in 1995 with Nikolai Patrushev. The FSB retains responsibility for counterespionage and counterterrorism, counterdrug and people trafficking, and some anticorruption operations.

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GAMMA GUPY. Code name for the **National Security Agency interception** of Kremlin radiotelephones installed in the **Soviet** leadership's limousines, compromised by a *Washington Post* article on 16 September 1971.

GAVRILOV CHANNEL. In 1983, at the request of the chief of the **KGB**'s **Counterintelligence** Directorate, Anatoli Kireyev, a covert link named after a 19th-century Russian poet was established with the **Central Intelligence Agency**'s **Directorate of Operations**, represented by Burton Gerber. An initial meeting was held in Vienna, and thereafter the channel was used for the CIA to give an assurance that the arrested American journalist Nicholas Daniloff was not associated with the CIA and to request the KGB's assistance in finding the Beirut station chief, William Buckley, who had been abducted in March 1984.

GCHQ. See GREAT BRITAIN.

GEHLEN, REINHARD. The son of a German army officer, Gehlen joined his father's regiment in 1918, and in 1936 was transferred to the General Staff where he played a key role in planning the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, which occurred in June 1941. The following year Gehlen was placed in charge of Foreign Armies East, the military intelligence organization collecting information on the Russian Front. He was dismissed in April 1945, and after the war, Gehlen offered his services, and what was left of his networks, to the U.S. forces. He began his collaboration with the United States in February 1946 and the relationship was formalized in 1949 following the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1956 his organization was renamed the Bundesnachrichtendienst

(BND) and he was its president until he retired in 1968, releasing his memoirs in 1971.

Gehlen proved a controversial figure, not least because his staff included several former Nazis and had been **penetrated** at a high level by the **KGB**. In October 1961 Hans Felfe was identified by a **Polish defector**, **Michal Goleniewski**, and was imprisoned for espionage. He had worked for the Sicherheitsdienst during the war and in November 1951 had joined Gehlen's organization, having been recruited as a Soviet spy two months earlier.

GERHARDT, DIETER. A South African naval officer, Commander Gerhardt was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in January 1983 while attending a mathematics course at Syracuse University and was flown to Pretoria, where he was convicted of treason and sentenced in December to life imprisonment. He had been a walk-in to the Soviet embassy in London in 1960, volunteering to sell NATO secrets while on attachment to the Royal Navy, and had been recruited by the GRU. At the height of his naval career, Gerhardt had commanded the Simonstown naval base near Cape Town. His second wife, Ruth Johr, who was Swiss and supposedly had been provided by the GRU, was convicted of having acted as his courier and sentenced to 10 years.

The existence of a **mole** in South Africa had been suspected since the **KGB illegal Yuri Loginov** had been dispatched to the country, but he had been intercepted and arrested in 1967. At the time of his recruitment, Gerhardt, who claimed to have been motivated by the internment during World War II of his German father, had been married for eight years to an Englishwoman, Janet Coggin, with whom he had three children. In 1999 she wrote an account of her experiences, *The Spy's Wife*, in which she claimed that she had refused her husband's invitation to become a spy, too, and had divorced him before moving to Ireland.

GERMANY. Prussian military doctrine emphasized the necessity of collecting good intelligence, and in 1866 Wilhelm Stieber, then editor of the *Prussian Police Journal*, was appointed Emperor Friedrich Wilhelm's chief spymaster; he undertook a secret mission to London to investigate the activities of émigré radicals, among them Karl

Marx. His request for assistance from Scotland Yard was met with a horrified rejection.

It was the kaiser's spymaster Walther Nicolai who is often credited with having established the first modern European intelligence agency, and it was certainly as a consequence of concerns about the activities of his agents that **Great Britain** and **France** established counterespionage departments. He and Gustav Steinhauer, a former Pinkerton detective, pioneered modern intelligence collection techniques and gained considerable notoriety following the publication of numerous books in the interwar period describing their exploits.

Following the Treaty of Versailles, Germany's intelligence activities were restricted to counterespionage conducted by the **Abwehr**, but following Adolf Hitler's rise to power, Capt. Konrad Patzig and his successor, Adm. **Wilhelm Canaris**, supervised the development of a decentralized collection agency based on Germany's military districts, each assigned overseas targets; Hamburg concentrated on Great Britain and the United States. However, the Abwehr became a refuge for anti-Nazis and in February 1944, following a series of embarrassing high-level **defections**, Canaris was placed on permanent leave and the Abwehr was absorbed into the Reich Security Agency, which included the parallel Nazi intelligence service, the Sicherheits-dienst (SD). Following the 20 July plot to assassinate Hitler, Canaris was arrested, along with several of his Abwehr subordinates and later he was executed, most probably at Flossenburg in February 1945.

After the German surrender, the Allies expressed considerable interest in maintaining the German military intelligence networks in Eastern Europe, managed by Gen. **Reinhard Gehlen**; his offer to continue his organization's operations under American sponsorship was eagerly accepted and led to the establishment of the Federal German **Bundesnachrichtendienst** (BND) at Pullach, outside Munich, in April 1956. The BND is presently headed by Dr. August Hanning, who replaced Dr. Hans-Georg Geiger in 1998. A corresponding internal security apparatus, the **Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz** (BfV), had been established in Cologne in December 1950 under Dr. **Otto John**, and both organizations remain in existence despite having experienced significant hostile **penetration** from the **KGB** and the **East German** Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. The BfV is headed by Heinz Fromm, who replaced Peter Frisch in June 2000.

GIBRALTAR. A British possession since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the Rock of Gibraltar occupies an important strategic position at the entrance to the Mediterranean and has a large dockyard and, since 1941, an airfield. During World War II Gibraltar was a vital link on the sea route to Malta and Alexandria and accommodated both an MI5 defense security officer and a Secret Intelligence Service station. It acted as a base for Special Operations Executive activities overland into southern Spain or by caique to southern France, and MI9 received evaders at the frontier for transfer to England.

After World War II the interior of the Rock, extensively tunneled over many decades, provided secure accommodation for a **SOSUS** terminal that monitored Eastern Bloc **submarine** transits and surface movements through the natural choke point. *See also* COPPER-HEAD; FLAVIUS.

GIDEON. Canadian Security Service code name for a KGB illegal posted to Montreal, posing as a photographer named David Soboloff, who surrendered himself to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in November 1953 because he had fallen in love with the wife of a Canadian soldier and wanted political asylum. He was persuaded to act as a double agent, revealing the identity of his handlers, but when he was recalled to Moscow in October 1955 he failed to hold a rendezvous, as arranged. with his British contacts. He had been betrayed by an RCMP mole, Gilles Brunet, and disappeared for 15 years into Lefortovo prison. In 1990 he walked into the British embassy in Vilnius, Lithuania, and was exfiltrated by Secret Intelligence Service and Canadian Security Intelligence Service personnel to Ottawa, where he was given \$1 million compensation and resettled with his Russian wife.

GLADIO. The code name for the NATO **stay-behind** organization that had been trained and equipped to collect intelligence and generally harass the enemy in the event of a **Soviet** invasion and occupation of **Italy**. Similar contingency plans had been prepared across Central Europe, and they became controversial for two reasons. First, in the Italian example, the vetting procedures employed to screen the volunteers had necessarily excluded leftists, and the candidates accepted for the program included some radical right-wing extremists who

were suspected of having allowed weapons and matériel to pass to **terrorist** groups with whom they were sympathetic. For example, the Bologna Railway Station bombing in August 1980, in which 85 people died, is an atrocity believed to have been carried out by terrorists using GLADIO explosives. In Belgium, too, there was evidence of similar equipment falling into the wrong hands and being used for criminal and political purposes.

The second embarrassment was the extension of NATO's training program to volunteers from neutral countries, including Finland, **Sweden**, Austria, and **Switzerland**. Each country had its own staybehind arrangements, but the issue was to prove controversial in Helsinki, where the organization was a cell-based structure known as Stella Polaris; in Stockholm, where an arms cache was discovered stored in the cellars of a radio station owned by a right-wing political activist; and in Bern, where the military unit designated **P-26** had been authorized and controlled by the chief of staff without the knowledge of his ministers or the Conseil d'Etat.

GOLENIEWSKI, MICHAL. In 1961 Goleniewski, a senior Polish intelligence officer, defected to the Central Intelligence Agency, providing the most spectacular information. As a self-motivated spy, he had supplied information anonymously, and when he finally fled Poland with his girlfriend, he came with an impressive "meal ticket" because he had knowledge of KGB operations as well as Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB) activities. The key to his success had been his dual role as a KGB asset inside the SB, trusted implicitly by both. As a consequence of his information, several spies were arrested in the West, including the Secret Intelligence Service turncoat George Blake, and Harry Houghton, then working on highly classified submarine detection systems at the Royal Navy's Underwater Weapons Research Establishment at Portland. Unfortunately Goleniewski's value rapidly diminished upon his arrival in the United States in January 1961 with his demand to be known as the tsarevich, Prince Alexei Romanov, son of Tsar Nicholas II. Realizing his credibility would plummet if he were allowed to give evidence to the Senate's Internal Security Subcommittee, as had been requested, the CIA humored his eccentricities and kept him away from Congress.

GOLITSYN, ANATOLI. A KGB officer working under diplomatic cover at the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, Golitsyn defected to the Central Intelligence Agency in December 1961 and proved to be one of the most influential defectors of the Cold War. As well as identifying several Soviet spies active in the West-including Hugh Hambleton, Georges Pacques, and Elsie Mai, a Finn inside the local British consulate—and extensive **penetration** of the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) in France with a spy ring code-named SAPPHIRE, he also revealed the existence of a sophisticated disinformation scheme intended to mislead the West about the Kremlin's long-term objectives. His interpretation of Moscow's Machiavellian strategy was articulated in his book New Lies For Old, and Leon Uris based his novel Topaz on Golitsyn's revelations of the SAPPHIRE network. Under the sponsorship of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, he was resettled in Florida and encouraged to visit Allied security and intelligence agencies to advise on countermeasures.

Golitsyn was to become controversial because the adherents of his theories, including **James Angleton**, gave him unprecedented access to operational files in a search for **moles**, and the subsequent investigations disadvantaged the careers of several intelligence professionals, including Peter Karlow, David Murphy, and Alexander Sogolow, who came under suspicion. Golitsyn also propagated the idea that the KGB would dispatch false defectors to discredit him, and acceptance of this led to the lengthy interrogation of Yuri Nosenko in 1964, although the only evidence to suggest the KGB ever adopted such a risky tactic was the example of **PROLOGUE**.

After his daughter died in 1974, Golitsyn contemplated suicide, but then pursued his theories with even greater vigor. He denounced Courtney Young and Guy Liddell of MI5 and Harold Shergold of the Secret Intelligence Service as Soviet moles and claimed that Oleg Penkovsky had been a skillful KGB manipulation from the outset. He also identified Isaiah Berlin, Sir Rudolf Peierls, and Victor Rothschild as British VENONA spies and named Averell Harriman and the veteran CIA case officer George Kisevalter as long-term KGB agents. Furthermore, he named the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire's deputy chief as a spy, code-named GARMASH, and insisted **Dmitri Polyakov** (TOP HAT) and Aleksei Kulak (FEDORA) had been deliberately planted on the **Federal Bureau of Investigation**.

Originally from the Ukraine, Golitsyn had met Josef Stalin and Georgi Malenkov in 1952 when he was a 26-year-old lieutenant and had undergone a political transformation when Nikita Khrushchev exposed Stalin's crimes in February 1956. Two years later, after a spell in a counterintelligence section dealing with the **United States**, he participated in the abduction in Vienna of Tremmel, the leader of an émigré organization, and in 1960 was posted to Helsinki, whence he eventually defected.

GORDIEVSKY, OLEG. A "line PR" political reports specialist of the Third Department of the KGB's elite First Chief Directorate, which covered Scandinavia and Great Britain, Gordievsky was disillusioned after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and had been warned of his future behavior because of his affair with his secretary. Gordievsky had been a member of Mikhail Luibimov's rezidentura in Copenhagen since October 1972, on his second tour of duty in Denmark as press attaché, and was pitched by the Secret Intelligence Service station commander, Robert Browning, whom he had encountered casually at a local squash club.

Quite apart from producing a veritable bonanza of highly relevant information from the very heart of the Third Department, Gordievsky's survival represented SIS's essential integrity, proving that the organization could run a successful **penetration** into the KGB without fear of compromise. Gordievsky was responsible for a series of Soviet **expulsions**. The first to go, in December 1982, was a naval attaché, Capt. Anatoli Zotov of the **GRU**, and he had been followed a month later by Vladimir Chernev, ostensibly a translator at the International Wheat Council. Finally, in April 1983, three diplomats and a correspondent, Igor Titov, had been expelled. All had been fingered by Gordievsky, who had given the SIS a comprehensive analysis of the KGB's *rezidentura*, thus allowing **MI5** to concentrate its limited resources on the best targets.

Gordievsky's knowledge extended far beyond the Third Department, and he revealed that his brother had trained as an **illegal** for deployment by Directorate S into West **Germany**. He also knew where his contemporaries had been posted, and his information was a con-

tributor to the West's efforts to curb the KGB. The positive identification of a Soviet diplomat as an intelligence professional can be of immense value to an overstretched security apparatus unsure of which target to concentrate on, and the statistics of Soviet expulsions worldwide began to escalate markedly in 1983, when 111 officials were declared **persona non grata** from 16 countries during the first eight months of that year. Between 1978 and August 1983 a total of 316 espionage suspects were removed from 43 countries, a figure that might have indicated to a vigilant analyst in Moscow that the KGB had sprung a leak. If the tips had been traced back to the SIS, doubtless the KGB would have conducted a mole hunt to trace the culprit.

On 17 May 1985, having been named the rezident designate, Gordievsky was unexpectedly summoned home to Moscow, supposedly for consultations, but he was very suspicious and agreed only when he had been assured by his SIS handler at an emergency meeting that there was no reason to believe he was in any danger. However, upon his arrival he realized his apartment had been searched, and when he reached KGB headquarters at Yasenevo, he was accused of being a spy. He denied the accusation and resisted his interrogators, who used drugs in an attempt to extract a confession, but although the KGB had been tipped off to his dual role, there was apparently not sufficient evidence to justify an arrest. Although under heavy **surveillance**, Gordievsky was able to shake off his watchers while jogging in a park at the end of July and make contact with the SIS, sending an emergency signal requesting a rescue. The ostensibly innocuous signal was nothing more elaborate than Gordievsky appearing on a prearranged street corner, at a particular time, carrying a shopping bag, but it was received and promptly relayed to London.

The distress signal prompted the SIS chief, Christopher Curwen, to fly to Scotland immediately to brief Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was then staying with the queen at Balmoral, while the Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe was visited at Chevening in Kent. When informed of the need for their permission to undertake the perilous act of removing Gordievsky from Moscow under the watchful eyes of the KGB, both approved the plan, and arrangements were made for him to be exfiltrated to Finland by the Moscow station commander, Viscount Asquith, in his Saab. He acted as a good Samaritan, escorting a pregnant member of the embassy staff for

medical treatment in Helsinki, while Gordievsky climbed aboard at a rendezvous outside Leningrad and was driven over the frontier at Viborg. Once in Finland he was greeted by the Helsinki commander, Margaret Ramsay, and then driven to Tromsø, Norway, for a flight the next day from Oslo to London. He was then accommodated briefly at a country house in the Midlands, where he was visited by Curwen, and then put up at Fort Monkton for a lengthy debriefing, lasting 80 days, conducted by the SIS's principal Kremlinologist, Gordon Barrass. Among Gordievsky's other visitors was **Director of Central Intelligence William Casey**, who was flown down to the fort for a lunch hosted by Curwen.

GOTT, RICHARD. A left-wing British journalist and author of several books on the liberation movements of Latin America, Gott, the son of a World War II general, was identified by Oleg Gordievsky as a long-standing agent of influence run by the London *rezidentura*. Then working as the literary editor of the *Guardian*, Gott acknowledged that he had held clandestine meetings with KGB officers in London and Vienna and had failed to declare payments from them. He resigned from his newspaper but continues to contribute articles periodically.

GOUZENKO, IGOR. A **GRU** cipher clerk based at the **Soviet embassy** in Ottawa, **Canada**, Gouzenko **defected** in September 1945 and delivered 109 documents from the *referentura* to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) identifying a large number of GRU spies active in Canada. A royal commission was appointed to review the documents, cross-examine Gouzenko, and take evidence from the suspected spies, and its report was subsequently published. Seventeen members of the exposed GRU network were prosecuted, of whom nine were convicted of espionage. Gouzenko, his wife, and children were **resettled** in Canada and occasionally made public appearances to defend themselves from criticism. With help from his RCMP interpreter, he wrote *Fall of a Titan* and his wife published *Before Igor*, and their story was turned into a movie.

GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS (GCHQ). See GREAT BRITAIN.

GRAY DECEIVER. The Federal Bureau of Investigation code name for the mole thought to have existed within the U.S. counterintelligence community following the arrest of Aldrich Ames in February 1994. The FBI investigation, code-named GRAY SUIT, was convinced that the spy was a veteran Central Intelligence Agency counterintelligence officer, Brian Kelley, but he turned out to be Kelley's neighbor, Robert Hanssen.

GREAT BRITAIN. Although Britain's various intelligence organizations can be traced back to the Elizabethan era, the modern security and intelligence structure is based on the separation of responsibilities established during World War I when the Home and Foreign departments of the Secret Service Bureau evolved into the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), leaving the Admiralty with the supervision of signals **interception** and decryption. In 1919 signals intelligence was passed to the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) and continued under SIS's umbrella until 1946 when, as the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), it moved from **Bletchley Park** to Eastcote and was placed under the control of the Foreign Office. Accordingly, the United Kingdom now maintains three principal intelligence agencies-MI5, SIS, and GCHQ-with a total budget in excess of a billion pounds. Now based at Benhall in Cheltenham, GCHQ employs more staff than the other two agencies combined, although exact strengths are not published.

During World War II numerous other agencies enjoyed a brief existence, including the **Special Operations Executive** (SOE), which conducted resistance and sabotage operations in Nazi-occupied territory, and **British Security Coordination**, which acted as an umbrella for MI5, SIS, SOE, and the Political Warfare Executive in New York. None survived significantly into the postwar era, although regional representative organizations were maintained in the Middle East (Security Intelligence Middle East and the **Inter-Services Liaison Department**), Far East (**Combined Intelligence Far East**), Iraq (**Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq**), and the **Aden** Intelligence Centre.

GRENADA. The invasion of this Caribbean island in October 1982 by a supposedly multinational force led by the **United States** to restore

democracy was an intelligence-led event following the arrival of **Cuban** troops and an expansion of the airport. Aerial reconnaissance showed the runway was being extended with Cuban support to 9,000 feet, and the suspicion was that Grenada had been earmarked as a regional base for long-range **Soviet** aircraft. The assassination of Marxist prime minister Maurice Bishop acted as the catalyst for American intervention and a large U.S. naval task force seized the island, much to the dismay of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose government had not been informed of the plan to occupy a Commonwealth country.

The U.S.-led invasion was supported on the ground by a single **Central Intelligence Agency** officer, a woman who distinguished herself by taking a sample of the runway to measure the depth and determine whether it could sustain landings by heavy-lift aircraft. The operation succeeded, but at a cost of 19 killed and 115 wounded, some by friendly fire, and the loss of three helicopters shot down by unexpectedly efficient antiaircraft fire.

GROUPEMENT DE CONTRÔLES RADIOÉLÉCTRIQUE (GCR). France's signals intelligence organization, based at Domme in the Dordogne, with intercept stations located at French military installations overseas. During the Cold War there were others at Bahrsdorf in the Harz mountains, at Appen in Hamburg, and at Landau. The French did not share their product with the U.S. National Security Agency, with the exception of data collected at a station at Berlin's Tegel airport, which was also shared with the German Bundesnachrichtendienst.

GRU. Originally known as the Third Department of the Red Army's General Staff, the Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie—the Soviet military intelligence service—was created in October 1918 but adopted that title only in June 1942. Like its NKVD counterpart, the GRU operated parallel foreign intelligence collection channels, one based on local *rezidents*, usually working under cover posts in the military attaché's offices, with another reliant on illegals. The West's knowledge of this organization was revealed by a defector, Walter Krivitsky, who had been the GRU's illegal *rezident* in The Hague until September 1937. Further information was imparted by Vladimir

Rezun, who defected to the **Secret Intelligence Service** in June 1978 while under **United Nations** cover in Geneva; later he was to write several not entirely accurate accounts of the GRU under the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov, leading some to suspect that he had not been their only author.

- **GT/EASTBOUND. Central Intelligence Agency** code name for an undisclosed spy betrayed by **Aldrich Ames**. The spy was presumed arrested after his CIA contact, Erik Sites, was ambushed in May 1986 as he attempted to make contact with him in a Moscow park.
- **GT/VILLAGE. Central Intelligence Agency** code name for an undisclosed spy who, after being betrayed by **Aldrich Ames**, was recalled to Moscow from the **Soviet** consulate in Surabaya, Indonesia, in March 1986 and executed.
- **GUILLAUME, GUNTER.** A close friend and one of three personal assistants to **German** chancellor Willi Brandt, for whom he worked in his private office; he was also a long-term **mole** run personally by **Markus Wolf**, the legendary chief of the **East German** Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), who had recruited him and his wife Christel 18 years earlier.

Guillaume had arrived in West Germany as a refugee in 1956, four years after he had joined the East German army as a loyal Communist party member and had served as an officer with the rank of captain. He had also been trained as an agent, and when he settled in Frankfurt, supposedly as an authentic refugee, Guillaume joined the Social Democratic party (SDP) as a voluntary worker before becoming a full-time party functionary. In 1970 he expressed the wish to become a civil servant in Bonn and, having sailed through a security check that failed to reveal his service as an officer in the East German army, was appointed to the economic and social affairs staff of the Chancellery. Soon afterward, Brandt had picked him to act as his link to the SDP, and he maintained an office both in the party's headquarters and in the Palais Schaumburg. For the next three years Guillaume enjoyed access to the very highest classifications of secret information and passed it back to Wolf, who shared it with Moscow. As well as material about West Germany's foreign policy and relations with NATO, Guillaume passed on details of Brandt's rather exotic extramarital affairs which, at that time, were completely unknown to the public.

The spy's run of luck ended when suspicions were raised about the existence of a top-level mole with direct access to Brandt, and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) launched an investigation. Exactly how the BfV got onto Guillaume remains a matter of speculation, and much of what has been written about the case, including by Wolf himself, has suggested that the BfV initiated an investigation after a study of illicit East-West communications found traces of an illegal code-named GEORG who had completed several missions in the 1950s. Allegedly a detailed analysis of contemporary decrypted East German wireless traffic had revealed a message, dating back to April 1957, in which a source known as "G.G." had been sent birthday greetings. Supposedly this clue had led the BfV mole hunters to conduct a lengthy trawl for anyone with the same birthday, and eventually the field had narrowed to Guillaume's son Pierre. "G.G." was somehow linked to the missions undertaken by GEORG, and both agents were tentatively identified as Guillaume, who was placed under intensive surveillance.

Gunter Nollau, the BfV's counterintelligence chief briefed his interior minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on 29 May 1973 and informed him that Guillaume was the subject of an investigation. Wolf was probably told about this much later by his star mole in the BfV, Klaus Kuron (who had offered to spy for the HVA in 1982 and continued undetected until the collapse of East Germany in 1989), but instead of moving Guillaume away from access, no action was taken, and this inertia led to Nollau's subsequent resignation. Thus, much to everybody's embarrassment, Guillaume was allowed to continue spying for 11 months before he was finally confronted and was even allowed to accompany Brandt on his holiday to his hideaway retreat at Hamas, Norway. During these final months Christel reported that she thought she was being watched, but Wolf did not take much notice of this warning, on the assumption that agents often develop a healthy degree of paranoia, and failed to extract his two agents before they were finally confronted by the BfV. Wolf was also influenced, he admitted later, by Christel's new job as an aide to Georg Leber, Brandt's defense minister.

Whatever the source of the initial tip, Guillaume came under intensive surveillance, which he also spotted. He was arrested by the BfV on 24 April 1974, provoking a major political scandal that led to Brandt's resignation just 12 days later. When the police burst into his house, Guillaume did not attempt to deny he was a spy—indeed, he identified himself proudly as an officer and citizen of the German Democratic Republic and demanded the appropriate, respectful treatment! He was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment in Rheinbach prison, outside Bonn, and Christel received eight. Suffering from kidney disease, he was released in October 1981 in a **spy swap** and returned as a hero to East Germany, where he died in April 1995.

According to the **KGB** *rezident* in Karlshorst, Sergei Kondrashev, the information from Guillaume, whose code name was HANSEN, was "of such extraordinary importance" that the KGB's chairman, **Yuri Andropov**, often passed it personally straight to Andrei Gromyko, **Soviet** premier Leonid Brezhnev's foreign minister. An officer messenger then waited for him to read the material, "information of the best quality on the situation in Germany and on discussions with the Western powers," and returned it to the KGB's headquarters. After Guillaume's exposure Brezhnev wrote a personal note to Brandt denying any personal knowledge of the espionage, but few believed him because he too must have been one of his recipients and beneficiaries.

Certainly, in political terms, Guillaume was in a position to reassure the Soviet bloc that détente was not a ruse and to supply crucial reports in 1973, when a potentially damaging political split had developed over policy between the Nixon administration in the **United States** and Washington's European partners in NATO. The case established Wolf's almost mythological reputation, and in January 1974 he was awarded East Germany's most coveted decoration, the Karl Marx medal, while his minister of state security, Erich Miekle, was appointed to full membership of the Politburo.

GUNMAN. An American code name for the investigation conducted in 1984 into the discovery that a consignment of IBM Selectric typewriters had been intercepted by the **KGB** while consigned to the U.S. **embassy** in Moscow and fitted with miniature transmitters that recorded each keystroke. The typewriters were used in the embassy until the transmitters were found and removed.

GUNNERSIDE. The code name assigned by the **Special Operations Executive** to a plan to infiltrate saboteurs into **Norway** in February 1943 to destroy the hydroelectric plant at Vermork upon which the Nazis were dependent for the production of heavy water, a commodity thought to be an essential moderator in an atomic pile when achieving a chain reaction.

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HAINAN INCIDENT. In March 2001 an American EP-3 Orion flying a routine signals intelligence collection mission off the coast of the People's Republic of China was intercepted by a pair of J-8 jet fighters, one of which accidentally collided with the U.S. plane. The pilot succeeded in landing the badly damaged aircraft on Hainan Island where Chinese troops arrested the crew of 24 and examined the sophisticated intercept equipment. After 11 days of tense diplomatic negotiations, the crew was released and the plane was dismantled, packed into two huge cargo planes, and flown back to the United States.

HAMBLETON, HUGH. A Canadian academic who worked as a NATO intelligence analyst and spied for the KGB between 1956 and 1961, Hambleton came from a left-wing, intellectual family and was identified as a Soviet agent in 1961 by Anatoli Golitsyn. He would later work at the London School of Economics and at Laval University in Quebec, but was not prosecuted, even when his home was raided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Although he had been warned that he might be arrested if he visited England, Hambleton flew to London on a visit in June 1982 and was charged with breaches of the Official Secrets Acts. He was convicted, sentenced to 10 years in prison, and eventually deported to Canada.

HANSSEN, ROBERT. The son of a Chicago policeman, Hanssen had 25 years with the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** and was weeks away from his retirement when he was arrested in February 2001 as he placed a rubbish bag filled with classified documents in a **dead drop** in a park in Northern Virginia. He came from a troubled background and—in spite of his appearance of being a family man, hap-

pily married with six children, and an active member of his Roman Catholic church, where he attended meetings of Opus Dei—Hanssen was a psychiatric textbook case of contradictions. While his colleagues at work joked that he had the appearance of an undertaker, he led a bizarre private life dominated by sexual fantasies, which he posted on a sordid internet site under his own name, and a year-long relationship with a Washington, D.C., stripper whom he took on an official visit to Hong Kong. Tormented by demons, Hanssen hid a videocamera in his bedroom and taped his bedtime escapades with his wife, which he then showed to a male friend.

A right-winger and an ardent gun collector, but with a heavy mortgage and six children at private schools, Hanssen later claimed to have been a Jekyll and Hyde personality motivated by fear of failure and anger at being passed over for promotion and not having had his talents recognized by the FBI. In fact the Bureau had acknowledged his computer and accounting skills, but had failed to link him to the mole that a post-Aldrich Ames damage assessment had concluded was still active. As a Soviet counterintelligence analyst, Hanssen knew how to exploit the Bureau's limitations and, like Ames, had sufficient grasp of the **tradecraft** to take the appropriate precautions to avoid detection. He was considered a computer genius and constantly monitored the systems to spot tell-tale traces of any sensitive, compartmented surveillance operations that might have endangered him. Unlike Ames, Hanssen was not the subject of routine **polygraph** tests to retain his security clearances and took care to protect his identity from his Soviet contacts, although doubtless they quickly worked out that he was a senior FBI officer, if not his actual name.

Hanssen compromised up to 6,000 pages of highly classified documents and was responsible, in his very first letter in October 1985, for tipping off the KGB to the existence of two FBI recruits inside the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., Sergei Motorin and Valeri Martynov, both of whom were promptly recalled to Moscow and executed. In addition he named **Boris Yuzhin**, who was sentenced to 15 years in a labor camp, and implicated Gen. **Dmitri Polyakov**, a **GRU** retiree who had volunteered his services to the FBI in New York in January 1962 when he had been deputy *rezident*. Code-named TOP HAT, Polyakov avoided discovery until he was named by Hanssen, after which he was executed for treason.

The person who eventually sealed Hanssen's fate was a retired KGB officer to whom the FBI had been alerted by a source codenamed AVENGER. Having provided the clues that led to the arrests of Earl Edwin Pitts and David Nicholson, the FBI pressed AVENGER for information that would assist their major mole hunt, code-named GRAY SUIT, which was intended to find the spy who must have operated in parallel with, but in isolation from, Ames. The FBI's principal suspect, code-named GRAY DECEIVER, was a veteran CIA counterintelligence officer, Brian Kelley, who had spent much of his career studying Soviet illegals and, most recently, had tried to entrap Felix Bloch. Instead of supplying the information himself, AVENGER recommended another source who in October 2000 had access to original documents from the KGB's "Ramon Garcia" file, together with a tape of one of the spy's brief, two-minute telephone contacts with his handler in Washington, Aleksandr Fefelov, in August 1986. The voice on the tape turned out to be that not of Kelley, but of Hanssen, who was then promptly code-named GRAY DAY and placed under intensive surveillance.

The final linchpin proved to be one of the original plastic trash bags that Hanssen had left at a dead drop, from which the FBI laboratory succeeded in lifting two latent fingerprints. Being caught in the act of filling a dead drop was the final part of a lengthy surveillance operation supervised personally by the FBI director, Louis Freeh, who knew Hanssen and his family and even worshipped in the same church.

The damage assessment analyzing the scale of Hanssen's betrayal amounted to a veritable catalog of the nation's most treasured secrets, including MONOPOLY, the tunnel dug under the Soviet compound at Mount Alto, packed with National Security Agency equipment to eavesdrop on Russian conversations; and the "continuity of government" contingency plans to protect the president and his staff in deep bunkers in the event of a nuclear conflict. Hanssen supplied a copy of *The FBI's Double Agent Program*, which summarized every current operation, and the 1987, 1989, and 1990 versions of the annual *National Intelligence Program*, which set out interagency plans and objectives. Incredibly, Hanssen even revealed to the KGB that one of their most impressive defectors, Viktor Sheymov, was now using the alias "Dick Shepherd" and ran a successful computer software com-

pany in Washington, D.C. He also disclosed documents circulated by the **director of central intelligence**—Stealth Orientation and volume 2 of Compendium of Future Intelligence Requirements—and others from the **Central Intelligence Agency**'s Directorate of Intelligence, including two nuclear war assessments for the 1990s, The Soviet Union in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years; a copy of the National HUMINT Collection Plan; and a technical survey of **measurement and signature intelligence** (MASINT) capabilities.

Information about the FBI's mysterious source code-named AVENGER emerged in May 2003 with the conviction in Moscow of Aleksandr Zaporozhsky, a 52-year-old former KGB colonel who allegedly had been lured back to **Russia** in November 2002 after his emigration to the **United States**. Zaporozhsky was accused of having helped the FBI to find Ames and Hanssen, and after a trial that lasted two and a half months, was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment in June 2003. According to a statement released upon his conviction, Zaporozhsky, formerly the deputy chief of the First Department of Directorate K until his premature retirement in 1997, had been living in Cockeysville, Maryland, with his wife Galina when he was ensnared. The **SVR** claimed that Zaporozhsky had contacted the CIA in 1995 and then left the country illegally three years later, supposedly to take up a position with the Walter Shipping Company, described as an FBI **front**.

HESS, RUDOLF. In May 1941 Hess, Adolf Hitler's deputy führer, created a sensation by flying himself across the North Sea in an Me-110 and parachuting into Scotland, apparently seeking to negotiate peace terms between **Germany** and the British government. Hess was eventually accommodated as a prisoner of war at Mytchett Place, Aldershot, where he was interrogated by a succession of British intelligence officers, who concluded that he was deranged. He stood trial at Nuremburg accused of war crimes in 1945 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He died, apparently by his own hand, having hanged himself with an electrical cord in the garden of Spandau Prison in Berlin in August 1987.

HISS, ALGER. A graduate of Johns Hopkins University and Harvard Law School, Hiss joined the U.S. State Department in 1936, and in

1946 he was appointed president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Two years later he was identified as a fellow **Soviet** spy by *Time* journalist **Whittaker Chambers**, but when he sued for libel, he lost the action and was himself imprisoned for libel, serving four years at the Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary in Pennsylvania. Hiss always protested his innocence but the release of **VENONA** texts in July 1995 proved that a spy code-named ALES had been recruited by the **GRU** in 1935, along with much of his family, and supplied information from inside the State Department. Significantly, ALES was described as having attended the Yalta Conference in 1945, and then having traveled on to Moscow.

MI5 in 1938 after he had been turned down by the Secret Intelligence Service, where his brother worked. In poor health, having contracted tuberculosis in China, Hollis became MI5's expert on Communism and was appointed deputy director-general in 1953 and director-general in 1956. He retired in 1965 but was recalled to undergo interrogation on suspicion that he may have spied for the Soviets. The investigation proved inconclusive and, in the absence of anything other than circumstantial evidence prior to his death in 1973, Hollis was cleared. However, when details of the mole hunt were leaked in 1981 by Peter Wright, there was a political furor and the controversy of Soviet penetration of the Security Service was reopened.

HONEYTRAP. The technique of compromising an adversary by means of a sexual trap in which the target is confronted with photographic evidence that would jeopardize his or her career. Before World War I this was institutionalized by the Sicherheitsdienst at the Salon Kitty, a state-sponsored bordello in Berlin where individuals were blackmailed after visiting prostitutes.

During the **Cold War**, the **Soviets** made extensive use of honey-traps to coerce cooperation, from either homosexuals such as John Vassall or vulnerable heterosexuals such as Sir Geoffrey Harrison, the British ambassador in Moscow. Whereas Vassall succumbed to the pressure and continued to supply classified information to the **KGB** until his arrest in 1961, the ambassador reported his relation-

ship with a maid in 1968 and was withdrawn. In another example, the political career of a Conservative member of Parliament, Commander Anthony Courtney, collapsed when photographs were circulated of him, before his marriage, cavorting with his attractive interpreter in a Moscow hotel room. Similarly, several attempts were made to entrap members of the U.S. Marines on guard duty at the American embassy in Moscow and one, Sergeant Clayton Lonetree, was imprisoned in for disclosing information to his KGB contacts.

The honeytrap was not a technique used exclusively by East Bloc intelligence agencies, and Oleg Lyalin was first persuaded to cooperate with a joint MI5-Secret Intelligence Service team when he was surprised during an illicit tryst held with his secretary.

HONORABLE CORRESPONDENTS. French journalists, businessmen, aid workers, and others coopted to assist the French intelligence service, the Direction Générale de Sécurité Extérieure. Honorable correspondents willingly undertake clandestine missions that would be considered unethical by their British and American counterparts.

HOWARD, EDWARD LEE. A defector to Moscow in September 1985, Howard is still blamed—although the Central Intelligence Agency's damage assessment has been revised following the confessions of Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen-for having betrayed many sources and operations, including TAW and TRIGON. Howard's CIA career had been brief, and he had been forced to resign in June 1983 when a routine **polygraph** examination, prior to his posting to Carl Gebhardt's Moscow station, revealed petty theft and drug use. When Howard was identified in July 1985 by the KGB's Vitali Yurchenko as a Soviet source code-named ROBERT who had sold secrets to the Soviets in Austria in September 1984, he was placed under surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at his home in Albuquerque but, using tradecraft he had learned during Jack Platt's "pipeliners" course for case officers assigned to Moscow, he easily eluded the watchers and fled the country in September 1985. A year later, in August 1986, the Soviets announced that Howard had been granted **political asylum** and Soviet citizenship.

Howard's defection was an enormous embarrassment to both the CIA and the FBI, not least because he was the first CIA officer to defect to Moscow. But a greater problem was the assessment of the damage he had inflicted, as initially he was blamed for the various operational failures later attributed to Ames and Hanssen. The expulsion of five U.S. diplomats from the Soviet Union was considered to be his handiwork, and it was also believed that he had been responsible for compromising Adolf Tolkachev, the aeronautics engineer who had been supplying classified material to the CIA since 1977 and was seized by the KGB on 9 June 1985 and executed soon afterward. Howard had been briefed to handle Tolkachev in Moscow and, following the failure of a colleague to complete the pipeliner course, had also been trained to service the source code-named TAW. When the CIA's Office of Security recommended Howard be fired for what his polygraph had disclosed, it had not been told of the sensitive knowledge with which he had been entrusted. The need to preserve secrecy, on this occasion, had meant that instead of being kept "on the reservation," he had been fired, allowing a disgruntled ex-employee to exercise his bitterness and apparently his wish for revenge.

Howard's escape from his home in Albuquerque also served to highlight some additional problems with the way the CIA shared, or failed to share, secret information. The FBI special agents assigned to watch Howard had not been told that he had attended the pipeliner course and should therefore have been considered well versed in countersurveillance techniques. The awkward location of Howard's house meant that it could only be watched remotely via a video link to a van parked nearby, inside which were two FBI special agents monitoring the camera and the wiretap. Whenever Howard or his wife Mary—who had also been trained by the CIA—left the building, the van warned a team in surveillance vehicles that were in the vicinity, ready to pick up his trail. On the night of his escape, his departure from the house, driven by his wife, had gone unnoticed. The setting sun had temporarily obscured the video camera, and the special agent on duty had been distracted by a telephone conversation conducted by the Howards' babysitter in which she gave a graphic account of a sexual adventure with her boyfriend the previous evening.

Not realizing that the FBI had failed to spot their exit, Howard and his wife had gone out for dinner, and then on the journey home he had slipped out of the car and left a "jack-in-the-box" replacement

dummy in the passenger seat. This was classic **Moscow rules** tradecraft, but in fact had been entirely unnecessary because the FBI team had not detected their absence until their car returned to the garage, apparently with two people aboard. Howard had actually caught a bus to the airport and flown abroad unhindered, ingeniously leaving a tape recording, which his wife later played over the telephone to his doctor's answering machine, making an appointment and thus giving the impression to the FBI that he was still at home. Accordingly, by the time it dawned on the FBI that their quarry had disappeared, Howard was safely out of reach.

After his defection, Howard cooperated with author David Wise on a biography, *The Spy Who Got Away*, meeting him in Budapest, and he established a successful insurance business in Moscow. His death was announced in July 2002, apparently as a result of an accident at his dacha outside Moscow.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT). Arguably more temperamental and difficult to handle than technical sources, the recruitment, management, and retention of HUMINT is an essential part of any efficient security or intelligence apparatus. Whereas a **satellite** or listening devices may provide valuable information, only a human source can give indications of political intent. However, the development of human sources can be extremely risky and may compromise case officers. In addition, individuals willing to betray their families, tribe, country, or other allegiance may prove difficult to handle and liable to work to their own agenda, fabricate information, or become a double agent.

Reluctance to engage in this potentially most sordid part of all intelligence work results in an overreliance on technical sources and the dangers inherent therein—and has particular disadvantages in counterterrorist operations where the targets are less vulnerable to technical surveillance.

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ILLEGALS. Professional intelligence personnel who were deployed in the West during the **Cold War** under long-term commercial or other

covers. They were vulnerable to arrest but because they operated in isolation from diplomatic premises, they were rarely the subject of the routine **surveillance** intended to identify intelligence personnel. The discipline of illegals was perfected by the **KGB**, which ran them as Line X personnel through Directorate N, an organization within the First Chief Directorate dedicated to the training, management, and support of illegals. Extremely difficult to detect, illegals invariably transited through a third country before reaching their target environment and often waited for years, developing a "legend," before they were activated to perform particular clandestine duties.

The senior illegal in any territory was designated the illegal *rezident* and fulfilled much the same task as his legal counterpart who enjoyed diplomatic immunity. During the **Cold War**, only two illegal rezidents were ever caught: Willie Fisher in the **United States** in June 1956, and Konon Molody in London in January 1961. Both were convicted of espionage and given long prison sentences, but were subsequently released in **spy swaps**.

IMAGERY. The product of **satellite** and other reconnaissance photography is known generically as imagery and provides **photographic intelligence**.

IMMUNITY. When only circumstantial evidence is available in a suspected espionage case and there is little prospect of a conviction at a criminal trial, a formal immunity from prosecution may be negotiated to extract an intelligence advantage from an individual thought to possess potentially valuable information. Occasionally considered controversial because the procedure may allow a self-confessed spy to go unpunished, it does offer the opportunity to exercise some leverage on an otherwise unpromising case. Such cases are rarely publicized, although the immunity offered to **Kim Philby** in January 1963 and to Anthony Blunt in April 1964 eventually was disclosed.

INDIA. During the colonial period, the Government of India's Intelligence Bureau, usually known as the **Delhi Intelligence Bureau** (DIB), was a small police unit that effectively controlled the security infrastructure of the entire country and ran sources in most subver-

sive organizations. During World War II, the DIB expanded with the assignment of military personnel.

Several of the senior figures in the British intelligence establishment cut their teeth countering subversion in India, including Sir David Petrie, the director of the Intelligence Bureau from 1924 to 1931 and the author of a secret report, Communism in India, 1924– 1927, who was later appointed director-general of MI5 (1940–46). One of his subordinates, Felix Cowgill, updated the document in 1935 for Petrie's successor, Sir Horace Williamson, and later was posted back to England to the Secret Intelligence Service's counterintelligence branch, Section V, then headed by Valentine Vivian, who himself had retired from the Indian Police in 1925 after 19 years of experience. Another influential figure in the British intelligence community in London was Sir Philip Vickery, another Indian intelligence chief, demonstrating that the intelligence establishment was staffed in large measure by professionals who had acquired ample experience resisting Soviet-inspired political subversion that had been infiltrated into the jewel in the British Empire's crown from Persia, China, and Afghanistan.

Since independence in 1948, India's principal intelligence agency has been the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which was created in 1968 within the Cabinet Secretariat and is accountable directly to the prime minister. RAW's main collection targets are Pakistan and Bangladesh, with an emphasis on protecting Indian interests in Kashmir and the Punjab, both states under threat from separatists and insurgents supported by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. In addition, India operates a cryptographic agency, the Joint Cipher Bureau, at Charbatia.

IN OBSCURA. Moments when operational personnel are momentarily out of sight of hostile surveillance are known by this Latin term and may provide an opportunity for the individual to complete operational acts, such as the servicing of a dead drop, maybe a brush contact, or simply a fleeting chance to change into a disguise and thereby elude the watchers.

INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS. The technique of monitoring telephone and radio traffic is known as interception and includes the physical wiretapping of landlines and the scanning of wavelengths to eavesdrop on a target. Since the end of the **Cold War** and the expansion of other means of electronic communications such as fax, text messaging, and email, interception has become more sophisticated to overcome routine encryption and frequency-hopping technology intended to provide protection.

Legislation authorizing interception invariably places a burden on telephone companies and internet service providers to retain comprehensive electronic records for subsequent scrutiny by law enforcement agencies. However, many countries conduct interception operations overseas in violation of local sovereignty, but outside the legal jurisdiction of their own courts. *See also* ENGULF; NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

INTER-SERVICES LIAISON DEPARTMENT (ISLD). During World War II, the innocuous-sounding Inter-Services Liaison Department was the **cover** in the Middle East and the Far East adopted by **Great Britain**'s **Secret Intelligence Service**. The ISLD established regional headquarters in Cairo and Delhi and undertook intelligence-gathering operations independently of, and sometimes in competition with, **Special Operations Executive** and the local regional security apparatus.

IRAN. During and after World War II, Iran was the focus of attention from international intelligence agencies because of the country's strategic location on the Soviet border and its great oil wealth, which was managed for many years by the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). When Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh attempted to nationalize the AIOC's assets in August 1953, he was deposed in Operation BOOT, jointly conducted by the Secret Intelligence Service and the Central Intelligence Agency. The coup restored power to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who developed a feared intelligence apparatus, SAVAK. When the shah was removed by the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Tehran fell into the hands of religious extremists who occupied the U.S. embassy, prompting the Iranian hostage crisis, and who established Hezbollah as an instrument of Iran's intelligence apparatus in the region, concentrating in Gaza and Lebanon.

IRAN-CONTRA. On 16 March 1984 the **Central Intelligence Agency** chief of station in Beirut, Lebanon, William Buckley, was abducted from the basement garage of his apartment block by Hezbollah terrorists. The subsequent efforts of the **director of central intelligence** (DCI), **William Casey**, to secure his freedom led to what became known as the **Iran-**Contra affair.

Casey ordered **satellite imagery** of the Abdullah barracks and all the other suspected Shiite bases and deployed such agents as there were on the ground to monitor suspected Hezbollah activists, but some evidence suggested that Islamic Jihad, which had claimed responsibility for the abduction, had actually been behind it. Islamic Jihad, an extremist cell led by Imad Mugniyah, a Shiite cleric with strong links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, was controlled from Tehran.

The CIA's channel of communication with Tehran depended upon an expatriate entrepreneur, Manucher Ghorbanifar, who had been known to the agency for more than 20 years and was regarded, after many **polygraph** tests, as being wholly unreliable. Indeed, he had even been the subject of a **burn notice**, but he did have a line into the Iranian prime minister's office. His first direct approach to the Agency, in July 1984, claiming to know who was holding Buckley, had been rejected after a polygraph indicated deception, but negotiations with him were subsequently opened with the DCI's personal authority. Ghorbanifar claimed that moderate elements in the Tehran government were anxious to trade Buckley for much-needed weapons, which were the subject of a **United Nations** embargo, so Casey went to President Ronald Reagan and obtained permission to begin talks.

Ghorbanifar's proposal was to exploit the Iranian demand for TOW antitank missiles by buying a quantity from the Israeli army, which possessed a large stock of the formidable weapon, and selling 508 of them to Iran at a vastly inflated price. The Israelis were willing to cooperate on the condition that their own arsenal would be replenished by the **United States**. To encourage the Americans to participate, Tehran was apparently willing to free their hostages in Lebanon. Since technically the United States would not be supplying the missiles directly to Iran, there would be no breach of the UN embargo or U.S. law, so there was theoretically an advantage to all the

parties involved, apart from the repudiation of the president's oftstated policy that he would not negotiate with **terrorists**.

Thus the DCI outmaneuvered his congressional critics by using a National Security Council staffer, Col. Oliver North, as a surrogate. While Casey could testify, as he did, that the CIA was completely unaware at the time that North's consignment of oil drilling equipment was actually Hawk missiles destined for Tehran in contravention of U.S. law, this was nothing more than semantics, for he personally almost certainly did know of the plan long in advance of its execution, and may even have been its original author. Nevertheless, Casey's dubious distinction between what he knew and what his organization knew, and when, provided the CIA with a fig-leaf defense never tested with any rigor. However, the really fatal aspect of the entire scheme was that it never achieved its intended purpose of freeing the unfortunate Buckley.

While it could be argued that North's intervention did obtain the release of two hostages, Benjamin Weir and later Father Lawrence Jenco, it also had the effect of enhancing the status of American captives as a valuable trading commodity. No sooner had Weir and Jenco been freed than another pair, Frank Reed of the Lebanese International School and Joseph Ciccipio of the American University, were abducted—on 9 and 12 September 1984, respectively—almost as though Hezbollah had decided to restock its inventory. Even worse, the terrorists also seized the British churchman, Terry Waite, who had acted for Oliver North as a compliant **cover** for the hostage releases, which were never under any circumstances to be linked publicly to the illicit sale of weapons. Thus, far from enjoying the advantage of success, North's ingenious scheme never accomplished its primary purpose. Indeed, according to some reports, the venture actually served to infuriate the Iranians, who had been told by Ghorbanifar to expect a different model of antiaircraft missile, and instead received outrageously overpriced Hawks, stamped with the Star of David and covered in Hebrew stencils.

The Iran-Contra affair, as it came to be known, and the diversion of the profits from the weapons sales, became the focus of one of a series of congressional investigations. Casey, just back from a grueling tour of the CIA stations in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Hon-

duras, was called to give evidence regarding the CIA's denial of any knowledge that the "oil drilling equipment" had been Hawk missiles until months after the transaction had taken place. Then, on 15 December 1987, while undergoing a medical examination in his office at Langley, he collapsed and was diagnosed as suffering from a massive brain tumor which killed him on 6 May 1988, just as the first witness began his testimony in the Senate.

IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS. On 4 November 1979 a large group of student supporters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and began an occupation of it that lasted for 444 days. Among the hostages were four members of the Central Intelligence Agency station, including the chief, Tom Ahern, along with William J. Daugherty, Malcolm Kalp, and a junior operations support officer. Eventually all the hostages were released, some having endured months in solitary confinement and beatings, but not before the students had reconstructed thousands of shredded documents found in the building, some of them highly classified. These were later published in **Iran** as facsimiles in a 30-volume paperback series with translations, for the purpose of embarrassing the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Personnel records recovered intact helped identify the CIA officers, and they were segregated from the other diplomats. Some of the staff not on the premises at the time the compound was stormed hid with friends and Canadian diplomats in Iran, and the CIA mounted a successful operation to exfiltrate six as members of a film crew in January 1980. A more ambitious rescue attempt, code-named EAGLE CLAW, failed in April when insufficient helicopters from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz reached the staging point near Tehran, one more broke down there, and another collided with a transport plane, killing eight crewmen.

IRELAND. As a neutral during World War II, the Republic of Ireland became a focus of Nazi espionage and British **counterintelligence** operations. A military intelligence organization, designated G-2 and headed by Col. Liam Archer, acted as a domestic security agency, liaising closely with the Garda Siochana, and monitored **German** attempts to establish links with the outlawed Irish Republican Army

(IRA). Under Archer, and later Dan Bryan, G-2 was responsible for capturing 13 Nazi agents who had infiltrated the country: Dr. Hermann Goertz, Willi Preetz, Gunther Scheutz, John O'Reilly, John Kenny, Jack Vickers, and James O'Neill by parachute; Ernst Weber-Drohl, Herbert Tributh, Dieter Gaertner, and Henry Obed by fishing boat; and Walter Simon by **U-boat**. In addition, Werner Unland, an agent who was already in Dublin when hostilities broke out, was captured. Joseph Lenihan became a **double agent**, code-named BASKET, run by **MI5**, and Dr. Richard Hayes succeeded in reading the cipher traffic exchanged between Goertz and Germany.

The extent to which G-2's cooperation with MI5 was known or authorized by the Irish government is unclear, but relations between the two organizations remained excellent until December 1972 when objection was taken to attempts by the **Secret Intelligence Service** to recruit Detective Sergeant Patrick Crinnion as a source inside the Garda Siochana's **Special Branch** with access to information about the **Provisional IRA**. Crinnion and his contact John Wyman were convicted of breaches of the Irish Official Secrets Act and sentenced to three months' imprisonment.

ISRAEL. Handicapped by the lack of diplomatic representation in target countries, Israel is dependent on illegals for the collection of human intelligence and the deployment of Mossad professionals. A country virtually surrounded by hostile nations and beset by Palestinian terrorism, Israel has the advantage of a unique combination of race, nationality, and religion and is very dependent on the efficiency of the four principal components of its security apparatus, the Mossad, Shin Bet, Aman, and Unit 8200. The division of operational responsibility among these separate organizations was established by the Agranat Commission, which was set up to investigate intelligence failures following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Israel has also founded other, smaller intelligence collection groups dedicated to particular targets, including Unit 504, which has been active in running agents in southern Lebanon; LAKAM, which concentrated on scientific targets until it was dismantled in 1986; and Sayeret Balonim, a Special Forces group, later renamed Rimon, which consisted of undercover personnel known as mista'aravim, Israelis running covert operations while disguised as Arabs.

ITALY. Prior to World War II, Benito Mussolini established the Opera Voluntaria per la Repressione Antifascisti (OVRA) as a highly efficient domestic secret police with responsibility for conducting intelligence operations overseas. Following the war, the Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democractica (SISDE) was created as a domestic security service, operating in parallel with its military counterpart, the Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI). In 2002 SISMI was commanded by Gen. Niccolò Pollari.

IVY BELLS. Code name for a National Security Agency project to record Soviet underwater cable transmissions in the Sea of Okhotsk. A pod containing sophisticated electronics was positioned over a cable on the seabed by a specially adapted submarine, the USS Halibut, and recorded the telephone and teleprinter traffic by induction, without the need to compromise the integrity of the cable. The operation was betrayed by Ronald Pelton in 1980, and soon afterward a satellite monitored a recovery operation conducted by a Soviet marine salvage vessel in the area. When the Halibut returned, the pod had been removed. It is now on display in the Red Army Museum in Moscow. Pelton was later betrayed by a KGB defector, Vitali Yurchenko, convicted of espionage, and imprisoned.

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JAMAHIRYA SECURITY ORGANIZATION (JSO). The intelligence apparatus of Libya, the JSO played a significant role during the 1970s in support of European and Palestinian terrorist organizations and was implicated in the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin in April 1986. The JSO also supervised three large consignments of explosives and weapons delivered by ship to the Provisional Irish Republican Army and shot an unarmed policewoman in London in April 1984. One JSO staff officer, Abdelbasset Megrahi, was convicted in a Scottish court convened in The Hague of planting the bomb that destroyed Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988.

JAMAICA. Strategically located in the Caribbean, this former British colony hosted naval intelligence operations during World War II to

combat **U-boat** operations in the area. In the postwar era, Jamaica's highly efficient, British-staffed **Special Branch** monitored Communist subversion. Upon Jamaica's independence in 1962, the **Central Intelligence Agency** established a station in Kingston. During Prime Minister Michael Manley's leftist administration between 1972 and 1980, Jamaica developed strong links to **Cuba**, but when Edward Seaga was elected in 1980, he became a staunch ally of the **United States** and sought to participate in the invasion of **Grenada** in 1983.

JAPAN. Before and during World War II, Japan's security apparatus, the **Kempe'tai**, was a branch of military intelligence operating as a ubiquitous and feared domestic security agency. Following the dissolution of the Kempe'tai in 1945, Japan's sole intelligence agency has been the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office, or Naicho, an analytic organization that operates in the Office of the Prime Minister. Employing an estimated 300, the Naicho draws its staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Police Agency, and until the advent of domestic **terrorism** in the form of a nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in March 1995, it concentrated largely in economic intelligence.

Japan has long been a target for **Soviet** espionage, and in October 1941 a large **GRU** network headed by **Richard Sorge**, a Soviet **illegal** operating under press cover, was rounded up. In January 1954 a **KGB** officer, **Yuri Rastvorov**, **defected** to the **Central Intelligence Agency** and named three of his Japanese spies: Shigeru Takamore, Hiroshi Shoji, and Nobunori Higurashi, all Foreign Ministry officials.

Domestic counterespionage investigations are conducted by the Koancho (Public Security Investigation Agency), created in 1952 and presently headed by Hidenao Toyoshima, who is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice.

JEDBURGH. British code name for paramilitary teams of three dropped into Nazi-occupied territory before and after **D-Day**. Trained at Milton Hall in Leicestershire and consisting of French, British, and American personnel, their objective was to establish contact with local resistance groups, offer training, coordinate supply drops, and maintain independent communications. The "Jeds," as they became known, were nominated individually by **Special Operations Executive**, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Bureau Centrale de

Renseignements et d'Action. They operated in uniform, principally in a liaison capacity.

JOHN, OTTO. An Abwehr defector to the British in Spain immediately after the failure of the 20 July 1944 plot against Adolf Hitler, John had been a Lufthansa lawyer in civilian life. He made propaganda broadcasts for the Political Warfare Executive in England before returning to **Germany** in 1945 to assist the prosecution at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. In December 1950 he was the British nominee for the first director of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), but in July 1954 he defected to East Germany. A year later he returned to the West, claiming to have been abducted. He was charged with treason, convicted, and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. Upon his release in July 1958 he moved to Austria, where he wrote his memoirs and died in 1997.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (JIC). Created in Great Britain in 1936 under the chairmanship of a senior diplomat, Sir Ralph Stevenson, to coordinate intelligence, the JIC evolved into a weekly gathering of the four directors of intelligence—representing the Secret Intelligence Service, MI5, GCHQ, and the Defence Intelligence Staff—the chief of the Defence Staff, and the permanent undersecretaries from the Home Office, the Foreign Office, and the Treasury. It sets the requirements for the SIS and GCHQ, and since 1968 has provided an Assessment Staff to undertake independent analysis. The JIC is also attended by the Central Intelligence Agency chief of station in London and his equivalents from Australia and New Zealand.

The chairs of the JIC have been Ralph Stevenson (1936–39), Bill Cavendish-Bentinck (1939-45), Harold Caccia (1945-48), William Hayter (1948–49), Patrick Reilly (1950–53), Patrick Dean (1953–60), Hugh Stevenson (1960–63), Bernard Burrows (1963–66), Denis Greenhill (1966–68), Edward Peck (1968–70), Stewart Crawford (1970–73), Geoffrey Arthur (1973–75), Antony Duff (1975–79) and 1983–85), Antony Acland (1979–82), Patrick Wright (1982–83), Percy Cradock (1985–92), Rodric Braithwaite (1992–93), Pauline Neville-Jones (1993–94), Michael Pakenham (1994–96), Paul Lever (1998–99), Peter Ricketts (1999–2001), John Scarlett (2001–04), and Ted Abraham (2004–).

JONNY X. Recruited by Frank Foley, the Secret Intelligence Service head of station in Berlin, Johann de Graff, later to be known as "Jonny X," was an experienced Comintern agent. A German who had run away to sea in 1907 at the age of 14 and served in the kaiser's navy during the war, he had been one of the leaders of the Communist-inspired mutiny in 1917 on the battleship Westfalen and later attended Lenin University in Moscow. Having become disenchanted with the **Soviets**, de Graff had simply volunteered his services to Foley, who used him as a human encyclopedia on the Comintern's activities in Germany and to gather information on his missions across Europe, to Great Britain and to Shanghai. When de Graff was sent to Brazil to foment revolution there in 1935, the SIS played a key role in providing Brazilian authorities with the detailed information they needed to suppress the uprising. When he was arrested in Brazil in 1940 and threatened with deportation back to Germany—and certain death as a by-now notorious member of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlande-de Graff was rescued by the SIS and resettled in Canada.

JOURNEYMAN. Code name for a Royal Navy task force led by HMS Dreadnought and deployed secretly to the South Atlantic in 1977 in response to intelligence that Argentina intended to invade the Falkland Islands. The nuclear hunter-killer submarine moved quickly ahead of the surface component, and when news of the deployment circulated in Buenos Aires, the plan was abandoned. Although JOURNEYMAN is credited with having deterred aggression, there remains some doubt as to whether the Argentine plan was anything more than a deception scheme to conceal a move against Chile in the disputed area of Tierra del Fuego. Exactly how JOURNEYMAN was deliberately compromised is also the subject of debate, as submariners are always reluctant to reveal their positions.

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K-129. A Soviet Golf-II-class submarine that was lost in the Pacific in March 1968 and was later the object of a July 1974 Central Intelligence Agency plan, code-named JENIFER, to raise the hull at a cost of

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\$400 million. The submarine had been carrying three nuclear missiles and ten 21-inch atomic-tipped torpedoes while on patrol, and the CIA conducted a clandestine effort to lift it to the surface with the *Glomar Explorer*, a ship purpose-built by Howard Hughes to recover the cipher equipment, the three Serb missiles, and the SS-N-5 warheads.

Precisely how the K-129 came to sink is unknown, but it is possible that the captain, Vladimir Kobzah, decided to make an unauthorized attack on Pearl Harbor. The K-129 sank 300 miles from where a Soviet search fleet believed it to have been. The Americans had recorded the loss of the K-129 using the SOSUS array of underwater sonar hydrophones on 7 March 1968, but had been mystified by the fact that the submarine had only suffered one detonation—on the surface—and not a series of explosions associated with watertight compartments imploding under pressure as the hull plunged three miles to the ocean floor. Unusually, this meant the vessel had reached the bottom virtually intact, which was later confirmed by thousands of underwater photographs taken by the U.S. submarine Halibut, which found the wreck on 20 August 1968. The pictures revealed that a hole 10 feet wide had been blown out of the deck, just behind the conning tower, and one of the three missile silos was empty. They also depicted the skeletal remains of a single sailor dressed in boots and foul weather gear, which confirmed that the K-129 had been on the surface when she suffered a catastrophic incident that had prevented the crew from closing the watertight hatches or transmitting a distress signal.

Impressed by the photographs, but appalled by the implication that a submarine commander would attempt to circumvent the fail-safe security precautions and accomplish an unauthorized launch, President Richard Nixon sanctioned the CIA's covert operation to lift the 2,350-ton K-129 an unprecedented 16,500 feet and bring it ashore to a secure base at Redwood City, California. The project was abandoned when only part of the hull was recovered, and news of the operation leaked to the *New York Times*.

For years, intelligence experts have been baffled by the vast expenditure devoted to this high-risk scheme, plundering the site where 85 Soviet seamen and 15 officers died. The Soviet naval codes were changed as soon as the Red Banner's Far East Fleet headquarters in Vladivostok lost contact with the K-129, one of 13 elderly Golf

submarines to be converted to carry the solid-fuel missiles with a 1,242-mile range that could be launched while partially submerged. The submarine was unlikely to be carrying any crucial information, which has left a mystery surrounding the exact circumstances of the K-129's loss, which most submariners have attributed to a buildup of highly volatile hydrogen gas while charging the submarine's massive 450-ton batteries.

KAL 007. The deliberate destruction of Korean Airlines flight 007 from New York to Seoul, South Korea, on 31 August 1983 by a Soviet fighter killed all 269 passengers and crew aboard. The Boeing jumbo jet was attacked in Soviet airspace over Sakhalin Island and was hundreds of miles off course, the incorrect data having been entered into its navigational system. The radio traffic generated as the Soviet interceptors were vectored by their ground control toward their target was intercepted by a National Security Agency station in Japan and an American signals intelligence reconnaissance aircraft flying in the vicinity.

Once news emerged in September 1983 that the airliner had been lost, the Kremlin quickly issued a denial that it had been shot down, only to admit soon afterward that a Soviet fighter had indeed been responsible for firing a missile at the intruder. The Kremlin conspired for 10 years to conceal the fact that the "black box" flight data recorder of KAL 007 had been recovered successfully from the Sea of Okhotsk. The cockpit voice and digital recorders were not surrendered to the International Civil Aviation Organization until January 1993, following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

KALUGIN, OLEG. Having studied journalism on a Fulbright Scholarship in New York in 1958, Kalugin was appointed Radio Moscow's correspondent in New York in June 1960, a post he was to hold for five years before joining the **KGB**'s *rezidentura* in Washington, D.C., in July 1965. In March 1973, at the age of 40, Kalugin was promoted chief of foreign **counterintelligence**, the youngest KGB general since the end of the war. However, in November 1979 he was transferred to Leningrad following disagreements with the KGB's top management, and eventually resigned in February 1990. In his re-

tirement he became a critic of the KGB and was elected to the Duma to represent Krasnodar, but was not reelected in August 1992.

Kalugin's memoir *Spy Master* was published in 1994, but soon afterward he was accused of having been indiscreet in his book and compromised a source he had run in Washington. The spy had been Robert Lipka, a former **National Security Agency** analyst, and although he had been traced and arrested by the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** in 1992, their tip had come from **Vasili Mitrokhin**, not Kalugin. Nevertheless, Kalugin was charged with treason and, during a visit to the **United States**, was convicted in absentia, making it difficult for him to return home. Accordingly, he found work in America as a lecturer on counterintelligence issues, and in 2003 became an American citizen.

KAMPILES, WILLIAM. In November 1977, 23-year-old Kampiles resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency, having worked for the Agency for just eight months as a trainee and a watch officer, after he was informed that his poor performance evaluations obviated any future in the elite Clandestine Service. However, when he showed up at the Soviet embassy in Athens, where he was interviewed by a GRU officer, he sold a highly classified KH-11 KEYHOLE satellite manual. Until that moment the Soviets believed that the BIG BIRD satellite was a **signals intelligence** satellite and had not bothered to conceal sensitive sites from overhead surveillance. Within a very short time after Kampiles sold the manual for \$3,000, the Soviets began to camouflage their installations. What Kampiles did not realize when he visited the Soviet compound was that the GRU officer who interviewed him, Sergei Bokhan, was himself working for the CIA and promptly identified Kampiles to his CIA handler. When Kampiles returned to the **United States**, he was arrested, and in December 1978 he was sentenced to 40 years in prison despite his assertion that he had always intended to become a **double agent** for the CIA. Much to the CIA's embarrassment, it emerged that a further dozen KH-11 manuals had gone missing and a request had been made to the Justice Department to prevent a public trial of the young trainee.

KELL, VERNON. An Irish-born officer in the South Staffordshire Regiment who had reported on the Boxer Rebellion for the *Daily*

Telegraph, Major Kell was appointed head of the Home Department of the Secret Service Bureau in August 1909. This would later acquire the **cover** military intelligence designation **MI5**, and the organization would be led by Kell until his dismissal by **Winston Churchill** in May 1940.

KEMPE'TAI. The **Japanese** military police unit created in 1881, which by the outbreak of World War II had acquired a ruthless reputation and responsibility for **counterintelligence**. Kempe'tai personnel were attached to all military commands and routinely resorted to torture during the interrogation of prisoners. On the mainland of Japan, the ubiquitous Kempe'tai maintained a watch on all foreigners. Its radio detection equipment first identified the existence of an illicit transmitter broadcasting in Tokyo, which led Inspector Hideo Ohashi to the **GRU** agent **Richard Sorge** in October 1941. The subsequent painstaking investigation led to more than 40 arrests and was a textbook example of a counterespionage investigation. The organization, which grew to 75,000 men, of whom a third were officers, was disbanded after Japan's surrender in August 1945.

KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. The death of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas in November 1963 was investigated by a commission headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren and including the former director of central intelligence Allen Dulles. The assassin was a lone gunman, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had served in the U.S. Marines and upon his discharge in 1958 had emigrated to the Soviet Union. The Warren Commission concluded that Oswald had acted alone, and not as the agent of any country, although the KGB attempted to exploit the situation by distributing forged documents suggesting that Oswald had been part of a right-wing conspiracy hatched either by wealthy Texans or by émigré Cubans opposed to Kennedy's policies. Confirmation that the KGB had no knowledge of Oswald's intentions was supplied in 1964 by a defector, Yuri Nosenko, but when he came under suspicion as a false defector, further doubts were raised concerning the Warren Commission's conclusions. The extent to which the KGB had sought to capitalize on the speculation surrounding the assassination would not be revealed until Vasili Mitrokhin defected in 1992.

KEYHOLE. A generic American code name for a series of satellite surveillance systems launched since 1960 by the National Reconnaissance Office, designated with sequential KH numbers, the first being the **CORONA** series, KH-1. Within the KEYHOLE **compartments** are subcategories, such as TALENT and BYEMAN, which indicate whether they have a signals intelligence or imagery collection function. The purpose of the compartmentalization is to isolate the platform designers from the contractors who build them and the technicians who analyze the product, thereby preventing anyone from gaining knowledge there was no reason to have. Thus individual code-word security clearances are required for indoctrination into specific classified projects, enhancing their integrity. The necessity for such high levels of secrecy was illustrated when a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, William Kampiles, compromised the KH-11 satellite by selling a technical manual to the **GRU** for \$3,000 in 1977.

KGB. The Soviet intelligence service was created in March 1954 under Ivan Serov following the execution of Lavrenti Beria, as the Komitei Gosudarstevnnoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security) and was the direct successor of various intelligence agencies, including the OGPU and NKVD, that had replaced the tsar's feared Okhrana in 1917. As well as being an instrument of repression within the Soviet Union, the KGB's elite First Chief Directorate (FCD) collected intelligence overseas from illegal channels, managed by "Line N" officers of Directorate S, and the more conventional sources managed by local *rezidents* operating under diplomatic **cover**. Until its abolition in December 1991 following the ill-fated August coup led by the KGB's chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB exercised almost unbridled power within the totalitarian system. It also succeeded in **penetrating** most of its target adversaries and proved particularly adept at finessing hostile counterintelligence agencies, but was handicapped by a lack of independent political analysis and the defection of many middle-ranking personnel, mainly to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Based in Dzerzhinsky Square, and later at a new modern headquarters at Yasenevo opened in June 1972, the FCD was hurt by a series of defections, the first wave of which was prompted by the death of Beria. This event appears to have been the catalyst for defections of senior personnel in Canberra (Vladimir Petrov), Vienna (Piotr Deriabin), and Tokyo (Yuri Rastvorov), but over the following decades numerous KGB officers posted to Western *rezidenturas* took the opportunity to accept pitches made to them by the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service. Among the most significant were Anatoli Golitsyn, Oleg Lyalin, Vitali Yurchenko, Viktor Sheymov, Oleg Gordievsky, and Vasili Mitrokhin. Information gleaned from their debriefings ensured Western counterintelligence agencies remained well informed about the KGB's order of battle and personalities, but nevertheless the FCD succeeded in running important Western spies, such as George Blake, John Walker, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen, for years before they were betrayed by defectors.

The KGB chairmen were Ivan Serov (1954–58), Aleksandr Shelepin (1958–61), Vladimir Semichastny (1961–67), **Yuri Andropov** (1967–82), Vitali Fyodorchuk (May–December 1982), Viktor Chebrikov (1982–88), Vladimir Kryuchkov (1988–91), and Vadim Bakatin (1991–92). *See also* RUSSIA.

KHOKHLOV, NIKOLAI. In April 1954 a **Soviet**-trained assassin revealed to the **Central Intelligence Agency** that he had been dispatched to Frankfurt on a mission to shoot the émigré Ukrainian nationalist leader George Okolovich with cyanide-tipped bullets fired from an ingeniously constructed gun concealed inside a pack of cigarettes. Khokhlov's **defection** proved an embarrassment for the Kremlin, and Khokhlov himself was later the victim of an unsuccessful attempt to kill him when he ingested radioactive thallium in Switzerland.

KOECHER, KARL. Karl F. Koecher and his wife were arrested on 27 November 1984 as they prepared to fly to Switzerland. For the previous 19 years they had operated as Czech illegals and had succeeded in penetrating the Central Intelligence Agency. Both had arrived in the United States as refugees in 1965 and had acquired U.S. citizenship in 1971. Two years later Koecher joined the CIA as a translator and obtained a Top Secret security clearance. For the next decade, he passed classified material to his Soviet contacts, using his

very attractive wife as a courier. While working at the CIA, they gained a reputation as "swingers," hosting and attending uninhibited parties where the guests swapped partners. After their arrest, they were charged with passing classified information, including details of CIA personnel, to Czech agents between February 1973 and August 1983, but before they ever came to trial, the Koechers were exchanged for the Russian Jewish dissident Anatoli Shcharansky in a **spy swap** organized in Berlin on 11 February 1985.

KONSPIRATSIA. This Russian word has a special meaning within the intelligence community and is a term used to encompass all the strict security procedures and measures taken to ensure the integrity of a clandestine operation undertaken by **Soviet** or **Russian** intelligence personnel. The rules of konspiratsia require the use of **safe houses**, **dead drops**, and other **tradecraft** designed to avoid hostile **surveillance**.

KOREA. In 1961 the Republic of Korea (South Korea) created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) but after a series of political scandals involving the maltreatment of prisoners and the misuse of funds, it was renamed the Agency for National Security Planning in January 1981, and in 1999 became the Korean National Intelligence Service (KNIS). Now formally under the control of the Minister of Reunification, the KNIS has intelligence collection and counterintelligence responsibilities, subject to an oversight committee of the National Assembly. In May 2005 KNIS's director, Ko Youngkoo, announced his retirement on health grounds.

The Republic of Korea has been a continuing target of North Korean espionage, with agents of the Research Department for External Intelligence infiltrated into the South through tunnels under the demilitarized zone, or from midget **submarines**, and **assassination** squads dispatched to murder or abduct politicians and other leading public figures.

KREUGER, OTTO. Code-named TR-16 by the **Secret Intelligence Service**, Dr. Kreuger was a marine engineer from Godesberg who made the mistake of striking a brother officer—who happened to be related to the kaiser—and was court-martialed. He was still bitter in

November 1914, when at age 39, he offered his services to Richard Tinsley at the British legation in The Hague. Kreuger proved to be an exceptional agent, with access to all the **German** naval bases, Zeppelin sheds, and construction yards and with the professional skill to know precisely what he was looking at. He possessed a phenomenal memory and made regular trips to Holland to report to Tinsley without the necessity of carrying any notes over the frontier. He was also sufficiently adept to escape any suspicion, even being elected a director of the Federation of German Industries, until 1939 when he was finally trapped by the Gestapo and beheaded.

KRIVITSKY, WALTER. The GRU illegal rezident in The Hague, where he ran an art gallery on the fashionable Celebestraat posing as a wealthy antiquarian bookseller, Krivitsky feared for his life when he was recalled to Moscow at the end of September 1937. He promptly fled to Paris, where he was granted political asylum, and the French Surété extracted enough information from him to fill 80 volumes. He then moved to the United States, where he gave interviews to the Saturday Evening Post and testified before the Dies Committee, and then to Canada. It was not until September 1939 that the British ambassador in Washington, D.C., Lord Lothian, was told by journalist Isaac Don Levine that Krivitsky could implicate a spy in the British Foreign Office. As a result, Capt. John King was arrested, convicted of espionage, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. In February 1940 MI5 brought Krivitsky across the Atlantic to be interviewed at length by Jane Sissmore, and then returned him to Canada, where he was the subject of two assassination attempts. His book, In Stalin's Secret Service, was published in 1940. He was found shot dead in his locked Washington, D.C., hotel room in February 1941, apparently the victim of suicide.

KRYUCHKOV, VLADIMIR. Chief of the **KGB**'s First Chief Directorate since 1972, Kryuchkov was appointed chairman of the KGB in 1988. However, he was arrested in 1992 following the collapse of the coup that attempted to seize power in Moscow from President Mikhail Gorbachev. Considered a shrewd intelligence professional and an unrepentant Communist *apparatchik*, Kryuchkov personally authorized the recruitment of **Aldrich Ames** and **Robert Hanssen**

and was respected by subordinates and adversaries alike. A teetotaler, fitness fanatic, and workaholic, Kryuchkov came from a humble background and was fond of reminding people that he had been a factory worker who had taken a correspondence course in law before becoming a criminal investigator. Having graduated from the Higher Diplomatic School, he spent five years at the Soviet embassy in Budapest, where he gained the trust of the ambassador, Yuri Andropov. When Andropov was appointed chairman of the KGB in 1967 Kryuchkov became head of his secretariat.

KUKLINSKY, RYSZARD. In August 1972 an unknown person mailed a letter addressed to the military attaché at the U.S. embassy in Bonn, postmarked Wilhelmshaven and signed "PV," promising to telephone the American embassy in The Hague a week later. When he did so, a rendezvous was arranged later the same night outside the main railway station, and this was followed by a meeting in a nearby hotel at which Colonel Kuklinsky identified himself as a Polish General Staff officer who was sailing along the Dutch coast with colleagues aboard the two-masted yacht Legia. He had chosen the initials "PV" because "V" is rarely used in Polish, and he wished to conceal his nationality if the offer fell into the wrong hands. Three further meetings were arranged, at Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Ostend, which persuaded Kuklinsky's inquisitors of his bona fides.

Kuklinsky explained that, having become disaffected by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, he had been persuaded by the events of December 1970, when the Polish Army had been ordered to suppress demonstrations in Gdansk and Gdynia, to help the West. He had been particularly impressed by his discovery of Soviet nuclear warheads deployed on Polish territory during a Warsaw Pact exercise and had determined to make contact with the Americans. Realizing that there would be no chance of reaching the U.S. embassy in Warsaw undetected, he had taken the opportunity to write his letter when the Legia docked at Wilhelmshaven. He confided in no one, including his wife Hanka and their two sons, Boguslaw and Waldemar.

The Central Intelligence Agency responded to Kuklinsky, codenamed GULL, by arranging a series of dead drops in Warsaw. A meeting with him in January 1973 at the Wolski cemetery was also set up, at which he delivered nine rolls of film containing classified material he had photographed at work. Six months later, in June 1973, Kuklinsky was assigned a new case officer, David W. Forden, codenamed DANIEL, who spoke Polish fluently, having served previously as the CIA's station chief in Warsaw.

In 1975, after Kuklinsky's fourth cruise out of Poland, the *Legia* was confined to Polish waters, so he was obliged to rely on dead drops emptied by the CIA's Warsaw station, with whom he communicated via a **Discus** that could transmit and receive alphanumeric messages. By 1980 Kuklinsky had been promoted to deputy chief of the Operations Directorate and he had gained access to the Warsaw Pact's contingency plans that detailed intervention from **East Germany**, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Altogether, Kuklinsky was to supply some 30,000 documents, ranging from war plans and military maps to electronic warfare manuals, military targeting guidelines, and even blueprints for command bunkers.

As soon as Kuklinsky discovered General Jaruzelski's plan for martial law, he called an emergency meeting to warn the CIA and revealed the code word to begin the operation, WIOSNA ("Heather"). However, this information leaked from the CIA, perhaps through the Vatican, and became known to the Solidarity movement, which prompted a crisis meeting in Warsaw in September 1981 at the Ministry of the Interior. Only about a dozen senior officers had been allowed to know about WIOSNA, yet the highly classified code name had leaked, so the KGB had reported, to Rome. Two months later, on 2 November, Kuklinsky was summoned to a chief of staff's conference, where he realized that although he personally was not yet under suspicion, it was now only a matter of time before the mole hunt now under way, which was concentrated on the only two people with uninterrupted full access to the martial law plans, trapped him because a crucial document had been compromised. Accordingly, Kuklinsky requested another emergency rendezvous and was met by the CIA deputy chief of station in Warsaw, a woman who promised an exfiltration for him, his wife, and his two sons. However, it proved almost impossible for the local CIA personnel to shake off their surveillance, and on three successive nights the operation had to be abandoned. Finally two CIA officers under commercial cover flew in to Warsaw from Germany on a black operation to supervise an escape devised by the "**pipeliners**" from the CIA's Office of Technical Support. Kuklinsky was driven to West Berlin on 7 November hidden under cardboard boxes in the back of a Volvo station wagon, and three days later he was flown in a military transport to Andrews Air Force Base to be met by a jubilant Forden, who escorted him to a safe house in Warrenton, Virginia.

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LAKAM. The Hebrew acronym of the Lishka LeKishrei Mada (Science Liaison Bureau). LAKAM was created in 1957 under the leadership of a **Shin Bet** officer, Benyamin Blumberg, to acquire and protect scientific and technical intelligence for **Israel**. It played a key role in the development of Israel's covert atomic industry and undertook highly secret, deniable operations in support of it, including the management of **front** companies to procure components for nuclear weapons and enriched fuel for the Dimona reactor.

LAKAM was closed down in 1986 when its director, Rafael Eitan, a veteran **Mossad** officer, was compromised inadvertently by one of his sources, **Jonathan Pollard**, an American naval intelligence analyst who had been supplying classified **satellite imagery** to his Israeli handlers since 1984.

LEE, PETER. A naturalized American from Taiwan, Dr. Peter Lee had worked as a laser expert at Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory before joining the defense contractor TRW to work on a classified antisubmarine project for the U.S. Navy. In January 1985 Lee visited Beijing, having been invited to lecture at the **People's Republic of China's** (PRC) Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM).

Peter Lee (code-named ROYAL TOURIST) under interrogation admitted that he had met Chen Nengkuan, the leader of the PRC's nuclear weapons program at the China Academy of Engineering Physics, in his hotel room. Lee had made several trips to Beijing and in a plea bargain with the prosecution in March 1998 admitted to having compromised classified information in return for a fine of \$20,000 and a year in a halfway house.

Lee was only slightly connected to the **Federal Bureau of Investigation**'s investigation code-named KINDRED SPIRIT, which focused on **Wen Ho Lee**, a friend of Peter Lee's who was also originally from Taiwan.

LEE, WEN HO. The **Federal Bureau of Investigation** conducted an inquiry code-named KINDRED SPIRIT, which it inherited from the original review of the **Chinese** acquisition of the W.88 nuclear warhead technology. Two of the three best suspects on a list of 70 people at Los Alamos National Laboratory known to have traveled to the People's Republic of China (PRC) between 1984 and 1988 were the Taiwanese-born Wen Ho Lee and his wife, Sylvia Lee, who worked at Los Alamos as a data entry clerk with a Top Secret clearance.

The KINDRED SPIRIT investigation failed to gather enough evidence to mount a prosecution, but it did lead the **mole** hunters to Wen Ho Lee, who had been recorded in December 1982 holding a telephone conversation with the suspect in which he had suggested he could find out "who had squealed" on the scientist. Although he had initially denied the conversation, Lee admitted it when confronted with the evidence and then acted as an agent for the FBI, attempting to entrap the suspect in telephone calls and a personal meeting in California in which he wore a wire. The embarrassment for the FBI in May 1996, after an inquiry lasting eight months and the pursuit of 12 possible leads, was that their own informant, Wen Ho Lee, had been identified as the "only individual with the opportunity, motivation and legitimate access to both W.88 weapons systems information" known to have been betrayed to China.

Lee was interviewed formally by the FBI in January 1999 and again in March and was finally arrested in December 1999 and kept in solitary confinement, supposedly to prevent him from compromising any further information. Actually, the FBI hoped that, in jail without bail, the scientist would crack and confess, but after 227 days of imprisonment, he was released in September 2000 after a plea bargain: the prosecution would drop 58 of the 59 charges in return for information on the whereabouts of the crucial missing seven tapes. With the promise of **immunity**, Lee admitted there had been more like 17 or 20 tapes, but insisted he had discarded them in a trash

dump. None were ever recovered and Lee was convicted of a single felony and sentenced to the time he had already served.

A counterintelligence assessment of Lee made a convincing argument for him having been recruited by Li De Yuan at a conference held at Hilton Head, South Carolina, in 1985, and this had heralded his first known trip to Beijing the following year, to address the Tenth International Conference on Fluid Dynamics. The FBI had briefed Lee before his attendance and had also approved a second trip, in 1988, when he had met senior explosives expert (and future chief of the PRC's entire nuclear weapons program) Hu Side and the director of the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, Zheng Shao Tang, in his hotel bedroom. Upon his return from each trip, he had listed the names of the scientists he had met, but had denied having been asked about any classified information. Years later he would admit that he had helped the Chinese with hydrodynamic nuclear codes on both occasions. A third invitation, to both Wen Ho and Sylvia in early 1989, to attend a conference on experimental fluid mechanics at Chengu, was declined on instructions of the increasingly anxious head of security at Los Alamos, and although they could travel to the PRC no more, there were no restrictions placed on trips to the **Republic of China** and Hong Kong, which they visited in March and December 1998 and again in 1992.

LEUNG, KATRINA. Code-named PARLOR MAID by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Leung allegedly in 1997 removed and copied a secret document from the briefcase of her FBI handler, "J. J." Smith. When her home was searched in 2002, a transcript of a telephone conversation with her Chinese contact was discovered. Although neither Leung nor Smith was charged with espionage, the case demonstrated that the FBI had been active in the field over a long period.

Born Che Wen Ling in Guangzhou, Leung had been brought up in Hong Kong by her aunt, Susan Chin. She had met her husband Kam, who was working on his doctorate in biochemistry at Cornell University, where she had studied engineering as a graduate student before switching to economics. Apparently her first contact with People's Republic of China officials occurred in New York in 1972, when Kam had worked as a volunteer at the Chinese mission to the United Nations.

Leung ran her own business consulting firm in California and was a director of the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, as well as being a major Republican party campaign contributor. She also made 71 overseas trips during the 20 years she worked as an agent for the Bureau, but failed to declare 15 of them. On those trips she is alleged to have been in contact with Ministry of State Security (MSS) officers on 2,100 occasions and was given a gift of \$100,000 by the PRC president, Yang Chankung.

Smith, who met her for trysts in London, Hawaii, and Hong Kong, is said to have found out that Leung was copying the classified material from his briefcase, and he also discovered in 1991 that Leung had been reporting to an MSS case officer in Beijing and was probably a **double agent** for the MSS, if not a triple agent, yet he apparently continued to provide Leung access to the secret information anyway. When questions were raised by analysts at FBI headquarters about Leung, Smith declared, untruthfully, that she had taken a polygraph test and passed it. Indeed, Smith filed no less than 19 evaluation reports describing Leung as "reliable." When challenged by the FBI, Smith denied having had an affair with the attractive Leung, only to be contradicted by tapes that recorded the pair together in a hotel.

Leung was also involved with another former FBI agent, William Cleveland Jr., who was the head of security at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory nuclear weapons research facility in California. When Cleveland was interrogated about this relationship, he lied, and it was not until his fourth interview that he admitted that he had had a sexual relationship with Leung from 1988 until he retired in 1993 and that he resumed the sexual contacts in 1997 and 1999. He, too, continued the sexual relationship even after he discovered that Leung had unauthorized contact in 1991 with the MSS intelligence service.

Leung was well connected in Beijing, and the Indonesian Chinese tycoon Ted Sioeng, whose family was investigated by the FBI for illegal donations to the Democratic party, was a friend. She had business-related contacts with companies such as Northern Telecom (Canada). Apparently Smith made little effort to conceal his relationship with Leung, and she accompanied him to his retirement party,

which she videotaped, and also to President George W. Bush's inaugural parade in Washington, D.C. She lectured classes at the FBI's training academy at Quantico, Virginia, on the management of double agents.

LIBERTY, USS. A U.S. Navy signals intelligence ship festooned with huge antennae, the *Liberty* was attacked by Israeli aircraft and gunboats in the Mediterranean off the coast of Sinai in June 1967 with the loss of 34 crewmen killed. The *Liberty* had been commissioned in December 1964, ostensibly as a naval auxiliary research vessel, but was actually a signals intercept platform controlled by the National Security Agency. The former World War II cargo ship was manned by wireless technicians, linguists, and other intelligence personnel. Commanded by William McGonagle, the clearly marked and flagged *Liberty* had been stationed in international waters north of Port Said when the Six-Day War broke out. The ship was strafed and bombed with napalm by two pairs of Mirage and Super-Mystère jets, before being attacked by three torpedo boats. Holed below the waterline, and with 171 wounded personnel, Commander McGonagle nevertheless sailed his ship to Malta.

Israel later claimed that the attack had been a case of mistaken identity—insisting that the *Liberty* had been erroneously reported to be an Egyptian troopship, the *El Quseir*—and paid compensation to the U.S. Navy, the survivors, and the dependants of those killed. Several subsequent investigations uncovered no evidence that the episode was anything other than a tragic accident, although the U.S. Navy's official court of inquiry was conducted in conditions of such secrecy, and its subsequent report was so highly classified, that there was considerable speculation about the possibility that the attack had been a deliberate attempt to prevent the NSA from collecting information about the Sinai campaign that might have been damaging to Israel's interests. Others have suggested that Israel intended to obliterate the *Liberty* and pretend the Egyptians had been responsible, so as to draw the **United States** into the conflict. The issue remains live, especially among the *Liberty*'s surviving crew.

LIBYA. Formerly an Italian colony, Libya obtained independence in December 1951 under King Idris. In September 1969 Col. Muammar

Qaddafi ousted the king and seized power to establish a radical regime that gave logistical support to various revolutionary **terrorist** organizations, including the **Provisional Irish Republican Army**. In 1986 U.S. aircraft bombed Tripoli after **intercepted** Libyan diplomatic communications proved the country's complicity in the bombing in West Berlin of the La Belle nightclub, a venue popular with off-duty U.S. Army personnel, in which 13 died.

Negotiations conducted by the British **Secret Intelligence Service** in **Switzerland** in 2003 with Musa Kusa of the **Jamahirya Security Organization** resulted in Colonel Qaddafi renouncing his policy of state sponsorship of **terrorism** and opening his nuclear and chemical research programs to international inspection, in return for an end to the embargo on Libya. *See also* LOCKERBIE.

LIDDELL, GUY. MI5's director of counterespionage from 1940 to 1945, Liddell had been decorated with the Military Cross during World War I and later had joined Scotland Yard's **Special Branch** as a civilian analyst concentrating on **Soviet** espionage. In 1931 Special Branch's staff was amalgamated with the Security Service, and Liddell was appointed an assistant to Brigadier Jasper Harker, the director of B Division, succeeding him in June 1940.

Socially well connected, having married into the Barings banking family, Liddell oversaw MI5's dramatic growth during the first 18 months of the war as the threat from Fifth Columnists, enemy aliens living in Britain, the fear of a Nazi invasion, and an **Abwehr** espionage offensive all posed a threat to the country. Liddell's actions and opinion were documented by him in 12 volumes of a daily journal that he dictated from August 1939 to June 1945. Codenamed WALLFLOWER, these sensitive documents were retained in the safe of the director-general until they were declassified and then published in 2005.

After the war, Liddell was appointed deputy director-general of MI5, but in 1953 transferred to the Atomic Energy Authority as a security adviser. The end of his career had been marred by a close wartime friendship with Anthony Blunt, who had served as his personal assistant, and by his friendships with the **Cambridge Five** spies Guy Burgess and **Kim Philby**. He died in 1958, seven years after the **defections** of Burgess and Maclean, aware only that Blunt had

fallen under suspicion but not that he would confess to having spied for the Soviets throughout World War II.

from London to New York over the small Scottish town of Lockerbie in December 1988 resulted in the deaths of 269 passengers, crew, and people on the ground and prompted the largest antiterrorist investigation ever conducted by MI5. A detailed forensic examination of the contents of the cargo hold revealed that a bomb had been concealed inside a battery-operated cassette recorder, which had been placed in an unaccompanied suitcase consigned from Malta. The bomb's timer was traced to a Swiss manufacturer, which identified the purchaser, and eventually two Libyan intelligence officers were charged with murder and tried before a Scottish court empanelled in The Hague. One, Abdelbasset Megrahi, was convicted, and Libya subsequently offered compensation to the families of the victims.

LOGINOV, YURI. A KGB illegal, Loginov had approached the Central Intelligence Agency in Finland in May 1961 and wanted to defect, but had been persuaded to return to Moscow as a spy. He was enrolled as AE/GUSTO and over the next three years met his CIA case officers whenever he traveled to Europe. Later suspected of being a plant, Loginov was arrested in May 1967 while undertaking a mission in South Africa and was questioned at length by BOSS interrogators with assistance from the CIA. Convinced that Loginov had tried to dupe the CIA, he was exchanged in a spy swap in July 1969 and returned to Moscow. An incomplete account of his case was published in South Africa as *Spy in the Sun* by Barbara Carr.

LUCY. The **Soviet** code name of Rudolf Rössler, the leader of the **Rote Drei**, a spy ring active in **Switzerland** during World War II. A former **German** soldier who had lived in Lucerne since 1935, Rössler ran
his own small publishing business while also working for Swiss intelligence. He was arrested by the Bundespolizei and prosecuted in
October 1945 but, despite the abundance of evidence against him, he
was acquitted, raising suspicions that he had been acting on behalf
the Swiss military intelligence service, which may or not have been
aware of the scale of his contacts with the Soviets.

LUDWIG, KURT. Born in Ohio in 1903 but brought up in Germany, Ludwig was an Abwehr officer who was arrested while on a mission in Austria in February 1938. He was released soon afterward, following the *Anschluss*, and in March 1940 arrived in the United States, where he established an extensive spy ring. The existence of Ludwig's organization became known to the Federal Bureau of Investigation when his reports, written in secret ink concealed in ostensibly innocuous letters addressed to neutral countries, were detected by British censors in Bermuda.

The FBI eventually identified Ludwig as the reports' author, "Joe K.," from clues contained in the correspondence. He was placed under **surveillance**, thus leading to the compromise of other members of the network. These included his young secretary, who later gave evidence against him at his trial in March 1942 and received a reduced sentence of five years in prison. Ludwig was arrested in Seattle in August 1941, and eight others were charged with espionage, including a scientist, Paul Borchardt, and a soldier based at Governor's Island, New York. Because his espionage had been conducted before Germany declared war on the **United States**, Ludwig received a prison sentence of 20 years and escaped the death penalty.

LYALIN, OLEG. A KGB officer who defected in London in August 1971 after he had been recruited six months earlier by a joint MI5–Secret Intelligence Service section that had compromised him as he conducted an illicit affair with his secretary, Irina Temlyakova. Working under Soviet Trade Delegation cover, Lyalin was a Department V sabotage expert who had prepared contingency plans for attacking certain strategic sites in the event of hostilities. In addition, he was responsible for running three agents in London, Sirioj Abdoolcader and two Cypriot tailors, all of whom were arrested upon his defection.

Lyalin's unplanned defection took place after his arrest on drunk-driving charges and acted as the catalyst for Operation FOOT, the **expulsion** of the entire **KGB** and **GRU** *rezidenturas*, whose membership he had identified. After his defection Lyalin was **resettled** in England with a new identity. He died in 2002.

MACKIERNAN, DOUGLAS. A Massachusettes Institute of Technology graduate and Central Intelligence Agency officer, Mackiernan lost his life in Tibet under mysterious circumstances in 1950; he was the first CIA officer to die while undertaking a clandestine mission. Also an Office of Strategic Services veteran, Mackiernan was shot, and then beheaded, by Tibetan soldiers who had not received a warning from Lhasa that a pair of American consular officials had been granted permission to enter the country. The mission's survivor was Frank Bessac, now a retired academic who insists he left the CIA in 1947, but accompanied Mackiernan and was a witness to the shooting incident on the frontier, which also resulted in the deaths of two other members of the group after an epic, two-month journey across the desert from Sinkiang Province to establish contact with the Dalai Lama.

The mission ended in double disaster because the Chinese Communists invaded soon afterward, using the presence of U.S. spies as a pretext. The Dalai Lama fled into exile and Tibet has been under uneasy Chinese occupation ever since. Mackiernan's consular **cover** in Tihwa, subordinate to the U.S. **embassy** in Nanking, concealed his principal task, which had been to monitor and maybe sabotage **Soviet** extraction of uranium ore from Koktogai in neighboring Turkistan and to report on activity at the Soviet nuclear test site at Semi-palatinsk.

MACLEAN, DONALD. See CAMBRIDGE FIVE.

MACRAME. The Central Intelligence Agency code name for a Soviet pilot, decorated for his service in Afghanistan, who in 1990 volunteered to spy for the CIA while posted as an instructor to Leipzig, East Germany. MACRAME supplied photographs of the flight manuals for the MiG-29 before he was exfiltrated with his wife to be resettled in the United States. Originally code-named SPANIEL, he had objected when he had learned his code name, so his case officer was obliged to change it.

MALAYA EMERGENCY. An emergency declared in Malaya in June 1948 as a result of the assassination of the governor and the increase of acts of terrorism committed by mainly Chinese Communist insurgents. Clearly the local police Special Branch was unable to cope with the scale of the problem and MI5 responded initially by appointing new security liaison officers in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, but later took control of and reorganized the local security apparatus with conspicuous success. The entire population was documented, issued with identity cards, and encouraged to resist the intimidation and withdraw into protected villages, known as "white areas." This latter policy was implemented by Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer and effectively starved the Chinese into defeat.

MANHATTAN PROJECT. The cover name applied to the joint Anglo-American plan to develop an atomic bomb, derived from the Manhattan District headquarters of the U.S. Army's Corps of Engineering, which had responsibility for the project when Gen. Leslie Groves was placed in charge of it in 1942. Security within the project, exercised by the U.S. Army, was so tight that initially even the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** was unaware of it. *See also* ENORMOZ.

MARENCHES, ALEXANDRE DE. See DE MARENCHES, ALEXANDRE.

MARKOV, GEORGI. A Bulgarian dissident, Markov broadcast on the BBC but in 1978 became a target for assassination after he had attracted the ire of President Todor Zhivkov. On 7 September 1978 Markov was injected with a pellet containing the deadly toxin ricin, dying in a hospital in London four days later. The attack took place on Waterloo Bridge, the assailant using a converted umbrella as a weapon to fire the tiny platinum pellet that was recovered from Markov's leg only during the postmortem. A subsequent investigation linked the incident to an attempt on the life of a Bulgarian defector, Vladimir Kostov, who had survived an identical attack while he was traveling on the Paris metro 10 days earlier.

According to **KGB** counterintelligence chief **Oleg Kalugin**, the pellet gun had been developed in Moscow by the KGB and delivered to the Bulgarians on the direct orders of **Vladimir Kryuchkov**. Kalu-

gin was later questioned by the police in London concerning his role in Markov's murder, and the investigation is still continuing with the assistance of the Bulgarian authorities.

MARTELLI, GIUSSEPPI. A nuclear physicist of Italian origin based at the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell, Professor Martelli was arrested in April 1963 and charged with breaches of the Official Secrets Act. He was acquitted at his trial because he demonstrated that he had no security clearance and therefore no access to classified information, and his possession of espionage paraphernalia was no crime. He acknowledged clandestine meetings with a Soviet intelligence officer, but insisted that he had been gathering evidence with which to entrap the KGB man. The case was an important defeat for MI5 and showed the importance of obtaining a confession from suspects in espionage cases. Martelli was later appointed professor of physics at the University of Southampton.

MARTIN, WILLIAM. In June 1960 Martin, a National Security Agency cryptographer, and his friend Bernon F. Mitchell disappeared while visiting Cuba. The pair were alleged to be homosexuals, and both had been assigned to the NSA's intercept site at Kamiseya in Japan when they had been in the U.S. Navy. They had visited Cuba in December 1959 together, where it is presumed that they made contact with the Soviets, but the statement they left, in a bank in Laurel, Maryland, gave no hint of their motives. Once in Moscow, they denounced the NSA publicly, claiming that the organization was reading the wireless traffic of more than 40 countries.

MARTYNOV, VALERI. Code-named GT/GENTILE by the Central Intelligence Agency and PIMENTA by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Martynov was a Line X scientific intelligence officer under cultural attaché cover in Washington, D.C., who had been recruited as an ideologically motivated agent in 1980. When he returned to Moscow in January 1985, he was arrested and executed after he had been identified as a spy by Aldrich Ames.

MASK. The British code name assigned to **Comintern** wireless traffic exchanged between Moscow and numerous Communist parties

across the globe between 1934 and 1937. The decrypted messages proved that the Kremlin controlled the **Communist Party of Great Britain** and its counterparts around the globe and showed that these supposedly independent political parties were simply instruments of **Soviet** foreign policy. Although the identities of individuals had been protected by **cover** names, **MI5** succeeded in working out who the major players were.

MAY, ALLAN NUNN. A Cambridge-educated physicist who had been identified as a spy code-named ALEK in papers purloined from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa in September 1945 by the defector Igor Gouzenko, May was placed under surveillance by MI5. An unsuccessful attempt was made to entrap him with an MI5 agent, Klop Ustinov, masquerading as his Soviet contact. May failed to attend the rendezvous in London compromised by Gouzenko and he was arrested. Confronted with the evidence, he was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in 1946. He had been a Communist since he was 16 and was completely uncooperative with his interrogators, refusing to name anyone else involved in the Canadian spy ring.

May had arrived in Montreal in 1943 to work on the **Manhattan Project**, and in January the following year had visited to the MetLab in Chicago, accompanied by a dozen other scientists. He returned in April for a fortnight and was back again at the Argonne Laboratory at the end of August for a three-day conference to discuss the Argonne pile and the planned Montreal pile. His final trip to the **United States** took place at the end of September 1944, but a proposed stay of a month in the spring of 1945 was vetoed by the Manhattan Project's security chief Gen. Leslie Groves on the grounds that it was contrary to policy for a single individual to learn too much from different areas of research.

After his release from prison, May returned to live in Cambridge, where he died in 2003. On his deathbed, he made a detailed confession to his family, but never disclosed when he had been recruited as a spy or by whom.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE (MASINT). Information derived from the study of data acquired from specific targets, and monitoring any alterations. Satellites in the

Heritage series are dedicated to MASINT to track missiles, monitor battlefield developments with infrared sensors, and detect nuclear detonations on Earth and in space with bhangmeters, which analyze X-ray emissions associated with atomic explosions.

MEINERTZHAGEN, RICHARD. A British staff officer on Field Marshal Lord Allenby's staff during the Palestine campaign in World War I, Meinertzhagen conceived of a scheme to distract the Turkish defenders away from an intended attack on Gaza City by planting false documents with the enemy. Meinertzhagen approached an enemy patrol and then pretended to accidentally abandon a briefcase, which contained forged documents that purported to contain details of future military plans. The deception was successful and Gaza City was finally captured against minimal opposition because the Turkish garrison had been deployed elsewhere to meet an imaginary threat.

MENZIES, STEWART. The chief of the British **Secret Intelligence Service** from 1939 to 1952, Menzies was an Eton-educated Guards officer who had fought in France at Ypres and earned the Distinguished Service Order and the Military Cross before being posted to Sir John Haig's headquarters staff at Montreuil. After the war, he joined SIS and headed the military section until his chief, Adm. Sir Hugh Sinclair, fell ill with cancer in 1938 and was incapacitated.

MESSAGES PERSONNEL. A communications system employed during World War II to send messages to recipients in enemy-occupied territory. Broadcast by the BBC on the regular news bulletins, the messages appeared innocuous, but contained a hidden meaning for the intended addressee. As well as providing a clandestine channel to individuals not in two-way wireless contact with the Allies, the system allowed agents to verify identities. *See also* NUMBERS STATIONS.

MI5. Created in Great Britain in August 1909 as the Home Department of the Secret Service Bureau and headed by Maj. Vernon Kell, the Security Service—also known as MI5 by virtue of its early cover as a military intelligence branch—established its reputation for quiet efficiency by rounding up a large German espionage organization

based in a barber shop in London's Caledonian Road in August 1914. Between the wars, MI5's strength was drastically reduced, to the point where in 1939 it was obliged to take on hundreds of officers, secretaries, and clerks to cope with the challenges of alien internment and German spies. The task proved too great for Kell and his deputy, Sir Eric Holt-Wilson, and Sir David Petrie was appointed by **Winston Churchill** to supervise its restructuring. A former Scotland Yard analyst, Capt. **Guy Liddell**, was promoted to director of counterespionage, and he selected Anthony Blunt as his assistant (*see* CAMBRIDGE FIVE). By the middle of 1941 MI5 had taken control of the **Abwehr**'s agents in England and had begun to perfect the art of strategic **deception**, a tactic that was to prove vital to the success of **D-Day**.

At the end of the war, MI5 retained a small proportion of its staff to work on countersubversion and run **counterintelligence** operations against the **Soviets**, but little was achieved until 1963, when the organization was almost paralyzed by the suspicion that it had suffered hostile **penetration** at a high level. However, the subsequent **mole** hunts proved inconclusive, and the only confirmed case of espionage was **Michael Bettaney**, an inadequate alcoholic who in 1983 volunteered to spy for the **KGB**'s London *rezident* but was betrayed by **Oleg Gordievsky**.

Always a secretive, independent government department, MI5 attracted unwelcome publicity when it attempted to **honeytrap** Eugene Ivanov with the help of a cabinet minister, John Profumo. In another embarrassment, an MI5 retiree, **Peter Wright**, collaborated with journalists to prove that MI5's poor postwar performance could not be attributed to Blunt's role as a Soviet mole. His controversial book, *SpyCatcher*, gained wide circulation because of a clumsy attempt to prevent publication in **Australia** in 1986. Since then the organization has suffered further embarrassment following the resignation in 1996 of a junior officer, David Shayler, who later served a prison sentence for breaches of the **Official Secrets Act** resulting from unauthorized disclosures to journalists.

MI5's 14 directors-general have been Kell (1909–40), Petrie (1940–46), Percy Sillitoe (1946–53), Dick White (1953–56), **Roger Hollis** (1956–65), Martin Furnival Jones (1965–71), Michael Hanley (1972–79), Howard Smith (1979–81), John Jones (1981–85), Antony

Duff (1985–87), Patrick Walker (1987–92), **Stella Rimington** (1992–96), Stephen Lander (1996–2000), and Eliza Manningham-Buller (2000–).

MICRODOT. A miniaturized communication system involving the reduction of a photograph to a scale where it can be read only with the aid of a microscope and is therefore easy to conceal. Microphotography was developed in Germany in 1938 and was adopted with enthusiasm by the **Abwehr** as an alternative secret writing, which was susceptible to detection by random testing. This ingenious solution, patented in 1938 by Zeiss, solved the problem of carrying potentially incriminating documents and messages. Photographing the item and then reducing it in size by a ratio of 200:1 to a microdot required specialist knowledge, training, and equipment but was a major breakthrough in concealed writing, which hitherto had depended on secret inks that could be detected under certain lighting conditions or chemical treatment. The use of microdots was first revealed in the United States by an Abwehr spy, William Sebold, in 1941. Suitably impressed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation hired an optical expert, James E. Dunlop, from the medical laboratory at Johns Hopkins Hospital, to study photoreduction techniques.

Code-named DUFF by **MI5** in 1940, microdots continue to be a practical method of conveying large quantities of information without the need for sophisticated equipment.

MILLER, RICHARD. In October 1984, Miller, a Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent with 20 years' experience in the elite Foreign Counterintelligence squad in California, was arrested and charged with selling classified information to the KGB. His defense was that—while he admitted having been romantically involved with a beautiful, 34-year-old Soviet émigré, Svetlanta Ogorodnikova, who had been resident in the U.S. since 1973—he had suspected that she and her husband, Nikolai, were KGB agents and was acting as a double agent to entrap them. The FBI had long suspected, like the rest of the local émigré community, that Ogorodnikova and her husband enjoyed links to the KGB, and a surveillance operation code-named WHIPWORM was intended to prove she was a KGB contact agent, or talent spotter, assigned the task of cultivating potential sources. In

September 1984, just as the trio were about to be arrested, Miller explained to his superiors that he was engaged on a complex double agent game with the KGB, with the intention of tricking the San Francisco *rezident* but, after lengthy interrogations, he was disbelieved, and all three were arrested on 3 October 1984.

The prosecution alleged that Miller had offered to sell classified information to the pair for \$50,000 in gold and \$15,000 in cash, and a large quantity of secret FBI documents was recovered from his home. At the time of his arrest, Miller had been planning to fly to Vienna to meet Ogorodnikova and complete the transaction. When charged, the two Russians pleaded guilty; Nikolai Ogorodnikov was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, his wife to 18. After two trials, at which Ogorodnikova gave evidence against Miller, he was sentenced in February 1986 to 20 years in prison, a term reduced on appeal to 13, which enabled him to be paroled in May 1994.

MINCEMEAT. MI5 code name for an ingenious deception operation conducted in April 1943 to persuade the enemy that the impending Allied amphibious operation in the Mediterranean would be directed against Sardinia and the Balkans, when the real objective was Sicily. The body of "Major Martin," a supposed British Royal Marines courier with a briefcase containing secret documents attached to his wrist, was deposited off the coast of Spain near Huelva by the submarine HMS Seraph in the expectation that the material would pass into the hands of the German intelligence service. In fact, the cadaver was of a Welsh-born London tramp, Gwyndyr Michael, who had died of drinking a toxin. As planned, the contents of his attaché case were examined by the enemy.

Conceived by an MI5 officer, Charles Cholmondeley, and inspired by a similar event that had occurred in 1941 when a Catalina aircraft carrying a French officer had crashed off the Spanish coast, causing classified documents to fall into enemy hands, MINCEMEAT was supervised by a naval intelligence officer, Ewen Montagu. Whether the Nazis ever believed Martin's documents is open to debate, but Axis reinforcements were sent to Greece in an apparent response to the information acquired from Spain.

The postwar publication of an indiscreet but fictional version of this episode in *Operation Heartbreak* by Duff Cooper, who had held

ministerial responsibility for MI5 in 1943, prompted press interest, and a Daily Express journalist, Ian Colvin, traced the grave of "Major Martin" in Huelva. This disclosure persuaded the government to commission Montagu to publish an authorized account of the operation as The Man Who Never Was in 1953, which was made into a movie in 1956.

MINISTERIUM FÜR STAATSSICHERHEIT (MfS). The official title of the East German security and intelligence apparatus often known as the Stasi. Created in October 1949 with the founding of the German Democratic Republic, the MfS was an efficient instrument of repression, which by its dissolution in 1990 had 70,000 uniformed and civilian employees, with an estimated 173,000 paid informers.

MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (MSS). See CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF.

MISSILE GAP. The accidental overestimate by the United States of **Soviet** missile strengths prior to 1962 was corrected by photographic reconnaissance conducted by CORONA satellites, which demonstrated that in 1960 the Soviets possessed only four of the SS-6 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) designated Sapwood by NATO. The exaggeration, deliberately propagated by Nikita Khrushchev, suggested a comparative Soviet advantage over the Americans in ICBMs, a political imbalance that was to become known as the "missile gap" until it was disproved by aircraft reconnaissance and satellite imagery, backed by information from Oleg Penkovsky. See also COLD WAR.

MITROKHIN, VASILI. In March 1992 Mitrokhin, age 69, walked into the British embassy in Riga and asked to see a member of the British Secret Intelligence Service. He had arrived on the overnight train from Moscow and spoke no English, but explained that he had joined the KGB in 1948, and that from late 1956 until his retirement in 1984 he had been in charge of the KGB's archives at the First Chief Directorate's headquarters at Yasenevo. For the previous 25 years, since the premature conclusion of his only overseas assignment, to **Israel**, he had supervised the tens of thousand of files that had been accumulated by the world's largest and most feared intelligence agency, and he had taken the opportunity to read many of the most interesting ones. For 12 of those years, and much of his retirement, he reconstructed his own version of what he regarded as the most significant dossiers, documenting Josef Stalin's crimes and the many misdeeds committed in the name of **Soviet** Communism. For most of his career, he said, he had been disenchanted with the Soviet system, had listened to Western radio broadcasts, and read dissident literature.

In 1972, when he was made responsible for checking the First Chief Directorate files being transferred from the old headquarters in the Lubyanka Prison to the KGB's modern building on the outskirts of Moscow, he embarked on an illicit history of the Soviet Union's most secret operations. Mitrokhin asserted that he had simply copied the original files and walked out of the heavily guarded KGB compound with his handwritten notes stuffed into his socks. He had then rewritten a detailed account of the files from his scraps of paper into exercise books and other convenient binders, which he had hidden in a milk churn concealed under his country dacha. In return for political asylum for himself and his family, he offered his entire collection, amounting to a full six cases of documents. He returned to Riga on 9 April with more samples of his handiwork and was met by SIS officers who examined some 2,000 sheets of his archive and scrutinized his party membership card and his KGB retirement certificate. Acknowledging the authenticity of what he had shown them, a further appointment was made two months hence to meet the man now code-named GUNNER by the SIS, and on 11 June he returned to Riga carrying a rucksack containing yet more material.

Mitrokhin subsequently made a second journey to Riga on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, accompanied by his wife and son, and an SIS officer later visited his empty dacha outside Moscow and recovered his secret hoard of papers and carried them undetected to the British Embassy. Now code-named JESSANT, no official announcement was made of Mitrokhin's **defection**, and in the chaos of 1992, his disappearance from the Russian capital probably went unnoticed.

In the months that followed, numerous **counterintelligence** operations were mounted across the globe. Near Belfauz, **Switzerland**, booby-trapped caches of weapons and covert radio equipment were

dug up in the forest. In Tampa, Florida, retired U.S. Army colonel George Trofimoff was approached by Federal Bureau of Investigation special agents posing as Russian intelligence officers, to whom he admitted in a secretly videotaped meeting lasting six hours that he had spied for the Soviets for 25 years since his recruitment in Nuremberg in 1969; code-named ANTEY, MARKIZ, and KONSUL in Mitrokhin's files, Trofimoff was the most senior U.S. Army officer ever charged with espionage. In Australia a senior Australian Security Intelligence Organisation analyst was identified as a longterm source for the KGB, although he was not arrested. In a Virginia motel, Robert Lipka, a former National Security Agency cryptographer, code-named DAN by the KGB, was arrested; in September 1997 he was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment. The information supplied by Mitrokhin was considered so valuable that the CIA paid the SIS an estimated \$1 million for his assistance. Ironically, the CIA had rebuffed his original approach to them in Riga, on the grounds that his material was of only historical and not current operational relevance. Mitrokhin's offer to the CIA's station in Riga had been rejected by the local station chief who never received a reply to a cable to the CIA's SE Division.

Mitrokhin's files were transformed into two books, the first of which was published in 1999 as *The Mitrokhin Archive* with Professor Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University. It identified **Melita Norwood** and John Symonds as having been important Soviet agents. The second volume was released in 2005, two years after Mitrokhin's death.

MK/ULTRA. The Central Intelligence Agency code name for a research program conducted jointly with the U.S. Army, beginning in May 1952 and concluding in February 1970, to study interrogation and manipulation techniques. MK/ULTRA funded more than 140 separate projects in the experimental field of parapsychology in various locations, working with volunteers. The object was to develop, test, and evaluate techniques that were later labeled "mind control," in an effort to create countermeasures, but the program was included in a list of possible abuses declared to Congress. Many of the hypnotic and psychedelic methods tested were condemned by the Rockefeller Commission.

MOLE. Although this term, as applied in an espionage context, dates back to Francis Bacon, the modern usage originated with novelist John le Carré, himself a former Secret Intelligence Service officer, and applies to a particular type of penetration agent, a mainly (but not exclusively) Cold War phenomenon. Theoretically, the mole burrows deep underground and deliberately maneuvers itself into a position where it can inflict maximum damage. This implies a spy already recruited before entering the employment of a target organization, which may not necessarily be an intelligence agency. According to this narrow definition, classic examples include Olga Gray and the Cambridge Five in England, Georges Pacques in France, Gunter Guillaume in Germany, George Trofimoff in the U.S. Army, Ian Milner in Australia, and Arne Treholt in Norway. Another definition, widened to include those who volunteered their services after they had gained access to classified information, would include John Walker, Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, Oleg Penkovsky, Dmitri Polyakov, Gilles Brunet, Ric Throssel, and Stig Wennerstrom. Accordingly, the term may be applied to exceptionally damaging spies who may have acted out of variety of motives.

MONTES, ANA. In the post—Cold War era, the longest and most damaging penetration of the U.S. military was perpetrated by Ana Belen Montes, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst arrested in September 2001. Born in the United States of Puerto Rican parentage, she graduated from Johns Hopkins University and joined the Department of Justice before she transferred to the DIA in 1985 as a Spanish-speaking specialist on Cuba. She made two visits to Havana for the DIA in 1993 and 1998, and at the time of arrest, in her midforties and unmarried, she was a senior analyst who had briefed Congress and the Central Intelligence Agency, was cleared for Special Access Programs and Intelink, the U.S. intelligence community's internal data exchange, and had passed her polygraph tests. Her brother was a Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent in Florida, and her sister was an FBI translator.

Under interrogation, Montes acknowledged that she had been recruited by the Cuban Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) before she had even joined the DIA and had been vectored into her post. She admitted to having betrayed U.S. war contingency plans and telling

the Cubans the names of four CIA officers working under diplomatic cover at the American Interests Section of the Swiss embassy in Havana. Montes seems to have declined the opportunity of a promotion to retain her access, apparently because she wanted to continue to influence U.S. policy on Cuba, a commitment for which she showed absolutely no remorse when she cooperated with the damage assessment conducted at her prison in Fort Worth. Indeed, she asserted her hope that her conviction would help American policy makers reconsider the continuing U.S. economic blockade.

From the DIA's standpoint, the Montes penetration represented a 16-year disaster, longer than the betrayals perpetrated by Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, and had been sustained by more than 300 meetings with Cubans operating not from the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C., but as illegals. The FBI's decision to arrest Montes was prompted by the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 and the fear that her information might leak to another adversary and assist in a further atrocity or compromise military retaliation in Afghanistan.

MONTESINOS, VLADIMIRO. A graduate of the Chorrillos military academy's 1966 artillery class in Lima, Peru, Montesinos was an ambitious officer whose lackluster military career came to an end in March 1977 when he was imprisoned for two years, convicted of leaking classified information. After his release and his dismissal from the army, Montesinos qualified as a lawyer and gained a reputation for successfully defending drug smugglers. In 1990, following the surprise election of Alberto Fujimori as Peru's president, Montesinos became his national security adviser, and although Julio Salazar Monroe was the titular director of the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), he effectively ran that, too.

During the decade Montesinos exercised control over the SIN, he pulled off two impressive successes. The first, in September 1992, was the capture of Dr. Abimael Guzman, the Marxist academic who led the feared Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement. Following an extraordinary series of lengthy interviews with Montesinos, he was persuaded to publicly renounce the organization and abandon his support for **terrorism**. The second was the rescue in April 1997 of 71 hostages who had been held in the Japanese ambassador's residence

for more than three months by a group of 14 Maoist terrorists. In a daring rescue, all the terrorists were shot dead, and only one hostage was killed, allowing Montesinos to claim credit for the raid.

Fujimori was reelected in 1995, but his victory in April 2000, despite the constitutional limit of two terms, was open to doubt as a million more people voted than were registered. Montesinos was accused of having rigged the polls. Worse, one of his collection of compromising videos was stolen, showing him in the act of bribing a politician with \$15,000. Over the years Montesinos had been suspected of involvement with the notorious military death squads that had roamed Lima and of blackmailing judges, money laundering, influence peddling, participating in drug deals with the Colombian cartels, tapping the telephones of critics, demanding kickbacks from arms sales, salting away \$48 million cash in Swiss bank accounts, running an illegal slush fund, working for the Central Intelligence Agency, and using his battalion of zeus bodyguards like a private army to exert pressure on the media and his opponents. All would turn out to be true, although few realized the scale of his corruption. According to the parliamentary commission that investigated Montesinos's activities, he had misappropriated more than a billion dollars and distributed a proportion of it to cronies, girlfriends, drug smugglers, and arms dealers. Proof of his misconduct would come from his vast library of audio- and videotapes, each compromising a politician, judge, or general.

The eventual fall of Montesinos was spectacular. Dismissed by President Fujimori, he fled the country but was refused **political asylum** by Panama. He went on the run and underwent plastic surgery in Caracas, but was eventually betrayed in Venezuela and returned to Lima to face trial in July 2002, when he was sentenced to nine years in prison. Meanwhile Fujimori also fled the country and took refuge in Japan, where his parents had emigrated from originally. After his trial, incarcerated in the prison block he had constructed to accommodate Dr. Guzman, Montesinos identified his CIA contacts and claim that SIN had undertaken numerous joint technical **surveillance** projects on local Eastern Bloc **embassies** and visiting targets.

MOROCCO. Although of no strategic significance, the Kingdom of Morocco has been of value to Western intelligence because of its pro-

vision of a signals **intercept** site at the U.S. Air Force Base at Kenitra (formerly Port Lyautey), on the Atlantic coast north of Rabat.

MOSCOW RULES. The specialist tradecraft developed for Central Intelligence Agency personnel assigned to the Soviet Union. Officers who underwent the dedicated countersurveillance course, run by Jack Platt, were known as "pipeliners." One graduate of the course, Edward Lee Howard, is known to have compromised many of the techniques taught in it. Because of the intensity of surveillance conducted against all suspect foreigners during the Cold War, most Soviet sources were run in the more relaxed security environments of third countries, obliging agents in Moscow to leave innocuous "sign-of-life" signals to indicate their continued freedom and future travel plans.

MOSCOW STATION. During the Cold War, one of the front lines was in the Soviet capital, where the Central Intelligence Agency and Secret Intelligence Service maintained stations in their respective embassies and attempted to conduct operations, despite heavy surveillance from the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. In the immediate postwar era, the CIA decided not to establish a station in Moscow, but when in 1953 that policy was reversed, the results were disastrous. The first CIA officer dispatched to the capital, Edward Ellis Smith, had fought in Europe during World War II, and afterward had worked in G-2 military intelligence in Washington, D.C. He learned Russian and in 1948 had been assigned to Moscow under assistant military attaché cover. In September 1950, when he returned to Washington, Smith joined the CIA and was to be the very first CIA officer sent to Moscow working under semiofficial cover. His mission was to prepare dead drops for Maj. Piotr Popov, the CIA's first source inside the GRU. Popov was a walk-in who had volunteered to spy while he had been posted to Vienna, but the CIA needed a method of communicating with him upon his return to Moscow. However, Smith succumbed to the attractions of Valva, his very alluring Soviet maid, and was compromised in a classic honeytrap and blackmailed by the KGB. Then Paul Garbler was dispatched to replace him. Smith was obliged to resign from the CIA, despite having confessed his failings, and Garbler did not have any more success in attempting to run the CIA's only GRU source.

The U.S. embassy in Moscow has long been the target of Soviet espionage, particularly the fifth floor, which accommodated the CIA station and the 300-square-foot "yellow submarine" metallic box in which the most sensitive work was undertaken. In 1952 an ingenious device was discovered concealed inside the Great Seal of the United **States** that had been presented to the ambassador, Averell Harriman, and placed over his desk. The resonance apparatus required no independent power supply but simply resonated at a particular frequency when bombarded with microwaves (see SATYR). The resulting lowlevel transmissions were picked up by the KGB nearby, and the equipment continued in operation until the seal was examined in 1952. Since then, the embassy has experienced almost continuous technical surveillance, although it took a tip from a KGB defector, Yuri Nosenko, in May 1964 to find no less than 40 bugs hidden inside the 8th, 9th, and 10th floors, which had been added in 1953 shortly before the building was occupied.

In 1978 a tunnel was discovered under the chancery in Tchaikovsky Street, and plans were made to build an entirely new building at a site nearby. However, the new construction, built by Soviet contractors, was dogged by frequent discoveries of eavesdropping devices embedded in the very fabric of the structure.

In 1984 more bugs were found inside typewriters used in the embassy, but knowledge of how they had been planted did not emerge until December 1986 when a U.S. Marine, Sergeant Clayton J. Lonetree, approached Jim Olson, the CIA station chief in Vienna, and confessed to having allowed KGB personnel into the classified areas of the embassy in Moscow at night. Lonetree had been the victim of a honeytrap conducted by a KGB agent, Violette Seina, while he had been posted to Moscow between September 1984 and March 1986. Seina previously had worked at the embassy as a locally employed telephonist and translator, but her genial "Uncle Sasha" was actually a skilled KGB officer, Aleksei G. Yefimov, who manipulated the young native American and persuaded him to compromise classified information.

Lonetree's confession resulted in the detention of six other marines, including Corporal Arnold Bracey, who was suspected of having had several affairs with various Soviet women. In the end, the charges against all except Lonetree were dropped, and he was convicted in August 1987 in a military court on 12 counts of espionage and collaborating with the Soviets to supply floor plans of the embassies in Moscow and Vienna and identifying U.S. intelligence personnel. Lonetree was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment, but following a further, detailed inquiry by the Naval Investigative Service, it was concluded that the KGB never did gain access to the embassy, and his sentence was cut in May 1988 to 25 years, in 1992 to 20 years, and then to 15 years. Finally, he was released in February 1996.

A year later, in July 1997 former director of central intelligence James R. Schlesinger completed a review of security procedures at the embassy in Moscow and recommended that the top three floors of the new embassy be rebuilt and that a new, six-floor annex be constructed to accommodate a high-security unit. It was not until May 2000 that the new embassy was completed, having been dismantled and rebuilt at a cost of \$240 million, nine years after Boris Yeltsin's chairman of the KGB, Vadim Bakatin, had handed over to the U.S. ambassador, Robert S. Strauss, the blueprints to the KGB's entire bugging system. In the new facility, the top two floors, reserved for the use of the National Security Agency and CIA, had been replaced with four ultrasecure floors.

CIA station chiefs in Moscow have included Hugh Montgomery, Barry Kelly, Jack Downing, Robert Fulton, Gus Hathaway, Carl Gebhardt, Murat Natirboff, Dick Stolz, Michael Cline, and Burton Gerber.

MOSSAD. An abbreviation for Le'Modi'in Ule'Tafkidim Meyuhadim ("Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks" in Hebrew), the Mossad is the best-known Israeli intelligence service, with a reputation for ruthless efficiency, and is charged with preventing attacks against the country. Created in 1948 by a Shai veteran, the Latvianborn and British-trained Boris Guriel, Mossad came into formal existence in 1951 under another experienced, British-trained Shai officer, Reuven Shiloah. As Israel has never enjoyed diplomatic links with its principal adversaries, the Mossad has been handicapped in its overseas operations by being entirely dependent on illegals to collect

intelligence in Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, **Libya**, and Lebanon. This lack of protection for its personnel under the terms of the Vienna Convention has left them vulnerable to arrest while carrying out unavowed Israeli government policies. In recent years, the arrest of Mossad personnel in **Cyprus** in November 1998, **Switzerland** in February 1998, and New Zealand in March 2004 has illustrated the risks run by the Mossad's dependence on staff officers operating under nonofficial **cover**. The imprisonment for six months of Elia Cara and Uriel Zoshe Kelman in Auckland in July 2004 after they had pleaded guilty to passport fraud was a demonstration of the Mossad's need to acquire third-country documentation, in this case for a third Mossad agent, Zev Barkan, to travel to target countries.

Mossad's reliance on illegals was demonstrated by the cases of Wolfgang Lotz, who was imprisoned in Egypt in 1964, and Eliahu Cohen, who was arrested in Damascus and executed in May 1965. Both were Jews who had developed elaborate covers to conceal their pasts and enable them to pose as businessmen in Arab countries. A counterbalance to the perceived disadvantage of a lack of diplomatic sanctuary is the existence of a unique, sympathetic worldwide Diaspora that can be called upon to offer emergency or other support should the need arise, although the Mossad is careful not to jeopardize the standing of local Jewish communities nor incriminate its membership, which collectively is always vulnerable to reprisals. Mossad's great advantage has been the degree of support given by successive governments to clandestine operations, even when they fail and the blowback results in major political embarrassment.

The Mossad's impressive reputation is based in part on the successful execution of daring, high-risk operations, such as the abductions of **Adolf Eichmann** in 1960 and **Mordechai Vanunu** in 1986, and credit given the organization for the accomplishments of others, such as the rescue from Entebbe, Uganda, of 96 Israeli hostages in July 1976, a coup achieved by **Aman**. In 1966 Mossad suborned a Syrian pilot to fly his MiG-21 fighter to Israel, and in 1971 it was identified as the recipient of thousands of Mirage blueprints stolen by a Swiss aeronautical engineer, Alfred Frauenknecht, who had been paid \$200,000 for them, thus allowing the Israelis to develop their own advanced version of the interceptor. Following the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972, the Mossad also demonstrated its ruth-

less quality by tracking down and assassinating the **Black September terrorists** responsible for the atrocity.

The Mossad's headquarters, as disclosed by a renegade trainee case officer—Victor Ostrovsky, who wrote *By Way of Deception*— are located inside a large secure compound at Glilot Junction, a residential area north of Tel Aviv, and consist of an operations and a headquarters directorate. The operations branch, headed by the Mossad's deputy chief, consists of Kesaria, the principal "combatants" section, which includes the **assassination** unit Kidon; Neviot, formerly Keshet, which is directed against static targets and installs technical collection systems in buildings; Tsomet, which handles all non-Israeli agents abroad; Tevel, the political reports and research unit; and other technical sections. The headquarters directorate encompasses planning and support.

The public's perception of the Mossad as an efficient organization with an effective global reach is not shared by others in the international intelligence community, as was demonstrated by a classified **Central Intelligence Agency** assessment of Israeli intelligence capabilities recovered from the U.S. **embassy** in 1979. Although shredded, the document was reconstructed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Iranian students, and it cited numerous operation failures and lapses in operational **tradecraft** and was particularly scathing about the Lillehammer incident, in which a Moroccan waiter was murdered in **Norway** when he was incorrectly identified as a Black September terrorist, and the bungled assassination of Khaled Meshal in Amman. While the Mossad attracts criticism for indulging in assassination as a declared instrument, many of its operations, particularly against the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah, have proven effective in reducing the incidence of suicide bombings inside Israel.

While Israel—with its unusual combination of race, nationality, and religion in its population and its precarious geopolitical status—generally can rely on intense loyalty, Mossad has suffered hostile **penetration**, although probably not all the cases identified have been publicized. The only example officially acknowledged is that of **Ze'ev Avni**, who wrote an autobiography, *False Flag*, in which he described some of his covert work for Mossad.

The directors of Mossad have been Reuven Shiloah (1951–52), Isser Harel (1952–63), Meir Amit (1963–68), Zvi Zamir (1968–74),

Yitzhak Hofi (1974–82), Nahum Admoni (1982–90), Shabtai Shavit (1990–96), Danny Yatom (1996–98), Efraim Halevy (1998–2003), and Meir Dagan (2003–).

MOTORIN, SERGEI. Code-named GT/GAUZE by the Central Intelligence Agency, Major Motorin was blackmailed into cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in early 1982 following his participation in an illegal transaction involving duty-free goods that was spotted by surveillance. He was selected as one of Vitali Yurchenko's four KGB escorts on his flight home on 6 November 1985 and was arrested on his arrival at Sheremetyevo Airport, having been identified as a spy by Aldrich Ames.

MUKHABARAT. The generic Arabic term for security and intelligence organization, a mukhabarat is to be found in many countries, including Egypt and Syria. During Saddam Hussein's reign of terror in Iraq, his Mukhabarat was an essential instrument of terror, responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence as well as the maintenance of a comprehensive security apparatus, usually headed by a member of his Tikriti clan, for a long period by Saddam's younger half-brother, Barazan.

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NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NGA). Based in Bethesda, Maryland, and created in November 2003, the NGA is the new title of the reorganized National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY (NIMA). This organization is a 1996 amalgamation in the United States of the Defense Mapping Agency, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, the Central Imagery Office, and the Defense Dissemination Program Office. In November 2003 it was retitled the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR (NID). A post created in the **United States** by the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 in response

to recommendations made following the perceived intelligence failure of 11 September 2001. John Negroponte and his deputy, Gen. Michael Hayden, took supervisory responsibility for entire United States intelligence community, comprising the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the National Counterintelligence Executive, the U.S. Air Force's Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Directorate, the U.S. Army's G-2 Intelligence Office, the U.S. Marine Corps' Intelligence Department, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Department of Energy's Intelligence Office and Counterintelligence Office, the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, the U.S. Coast Guard's Intelligence Directorate, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Office of Intelligence and its counterterrorism and counterintelligence divisions, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the U.S. Treasury's Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Office.

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO). Created in August 1960, the NRO was given responsibility for the supervision of satellite systems in the United States, notionally under the secretary of defense but actually answering to the director of central intelligence, who assigned personnel to the NRO, was its principal consumer, set its requirements, and provided the **imagery** analysis. The existence of the organization, which operates more than 30 ground stations across the globe and is based near Dulles International Airport, in Virginia just outside Washington, D.C., remained unannounced until 1992. In 1995 some responsibility for product processing was passed to the U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency. In 2005 the NRO's director was Peter J. Teets.

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA). Created in October 1952 from the Armed Forces Security Agency, which was itself the successor to the Signal Security Agency that had conducted **interception** operations during World War II, the NSA is based at Fort Meade, Maryland, and is responsible for conducting signals intelligence operations for the United States government. The NSA was considered so secret, until its charter was published in 1984, that it was often referred to as "No Such Agency" even though it was the largest federal employer, with an estimated 40,000 personnel worldwide. The NSA runs its own intercept operations and processes raw intelligence collected by the U.S. Naval Security Group, the Army Intelligence and Security Command, and the Air Intelligence Agency.

The directors of the NSA have been Gen. Ralph Canine (1952–56), Gen. John Samford (1956–60), Adm. Hugh Frost (1960–62), Gen. Gordon Blake (1962–65), Gen. Marshall Carter (1965–69), Adm. Noel Gayler (1969–72), Gen. Samuel Phillips (1972–73), Gen. Lew Allen (1973–77), Adm. Bobby Inman (1977–81), Gen. Lincoln Faurer (1981–85), Gen. William Odom (1985–88), Adm. William Studeman (1988–92), Adm. John McConnell (1992–96), Gen. Kenneth Minnihan (1996–99), and Gen. Michael Hayden (1999–). See also ECHELON.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC). Created by the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC advises the president of the United States on security, intelligence, and foreign policy issues and consists of the vice president, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense. The NSC is headed by the national security adviser, who is supported by a staff on temporary assignment from other departments.

Although the NSC has no operational capability, in 1985 Director of Central Intelligence William Casey opted to circumvent congressional oversight by using the NSC staff to undertake a complicated series of transactions that could not be completed legally by the Central Intelligence Agency. His objective was to free the CIA station chief in Beirut, William Buckley, who had been abducted by Tehran-controlled Hezbollah terrorists in March. The scheme, later known as the Iran-Contra affair, was intended to arrange through intermediaries for the sale of embargoed weapons to Tehran and to divert the windfall profits to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels who had been barred from CIA financial support since the passage of the Bolland Amendment in December 1982. Almost coincidentally, in January 1986, CIA pilot Eugene Hasenfus was captured in Nicaragua when his supply plane was shot down, apparent proof of violations of the Bolland Amendment. A subsequent investigation conducted by Senator John Tower revealed the extent to which Casey, who succumbed to a brain tumor in January 1987, had masterminded the operation, and consequently Col. Oliver North and two of the president's national security advisers, Adm. John Poindexter and Robert McFarlane, were convicted of various offenses connected with the arms sales, diversion of funds, and misleading Congress and were fined.

NATIONAL UNDERWATER RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NURO). A joint U.S. Navy/Central Intelligence Agency group created during the Cold War to coordinate and fund special projects conducted by submarines, principally the USS Halibut, which in August 1968 found the wreck of the K-129 and serviced the IVY BELLS cable pods: Seawolf, Parche, and Richard B. Russell.

NETHERLANDS. When the Dutch government was reestablished in The Hague in 1945 following five years of exile in London during the Nazi occupation, it adopted the British model of a domestic security service and a foreign collection agency, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) and Inlichtingendienst Buitenland (IDB), respectively. The BVD is based at Leidschendam and the director, currently S. Van Huist, is accountable to the prime minister. Little has been disclosed concerning the BVD's operations, although a retiree, Frits Hoekstra, has tried unsuccessfully to publish a book describing his experiences.

The IDB, which was dismantled in January 1994, concentrated on Indonesian targets posing a threat to Dutch colonies and, during the Cold War, on Warsaw Pact military installations. One highly secret branch, based at the Villa Maarheeze in The Hague, provided a stavbehind capability in the event of a Soviet invasion and adopted the name of its headquarters.

NKVD. See KGB; SOVIET UNION.

NON-OFFICAL COVER (NOC). The American term for commercial, business, or journalistic cover adopted by professional intelligence officers while conducting clandestine operations. Unlike their colleagues who may enjoy consular or diplomatic cover and therefore an immunity from arrest in their country of accreditation, NOCs are extremely vulnerable and therefore are supported by several layers of **back-stopping**.

NORTHERN IRELAND. Plagued by sectarian divisions, the six counties of Ulster have experienced three periods of republicaninspired terrorism conducted by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The last serious episode was in July 1957 when the introduction of internment enabled the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch to identify and detain the 50 leading republicans who had been responsible for the violence, thereby temporarily containing the problem. However, when the same exercise was attempted in 1971, following two years of riots, car bombings, and shootings, the RUC had lost the confidence of the minority Roman Catholic community and were ill prepared to execute Operation DEMETRIUS. In particular, the IRA had divided into two factions, with the so-called Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) wing taking a militant Marxist approach and leaving the "officials" to retire to Dublin.

In fact the RUC had not recruited any sources inside the republican movement since the 1950s and such intelligence as they had proved largely inaccurate. While the army's DEMETRIUS sweep with 3,000 troops through Belfast and Londonderry before dawn on Monday, 9 August, netted a total of 342 suspects, none had anything to do with the PIRA leadership. This was proved when Joe Cahill of the PIRA's Belfast Brigade slipped over to Ballymurphy and called a press conference in a school gym with John Kelly on the platform, and Gerry Adams and Sean MacStiofain in the wings. Plainly the PIRA leadership was intact, but it had anyway anticipated the raids and many of the senior personnel were based in Ireland. Heavy rioting followed, and over the next three days some 23 people died in the disorder. Nevertheless DEMETRIUS provided a foundation, at least for the army, to understand PIRA's structure, membership, and order of battle. Of the total detained, 116 were soon released, and the remaining 226 were either placed in Crumlin Road jail or on the prison ship Maidstone, which had been moored in the Belfast docks until special camps at Long Kesh and Magilligan could be prepared. The interrogations were conducted at Girdwood Barracks, in Belfast, and at an old Royal Air Force base at Ballykelly, and as a result of the intelligence gained, the number of detainees rose to 694 by mid-December.

In fact, the exercise proved counterproductive in political terms, alienating the minority community, playing into the hands of the republican propagandists, and upsetting international opinion, especially in Dublin where Prime Minister Jack Lynch had not been forewarned. Worse, when protests about maltreatment surfaced, numerous complaints about "in-depth" interrogation techniques, such as sensory deprivation, were held up and equated to torture, thereby undermining the operation's legitimacy. Nevertheless, DEMETRIUS did yield good intelligence, and critics of the policy, who denounced internment as the "terrorists' recruiting sergeant," overlook the huge increase in seizures of illegal weapons and explosives in the five months that followed. Some 363 rifles, pistols, and machine guns were recovered after DEMETRIUS, including 2,541 pounds of explosives and 55 rockets, compared to just 93 equivalent firearms and 1,194 pounds of explosives in the previous seven months. On the other hand, there were many more PIRA weapons to be found, and they were being used with increasing frequency. Whereas 42 soldiers were killed during 1971, 64 died during the following year, in part a consequence of the legitimate purchase in the United States of Armalite high-velocity rifles, which were then smuggled across the Atlantic to Southampton aboard the Queen Elizabeth 2.

After several false starts, the various British clandestine agencies accomplished the total penetration and elimination of one republican paramilitary organization, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and the actual defeat of its rival, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Between 1969 and February 1996 approximately 125 republican terrorists were victims of "own goals," meaning that they blew themselves up accidentally with their own explosives. In addition, during much of that period about 40 percent of PIRA's membership, estimated at never more than 500 in total, were in prison or remanded in custody facing terrorism charges.

Over the years that followed the DEMETRIUS fiasco, three other British civilian agencies were to participate in the covert war: MI5, the Secret Intelligence Service, and GCHO, which supplied the sophisticated equipment to assist in the technical surveillance of suspects. In addition, the British Army developed its own intelligence-gathering structure, beginning with the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF), which was to be replaced by the 14th Security and Intelligence Company, technically a subdivision of the Security and Intelligence Wing of the Intelligence Corps. Known also as "14 Int," it was deployed in three units across Ulster and was composed of volunteers drawn from all branches of the armed forces. Acting as the executive arm of 14 Int, whose prime role was one of passive surveillance, was the 22nd **Special Air Service regiment**, which operated within Northern Ireland intermittently from 1969 but was formally deployed in squadron strength into Armagh in January 1975. Operating in parallel to 14 Int was a much smaller structure, the Force Research Unit (FRU), a team of agent handlers led by a lieutenant colonel and an MI5 officer, which **cultivated**, recruited, and ran sources in both the nationalist and loyalist communities.

The opposing teams consisted, on the republican side, of the Provisional IRA and finally the breakaway Real IRA and Continuity IRA. Assisted by British penetration, INLA was to self-destruct, and both the Real IRA and Continuity IRA were to suffer defeat to the point where almost their entire membership became the subject of surveillance, thus forcing them to publicly renounce violence and disband. On the loyalist side, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and various smaller splinter groups adopted the peace process when PIRA announced a cease-fire and also disbanded. Finally, in July 2005, PIRA formally declared the end of the "armed struggle" and committed itself to abandoning its weapons.

NORUSA. Acronym for the **Norway–United States** Communications Intelligence Agreement concluded in December 1954 governing the **interception** of signals from Norwegian stations and access to the resulting intelligence product.

NORWAY. The Norwegian Deuxième Bureau, designated FO-II, was created in 1939 by Col. Roscher Lund. During World War II, it expanded under British sponsorship to train, infiltrate, and run some 200 agents in Nazi-occupied Norway, with an additional estimated 1,800 support personnel. At the end of the war, Lund was succeeded

by Maj. Vilhelm Evang, who headed the Intelligence Staff until October 1966 when Col. Johan Berg took over.

The role of the Intelligence Staff during the Cold War was to establish a stay-behind organization, liaise closely with the Secret Intelligence Service and the Central Intelligence Agency, and provide support for clandestine operations, including U-2, SOSUS, and signals intelligence collection. The Norwegian Security Service, headed by Asbjørn Bryhn from 1947 to 1966, concentrated principally on the Soviet target and scored some notable successes, including the arrest of Capt. Kristen Gjoen of the air force in June 1965, and of the Foreign Ministry's Arne Treholt in January 1984 as a result of information from Oleg Gordievsky. Previously one of Bryhn's own secretaries, Ingebord Lygren, had been accused of supplying information to the KGB, and on the advice of the KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn she had been interrogated in November 1965. She had conducted some operations for the CIA while posted to the Norwegian embassy in Moscow in 1956 for three years, but she was not the culprit, who turned out to be a Foreign Ministry clerk, Gunvor Haavik. Haavik was arrested in January 1977 while passing classified documents to her Soviet contact and confessed to having spied since 1950. She died in prison before she could be placed on trial. See also NORUSA; NORWEGIAN SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.

NORWEGIAN SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE. During the Cold War, a network of Norwegian signals intelligence facilities in the far north of the country scooped up the VHF transmissions of Red Army units garrisoned in the Baltic states. Analysis of routine call signs and wireless traffic allowed the Norwegians, acting as surrogates for the U.S. National Security Agency, to monitor troop movements and any sudden deployment to the south or west. Soviet signals were intercepted at Tomaselv on Vadso Island, Kirkenes and Viksjofjell, and Fasuske. They were then sent to the NSA via an American communications relay at Gardermoen, on the outskirts of Oslo not far from the Norwegian signals intelligence headquarters at Saeter, or via a teleprinter to Chicksands in England. In addition, the Norwegians ran two direction-finding stations at Heimdal outside Trondheim, and at Randaberg, near Stavanger, with a further site at Nordstrand, outside Oslo, which concentrated on the southern Soviet **Union** and the Warsaw Pact satellite countries. The significance of the Norwegian activity can be judged by the fact that the entire Norwegian Intelligence Service only ever employed a thousand personnel, of whom more than half were engaged on "high priority" work, which was a euphemism for signals intelligence.

NORWOOD, MELITA. Identified by the KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin in 1992 as a lifelong Communist and spy, Norwood had been code-named HOLA and had been in contact with KGB's illegal rezident in London until January 1961. Born in London in 1912 of an immigrant Latvian bookbinder named Sirnis, Norwood had been a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and had been linked to Percy Glading in 1938 when the former CPGB national organizer was imprisoned for espionage. Her name and her family's address in Hampstead were found in a notebook owned by Glading at the time of his arrest, when he was charged with stealing secrets from the Woolwich Arsenal, but MI5 had not pursued the clue. Later she had joined the headquarters of the British Non-Ferrous Metals Association in Euston as a typist for one of its directors, G. J. Bailey, and this had given her access to nuclear secrets, as the organization was a component of the Anglo-American Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb, against which the NKVD had initiated Operation ENORMOZ. In 1964 Norwood had been tentatively identified as the spy code-named TINA who had been mentioned in a single VENONA message from Moscow dated 16 September 1945 instructing her not to confide in her husband, a Communist school teacher, about her espionage. She died in June 2005, while her biography was being written by an English academic, David Bourke.

NOVEMBER 17 (N17). A Greek terrorist organization credited with the murder of the Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Athens, Richard Welch at his home in December 1975, as well as at least 50 bombings and 22 other assassinations. A self-styled Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group named after the day on which the Greek Junta had ordered the army to occupy the campus of the University of Athens to suppress a student uprising in 1973, the group appeared immune to all attempts at **penetration** until Savas Xiros was injured while planting a bomb in Piraeus in June 2002. He identified his

brother Vasilis as the gunman who had shot the British defense attaché, Brigadier Stephen Saunders, and named Alexandros Giotopoulos as N17's leader. Both he and his principal subordinate, Paulos Serifis, were arrested and convicted of terrorist offenses committed over the previous 30 years.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. Concern about nuclear matériel and components falling into the hands of irresponsible organizations or governments has led Western intelligence agencies to monitor the work of the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) in Vienna and intervene to prevent the spread of plutonium, weapons-grade uranium, and the equipment required to enrich atomic fuel. The first significant atomic development by a nonsignatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was Israel, which built a civil reactor at Dimona and then began to accumulate a nuclear arsenal of landmines and free-fall bombs. Successive Israeli governments have consistently refused to allow external inspection of the site, but disclosures made by a former technician, Mordechai Vanunu, in 1986, a year after he had been laid off, served to prove that Israel had acquired a far larger atomic stockpile than anticipated.

With 40 countries possessing the technology to construct reactors, the IAEA's task is to detect any enrichment program and give advice to the United Nations Security Council regarding the production of weapons-grade matériel or the acquisition of other essential equipment or components. IAEA investigations conducted in Iran, Libya, and North Korea have demonstrated the spread of expertise from Pakistan's A. Q. Khan and the former Soviet republics, and the inability of international inspectors to gain access to suspect sites in Iraq proved to be one of the catalysts for the 1992 Gulf War. See also CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF.

NUMBERS STATIONS. During and since the **Cold War**, several shortwave radio stations have transmitted continuous voice broadcasts of apparently random numbers in numerous languages in four or five figure groups. No public statement has been made by any originating country concerning the purpose of these signals, but they have a clandestine role in communicating with agents operating in denied areas. The numbers may conceal an enciphered message, or a particular sequence broadcast at a predetermined time may convey a hidden meaning in much the way the *messages personnel* that accompanied the BBC news bulletins during World War II acted as a one-way channel to recipients briefed to understand the meaning of certain otherwise innocuous texts.

The broadcasts are not licensed by the International Telecommunications Union, although a Spanish four-digit channel was traced to the **Central Intelligence Agency**'s transmitter at Warrenton, Virginia, and **Cuba** is the source of similar five-figure groups. Many of the transmissions appear to be live, but some are automated, with distinctive clicks to be heard between each number. The most common languages are English, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Czech, and Chinese, and the transmissions are made in the AM mode, making them easy to receive on conventional radios. Some are sent only at particular times and on regular days, while others are almost continuous, sometimes being duplicated on two different frequencies. One of the more distinctive, transmitted from **Cyprus**, begins each hour with the opening notes of "The Lincolnshire Poacher" as its station identification.

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OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. Originally passed in 1889 by Lord Salisbury's government following the collapse of the prosecution of Charles Marvin under the Larceny Acts for stealing information about a secret treaty with Russia, the Official Secrets Act was later amended in 1912 and 1920. The purpose of the legislation was to provide protection for official information and sanctions against foreign espionage. While the statute, as amended in 1920, allowed for the interception of all overseas cables, it was ineffective as a deterrent against spying and was criticized for being too widely drawn. Few successful prosecutions were ever achieved without a plea of guilty from the defendant, and in 1940 the Treachery Act was passed in great haste when it was realized that enemy agents landing in Great Britain for the purpose of espionage, if they were arrested before they had collected any information covered by the Act, had not committed an offense.

OGORODNIK, ALEZANDER. Code-named TRIGON by the Central Intelligence Agency, Ogorodnik was a Soviet Foreign Ministry official recruited in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1969 after having sought the CIA's help when his Colombian girlfriend had become pregnant. In 1977 TRIGON's case officer, Martha Petersen, was detained while servicing one of his dead drops in Moscow, and the KGB seized some of his espionage paraphernalia, including two cameras and some sophisticated miniaturized communications equipment. Ogorodnik committed suicide with a lethal cyanide pill concealed in a fountain pen while under interrogation, but Petersen was released and expelled because she had diplomatic immunity. The CIA later concluded that Ogorodnik had been betrayed by Karl Koecher, a Czech spy who succeeded in penetrating the Agency.

OGPU. See KGB; SOVIET UNION.

OKHRANA. See SOVIET UNION.

OMAN. Strategically located on the oil-rich Arabian Gulf, overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman has been a center of regional trade and a base for British military and signals intelligence operations since the Cold War. The British-backed sultan's armed forces have been organized and commanded by British personnel. In 1958, when British troops were deployed to oppose insurgents, the sultan's chief of staff was David Smiley, a regular soldier and a former Secret Intelligence Service officer. Supported by RAF bombers flying from Bahrain and Masirah Island, the airfield and GCHQ intercept station off Oman's coast, two squadrons of 22nd Special Air Service (SAS) defeated the Saudi-backed rebels on the Jebel Akhdar.

In 1970 more insurgents, this time from the Yemen, infiltrated into the Dhofar mountains, and for the following six years SAS troops engaged them in Operation STORM and gained the trust of the local population by supplying badly needed veterinarian and medical advice. The Communist guerrillas were defeated, and the constituent countries of what became the United Arab Emirates continue to depend heavily on British military, security, and intelligence support.

ONE-TIME PAD (OTP). A cipher system based on the single use of a cipher, thereby avoiding the repetition that allows the **cryptographer** an advantage. The system is usually based on disposable sheets of randomly generated five-figure numbers which are used as additives to alter an enciphered text. Although theoretically ciphers based on OTPs should be unsolvable except by the parties with access to the pads, the British Government Code & Cypher School found in 1942 that it was possible to mimic the supposedly random numbers generated by the Lorenz machine used as the basis of the OTPs used by the **German** Foreign Ministry. This traffic, code-named FLORADORA, was read consistently until the end of hostilities and proved excellent intelligence.

Duplicate keys spotted in **Soviet** cable traffic in 1943 led to the discovery that between 1940 and 1948 the Soviets had depended on identical sheets inserted separately into the OTPs used for diplomatic, consular, trade, NKVD, **GRU**, and Naval GRU communications. This source later became known by the generic code name **VENONA**, although precisely how the random numbers were generated, before they were printed on their pads' disposable sheets, remains a mystery.

OPEN SOURCES. Unclassified sources of information are termed "open source." These include the type of data that can be gleaned from newspapers, scientific journals, specialist publications, and the internet. Whereas some intelligence agencies have specific open-source sections to exploit this material, it is generally estimated that 80 percent of intelligence supplied by intelligence agencies has been derived from open sources. Information from open sources may be combined to become a classified item. For example, where an agency's premises may be known, and the local office employment density regulations are available, it may be possible to calculate accurately the personnel strength in a particular building, a figure that itself may be classified.

OPERATIONAL ACT. A term used by **Central Intelligence Agency** personnel to indicate compromising behavior that would be likely to indicate to an adversary that a particular individual was a professional intelligence officer. When working in a denied area, an officer is reluctant to break **cover** and thereby give any indication to an ad-

versary that a professional is active. Accordingly, operational acts, which may involve the preparation of signal sites, the servicing of **dead drops**, or **brush contacts**, are kept to an absolute minimum and undertaken in the absence of hostile **surveillance**.

ORDER OF BATTLE. The military term applied to the organizational structure of an adversary—often referred to, when illustrated as a chart, as a "wiring diagram"—indicating the hierarchy and relationships with other units. Development of an order of battle, identifying members of an intelligence unit, their administrative support, cipher personnel, and **cooptees** is regarded as the mandatory foundation of any **counterintelligence** operation.

ORGANISATION ARMÉE SECRÈTE (OAS). Created by disaffected opponents of **France**'s policy after the withdrawal from **Algeria**, the OAS conducted a campaign against President Charles de Gaulle and plotted his **assassination** on several occasions until the leadership disbanded the command structure in the face of operations conducted by the Service de Documentation et Contre-Espionnage.

OSHIMA, HIROSHI. The Japanese ambassador in Berlin during World War II, having served since 1934 as the military attaché, General Oshima developed a particularly close relationship with Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler and received regular intelligence briefings. His detailed reports to Tokyo, more than 1,450 of them before the end of the war, were transmitted in the PURPLE diplomatic cipher, which had been solved in the United States in December 1940 and was read at Bletchley Park. These provided invaluable insights into Oshima's views of the conduct of hostilities and included very comprehensive accounts of his observations made during inspections of the Russian front and the Atlantic Wall, which were circulated as summaries code-named MAGIC.

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P-26. A secret unit under the direct control of the Swiss Army's chief of staff during the **Cold War** that was trained in **stay-behind** tactics by

NATO as part of a contingency plan for a **Soviet** occupation of **Switzerland**. Disclosure of P-26's existence, without the knowledge of the Swiss Conseil d'Etat, resulted in a parliamentary investigation in 1991 conducted by Judge Cornu. Led by Efram Cattelan, P-26 had prepared secret headquarters in Auckland, New Zealand, and Montreal, **Canada**, under Swissair cover, and installed Major Bachmann at Liss Ard House in Skibereen, on the south coast of **Ireland**, as an alternate communications center to coordinate P-26's operations. Following its disclosure, P-26 was dismantled. *See also* GLADIO.

PACEPA, ION. The most senior Eastern Bloc intelligence officer ever to defect to the West, Lt. Gen. Ion Pacepa headed Romania's Departmentule Informatii Externe until he walked into the U.S. embassy in Bonn in July 1978 and requested political asylum. After he had been debriefed, he married the Central Intelligence Agency handler responsible for his resettlement.

PACQUES, GEORGES. A French-born **Soviet** spy working at NATO headquarters in Belgium in 1961 as a press spokesman, Pacques was arrested and convicted of espionage after he had been betrayed by a **KGB defector**, **Anatoli Golitsyn**. In his confession he admitted having spied for the Soviets since he had been recruited in Algiers in 1944.

PAKISTAN. Established after India was partitioned in 1948, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) fulfills the dual role of a domestic security service and a collector of foreign intelligence. The ISI operated as a surrogate for the **Central Intelligence Agency** from 1983, arming and training 125,000 **Afghan** volunteers, the Mujahadeen, drawn from the refugees camped around Peshawar who had fled the **Soviet** occupation of their own country.

Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, the ISI continued to support the radicals among the Mujahadeen who filled the power vacuum in Kabul by establishing an Islamic Taliban government, leaving the rest of the country in the control of feuding warlords anxious to protect their own crops of opium. However, as pressure increased from the **United States** to curb Islamic extremism and the training of radicals in the tribal areas around

the Afghan border, the ISI was purged to eliminate officers overtly sympathetic to those committed to continuing the holy jihad against the West who were thought to have collaborated with the Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden.

PALESTINE. Following the League of Nations' grant of a Palestinian mandate to Great Britain after World War I, a garrison was established at Sarafand, which became one of the links in the Empire Chain of relay wireless transmitters, as well as a signals intelligence intercept station. Prior to the Afrika Korps offensive of 1941, plans were drawn up for the evacuation of Palestine and the development of a stay-behind organization drawn from volunteers from within the Jewish community. The Jewish settlers had already organized into paramilitary self-defense bands, known as the Haganah, due to the Arab revolts during and after 1936. The group involved in collecting intelligence was known as the Shai and was supplied with weapons and radios by **Special Operations Executive**. Thus, at the conclusion of World War II, Great Britain had trained and equipped a welldisciplined force dedicated to the establishment of an independent Jewish state, and it engaged the local security forces in a guerrilla war. The British withdrawal in May 1948 acted as a catalyst for an Arab attack, which was defeated by the Haganah, thus allowing the state of **Israel** to be established in part of the territory of Palestine.

During the Oslo peace negotiations conducted with Israel in 1993, the **Palestine Liberation Organization** traded formal recognition of Israel and the country's right to exist for the establishment of a Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza and the occupied territory of the West Bank of the River Jordan.

The Palestinian Authority established a General Intelligence Service (GIS) with training from the **United States** and the European Union, but it proved ineffectual at exercising control over the rejectionists, and at worst actively collaborated with the extremists. Evidence for collusion comes from several incidents in which GIS personnel were engaged in firefights with the Israelis, including Sayyid Salih Abu-Safra, who was killed by Israeli forces in the village of al-Badawiyah in November 2003. Another GIS suspect, Musa Shahin, was held by Israel for 18 months on a number of security charges, before being released in December 2003 following criticism of the way

the Office of the Judge Advocate-General had handled the case, including a muddled and contradictory indictment.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Created by Yasser Arafat to campaign for the establishment of an independent state of **Palestine**, the PLO proved an effective **terrorist** organization, even after the **Central Intelligence Agency** recruited its charismatic intelligence chief, Ali Hassan Salameh, as a source. He was finally killed by a **Mossad** car bomb in Beirut in 1979.

The PLO proved ineffective in exercising any discipline over the many splinter groups that conducted terrorist operations against Israel, even after the movement was legitimized during the Oslo peace accords and supplied with funds and training by the **United States** and the European Union. Thoroughly **penetrated** both by the Mossad and by Islamic extremists controlled by Hezbollah and Hamas, the PLO failed to reach a settlement at Camp David in talks organized by President Bill Clinton, leaving Arafat impotent and allied with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. After Arafat's death in 2004 and the election by secret ballot of a new Palestinian Authority, the General Intelligence Service was given additional aid to enhance its internal security apparatus and to curb the extremists. *See also* BLACK SEPTEMBER.

PAPERMILL. A source of forged documents or material whose authenticity is open to doubt. The problem posed by such documentation is that while the actual product may have been fabricated, the content may still reflect an essential truth. A good example is the Zinoviev Letter, now widely regarded as having been manufactured by a notorious White Russian forger and peddled to the Secret Intelligence Service head of station in Riga in 1924, which accurately reflected the policy of the Comintern and the views of the alleged author, Grigori Zinoviev, even if the actual text was bogus.

PAPUSHIN, SERGEI. Formerly a member of the **KGB**'s Second Chief Directorate (SCD) Sergei Papushin moved to New York and, after a run-in with the police in New Jersey over drunkenness, was approached in December 1989 by the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** to supply information. He did so, disclosing that he had heard in

Moscow that the KGB had **penetrated** the **Central Intelligence Agency**, probably through the **embassy**. Most of Papushin's material was of interest to the British, who had been his section's particular target, but he did identify a hitherto anonymous CIA source, codenamed **PROLOGUE**, as an SCD colleague, Aleksandr Zhomov. As anticipated, Zhomov had been a **dangle**, controlled from the outset by the KGB.

PASSPORT CONTROL OFFICE (PCO). In 1924 the British Secret Intelligence Service adopted Passport Control Offices as a convenient cover for its stations overseas. Invariably the true role of the passport control officer was declared to the local security apparatus, and he or she acted in a liaison role with his hosts. By limiting their activities to the collection of information against a common adversary and taking care not to compromise British diplomatic interests, the PCOs generally operated against neighboring countries and thereby avoided undermining the relationship with the local regime or attracting unwelcome attention.

The PCO system was widely acknowledged to be semitransparent, which had the advantage of enabling potential informants to approach an SIS officer directly without embarrassing regular diplomatic personnel, but also meant that adversaries had an easy target to work on when planning **penetrations** or **double agent** operations. In the aftermath of the Venlo incident in November 1939, it became clear that the SIS station in The Hague had been hopelessly compromised and penetrated for years. Nevertheless the system was retained until the end of World War II, when the Foreign Office accepted the need to provide posts in overseas diplomatic missions for SIS personnel, thereby granting them a measure of protection under the terms of the Vienna Convention.

PEARL HARBOR. The surprise attack by **Japanese** aircraft and midget **submarines** on the U.S. Navy's anchorage at Oahu, Hawaii, on Sunday, 7 December 1941 led to the **United States**' entry into World War II. The intelligence failure that allowed the Japanese carrier battle fleet to steam towards the Hawaiian Islands without being detected was the subject of several congressional investigations, the first of which apportioned blame to Admiral Kimmel for

concentrating the Pacific Fleet where it made an easy target for enemy torpedoes and bombers.

The disaster was all the more inexcusable because American **cryptographers** had gained access to some of the Japanese diplomatic and naval ciphers, and as Tokyo's wireless traffic was read, it became evident that the increasingly tense telegrams contained obvious clues to an imminent breakdown in diplomatic relations and an air raid on Pearl Harbor and American bases in the Philippines.

PELTON, RONALD W. A former National Security Agency (NSA) analyst with 14 years of experience, Pelton approached the Soviets in 1980 and sold them classified data until he was arrested in Annapolis, Maryland, following his betrayal by a KGB defector, Vitali Yurchenko, on 25 November 1985. Among the projects he compromised was IVY BELLS, an eavesdropping device placed on a Soviet underwater cable in the Sea of Okhotsk by the USS *Halibut*, a specially converted submarine fitted with a unique diving compartment to allow the pods and recording equipment to be replaced. Pelton was arrested on six conspiracy and espionage charges; he pleaded not guilty, but on 16 December 1986 he was sentenced to three concurrent life terms plus 10 years.

PENETRATION. The process of developing a spy to supply classified information from within an adversary's security or intelligence apparatus—and the act of accomplishing that operation. Penetration is likely to provide information of significant value. Accordingly, a penetration agent is considered the acme of achievement in the **counter-intelligence** field. Inevitably, most intelligence agencies are likely to experience hostile penetration at some level, and as the spies are professionals, not part-time agents, they are less vulnerable to detection.

PENKOVSKY, OLEG. A GRU colonel, Penkovsky had served under military attaché cover in Ankara, Turkey, in 1955, but upon his return to Moscow volunteered his services to the Americans and Canadians as a source of intelligence. He was at first rebuffed as a likely provocation, but was taken seriously after a further approach to the Secret Intelligence Service in December, through a British businessman, Greville Wynne. This resulted in a joint SIS—Central Intelligence

Agency operation that lasted 18 months, until his arrest by the **KGB** in October 1962, code-named HERO by the CIA and YOGA by SIS.

During 1961 Penkovsky made three visits abroad, to London in April and July 1961 and to Paris, and on each occasion he underwent a lengthy debriefing by a CIA team led by Joe Bulik and Kisevalter, and two SIS officers, Michael Stokes and Harold Shergold. Penkovsky's information, distributed in London and Washington, D.C., under the code names ARNIKA, RUPEE, and IRONBARK, included details of his GRU colleagues, planned operations, and the deployment of **Soviet** intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Convicted at a public trial in May 1963, Penkovsky was executed, and Greville Wynne was imprisoned and later exchanged in a **spy-swap**.

PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG). Under the terms of the Vienna Convention governing the conduct of diplomats, an individual who is no longer welcome in a host country is declared persona non grata and is required to return home within a specified period. Although such **expulsions** are often made public, the alternative is a private demand for the withdrawal of a named person, an act known as a "silent PNG." The principal of reciprocal diplomatic immunity was established in England in 1708.

PERU. In almost permanent conflict with neighboring Ecuador and **Chile**, Peru had developed a substantial intelligence structure based on the three armed forces and the notorious Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), which, for 10 years during the 1990s when the country was led by President Alberto Fujimori, had been controlled by **Vladimiro Montesinos**. Based at the Chorrillos military academy in Lima, SIN had been nominally headed by Edwin Diaz, Julio Salazar Monroe, and finally Admiral Rozos, but in fact Montesinos exercised complete control over all branches of the government and was regarded by the **Central Intelligence Agency** as having been effective in counternarcotics and counterterrorism. Although Montesinos was later implicated by **Colombian** drug traffickers, he played a key role in destroying the cross-border safe havens favored by Colombian narco-**terrorists**, and he decapitated and eliminated the Shining Path movement.

PETROV, VLADIMIR. Reluctant to return to Moscow at the conclusion of his tour of duty as *rezident* in Canberra, **Australia**, Petrov negotiated his **defection** with the **Australian Security Intelligence Organisation** (ASIO) in April 1954. He had not disclosed his plans to his formidable wife Evdokia, a Soviet intelligence officer herself, and she made a dramatic escape from her plane in Darwin while being escorted back to the **Soviet Union**. Previously they had both served for three years at the *rezidentura* in wartime Stockholm and were experienced officers.

Petrov's disclosures in Australia led to the appointment of a royal commission to investigate allegations of espionage, and ASIO took the opportunity to introduce suspects who had been implicated not by Petrov, but by VENONA material. The Petrovs were **resettled** in the Melbourne suburb of Bentleigh under the **alias** Sven and Anna Allyson; he died there in 1991, and she survived him until 2002. Reportedly the **KGB** learned of their new identities and whereabouts, but decided against their **assassination**.

PHILBY, KIM (H. A. R.). Philby was a Secret Intelligence Service officer who transferred into Section V in 1941 from Special Operations Executive, where he had worked as an instructor on propaganda techniques. As the longest-serving foreign correspondent in Spain during the Civil War, working for *The Times*, Philby was fluent in German, French, and Spanish and was an able writer. A Cambridge graduate with a graduate degree in economics, he had been recruited as a Soviet agent in mid-May 1934, after his marriage to Litzi Friedmann in Vienna, and joined the SIS as a lecturer, apparently unhindered by a speech impediment and his father, a fervent Arabist who was detained under the Defence of the Realm Emergency Regulations as a Nazi sympathizer.

Philby established his reputation as a **counterintelligence** specialist while working as an analyst of **intercepted Abwehr** ISK and ISOS traffic pertaining to his designated sphere of interest, the Iberian Peninsula. By the end of the war, he had been promoted to head of the anti-Soviet branch, Section IX, and was sent to the SIS station in Istanbul on his first overseas posting. In 1949 he was recalled to London for a new assignment to Washington, D.C., where he remained until May 1951, when he was summoned home to face interrogation

over the disappearance of his friend Guy Burgess. Sacked by the SIS in November 1951, Philby eked out a living as a journalist in Beirut, often writing under a pseudonym, but in January 1963 **defected** to Moscow after he had been offered, and had accepted, a British **immunity** from prosecution in return for a detailed confession. Philby's statement, in which he implicated a schoolfriend and colleague and made other misleading assertions, was later demonstrated to have been fabricated.

As a Soviet mole, Philby had proved an assiduous spy, sending Moscow vast quantities of information from inside the SIS during the decade he was employed there, and even afterward when he maintained contact with former colleagues who were unaware of the scale of the evidence against him. He admitted compromising Konstantin Volkov, a GRU officer who had attempted to negotiate his defection in Istanbul in September 1945, and tipping off his Soviet contacts when he was indoctrinated into the VENONA project prior to his appointment to Washington. Although famously labeled "the third man," a charge for which the Macmillan government was obliged to exonerate him in November 1955, and a member of the notorious Cambridge Five, Philby was actually the first of the five to be recruited, by the illegal rezident Arnold Deutsch on the recommendation of his wife's Austrian friend, Edith Suschitzsky. Later he would be handled by several Soviets, including Alexander Orlov, who later defected.

Philby's life in Moscow proved unfulfilling and he descended into alcoholism, from which he was rescued by his third wife, Rufina, whom he met in 1970, two years after the publication of his memoirs, *My Silent War*. He died in a Moscow hospital in May 1988, disappointed by the lack of attention he had received from the **KGB** and the organization's unwillingness to entrust him with any serious assignments.

PHOENIX. The code name for an operation conducted during the Vietnam War between 1967 and 1971 to infiltrate, identify, and neutralize the Vietcong infrastructure in rural villages. Sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency's Provincial Reconnaissance Units but managed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, teams of Vietcong defectors were granted amnesty in return for their assistance in penetrating the

Communist cells across South Vietnam. Their objective was to offer further amnesties and gain more defectors, especially from the elite **Ban-an-ninh**, and although an estimated 17,000 took advantage of the scheme, and another 28,000 were taken prisoner, approximately 20,587 refused to surrender and died in firefights. An unknown number of PHOENIX members and their families were abducted, tortured, and murdered by the equally ruthless Ban-an-ninh.

Although often characterized by critics as an **assassination** program, achieving notoriety when William Colby was appointed **director of central intelligence** after having supervised the operation, PHOENIX is recognized as having been an exceptionally effective counterinsurgency measure, based upon British-inspired **countergang** principles, dependent on defectors denouncing their former comrades. In such circumstances, there is inevitably an element of personal score-settling and unreliable denunciations motivated by other reasons, but intelligence suggested that PHOENIX was the most significant factor in undermining Vietcong morale and isolating its cadres from the village headmen, and given more time, it might have prevented the final massed assault on Saigon.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE (PHOTOINT). The collection and analysis of orthodox film-camera photography, generally including electro-optical **imagery** as well.

PIGUZOV, VLADIMIR. In 1985 Col. Vladimir M. Piguzov, codenamed GT/JOGGER by the Central Intelligence Agency, a KGB officer recruited in Djakarta and assigned to the KGB's Andropov Institute training academy, dropped from sight. This was an especially mysterious and sinister loss, for Piguzov had not been in contact with the CIA since 1979 when he had returned to Moscow and had proven himself to be an exceptionally useful source by identifying David Barnett, a turncoat CIA retiree working on a training program on contract who was arrested in April 1980 and had been sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.

PIKE COMMITTEE. New York congressman Otis Pike chaired a committee in the House of Representatives in 1973 to investigate operations conducted by various services, including the **Central Intel-**

ligence Agency. The committee never produced a report and was wracked by partisan political disagreement. The incomplete report was leaked in January and February 1976, but following the murder of the CIA station chief in Athens, Richard Welch, in December 1975, there was no appetite to continue the committee's hearings.

PIPELINERS. A term used by Central Intelligence Agency personnel for the countersurveillance course given by Jack Platt to officers assigned to denied areas. Having completed the course, which includes exercises conducted in Washington, D.C., Directorate of Operations staff are qualified to spot hostile surveillance, evade the watchers, and exploit moments in obscura when they may be out of sight and able to complete operational acts without discovery. During the Cold War, when the CIA's principal adversary was the KGB Third Chief Directorate, the protocols governing the tradecraft were known as Moscow Rules.

PITCH. The moment a target is approached for recruitment is known as the "pitch" and, because it is an unmistakable request to engage in espionage, invariably compromises the individual making it. Pitches can be made after a period of **cultivation**, in which the quarry has been gently prepared for the offer, or can be made "cold," without any previous contact. Targets with access to classified information, such as professional intelligence personnel, are trained to report such offers, and in some organizations the failure to make such a declaration can itself be regarded as potentially incriminating.

Pitches can take many forms, and during the **Cold War**, **Soviet** Bloc targets were often subjected to "gangplank pitches" in which an adversary leaving the country at the end of a tour of duty, sometimes literally on the gangplank joining a ship, was taken aside and offered **political asylum** in return for information or was slipped a card offering a contact telephone number in a third country where a discreet message indicating a willingness to cooperate would be taken. Such incidents were often regarded as usefully disruptive because if the target reported the approach to his superiors, as required to do so, it indicated that their true role as an intelligence professional had been discovered, thereby diminishing the chances of further overseas assignment. On the other hand, officers who failed to report such a

pitch were thought to have either consciously decided to protect their careers and were vulnerable to suspicion, thereby making them better targets in the future.

PITTS, EARL EDWIN. In December 1996 Pitts, a 43-year-old **Federal Bureau of Investigation** special agent with 13 years of experience, was arrested at the Quantico training academy and charged with passing classified data to the **Soviets** between 1987 and 1992 for more than \$224,000.

In July 1987 Pitts, a former army officer who had served in U.S. Special Forces, while assigned to the New York Field Office had approached a KGB officer at the Soviet mission to the United Nations with an offer to sell him information, including a document entitled Counterintelligence: Identifying Foreign Agents. The KGB accepted the offer. Having been paid \$129,000, with another \$100,000 allegedly placed in a foreign bank account, Pitts broke off contact with the KGB in 1992, but when the FBI learned of his duplicity from a Central Intelligence Agency source code-named GT/AVENGER, one of Pitts's handlers, Aleksandr Karpov, whom Pitts had met at least nine times, was himself recruited by the FBI. A sting operation was mounted to entrap Pitts into further acts of espionage, which was complicated at the outset when Pitts's wife Mary, an ex-employee of the FBI, reported her suspicions about her husband within two days of it being initiated. A man had called at their home claiming to be a real estate agent, but she had not believed him. Later she had searched his desk and found a letter addressed to a Soviet.

The FBI ran the operation for 15 months, during which Pitts was monitored making 22 drops of classified information in exchange for \$65,000. In February 1997, after the FBI had seized his personal computer, which contained a highly incriminating letter addressed to his supposed KGB case officer, Pitts pleaded guilty to two counts of espionage; in June, he was sentenced to 27 years in prison. The prosecution conceded that all the material he had compromised had been below the level of Top Secret, so he did not have to face a life sentence.

At the time of his arrest, Pitts had been transferred to personnel security and security education, a position in which he was responsible for lecturing others on the importance of the Bureau's security pro-

cedures. As an explanation of his own espionage, Pitts later claimed various grievances, including his posting to the New York Field Office where, he complained, his living expenses were simply too high, thus forcing him into selling secrets to make ends meet. Significantly, he asserted that he had deduced from the attitude of his KGB handlers that there must have been another, more senior **penetration** of the FBI active simultaneously, and although this claim was taken seriously by Special Agent Kimmel, it did not have any impact until the arrest of **Robert Hanssen** in February 2001. When asked who the other **mole** might have been, Pitts had replied, "Robert Hanssen."

POLAND. Prior to World War II the Polish **Deuxième Bureau** collaborated closely with its French and British counterparts, and the Cipher Bureau made an important contribution to the Allied effort to solve the **German** ciphers generated on the **Enigma machine**. Upon the outbreak of war, the senior Polish intelligence management moved to France, and then to England, to collaborate closely with the **Secret Intelligence Service**, which provided accommodation and communications facilities. This cooperation ceased when the Communists seized power in Warsaw, leaving a government-in-exile in London.

Operations conducted during the **Cold War** against the regime by the SIS and the **Central Intelligence Agency** were stymied by the ubiquitous **UB** (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa) which exercised total control over the population and ran some sophisticated **double agent** operations against its Western adversaries, including the fictitious WIN (Freedom and Independence Movement) resistance organization that maintained the pretense for years that it was fomenting dissent in Poland. In reality, WIN was controlled by the UB, as was revealed in December 1952 in a successful effort to embarrass the CIA. At the height of the Cold War, the CIA acquired a key source, Col. **Ryszard Kuklinsky**, who supplied exceptionally valuable information about top-level political decisions and Warsaw Pact strategy until he was eventually **exfiltrated** in November 1981.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the restoration of democracy in Poland, the UB was replaced by the Urzad Ochrony Panstwa (OUP), which was headed from August 1990 to February 1996 by Gen. Gromoslow Czempinski. He proved a helpful ally to

the West, and his subordinate, Gen. Henrik Jasik, took the initiative and gave the CIA invaluable assistance in accommodating and exfiltrating six Americans trapped in Baghdad after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. In 1996 Jerzy Konieczny was appointed director, and he was later replaced by Col. Zbigniew Nowak. In May 2002 the OUP was dismantled and replaced by Agencja Wywiadu, and an internal security service, Agencja Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego, created to take responsibility for countering terrorism, espionage, corruption, and narcotics. *See also* GOLENIEWSKI, MICHAL.

POLESCHUK, LEONID. Code-named GT/WEIGH by the Central Intelligence Agency, Poleschuk was recruited in Katmandu, Nepal, in 1974 after he had gambled with KGB funds. He was recalled from his counterintelligence post at the Lagos, Nigeria, *rezidentura* in May 1985, having been identified as a spy by Aldrich Ames and was arrested three months later in Izmaylovskiy Park as he emptied a dead drop; Poleschuk was convicted of espionage and executed.

POLITICAL ASYLUM. The process by which an individual switches allegiance and seeks refuge in a foreign country. In the **United States**, the **director of central intelligence** is empowered to grant 10 citizenships each year on his own authority without the necessity of the application undergoing the usual naturalization procedure.

POLLARD, JONATHAN. The son of a respected academic and cancer expert at Notre Dame University, Pollard graduated from Stanford University in 1977 and began studying law at Tufts, but in 1979 became an intelligence analyst in the U.S. Navy. He was later transferred to counterterrorism duties at the Naval Investigative Service.

In 1981 Pollard's security clearance was suspended briefly after he offered to supply classified information to a South African military attaché in Washington, D.C., but he claimed he had been preparing an entrapment and threatened to sue the Navy unless his clearance was restored. In 1984 he began to supply an **Israeli** intelligence officer with documents and **imagery** to which he had access, but he was investigated when colleagues noted he was regularly requesting material outside his responsibilities and was placed under **surveillance**. Pollard was arrested in November 1985 after he was turned away

from the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., where he had applied for **political asylum**. He had attempted to flee when his wife, Anne, had spotted Federal Bureau of Investigation surveillance outside their apartment in Washington, unaware that the vehicles had actually been watching a different target, Ronald Pelton, who lived close by. Panicked by the thought of their imminent arrest, she entrusted a suitcase of purloined classified documents to a neighbor, who later turned it over to the FBI. Also recovered was a mass of material relating to the **People's Republic of China** and evidence that the Pollards had intended to sell it to the Chinese embassy.

Pollard was later sentenced to life imprisonment; his wife served three years of a five-year sentence before moving to Israel. Numerous requests for a reduction in his sentence have been declined; the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet threatened to resign if Pollard were pardoned.

The damage assessment concluded that Pollard had betrayed numerous National Security Agency projects, and that there was evidence the information sold to Israel had reached the **Soviets**.

POLYAKOV, DMITRI. A colonel in the GRU Soviet military intelligence service, Polyakov volunteered to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York in January 1962, following the death of his son, whom he believed could have been saved by an operation in America, permission for which had been turned down. Polyakov was run successfully and jointly by the FBI (code-named TOP HAT) and the Central Intelligence Agency (code-named ROAM) afterward. He was bitter about the death of his son and infuriated that his pay had been cut because of his unpopular opinion that sophisticated illegal operations in the United States were a complete waste of money because the environment really did not call for anything more complex than a false passport. In 1977, as Ryszard Kuklinsky was mastering his Discus device, Polyakov's CIA handler in New Delhi, Paul L. Dillon, taught the GRU officer to use the squirt transmitter so he could send signals to the CIA station while traveling past the U.S. embassy in Moscow on a bus. By this means Polyakov, code-named CK/BEEP, managed to maintain radio contact with the CIA for two years in the Soviet capital before returning to India as military attaché with the rank of lieutenant general.

In June 1980, apparently undetected and approaching his official retirement, Polyakov returned to Moscow to reach the peak of his importance, keeping the local CIA station in touch with events inside the GRU's headquarters that, hitherto, had been almost immune to **defection** and **penetration**. It was later to emerge that the GRU had come to suspect Polyakov while he was on his final overseas tour, which had been cut short as a precaution. He was arrested in Moscow in July 1986, the day after his 65th birthday, and was executed, having been identified as a CIA source by both **Robert Hanssen** and then **Aldrich Ames**.

The CIA's determination to identify the **mole** responsible for betraying Polyakov was enhanced by the fact that one of the principal mole hunters, Sandy Grimes, had been the headquarters manager of the case, and she had made a personal commitment to finding the traitor.

POLYGRAPH. The device dubbed the "lie detector" monitors a subject's four key indicators in an effort to identify deception. The machine's principle is based upon the supposition that pulse, breathing, perspiration, and electrical conductivity are altered by attempts to deceive, and that a skilled examiner can identify where the relevant graphs reveal untruthful answers to questions posed following a series of standard-setting questions that act as a benchmark. A popular instrument used to screen intelligence personnel in the **United States** and to test the integrity of sources, it has been rejected by the British intelligence community.

Although the polygraph's efficacy remains a controversial issue, it is, on the evidence of convicted traitors, a powerful deterrent, and there is some evidence to suggest that vulnerable individuals opt to forgo their security clearances rather than risk failing a test and perhaps thereby prompting an investigation.

POPOV, PIOTR. A **GRU** officer, Major Popov volunteered in January 1953, while posted to Vienna, to supply the **Central Intelligence Agency** with information. As well as a wife and family in Moscow, Popov also had an Austrian mistress and became dependent on the CIA for financial support until his arrest in October 1959. He was tried in January 1960 and executed.

Popov was the first GRU officer to be recruited as an agent in the postwar era, and he supplied large quantities of information about his colleagues and their agents in the West. It proved impossible to communicate with him in Moscow, and he may have compromised himself when he reestablished contact with his American handlers through British channels upon his posting to East Germany.

PORTLAND SPIES. The collective term applied to Harry Houghton and his mistress, Ethel Gee, who both worked at the British Admiralty's Underwater Weapons Research Establishment at Portland in Dorset until their arrest in January 1960. Originally recruited by the KGB while attached to the British embassy in Warsaw, Houghton had been caught dabbling in the local black market and pressured into espionage.

Betrayed by the Polish defector Michal Goleniewski, Houghton was placed under surveillance by MI5 and was seen to be in contact with Konon Molody, alias Gordon Lonsdale. He in turn led his watchers to Morris and Lona Cohen, alias Peter and Helen Kroger, and all five were arrested on the same day following a rendezvous at which Houghton passed classified documents to Molody in return for cash. All were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, although Molody and the Cohens were later released and exchanged in a spy swap.

POSITIVE VETTING (PV). The security screening procedure introduced in Great Britain in 1950 to prevent political extremists and other unsuitable candidates from gaining access to sensitive posts in the British government. The PV consists of a questionnaire, an interview, and field inquiries conducted to verify referees. For applicants to posts in the security and intelligence services, Enhanced Positive Vetting requires an applicant for a security clearance to be supported by additional referees.

The PV process is a development of Negative Vetting, which is limited to checks conducted on the MI5 indices and the Criminal Records Office to establish whether any adverse information has been recorded. In the absence of such material, the applicant is cleared automatically.

POTASHEV, VLADIMIR. Code-named GT/MEDIAN by the **Central Intelligence Agency**, Potashev was an arms control negotiator at the **Soviet** Institute for United States of America and Canada Studies who had spied since 1981. He was arrested in Moscow in July 1985 and executed after being identified as a spy by **Aldrich Ames**.

PRIME, GEOFFREY. Identified as a spy only after he had been arrested on charges of pedophilia in April 1982, having made a confession to his wife Rhona, Prime took nine hours to detail his espionage for the **KGB**. He had joined the Royal Air Force at the age of 18 in 1956 and, having qualified as a Russian linguist, joined GCHQ in 1968. A decade later, he resigned to work as a taxi driver in Cheltenham, but in the meantime he had sold vast quantities of classified material to his **Soviet** contacts. When his house was searched, a quantity of incriminating paraphernalia was recovered, including **one-time pads** and envelopes preaddressed to a contact in East Berlin.

Prime admitted that he had first approached the Soviets while he was at RAF Gatow in Berlin and had remained in touch thereafter, undergoing lengthy debriefings in Vienna in 1980 and Berlin in 1981. In November 1982 he was sentenced to 35 years' imprisonment for breaches of the **Official Secrets Act** and four years for three sexual assaults on children.

PRISONER-OF-WAR INTELLIGENCE. Information acquired during the skillful interrogation of prisoners of war (POWs), or the monitoring of their conversations with fellow prisoners or stool pigeons, can be of critical importance. In most conflicts where POWs are taken, intelligence personnel are on hand to extract tactical intelligence and screen candidates suitable for further interrogation. During World War II, Luftwaffe and U-boat crews often unwittingly disclosed vital information about navigation techniques and radar and electronic countermeasures. A chance remark by one submariner, for example, revealed that Allied depth charges were invariably set to detonate at a maximum of 250 feet, whereas U-boats were operating much deeper. More recently, the detainees imprisoned at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, have provided their interrogators with an abundance of valuable information concerning the Taliban and al-Qaeda

personalities, international **terrorist** networks, their individual **tradecraft**, communication methods, and financial transactions.

PROLOGUE. Codename assigned by the Central Intelligence Agency to an anonymous KGB officer who volunteered to supply information in May 1987 to Jack Downing, the station chief in Moscow. PROLOGUE continued to pass messages to Downing until July 1990 when he was given instructions for his **exfiltration** through Tallinn, Estonia. PROLOGUE failed to make the trip and lamely complained that his documentation, carefully prepared by the CIA, had been deficient. By then PROLGUE has been identified by a defector, Sergei Papushin, as Aleksandr Zhomov, and the CIA had concluded he had been a sophisticated but definite dangle. PRO-LOGUE was the only time the KGB ever used one of its own staff officers as a dangle, a very high-risk strategy. When considering why the KGB had adopted these tactics, it was concluded that PROLOGUE had been primed as a possible channel to give protection to either **Aldrich Ames** or **Robert Hanssen**, or both. Zhomov's career was unaffected by the episode, and he went on to lead the SVR investigation into the leak that eventually had led the Federal Bureau of **Investigation** to Hanssen.

PROPRIETARIES. Companies wholly owned by the Central Intelligence Agency are known as proprietaries, as opposed to the more usual "front company" or "Delawares," referring to the state of their original incorporation. Not all the staff working for a proprietary may be aware of its covert ownership, which is usually concealed through a complicated web of deliberately obscure trusts, foundations, management consultancies, and proxies. In the case of Air America, a charter aircraft company active in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, it grew to be one of the largest airlines in the world, employing 6,000 pilots, ground staff, and administrators, and flew numerous routes in addition to the work undertaken on behalf of the CIA. Other identified proprietaries in the same field are Southern Air Transport, Intermountain, Continental Air Services, and Civil Air Transport. The CIA's aircraft servicing branch in the Pacific, Air Asia, based in the **Republic of China**, employed some 2,000 staff prior to its sale in 1975.

Proprietaries are usually deniable, arm's-length operations, and when John T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau were shot down on an illegal flight over the **People's Republic of China** in November 1952, they spent many years in prison, not being released until March 1973 and December 1971, respectively. Similarly, in May 1958 Allen Pope was captured by the Indonesians while on a clandestine flight to resupply rebels in Sumatra and was imprisoned for four years. In 1986 two Southern Air Transport crew members, William Cooper and Wallace Sawyer, were killed and their cargo-kicker, Eugene Hazenfus, was captured when their C-123 was shot down over Nicaragua during an air drop to the Contras. Between 1947 and 1975, a total of 242 clandestine employees died in operations conducted in Vietnam, China, **Korea**, and Laos.

PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA). Created in 1969 as a mainly Marxist splinter group of the Irish Republican Army, PIRA was organized on four commands: one based in Dublin and the other three brigades in Northern Ireland in Londonderry, Belfast, and South Armagh. Controlled by an Army Council, PIRA later spawned a Trotskyite faction, the Irish National Liberation Army, which self-destructed following internecine warfare in 1987. Although estimated to have an active membership of less than 500. mainly drawn from Ulster's most economically and socially deprived areas, PIRA obtained weapons and explosives from abroad-either from sympathizers in the United States or from the Libyan revolutionary leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi-and succeeded in tying down a third of the British Army for 32 years by engaging in acts of terrorism. Comprehensively penetrated by MI5 and successive British Army intelligence and surveillance units, its political wing, Sinn Féin, entered a peace process in 1988, leaving just a small core of rejectionists, who later broke away in 1997 to form Continuity IRA and the Real IRA, but both organizations were penetrated and suppressed following a bomb atrocity committed in Omagh in 1998. See also FLAVIUS.

PROVOCATION. One technique employed by intelligence agencies is to send an **agent provocateur** with an incriminating offer to an identified adversary with the intention of compromising the target. The

objective may be either to effect an immediate arrest, thereby entrapping the hapless victim, or to coerce the person's cooperation. As a short-term expedient, it can be practical in political terms when seeking to develop some leverage in high-level negotiations, but generally it is regarded as a clumsy method of exacting tit-for-tat retaliation. Bitter experience of provocations has been known to have an adverse impact on intelligence professionals, who may become risk-averse in their efforts to avoid falling victim to the tactic. Thus in 1982, when MI5's Michael Bettaney made an genuine offer to help the KGB, delivered to the London *rezident* Arkadi Gouk with supporting authentic documentation, he was turned down as an obvious provocation. On the other hand, the Central Intelligence Agency's John Guilsher decided to accept Adolf Tolkachev's approach in Moscow at face value and was rewarded with the recruitment of one of the most important spies of the Cold War.

PSEUDONYMS. Many intelligence officers work under noms de guerre, and each country's agencies have adopted their own distinctive conventions. The **Central Intelligence Agency** assigns **Directorate of Operations** (DO) staff with a pseudonym which they retain throughout their career and use for internal purposes only, especially for signing communications. DO personnel posted abroad may also use an **alias** for a particular mission, although it is uncommon, but by no means unusual, for those under diplomatic **cover** to have an alias for the duration of their posting. Their **Soviet** counterparts of the First Chief Directorate often used a false family name while retaining their true given name and patronymic.

PSYCHOKINESIS. See REMOTE VIEWING.

PUEBLO, USS. In January 1968 this U.S. Navy signals intelligence ship was captured by North Korean sailors while it cruised in international waters off the port of Wonsan. Commanded by Lloyd Bucher, the lightly armed Pueblo was a converted cargo ship that had been commissioned the previous year as an auxiliary with a crew of 83 under the operational control of the National Security Agency. When the ship was raked by 57mm cannon fire from North Korean

gunboats, mortally wounding one member of the crew, Bucher obeyed an order to surrender, and the ship was boarded. The *Pueblo* was then sailed into Wonsan, where the classified compartments were emptied of documents, cipher machines, **intercept** equipment and other electronics. The survivors were repatriated after 11 months of beatings and interrogation, but the ship remains in Nampo where it has become a tourist attraction. Although Commander Bucher was recommended for prosecution by court-martial, the secretary of the navy stayed the proceedings and he remained in the U.S. Navy until his retirement in 1973.

PURPLE. The code name given by American **cryptographers** in December 1940 to the **Japanese** cipher generated on the Alphabetical Typewriter 97 used to communicate between Tokyo and 12 diplomatic missions overseas. The decrypted **intercepts**, read with the assistance of a reconstructed machine using 25 telephone relay switches, were distributed under the code name MAGIC.

– Q –

- **Q.** The fictional quartermaster of the **James Bond** films did not originate with Ian Fleming's books, but instead was introduced as a device to equip 007 with the sophisticated, ingenious gadgetry which caught the public's imagination. Fleming did refer to a Major Boothroyd as the Secret Service armorer, a character doubtless based on Maj. Geoffrey Boothroyd, a weapons expert who had written to the author pointing out that a Walther PPK was a far more appropriate handgun for Bond than his .22 Beretta.
- QUEBEC LIBERATION FRONT. The terror campaign conducted in Canada by the Quebecois separatist group Quebec Liberation Front in the 1960s was the subject of a lengthy investigation conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service, but the unorthodox, robust countermeasures taken led to allegations of misconduct and a commission of inquiry conducted by a judge, which reported adversely on the tactics adopted by Security Service personnel.

RAINBOW WARRIOR. In July 1985 the French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) concluded a lengthy penetration of Greenpeace by sinking the environmental organization's flagship, the Rainbow Warrior, which was in Auckland Harbor about to lead a flotilla of boats to protest French nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll in Polynesia. The DGSE sent a team of saboteurs to New Zealand to place limpet mines on the ship's hull, but after the first detonation, a Portuguese photographer, Fernando Pereira, went back aboard to retrieve his cameras and was drowned. A murder investigation was launched and although most of the DGSE group, which had posed as holidaymakers on a white-water rafting vacation, were evacuated on a yacht to an offshore rendezvous with a submarine, Dominique Prieur and Alain Maffart were questioned because their rented campervan had been reported acting suspiciously.

The two DGSE officers, posing as Swiss honeymooners named Sophie and Alain Turenge, were identified as intelligence personnel when it was learned that they had not shared a bed in their motel, which happened to belong to the prime minister, and that Maffart had forged an inflated total on his hotel bill even though he had insisted he was not claiming any expenses. The police realized he was on an official mission when his monitored telephone call to Paris was to a number that Interpol insisted had not been allocated.

Maffart and Prieur pleaded guilty to manslaughter in November 1985 and were sentenced to 10 years in prison, but were released into French custody following a deal which compensated Pereira's family and Greenpeace. The arrangement required the pair to be confined to a French military facility on Hao Atoll, but a clause covering medical emergencies was invoked in December 1987 to repatriate Maffart, and in May 1988 Prieur returned to France having become pregnant following a visit by her husband. The French government was later held by a **United Nations** adjudication to have breached the terms of the agreement with New Zealand and was fined a further \$2 million.

Although the French government denied all knowledge of the operation and was absolved of responsibility by a supposed independent investigation conducted by senior civil servant Bernard Tricot, it became clear that the DGSE had been authorized by Minister of Defense

Charles Hernu, who resigned, as did the DGSE director, Adm. Pierre Lacoste. The episode had caused a major diplomatic incident, but there was minimal political **blowback** in France about the DGSE's tactics, although professionals were dismayed that Maffart had compromised his **cover** by padding his expenses.

RASTVOROV, YURI. A defector from the NKVD in Japan in January 1954, Rastvorov approached a Secret Intelligence Service officer after he had taken English lessons from an elderly British lady in Tokyo and negotiated his resettlement, but at the last moment he changed his mind and opted to go to the United States. Once in America, Rastvorov identified his contacts in Japan and gave his name to two articles published in *Life* magazine. He later married his Central Intelligence Agency debriefer, with whom he had two daughters, after being divorced by his wife in Moscow, a ballerina. Under the name Martin Simons, he was an enthusiastic tennis player but an unsuccessful businessman and had to be bailed out financially by his CIA handlers. Convinced his life was in danger, he always kept a gun handy. Rastvorov/Simons died in 2004 and his obituary, which made front-page news, was based largely on his CIA file, which was hastily declassified for the purpose by his lifelong friend, CIA counterintelligence expert Paul Redmond.

REDEFECTOR. An individual who defects to an adversary and then undergoes a change of heart, for whatever reason, and returns home. Examples are limited, but the most notorious was the KGB's Vitali Yurchenko, who unexpectedly defected to the Central Intelligence Agency in Rome in July 1985 and then three months later evaded his CIA escort and made his way to the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., where he held a press conference to assert that he had been abducted and drugged. Other redefectors include Anatoli Cheboratev, a GRU officer who defected in Brussels in October 1971; Anton Sabotka, in Canada in 1972; Nikolai Petrov, a GRU officer in Jakarta in June 1972; Lt. Artush Hovasenian of the KGB, in Turkey in July 1972; and Evgenni Sorokin in Vientiane in September 1972.

REFERENTURA. The **Russian** term for the secure accommodation inside diplomatic premises reserved for the exclusive use of intelli-

gence personnel. Usually it includes an office for the *rezident*, a cipher room, and a soundproof vault in which conversations can be conducted without fear of eavesdropping.

REMOTE VIEWING. Research into the paranormal has been undertaken by several intelligence agencies, and there are reports that the **Soviets** invested heavily in acquiring an advantage by remote viewing and psychokinesis. The theory of remote viewing is that sheer mental application can enable a suitably trained or gifted individual to project his or her mind into another physical environment and take action as though he or she were actually present, such as by reading and memorizing document. Psychokinesis is the ability to influence or interact with a solid object, perhaps by moving it, by willpower alone. Both techniques, if practical, could be of considerable benefit to any intelligence collection agency, but despite lengthy experiments, no evidence has been found to justify continued investment in the research. *See also* STARGATE.

RESETTLEMENT. The term applied to the process of assisting a **defector** to adopt a new life of **political asylum**. After some initial euphoria, during which an individual is the focus of intense attention from teams of debriefers, the novelty may wear off. Few defectors are allowed to remain in the intelligence community, receive security clearances, or have access to classified information, and they often experience difficulty in finding new occupations that satisfy them. A report by the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation in 1982 high-lighted the widespread dissatisfaction among defectors, who felt they had received inadequate preparation for an alien lifestyle and complained about the quality of their handlers after their direct operational usefulness had diminished.

Director of Central Intelligence William Casey acknowledged the immense value of defectors and the potential impact of allowing badly handled defectors to articulate their complaints publicly. He allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to publicize a \$1 million bounty for KGB and GRU personnel with useful information and reversed an institutional caution of accepting Soviet defectors at face value in case they turned out to be career-jeopardizing provocations. One of the first to be attracted by Casey's policy was Vitali

Yurchenko, who defected in July 1985 and supplied sufficient information for the CIA to identify Edward Lee Howard and Ronald Pelton. He also revealed that Oleg Gordievsky was suspected of having spied for the British. However, having been thoroughly debriefed, his knowledge of Soviet operations exhausted, Yurchenko was entrusted to CIA security personnel who spoke no Russian and, increasingly disillusioned, he redefected when news of his collaboration with the CIA leaked.

REZIDENT. The title of the senior **Russian** or **Soviet** intelligence officer in a particular country, undertaking duties identical to a **Central Intelligence Agency** station chief or a **Secret Intelligence Service** station commander. Usually working under diplomatic **cover**, though necessarily at a rank that reflects his true status, the rezident will have a staff of subordinates and may call upon the assistance of **cooptees**. During the **Cold War**, the senior **illegal** in a given area was designated the illegal rezident and fulfilled much the same role as his legal counterpart but without diplomatic immunity.

REZIDENTURA. The **Russian** or **Soviet** intelligence organization headed by the *rezident* and responsible for security and intelligence operations conducted in a particular country. A typical rezidentura will include officers from the political, scientific and technical, **counterintelligence**, and **illegal** support lines. In addition there will be security personnel to monitor the local diplomatic community and specially protected cipher clerks to handle communications. Information about the structure of rezidenturas has come from **defectors**, supported by physical and technical **surveillance**.

RIMINGTON, STELLA. The first woman officer to be appointed director-general of the British Security Service, Rimington began to work for **MI5** as a part-time secretary in Delhi when her husband was posted to the British High Commission and the local security liaison officer needed some clerical assistance. Upon her return to London, she joined the organization full-time and worked in every branch, making her an obvious choice to succeed Sir Patrick Walker upon his retirement in 1992. In 2001 she published her memoirs, *Open Secret*,

in which she was fiercely critical of the male-dominated culture she had found in MI5 when she first joined.

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION. Headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and appointed by President Gerald Ford, the Rockefeller Commission investigated allegations of misconduct made against the Central Intelligence Agency in December 1974 by journalist Seymour Hersh. The commission concluded that the CIA had acted beyond its 1947 charter but it was overshadowed by the simultaneous congressional Pike and Church Committees. In contrast, the Rockefeller Commission took evidence in private, using the Vail Report prepared by Director of Central Intelligence William Colby, and reported directly to the president on 6 June 1975. Details of the report, including references to the assassination plots, leaked almost immediately.

ROMANIA. During the Cold War, the Departmentul de Informatii Externe (DIE) acted as an instrument of political power for Romanian president Nicolae Ceaucescu and as a surrogate for the KGB, but it was handicapped by frequent high-level defections, including that of its chief, Lt. Gen. Ion Pacepa, in Bonn in July 1978. Other DIE defectors included Ion Iacobescu in Paris in 1969; Constantin Dumitrachescu, the DIE station chief in Paris, in Tel Aviv to the Mossad in 1972; Col. Ion Marcu, who moved from Tehran to Canada; Constantin Rauta in 1973; and Virgil Tipanudt who defected in June 1975 from Copenhagen.

ROMEO SPIES. Men employed for the purpose of seducing and recruiting women with access to useful information. The strategy became known primarily in West Germany during the Cold War when a series of spies was identified as having entered into relationships with East German agents, often directed by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) chief, Markus Wolf, who established a reputation as a shrewd manipulator of vulnerable women, often secretaries working for the Federal Republic.

Wolf successfully **penetrated** Konrad Adenauer's chancellery with an agent code-named FELIX, who pretended to be a sales

representative marketing beauty products to hairdressers and seduced one of the chancellor's less attractive secretaries. Their relationship lasted for years before the **Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz** (BfV) started to take an interest in Felix and he was withdrawn to safety in East Berlin. As was typical, Wolf was able to exploit the situation by learning from Felix of another potentially vulnerable secretary who worked for Hans Globke, Adenauer's secretary of state. She was promptly targeted by Wolf's star Romeo, Hans Stöhler, and proved to be an excellent source, to the point that she was herself recruited as a spy and code-named GUDRUN. She continued to supply valuable information until Stöhler, a former Luftwaffe pilot whose **cover** was that of a real estate agent, fell ill and was brought home to die. After his death, GUDRUN, who thought she had been working for the **KGB**, gave up espionage.

In a similar case, Gabrielle Gast, a **Bundesnachrichtendienst** (BND) analyst, fell for Karl-Heinz Schneider while she was completing her doctorate in Karl-Marx-Stadt in 1968. Under his guidance, she applied for a job with the BND at its headquarters in Pullach and by 1987 was deputy chief of the BND's **Soviet** Bloc political branch and a dedicated convert to Communism. Three years later she was betrayed by a senior HVA officer anxious to ingratiate himself with the Federal Republic, who knew only that Wolf had been running a woman inside the BND for years and that she had adopted a handicapped child, but this was enough for the BfV to identify Gast and she was imprisoned.

Wolf also handled Dagmar Kahlig-Scheffler, a 27-year-old blonde divorcee and another of Stöhler's conquests who in December 1975 went to work in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's private office. She was caught a couple of years later when her HVA controller, Peter Goslar, came under BfV surveillance. When Goslar's home was searched, the BfV found among his papers Schmidt's notes of a conversation with British prime minister James Callaghan about his recent discussions with President Jimmy Carter. Goslar was then watched as he collected more information from Kahlig-Scheffler, who was brought in for interrogation. She revealed that she had fallen for Stöhler while on holiday in Bulgaria with her seven-year-old daughter, and she was subsequently sentenced to four years and five months' imprisonment for espionage.

In 1966 Helge Berger, a buxom secretary in the Foreign Ministry, believed that the handsome "Peter Krause" she had met in Bonn was a South African working for the British Secret Intelligence Service. This was a classic false flag operation, complete with a senior "British" officer who flew into Frankfurt to debrief her. Actually, he was a former Wehrmacht prisoner of war who spoke fluent English. He persuaded her to supply her boyfriend Krause with thousands of copies of classified documents over the next six years. She was arrested and sentenced to four and a half years in prison.

Wolf's best false flag operator was Roland Gandt, who persuaded a German secretary at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, at Fontainebleau, that he was a Danish intelligence officer operating in France under journalistic cover. Accepting that Gandt was a national of another NATO country, Margerete fell for him in Vienna but, as a devout Roman Catholic, insisted that she confess her espionage to a priest. Ever the master of improvisation, Wolf arranged for a bogus priest to hear her confession at a remote Jutland church and give her an equally worthless absolution.

Dietmar Schumacher, another of Wolf's stars, kept up the pretense of being a peace activist named Olaf for the 12 years of his relationship with an English secretary, Helen Anderson. Code-named MARY, she was persuaded by her lover Olaf to stay in Germany and obtain a job at a U.S. Army base in West Berlin, where she stole classified NATO documents for him. She was arrested only in March 1992 when Schumacher's HVA controller, Karl-Heinz Michalek, confessed, compromising Olaf, who was revealed as Schumacher, a man with a wife and a son in **East Germany**. Because Anderson was able to demonstrate that she had no idea her lover had been a Communist spy, she was sentenced to just two weeks' community service before she settled down in Arbroath; Schumacher received a suspended prison term of 12 months.

Another of Wolf's Romeos, Herbert Schöter, started an affair with Gerda Osterreider, a slender 19-year-old student who was on a languages course at the Alliance Française in Paris. When she returned to Bonn in 1966, she got a job as a cipher clerk in the Foreign Office and gave her lover the original teletype tape on which incoming diplomatic telegrams were printed. Five years later she was posted to Warsaw where, in Schöter's absence, she took up with a German

journalist to whom she had confessed her espionage, but he reported her and she was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

In September 1972 Renate Lutze, a secretary in the Ministry of Defense married her Romeo, Lothar, and was arrested with him at their Bonn apartment in June 1976. She was sentenced to six years, he to 12, but later they were freed in an exchange negotiated by Wolf.

It was only when the HVA's archives fell into Western hands, and Rainer Rupp was given 12 years in prison, that the scale of the HVA's operation was fully grasped. Rupp's English wife Ann, codenamed TURQUOISE, had worked at NATO's headquarters and had willingly spied for her husband, whose name had appeared in a file marked TOPAZ. She received a 22-month suspended prison sentence in 1994. Wolf's other agents included Ingrid Garbe, a member of West Germany's mission at NATO headquarters in Brussels; Ursel Lorenzen, who worked in NATO's general secretariat; Imelda Verrept, a Belgian secretary in NATO; Inge Goliach, who had penetrated the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); Christel Broszey, secretary to the CDU's deputy leader Kurt Biedenkopf; Helga Rödiger, a secretary in West Germany's Ministry of Finance; and Ursula Höfs, a secretary in the Christian Democratic party. As a consequence of these security breaches, the new BfV president, Dr. Richard Meier, in 1979 belatedly introduced a new vetting procedure, code-named Operation REGISTRATION, to screen the partners of single women holding sensitive posts.

ROTE DREI. The German name applied by the Swiss Bundespolizei to a Soviet spy ring, led by a Hungarian, Rudolf Rössler, that was active in Switzerland during World War II. It acquired high-quality military intelligence about the Nazis and passed it to wireless operators for transmission to Moscow. The first two radio operators, Edouard Hamel and Margaret Bolli, were arrested in October 1943 after their traffic had been monitored for some months, and the third, an Englishman named Alan Foote, was caught while transmitting from his apartment in Lausanne at the end of November 1943. In the highly compartmented spy ring, all three had been run by a Hungarian cartographer, Sándor Radó, who escaped to Paris in 1944 and was evacuated to Moscow. Code-named DORA, an anagram of his surname, Radó had avoided direct contact with Rössler, who was code-

named LUCY, and seemed to have liaised closely with a branch of Swiss military intelligence headed by Hans Hausamann that had penetrated Nazi Germany with a network known as VIKING.

The precise relationship between Hausamann and Rössler has never been clarified, but when Rössler was arrested after the war on a charge of having spied for Czechoslovakia, he was quickly released, prompting speculation that he had always acted for the Swiss. Intriguingly, some of the messages intercepted and read by Swiss cryptanalysts suggested that Moscow Center was equally keen to learn the sources of Rössler's information, code-named TEDDY, ANNA, OLGA, and WERTHER, but he never identified them. As all the participants are now dead, and the memoirs written by Foote, Handbook for Spies, and Radó, Codename DORA, do not identify them, only the permanently sealed Swiss intelligence archives can explain the Rote Drei's true sources.

ROTE KAPELLE. The German code name applied by the Sicherheitsdienst to a large Soviet espionage network, led by Leopold Trepper, which extended through much of Western Europe and was centered in Belgium and Germany before and during World War II. After the war, the **Central Intelligence Agency** devoted considerable resources to studying the Rote Kapelle and one major report, written by Dan Pinkus, was declassified in 1979. Further work, based on the network's **intercepted** wireless traffic, was undertaken by Jim Olsen for the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff.

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP). See CANADA

RUMRICH, GUNTHER. In January 1938 Capt. Guy Liddell, then MI5's deputy director of counterespionage, visited Washington, D.C., to share information about MI5's surveillance on Mrs. Jessie Jordan, a suspected **German** spy resident in Dundee and working as a hairdresser with an unusually large overseas postbag. Liddell supplied the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the address of Jordan's principal correspondent in the United States, a "Mr. Kron," and the interception of her mail resulted in the identification of Sgt. Gunther Rumrich, a Sudetan German who had become a naturalized American citizen and was a deserter from the U.S. Army who had absconded with the sergeants' mess funds from Fort Missoula, Montana. Under interrogation, Rumrich confessed that he had been recruited as a spy in May 1936 and ever since had communicated with his controller in Wilhelmshaven through Jordan. In addition, he named the other members of his network, including two couriers working on the SS *Europa* and four other spies, among them an aircraft mechanic and a draftsman working for the Sikorsky plant at Farmingdale, New York. J. Edgar Hoover's delight at rounding up a major **Abwehr** spy ring was tempered only by the embarrassment caused by one of his special agents, Leon G. Turrou, who promptly gave a mildly inaccurate account of the case in his book *Nazi Spies in America* and was dismissed from the FBI.

RUSSIA. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, the Russian Federation dismantled the hated KGB and established a domestic security and counterintelligence agency, the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), and a foreign intelligence service, the Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki (SVR). Both are dependent on many of the techniques developed during the totalitarian era and, although linked to their Western counterparts through formal liaison channels, retain close ties to the new democratic leadership headed by President Vladimir Putin, himself a former First Chief Directorate officer who has selected many of his former KGB colleagues for senior ministerial positions in his government. See also FAPSI.

-S-

SAFE HOUSE. The term universally used to denote a property—a house, apartment, or other accommodation—retained covertly by an intelligence organization for the purpose of providing an environment in which agent meetings or other clandestine activity can be conducted free of hostile **surveillance**.

SATELLITES. The use of satellites as an effective aerial reconnaissance platform began in January 1960 with the introduction by the **United States** of the **CORONA** system. Since then, many countries

have placed satellites into orbit either to collect **imagery** or to **intercept** signals. While cloud cover tended to inhibit the efficiency of the original photographic lenses, the development of infrared and other techniques allowed imagery to be acquired even through inclement weather. While the first satellites ejected film capsules for capture by specially deployed aircraft, later systems allowed for the instant transmission of data to ground stations.

SATYR. MI5 code name for the classified contract given to Marconi at Chelmsford in 1952 to determine how the listening device found inside the Great Seal presented to Ambassador Averell Harriman by the Soviets in 1944 really worked. The ingenious apparatus, designed by the NKVD's Lev Thereman, with no discernable power source, had baffled the Federal Bureau of Investigation's scientists, but a young British technician, Peter Wright, grasped the principles of passive cavity resonance and succeeded in demonstrating how the human voice's sound waves vibrated a sensitive filament which, when bombarded with microwaves at 330 MHz, moved at a frequency that could be picked up by a remote radio receiver. A sensitive diaphragm contained in a brilliantly engineered cylinder attached to a short antenna acted as a microphone and transmitter when activated by the microwave beam. The device was intended to have an unlimited life. picking up all the conversations conducted in the ambassador's study at his residence, Spaso House. On the strength of this accomplishment, Wright was offered a permanent position in the Security Service as a technical adviser.

SAVAK. The acronym for Sazeman-I Effelaat vaAmniyat-I Keshvae, Iran's National Organization for Intelligence and Security. Created in 1957 and initially headed by Teimur Bakhtiar, the agency acquired a ruthless reputation as an instrument of repression and was controlled by personal friends of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, although Bakhtiar was himself dismissed in 1962. SAVAK received advice and training from a long-serving Mossad representative in Tehran, Yaacov Nimrodi, as well as from successive CIA station chiefs, although American support waned as SAVAK's professionalism declined. In 1965 Gen. Ne'matollah Naseri was appointed SAVAK's chief, but his deputy, Gen. Hussein Fardust, sided with the regime's opponents in

January 1979 when the shah was deposed. A month later, SAVAK was supplanted by SAVAMA, with Fardust in command, but in 1985 he was arrested and accused of being a **Soviet** spy. He died in 1988 soon after his confession was broadcast on television.

SCRAMBLE. British **Secret Intelligence Service** code name for a clandestine operation conducted from Turkey in the postwar era to infiltrate émigré agents into the western Ukraine. No networks were successfully established and the project was considered a failure. The explanation emerged in January 1963 when **Kim Philby** signed a confession in which he acknowledged having compromised SCRAMBLE by supplying details to the **Soviets** while he had been posted in Istanbul as the local SIS head of station.

SCRANAGE, SHARON. A Central Intelligence Agency operations support assistant based in Accra, Ghana, Scranage gave classified information to her lover, Michael Soussoudis, a member of the Ghanaian intelligence service. She was identified as a result of a routine inspection conducted by a CIA team waiting for visas to enter Nigeria. A search of her home disclosed some compromising photographs of her with her lover, whom she had failed to declare, and on this basis she was ordered home to undergo further interviews and a polygraph. A mousy young divorcee, recovering from an unhappy marriage in which she had been physically abused and somewhat isolated socially within the male-dominated, largely white (Scranage was black) CIA station, she subsequently agreed to cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to entrap Soussoudis, a business consultant with permanent resident status in the United States who was related to Ghana's military ruler, Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlins. Despite the fact that Scranage seemed oblivious to what she had done, asserting that her station chief had been delighted by the fact that she had found a boyfriend, she was charged in July 1985 and in November was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, later reduced to two years. Soussoudis was sentenced to 20 years, suspended on the condition he leave the United States immediately.

The case caused some anxiety for the CIA because the chief of Ghana's intelligence service, Kojo Tsikata, was a Marxist with links to Cuba, Libya and East Germany, suggesting either that Scran-

age's information had gone straight to Moscow or that Soussoudis was working for the Cubans, hoping to **cultivate** Scranage for future access, perhaps during her next posting, which was scheduled to be Calcutta. In terms of cost, the breach in security proved expensive in financial terms, with 28 of the station's local sources demanding immediate **resettlement** in the United States, among them the dissidents who reportedly had been planning a coup.

SEBOLD, WILLIAM. When Sebold, a 40-year-old married engineer working for the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation in San Diego, paid a visit to his family in his native **Germany** in 1940, his first in 15 years. There he had succumbed to an implied threat from officials purporting to be from the Gestapo and, for the sake of his mother, two brothers, and sister in Mülheim, Sebold reluctantly had agreed to be signed on by the **Abwehr**'s Hamburg branch in June 1939 with the code name TRAMP. However, dismayed by this episode, Sebold had alerted the American Consulate in Cologne of his predicament and had been advised by the vice consul to pretend to cooperate with the Nazis. Thereafter the Germans put Sebold through an intensive training course with the intention of placing him in charge of a transmitter so a clandestine radio channel could be opened between the East Coast and the Abwehr's radio station at Hamburg-Wohldorf.

Once safely back in the United States in February 1941, aboard the SS Washington from Genoa and traveling on a new passport identifying him as Harry Sawyer, Sebold was contacted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and made a detailed statement, explaining that he had fought for the kaiser during the Great War and had been wounded in the Battle of the Somme. After the war he had moved to America, changed his name from Wilhelm G. Debowski and become a naturalized citizen and loyal American. He agreed to follow the Abwehr's instructions and contact four other Abwehr agents for whom he was carrying a **microdot** questionnaire. Those agents, all living in the New York City area, were Lily Stein, an Austrian model of Jewish descent; Everett Roeder; Fritz Duquesne; and an engineer, Herman Lang. To aid communications, Sebold had been told how to contact a courier, Irwin Siegler, a butcher on the United States Lines' SS Manhattan, and was given postal addresses in Shanghai, São Paolo, and Portugal.

The FBI proceeded to exploit Sebold's leads and placed his contacts under **surveillance**. Using money provided by the Abwehr, a cottage was purchased on Long Island, and a powerful shortwave transmitter was installed. Sebold also rented an office in Manhattan, under the name of the Diesel Research Company, and the FBI wired the room for sound and installed a two-way mirror behind which a movie camera filmed every visitor.

When the entire network, including a group of couriers working for the Hamburg-Amerika line led by Hans Kleiss, was rounded up, some of them had been under surveillance for two years. Kleiss, employed as a chef on the SS *America* was arrested on 28 June 1941. The FBI decided to break up the spy ring after Duquesne announced that the organization was to move from relatively passive intelligence collection to active sabotage; the General Electric plant at Schenectady, New York, had been selected as a target. In addition, and even more alarming, was his assertion that he was working on a plan to assassinate President Franklin D. Roosevelt when he came up to his estate at Hyde Park for the weekend.

The leads from the Sebold case covered the entire country and hemisphere and resulted in follow-up visits to **Cuba**, **Chile** and **Argentina**, 19 pleas of guilty and a total of 32 convictions, including a sentence of eight years' imprisonment for Kleiss. The case ended with prison sentences totaling 300 years and fines of \$18,000. Duquesne received the longest sentence, of 18 years, while his mistress, Evelyn Lewis, received a year and a day.

SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS). Created in 1909 as the Foreign Department of the Secret Service Bureau, under the leadership of Capt. Mansfield Smith-Cumming, the SIS was responsible for the collection of intelligence from outside the British Empire until the end of World War II. During the Cold War, the SIS extended its reach by opening stations in Commonwealth countries, but was handicapped by a series of hostile penetrations. Dick Ellis admitted in 1966 that he had sold SIS secrets to the Abwehr before the war, and in March 1961 George Blake confessed that he had spied for the KGB since his release from internment in Korea in April 1953. In addition, in January 1963 Kim Philby confirmed that he had spied for the Soviets since his original recruitment in May 1934.

Although the SIS experienced hostile penetration by the Germans, especially in Holland from 1936 on, and consistently thereafter by the Soviets, the organization took the credit for much of the cryptographic success achieved at Bletchley Park and developed uniquely close links with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services and its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency. Based on mutual trust engendered through collaborative operations, including technical operations against the Soviets in Vienna and Berlin during the 1950s and the infiltration of partisans into the Eastern Bloc, the SIS became the CIA's acknowledged partner in such major joint operations as BOOT, SCRAMBLE, and VALUABLE.

This unequal partnership with the United States survived the 1956 Suez Crisis, when political relations between the two countries dropped to a low point, and despite being a fraction of the CIA's size, the SIS gained respect for the quality of its political analysis and the ingenuity of its technical operations, such as the highly productive eavesdropping conducted in Athens during the Cyprus Emergency. Any lingering doubts about the SIS's ability to attract Soviet defectors, or its internal integrity, were removed by the successful recruitment and management of Oleg Gordievsky, who was run from December 1973 until his impressive exfiltration from Moscow in July 1985. However, there would later be concerns that Gordievsky may not have been compromised by Aldrich Ames, as originally supposed when the CIA debriefed the mole following his arrest in February 1994, leaving the possibility that another spy had gone undetected.

The SIS has had 14 chiefs, but the appointment of John Scarlett in July 2004 was by far the most controversial. A career SIS officer, Scarlett had been expelled from Moscow in January 1994 and been responsible for managing the Mitrokhin fiasco in 1998. He had also been chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in September 2002 when the British government issued a document to explain and illustrate the threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the Iraq War of 2003 and the Butler Report into WMD intelligence, the JIC-sponsored assessment was demonstrated to have been fundamentally flawed, and SIS's reputation was severely undermined. The chiefs of SIS have been Mansfield Smith-Cumming (1909–23), Hugh Sinclair (1923–39), Stewart Menzies (1939–53), John Sinclair (1953–56), Dick White (1956–58), John Rennie (1968–73), Maurice Oldfield (1973–78), Dickie Franks (1978–81), Colin Figures (1981–85), Christopher Curwen (1985–89), Colin McColl (1989–94), David Spedding (1994–99), Richard Dearlove (1999–2004), and John Scarlett (2004–).

SECURITY SERVICE. See MI5.

- **SENIOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.** Within the **Central Intelligence Agency**, this is a management "super grade" for selected senior personnel at an elevated pay scale.
- **SHAI.** The intelligence branch of the Haganah, Shai—the Hebrew abbreviation of Sherut Yediot (Information Service)—was created in 1941. *See also* ISRAEL.
- **SHEEPDIP.** The process by which U.S. military personnel are detached temporarily from their regular duties and assigned a clandestine role.
- **SHEVCHENKO, ARKADI.** Code-named DYNAMITE by the **Central Intelligence Agency**, which ran him for a year or so before he **defected** in April 1978, Shevchenko was a career **Soviet** apparatchik recruited in New York, where he was employed as an assistant general-secretary in the **United Nations** Secretariat. After being granted **political asylum** in the **United States**, he was **resettled** in Alexandria, Virginia. Soon after his defection, his wife died in Moscow, apparently of an overdose. Although never a **KGB** officer, Shevchenko was able to identify most of the local **rezidentura**. Shevchenko's initial resettlement in the United States was marred by his indulgence in alcohol and prostitutes but, despite the embarrassment of being written about in *Defector's Mistress* by Judith Chavez, he married a Washington, D.C., lawyer.
- **SHIN BET.** The abbreviation of Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali, Shin Bet is **Israel**'s General Security Service, responsible for internal security within the country's boundaries. Created in June 1948, Shin Bet was placed under the Ministry of Defense in 1950. In 1952, it gained its

own independent director when Isser Harel was succeeded by his deputy, Isi Dorot. Although Shin Bet conducted successful counterespionage investigations, arresting three army NCOs as Soviet spies in 1950 and later identifying Dr. Kurt Sitte, Aharon Cohen, Dr. Israel Beer, Ze'ev Avni, and Shimon Levinson as KGB moles, its reputation as a ruthless counterintelligence organization, occasionally resorting to unorthodox countergang tactics, led to the resignation of Avraham Avituf in December 1980.

Shin Bet was implicated in attempts to assassinate the Arab mayors of some West Bank towns, and there was a similar scandal in April 1984 when two Palestinian terrorists were dragged off a hijacked bus and beaten to death. Shin Bet's concealment of what had happened led to the resignation of Avraham Shalom in April 1986. Shalom and seven of his subordinates received pardons in that instance, whereas in July 1997 Yosef Harmelin resigned when Shin Bet covered up the death in prison of a Palestinian prisoner. Shin Bet has been the subject of continuous criticism over its interrogation techniques, and in May 1987 the Israeli Supreme Court condemned the methods it had used to obtain a conviction against Lt. Izat Nafsu, who had spent seven years in prison after being framed at a military tribunal of supplying weapons to terrorists. Shin Bet's reputation was further damaged by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 by Yigal Amir, a member of the Jewish extremist group Koch, which had been a priority for **penetration** by Shin Bet.

The directors of Shin Bet have been Harel (1948-52), Dorot (1952-53), Amos Manor (1953-63), Harmelin (1964-74 and 1986–88), Avraham Ahituf (1974–81), Shalom (1981–86), Jacob Peri (1988–94), Karmi Giron (1995–96), Adm. Ami Ayalon (1996–2000), Abraham Dichter (2000–05), and Yuval Diskin (2005–).

SIGNALS ANALYSIS. The discipline of signals analysis, within the broader category of signals intelligence, covers the spectrum from interception to cryptography. The identification of the sender and receiver, the call signs, and the technology involved and the study of the encrypted cipher groups may reveal a large amount of useful information even if the actual content of the message itself remains unread. Direction-finding, discrimination, and traffic analysis are component parts of signals analysis.

- **SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT).** The discipline of signals intelligence includes the **interception of communications** and other signals, decryption, and **signals analysis**. The definition of *signals* is wide and may include **communications intelligence** (COMINT), telemetry intelligence (TELINT), and radar intelligence (RADINT). *See also* DISCRIMINATION; ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE; FERRET; TELEMETRY INTERCEPTION; TRAFFIC ANALYSIS.
- **SILENT PNG.** The process by which an individual with protection under the Vienna Convention is required to leave the country without being publicly denounced as **persona non grata** (PNG).
- **SLEPER.** An agent who is established in a host country but remains inactive, sometimes for years, until called upon to undertake some clandestine activity. Because they are inactive, sleepers are virtually impossible to detect and are immune from conventional countermeasures, such as **surveillance**.
- **SMERSH.** The Russian acronym for "death to spies," Smersh was a feared wartime NKVD unit that operated in territory newly liberated from the Nazis to liquidate counterrevolutionaries and others suspected of anti-**Soviet** activities. In March 1946, having acquired an unsavory reputation as Josef Stalin's executioners, Smersh was disbanded and its personnel absorbed into the NKVD.
- SMITH-CUMMING, MANSFIELD. The first chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Capt. Smith-Cumming was appointed head of the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau in August 1909. Born plain Mansfield Smith on 1 April 1859, his career had been handicapped by chronic seasickness. Already a wealthy man, Smith-Cumming received a considerable settlement from his wife, an heiress. Following his retirement, Smith-Cumming attended an Admiralty torpedo course and later became an expert on boom defenses. These talents, along with his fluency in French, his interest in electricity and photography, and his skill as a draftsman, led to his selection by Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Bethell to join the Secret Service Bureau. Something of a daredevil, he kept fast

motorboats, loved the new sport of motoring, and even learned to fly. He was seriously injured in a car accident in France in October 1914, breaking both legs. Thereafter Smith-Cumming often disconcerted his visitors by absent-mindedly stabbing his wooden leg with a paper knife. According to one witness, he did this deliberately while interviewing candidates recommended for SIS posts and rejected those that winced at his performance.

SORGE, RICHARD. A German-born Soviet intelligence officer, Sorge was trained in Moscow and in 1930 was sent to Shanghai, where he ran a large espionage network for the GRU while operating under journalistic cover as a foreign correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung. He was transferred to Tokyo from September 1933 and built up an extensive clandestine organization until he was arrested in October 1941. More than 40 of his subagents were eventually rounded up, and he was hanged with his principal collaborator, Hozumi Ozaki, in November 1944. Sorge's spy ring included sources in the German embassy, where he was regarded as an ardent Nazi, and in the very highest levels of the Japanese government. His warnings that the Nazis intended to launch a surprise offensive against the Soviet Union in June 1941 were ignored by Moscow, but after his death he was made a posthumous Hero of the Soviet Union, and a postage stamp was issued in his honor.

War, a highly classified network of underwater acoustic sensors was deployed around the globe to monitor the movement of Eastern Bloc submarines. Originally developed to protect America's eastern seaboard, SOSUS recorded transits through geographical choke points such as the Strait of Gibraltar and the Greenland-Iceland-Faeroes gap. The sonar arrays were eventually extended to provide coverage of much of the Atlantic and Pacific ocean basins. Linked by 30,000 miles of cables, which terminated at 22 permanent, protected facilities on land, the equipment was mounted on rigid frames corresponding to the size of a double-decker bus and deposited 3,000 feet down on the sea floor by night, safely away from hostile satellite surveillance. SOSUS was declassified in 1991 when the system had been defeated by the introduction of the Akula-class submarine,

nearly three decades after the first **Soviet** nuclear submarine had been detected near Iceland in June 1962 by a terminal in Barbados.

The use of hydrophones to detect and monitor submarines dates back to World War I, when the Royal Navy sank three **German U-boats** after they had been heard on passive devices located in shallow water.

SOUTH AFRICA. In 1966 the South African Intelligence Service changed its name to the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). It was then headed by Gen. Hendrik van den Bergh, who had commanded South Africa's Security Police since June 1963. Too closely associated with repression, torture, and a ruthless counterterrorist campaign during the apartheid era conducted in neighboring African countries sympathetic to the banned African National Congress, BOSS was first reorganized as the National Intelligence Service (NIS), then dismantled in 1994 by Sizakele Sigxashe who established a domestic National Intelligence Agency under the authority of the new intelligence minister, Joe Nhlanhla, with a headquarters at Delmas Road, Pretoria. In January 2000 Vusi Mavinbela was appointed the NIA's new director-general.

SOVIET SATELLITE SERVICES. See SURROGATES.

SOVIET UNION. Since the prerevolution era, when the tsars depended upon the feared Okhrana for monitoring their enemies, successive regimes have been reliant on an efficiently omniscient secret police to act as the "sword and shield" of the Communist party. Lenin created the Cheka, under the leadership of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, and the organization was later renamed the General Political Administration (Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenye/GRU) and the Unified State Political Administration (Obyedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenye/OGPU). In 1934 the NKVD (Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del') took control of the entire security apparatus and was eventually replaced in 1954 by the KGB (Komitei Gosudarstevnnoi Bezopasnosti). Both agencies were handicapped by the loss of experienced personnel who fell under suspicion or were purged, leaving key posts in the hands of staff with impeccable political credentials but not much else.

A manifestation of the paranoia that gripped the NKVD was Lavrenti Beria's decision to close down the London rezidentura and withdraw its entire staff in 1940 in the mistaken belief that it had been penetrated. Similarly, his counterintelligence experts advised that the information supplied by the Cambridge Five was too good to be true and amounted to evidence of a sophisticated **deception** scheme. As the older Chekists had themselves masterminded several such sophisticated stratagems—such as the Trust, which had duped several leading anti-Bolsheviks, such as Sidney Reilly, into believing there was a large anti-Communist resistance movement active in the Soviet Union—the OGPU and NKVD veterans knew the risks. Nevertheless the NKVD played a significant role in acquiring modern Western technology for Soviet industry and scored considerable success in stealing atomic, jet engine, and ballistic missile secrets, thus assisting Soviet scientists to develop nuclear bombs, the swept-wing MiG-15 fighter, and intercontinental rockets.

As well as operating aggressively overseas to protect Soviet interests, the state security organs concentrated on the penetration of émigré and other hostile expatriate groups, and during Josef Stalin's era, they waged a covert war of attrition against Leon Trotsky and his political supporters who were marked for recruitment or assassination. However, they also showed consummate skill in exploiting the membership of foreign Communist parties through the Comintern, such as the Communist Party of the United States of America and the Communist Party of Great Britain, and employing a cadre of recruiters such as Arnold Deutsch, Alexander Orlov, and Ignace Poretsky, later feted as "the great illegals," to act as intermediaries and build espionage networks abroad run by local sympathizers. Throughout the Soviet era, the Central Committee was able to recommend hundreds of underground party members to join secret cells and engage in espionage.

After the collapse of the Soviet system, **Russia** replaced the KGB with the **FSB** and **SVR**. *See also* FAPSI.

SPAIN. In the post-Franco era, Spain's security and intelligence apparatus has been concentrated on a single domestic target, the Basque separatist movement ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Freedom and Homeland), which was engaged in a "first dirty war" between

1975 and 1981. During that period, three unavowed organizations ran counter-ETA operations: the Anti-Terrorismo ETA (ATE); the Acción Nacional Española (ANE); and the main group, the Batalión Vascol Español (BVE), which is now known to have been sponsored by members of Spain's security apparatus. Little is known about ATE and ANE, but the BVE and its notorious successor, the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) deployed **assassination** squads against ETA's leadership during the "second dirty war," which occurred between 1983 and 1987.

The BVE came into existence shortly before the death of Gen. Francisco Franco in November 1975 and targeted the men widely believed to have been responsible for the assassination in a Madrid street of Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco in December 1973, an act that was to split ETA into two rival factions and mark the beginning of a long and bloody conflict between terrorists operating on both sides of the French border, often with political refugee status in France which gave them immunity from extradition, and their frustrated opponents within the Spanish government. A further significant event was a shooting in December 1980 at a café in Hendaye, France, that resulted in the death of two people, and injuries to nine others, including two ETA activists. The three gunmen left the scene in a car, which immediately crossed the frontier into Spain and was taken into the custody by the Spanish police, who thereafter refused to either prosecute them or disclose their identities to the outraged French authorities. The interior minister responsible for shielding the suspects and then ordering their release was Juan José Rosón, who insisted that they were police informers who had not committed the crime and were entitled to official protection. Rosón's brother, Gen. Luis Rosón, was later the target of an unsuccessful attack in November 1984 when his car was riddled with bullets in a Madrid street. wounding both himself and his driver.

It is now acknowledged that the BVE was officially sponsored and hired various mercenaries to carry out murders in France. The statistics of the period show that the BVE killed three ETA members in France in 1979 and a further nine in two random bombings and two rape-murders in Spain's Basque Country in 1980, while ETA was responsible for 17 murders. The BVE's only known forays onto French territory were the December 1980 shootings mentioned above and the

well-publicized murders in Biarritz in which three ETA men were killed and one was injured, with the incident attributed to the GAL. The first of the murders was the death of Tomas Pérez in June 1984; a bomb was remotely detonated as he walked past with refugee priest Ramón Orbe, who was badly injured. This was followed by the shooting in March 1985 of Xabier Pérez as he fueled his car at a gas station, murdered by a lone gunman who escaped on a motor scooter. In December of the same year, Robert Caplanne was killed by the GAL in a case of mistaken identity. Caplanne was an innocent French electrician, but his murderers had incorrectly identified him as their true target, Enrique Villar. Of these three deaths, Tomas Pérez was a known ETA leader (who had survived an earlier machine-gun attack on his car in 1976, which had wounded his wife), and Xabier Pérez was Domingo Iturbe's brother-in-law.

Later there were other GAL killings, for example, of ETA's notorious Algerian-trained hit man Mikel Goikoetxea in December 1983, who was shot by two gunmen outside his home in St. Jeande-Luz. The 27-year-old Goikoetxea came from a long family tradition of ETA militancy. The BVE's earlier operations against ETA's leadership included the murder in July 1978 of Juan José Extabe, ETA's former leader, who was machine-gunned in his car in St. Jean-de-Luz and killed, together with his wife. In December 1978, ETA's leader, Benaran Ordenana, was killed when his boobytrapped car was blown up in the French Basque town of Angelet. Three weeks later José Pagoaga, widely believed to have planned Prime Minister Carrero's assassination five years earlier, was badly injured by another bomb. Domingo Iturbe survived two assassination attempts in 1979, and Tomas Alba, the deputy mayor of San Sebastián, was killed. When the "dirty war" extended into France, the French police responded in January 1984 with raids in which 40 ETA suspects were arrested.

Details of the two "dirty wars" emerged because of investigations conducted during the second half of the 1980s by magistrates in Portugal, France, and Spain. The French prosecutions concentrated on individual hit men, including Jean-Philippe Labade and Patrick de Carvalho, and prosecuted several mercenaries, who admitted to having been hired to kill ETA targets and implicated members of the Guardia Civil as their paymasters. In Spain, Superintendent José

Amedo of the Policia Nacional in Bilbao was implicated, as was his subordinate, Inspector Michel Dominguez, and they were later to testify against two other police superintendents in Bilbao, Julio Herro and Francisco Saiz, the police chief himself, Miguel Planchuelo, and his director of antiterrorist intelligence, Francisco Alvarez.

As the searching inquiries continued, the evidence increasingly pointed to complicity at a high level in the Spanish Ministry of the Interior. The director of state security, Julián Sancristóbal, his deputy Rafael Vera, and several members of their elite antiterrorist unit were arrested in December 1984. Gen. Enrique Rodriguez, the Guardia Civil's senior antiterrorist officer in San Sebastián, was convicted of two murders and sentenced to 60 years, and convictions were obtained against José Barrionuevo in September 1998, Rosón's successor as minister of the interior between 1982 and 1988.

The links between the GAL and the Guardia Civil, the Policia Nacional, the Socialist-run Ministry of the Interior, and Spain's military intelligence service, the Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa (CESID), were explored in dozens of overlapping investigations, and although the authorities showed little enthusiasm to extradite fugitives, arrest suspects, and pursue politically embarrassing leads, the carnage was considerable and at times threatened to destroy Prime Minister Felipe González's administration. Certainly one related scandal, CESID's June 1995 tapping of King Juan Carlos's private telephone, among those of many other senior figures in the government, shocked Madrid and led to many dismissals and sudden resignations, including that of the director, Gen. Emilio Alonso Manglano. At one point Luis Roldán, the director-general of the Guardia Civil, fled the country and had to be extradited from Laos and Thailand before he could be interrogated as a witness. The present CESID director is Gen. Javier Calderón.

SPECIAL AIR SERVICE REGIMENT (SAS). Created by David Stirling in July 1941 to engage the enemy with unorthodox tactics behind enemy lines in North Africa, the SAS was disbanded at the end of World War II but reformed in 1952 as the 22nd SAS to undertake operations in the Malayan jungle against Chinese insurgents. In November 1958, following considerable success in the Malaya Emergency, D Squadron was deployed to assist the Sultan of Oman, then

besieged by rebels. Later the regiment, expanded to three saber squadrons and based at Hereford, would see action in Dhofar, Borneo, Aden, and from 1974, in Northern Ireland. Skills acquired while operating against the Provisional Irish Republican Army led the regiment to develop its counterterrorist techniques, which were first manifest during an airliner hijacking at Mogadishu in 1977 and were then refined in April 1980 when B Squadron stormed the Iranian embassy in London, which had been seized by terrorists. All but one of the terrorists were killed in the rescue that followed, establishing the SAS's reputation worldwide as a highly efficient, welltrained, and superbly disciplined group of Special Forces.

Subsequently the 22nd SAS, reinforced by the Territorial Army units of the 21st SAS and 23rd SAS were deployed in the Falklands, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, both Iraq wars, and Afghanistan. In addition, SAS training cadres undertook missions to Kenya, Colombia, and other countries where the host government had requested specialist support. During the first Iraq War, one patrol, dropped deep into Iraqi territory to pinpoint Scud missile launchers and sabotage enemy communications, achieved considerable notoriety as the survivors wrote accounts of their experience. The patrol leader, writing under the alias "Andy McNabb," published Bravo Two Zero, creating further interest in the regiment's operations.

SPECIAL BRANCH. Created in 1884 as the Special Irish Branch of the Metropolitan Police as a response to an outbreak of Fenian bombings in London, Special Branch was the organization responsible for the investigation of political crime in Britain, and during the postwar period similar units were created in most of the colonies. Most became the principal local security apparatus, staffed with personnel trained by MI5 in London, and they survived into independence as effective specialist units gathering information in preference to pursuing criminals.

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS). In June 1940 Federal Bureau of Investigation director J. Edgar Hoover produced his plan for a new clandestine intelligence agency, the Special Intelligence Service, to operate across Latin America to counter any threat from the Nazis. Its mission was to combat "financial, economic, political, and subversive activities detrimental to the security of the **United States**." President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave his secret approval on 24 June. Hoover's choice to head the SIS was Assistant Director Percy E. Foxworth. However, Hoover's determination to exercise his right to be the only civilian intelligence-gathering organization to operate in Latin America led to some extraordinary conflicts with the Office of Strategic Service's (OSS) Gen. **William Donovan**.

The SIS concentrated on Brazil, **Argentina**, **Chile**, and Mexico, where there were large expatriate **German** communities, but was able to establish overt offices in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires when Brazil cut diplomatic relations with the Axis in February 1942 and Argentina did so in 1944. Altogether about 360 SIS agents operated across Latin America, and by the end of the war, the FBI had appointed official legal attachés (legats) to liaise with the authorities in nine countries where they were openly declared as the FBI's representatives based at the U.S. **embassy**.

The SIS in Brazil, headed from May 1941 by Jack West and then William J. Bradley, operated under difficult, shifting circumstances, but eventually identified Josef J. Starziczny as LUCAS, the organizer of a major Nazi spy ring whose radio transmissions to Hamburg had been **intercepted** by the Allies. Also caught up in the same organization was Albrecht Engels, code-named ALFREDO, who was the director of a Brazilian power company and another key figure in the **Abwehr**'s operations across South America.

In Chile the SIS, headed by legat Robert W. Wall since August 1941, with Dwight J. Dalbey operating undercover, gathered information about a transmitter that was traced to a farm outside Quilpue, near Valparaiso, and directed by the **German** air attaché, Maj. Ludwig von Bohlen, code-named BACH. By the time Chile severed relations with the Axis in January 1943, the radio had been silenced.

The SIS continued to operate until June 1946 when President Harry Truman's National Intelligence Authority, chaired by Dean Acheson, transferred responsibility for all overseas intelligence gathering to the newly created Central Intelligence Group (CIG). However, the transfer was far from smooth, with Hoover taking offense when the CIG's chief, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, sent a team of former FBI special agents to negotiate with his assistant to the director for investigations, Edward A. Tamm. Hoover was furious, causing an

embarrassed Adm. William D. Leahy to send a memorandum to Vandenberg recommending that "ex-FBI men now in the CI Group should certainly not be used for such contacts" and even that "to avoid offending Mr. Hoover we should not hereafter, without specific approval in each instance by the Authority, employ any persons who at any time separated themselves from FBI."

Hoover's rage at losing the SIS knew no bounds. The SIS supervisor for Mexico and Central America, William C. Sullivan, recalled that "he gave specific instructions to my office and all offices abroad that under no circumstances were we to give any documents or information to the newly established Central Intelligence Agency." As well as being disappointed at the loss of his SIS, Hoover also knew, from the cryptographic source code-named BRIDE (later better known as VENONA), that the OSS had been heavily penetrated by Soviet spies, and that several suspects had been accepted onto the new CIA's staff. A measure of Hoover's distrust of the CIA is the fact that the new agency was not informed about the existence of VENONA until 1954.

The Special Intelligence Service was formally closed on 31 March 1947, by which time the FBI had undertaken security surveys on more than 150 industrial plants and utilities and opened files on 887 espionage suspects in the region, of whom 389 had been arrested and 105 convicted. A total of 281 propaganda agents had been exposed and 60 arrested; 30 saboteurs had been identified and 20 arrested; and 222 smugglers had been identified, with 75 arrested and 11 convicted. Altogether 24 clandestine radio stations were monitored, and 30 sets seized, at a cost to the FBI of the loss of four SIS agents, killed in three separate plane crashes in South America. During the course of the war, Hoover sent 2,600 individual reports to the White House, the overwhelming majority of which concerned Latin America, but none of this was enough to persuade the Truman administration that the FBI required an overseas presence beyond the legats already established in the embassies in Rome (Stanley R. Russo), Paris (Horton R. Telford), Ottawa (Glenn H. Bethel), London (John A. Cimperman), and Mexico City.

The SIS was a brief, wartime experiment in the collection of intelligence, and its reach was extensive, far beyond its official brief of Latin America. At various times SIS personnel were stationed in Lisbon (Ivan W. Newpher), Manila (Nicholas J. Alaga), Madrid (Frank G. Siscoe), Casablanca (Joseph E. Thornton), and Tokyo (Alex M. Hurst).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE (SOE). The SOE was the sabotage and resistance organization created in London under the leadership of Sir Frank Nelson in July 1940 to foment armed opposition to the Nazis in occupied territory in response to Winston Churchill's demand to "set Europe ablaze." Before it was shut down at the end of June 1945, it had trained 9,000 agents, operated in 19 European countries, and sent missions to China, Malaya, Africa, South America, and the Middle East. SOE was an amalgamation of a covert propaganda unit known as Electra House and the SIS's sabotage branch, Section D.

SOE was the world's first large-scale, government-sponsored commitment to paramilitary tactics and unorthodox warfare conducted by irregulars, and it changed the face of combat forever. Whereas others, such as the Boers in the South African War, had pioneered what would now be recognized as guerrilla strategies—mounting hit-and-run raids, ambushing supply routes behind enemy lines, and avoiding pitched battles—SOE had institutionalized the doctrines, established a global network of training facilities known as "Special Training Schools," developed specially designed weapons and equipment, and liaised closely with local resistance groups to exploit territorial advantage.

During the course of World War II, SOE pulled off several spectacular successes that boosted anti-Axis morale, but probably exercised only a minimal influence over the final Allied military victory. It mounted imaginative efforts to destroy stocks of heavy water at the Vermork hydroelectric plant in Norway that undermined German atomic research in Operation Gunnerside. The assassination of Reichprotektor Reinhard Heydrich in May 1942 (Operation ANTHROPOID), while applauded by many, resulted in appalling retribution taken against the civilian population, including the razing of Lidice, Czechoslovakia, and murder of the village's entire population.

Inexperience and overenthusiasm contributed to some monumental errors and the widespread enemy **penetration** of the French and Dutch resistance networks. Some unsuitable personnel were selected for clandestine work in enemy-occupied territory, and there was a

continuous, probably inevitable conflict with rival Allied agencies engaged in intelligence collection. Sir Frank Nelson was replaced in May 1942 by banker Sir Charles Hambro, who was succeeded in September 1943 by Maj. Gen. Colin Gubbins. What was left of the organization was absorbed into the **Secret Intelligence Service** in August 1945, and Gubbins's post ceased to exist in June 1946.

SPY DUST. A tagging technique used by the KGB's Third Chief Directorate during the Cold War to monitor the movements of individuals who were difficult to keep under direct observation. "Spy dust" was the general term for nitrophenyl pentadien (NPPD), luminal, and other chemicals. A sample was provided by the Central Intelligence Agency's source COWL, and a defector, Vitali Yurchenko, confirmed the procedure for its use.

Under a secret research program code-named METKA, the compound was applied to the clothing, shoes, or person of the target, thus allowing the target to be followed from a safe distance by watchers equipped with the appropriate detection devices. Although invisible to the naked eye, the chemicals could be tracked passively by detectors at strategically located choke points or could be illuminated by infrared beams. Fear that NPPD was mutagenic and possibly carcinogenic resulted in a formal protest from the U.S. State Department in 1985.

SPY SWAP. Exchanges of espionage agents across the Iron Curtain was a feature of the Cold War, the first coming in February 1962 when a Soviet illegal, Willie Fisher, alias Rudolf Abel, serving a 30-year prison sentence, was released in Berlin in return for the Central Intelligence Agency's U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, who had been imprisoned in Moscow after his plane was shot down in May 1960. The negotiations were initiated and conducted by an East German lawyer, Wolfgang Vogel, who claimed to be acting on behalf of Fisher's wife. In July 1969 he also arranged for 11 Bundesnachrichtendienst agents to be sent over the border at Herleshausen, as Yuri Loginov, a KGB illegal arrested in South Africa, was released back to the Soviets.

A third swap took place took place in October 1969 when a British academic, Gerald Brooke, arrested for distributing subversive literature

in the **Soviet Union**, was released in exchange for the **Portland spies**—Konon Molody, alias Gordon Lonsdale, and Morris and Lona Cohen, alias Peter and Helen Kroger—who had been convicted of breaches of the **Official Secrets Act** in March 1961. Vogel would supervise dozens of similar swaps, mostly involving the release of East Germans to be reunited with their families in the Federal Republic, in exchange for a ransom of hard currency, a deal known as "Freikauf."

Another, more complex swap occurred in May 1978 when Robert G. Thompson, a former Air Force sergeant who had been sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment in May 1965 on charges of having spied for the KGB, was exchanged in Berlin for Alan van Norman, an American student convicted of having attempted to smuggle a family out of East Germany. Also released was Miron Marcus, an **Israeli** pilot shot down over Mozambique and captured by Communist-backed guerrillas. In February 1986 Vogel brokered another deal, enabling two **Czech** StB agents, Hanna and **Karl Koecher**, to be freed in return for the Russian dissident Anatoli Shcharansky, then serving a nine-year prison sentence, together with a Czech convicted of helping refugees to reach the West and two other unnamed agents.

STARGATE. An American intelligence community code name given to a classified research project dedicated to research of psychic powers and their defense applications. The project began during the Cold War under several code names, among them GRILL FLAME, CENTER LANE, and SUN STREAK, following information that the Soviets were investigating remote viewing techniques. The objective was to establish whether astral traveling was a practical method of acquiring intelligence from denied areas and if telepathy offered any opportunities to be exploited by an intelligence collection agency. The project was abandoned in 1995 when funding was terminated on the grounds that no discernible benefit had been established.

STASHINSKY, BOGDAN. In October 1957 the Ukrainian nationalist leader Lev Rebet collapsed and died at his home in **Germany**, and two years later another exile, Stephan Bandera, suffered the same fate. In August 1961, Stashinsky revealed that he was an experienced **KGB** officer who had killed both men by firing prussic acid into their faces, causing their almost instantaneous deaths from what appeared

to be heart attacks. Troubled by his conscience and disapproval of his German fiancée, Stashinsky **defected** to the **Central Intelligence Agency** and revealed his next assignment had been the **assassination** of the former Ukrainian prime minister, Raoslav Stetskow. Stashinsky was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in Germany but was released in 1966 and **resettled** by the CIA.

STASI. The slang term for the **East German** security and intelligence apparatus within the **Ministerium für Staatssicherheit** (MfS; Ministry of State Security) and generally held to include the foreign branch, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA).

STAY-BEHIND. Agent networks that remain dormant in strategic locations until they are occupied by enemy forces. The system anticipates being "rolled over" by an enemy and obviates the need to conduct dangerous infiltration missions to insert agents into hostile territory. The virtue of a stay-behind organization is that is allows a network to make the necessary preparations for **cover** and clandestine communications at leisure, and thereby reduce the chances of detection.

During World War II, the technique was employed extensively by the Axis, and virtually every significant military withdrawal was accompanied by the establishment of a German stay-behind organization. During the **Cold War**, NATO created extensive stay-behind organizations in West **Germany** and **Norway**, considered the two vulnerable flanks to a surprise Warsaw Pact attack; more controversially, it also sponsored embryonic resistance networks in neutral Austria, **Sweden**, Finland, and **Switzerland**. Each operated independently and concealed its existence under code names, the best known being the **GLADIO** network in **Italy**, **P-26** in Switzerland, and Stella Polaris in Finland.

SUBMARINES. Often referred to as the "silent service," submarines have always been deployed on intelligence-gathering missions, and their covert nature make them ideal vehicles for conducting **surveillance**, collecting **signals intelligence**, and clandestinely infiltrating agents and saboteurs. The use of submarines as a means of delivering secret agents and special forces developed during World War II, and

both the Axis and the Allies relied upon them to undertake clandestine missions. **U-boats** carried **Abwehr** agents across the Atlantic to **Canada** and the **United States**, while British submarines were active on similar assignments in French waters, the Mediterranean, and the Far East.

During the **Cold War**, British and American submarines shared intelligence collection duties in or near **Soviet** harbors, acting as pickets to monitor the movement of Soviet submarines and engaging in occasionally dangerous "cat-and-mouse" tactics, shadowing target hostiles. When collisions sporadically occurred, no public protests were made by either side, and the consequent damage was usually attributed to "ice damage," which became a euphemism.

The advent of nuclear propulsion allowed submarine endurance to be limited only by the amount of food stored aboard and enabled specially adapted hunter-killers to undertake long patrols permanently submerged to complete highly classified tasks, such as the servicing of IVY BELLS **intercept** equipment.

During the **Falklands Conflict**, which was the first time nuclear submarines had been deployed in anger or had sunk a surface vessel (other than on exercise), three hunter-killers patrolled the South Atlantic and performed various duties, including acting as air-raid warning pickets, lying submerged off **Argentine** airfields, and monitoring enemy air movement and wireless traffic. *See also* JOUR-NEYMAN; K-129.

SUEZ CRISIS. The plot devised by Great Britain, France, and Israel to seize control of the strategic, Anglo-French-owned and British-administered Suez Canal, recently nationalized by Egyptian leader Abdel Nasser, resulted in a tripartite invasion of Egypt in October 1956 code-named STRAGGLE. Although the United States was not a participant and was preoccupied by the opportunistic simultaneous Soviet invasion of Hungary to suppress an uprising in Budapest, the Central Intelligence Agency continued to supply intelligence to the Secret Intelligence Service, including U-2 imagery of Egyptian forces. The decision by the disapproving President Dwight D. Eisenhower, then in the middle of an election campaign, to withdraw support for the pound precipitated a financial crisis that forced Great Britain to evacuate its troops.

The Suez Crisis had been prompted by SIS reports from a source code-named LUCKY BREAK that Colonel Nasser was falling under increasing Soviet influence and joining the Communist Bloc. Prime Minister Anthony Eden's first demand, which was to cause Selwyn Lloyd's minister of state, Sir Anthony Nutting, to resign, was for the SIS to **assassinate** the troublesome Egyptian leader; the second, which was to split the country, was to collude with Israel and France to invade and regain control of the canal.

The crisis was exacerbated by the SIS's lack of assets in the field, the **Mukhabarat** having rolled up the main British network, organized by local expatriates, weeks before the invasion. Even worse, a source considered one of the SIS's most valuable revealed himself to have been long controlled by the Mukhabarat. Dogged by ill health and the knowledge that the French and Israelis had retained copies of the secret Sèvres Agreement which had set out the plan in detail and had been negotiated and signed on Eden's behalf by the chairman of the **Joint Intelligence Committee**, Sir Pat Dean, Eden resigned, citing the need to recover from a botched operation which had severed his bile duct. *See also* BLOWBACK.

SURROGATES. During the Cold War, the Polish, East German, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romanian, and Czechoslovakian intelligence agencies often acted on behalf of the KGB where their personnel might be likely to exploit local sympathies and gain better results. Their representatives were often required to report their recruits to the local KGB rezidentura, in case "a horse was already being run by another stable," and were directed by the KGB to exploit particular émigré groups. For example, the Polish UB was especially active in Chicago, where there was a large expatriate community, and the Czech StB concentrated on former refugees and people who had been sympathetic to Czechoslovakia since the Munich Crisis of 1938. Western counterintelligence agencies invariably considered all Eastern Bloc adversaries, with the exception of the Yugoslavs, to be Soviet satellites.

SURVEILLANCE. The technique of keeping a covert watch on individuals and premises. Surveillance may be categorized as observation of suspects, known as *physical surveillance*, and the monitoring

of conversations, referred to as *technical surveillance*. Physical surveillance may require the deployment of teams of experts, some in vehicles or aircraft, trained to report on the movements of a person without arousing his or her suspicions and to identify attempts at countersurveillance even when they are disguised.

During the **Cold War**, surveillance techniques grew increasingly sophisticated and included the use of specially developed technology to assist in monitoring the movement of targets. In Moscow this included the application of **spy dust**, while in London and Washington, D.C., tracking equipment was retrofitted into vehicles used by adversaries. *See also* SATELLITES; TAGGING.

SVR. Created out of the KGB's First Chief Directorate (FCD) in 1992, the Sluzha Vneshnogo Razvedsky (Russian Foreign Intelligence Service) operates overseas and was headed by a KGB veteran, Vyechslav Trubnikov, until he was replaced in January 1996 by Gen. Sergei Lebedev, formerly the SVR rezident in Washington, D.C. The SVR, based in the old FCD headquarters at Yaseveno, is estimated to employ 12,000 staff, a small proportion of whom are posted abroad at rezidenturas in diplomatic premises. Whereas the FCD's Directorate S deployed illegals across the globe, SVR defectors have suggested that this capability has proved expensive and unnecessary and has been cut radically.

SWEDEN. During World War II the Swedish General Staff maintained an intelligence bureau, widely considered to be sympathetic to the Nazis, and a highly efficient **signals intelligence** organization that **intercepted** and read the enciphered **German** cable traffic from **Norway** to Germany, which was routed through Stockholm.

The Swedish intelligence apparatus during the **Cold War** consisted of a security service, the Säkerhetspolisen (SAPO), and a **communications intelligence** bureau, the Forsvarets Radioanstalt (FRA). The principal **Soviet** agent caught by the SAPO security police was Col. Stig Wennerstrom, a Swedish Air Force officer who was identified as a **mole** in December 1961 by the **defector Michal Goleniewski** and sentenced to life imprisonment.

SWITZERLAND. Since before World War II, Switzerland exercised strict control over resident foreigners and over any contact between

its own citizens and the **Soviet** Bloc. During the war, the Bundespolizei (Bupo) proved an effective counterespionage organization and monitored the activities of the **Rote Drei** before arresting its membership in 1943. During the **Cold War**, the country became a focus of international intelligence, partly because of the presence of so many **United Nations** organizations in Geneva, but mainly because of the benign security environment in which foreign agencies were free to operate against third parties. Switzerland itself was rarely the principal target of espionage, although the local defense industry attracted both Soviet and **Israeli** spies.

Although nurturing the Swiss Federation's traditional neutrality, contingency plans were made to collaborate with NATO in the event of a Soviet invasion and occupation, and liaison links were established with Western intelligence agencies. These relationships withered following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, but were reestablished during the first Iraq War when Swiss citizens were taken hostage by Saddam Hussein. This led to a realignment of Swiss foreign policy, with Bern authorizing Swiss participation in UN sanctions, including the freezing of bank accounts, despite not actually joining the United Nations, after a mandatory referendum in 2004.

Following disclosures about the lack of accountability concerning **P-26** and the extent of **surveillance** conducted during the **Cold War** by the Bundespolizei, both organizations were dismantled. They were replaced by the Strategischer Nachrichtendienst (Strategic Intelligence Service) and the Bundesamt für Polizei (Federal Police Office).

SZABO, ZOLTAN. A Hungarian intelligence officer, Capt. Zoltan Szabo was convicted in 1989 of espionage in Austria, but was released in return for his evidence against his agent Clyde Conrad, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in West Germany in June 1990; nearly eight years later, in January 1998, he died in prison of heart failure. According to the damage assessment, based on the largest espionage investigation ever conducted in peacetime by the U.S. Army, Conrad had compromised the entire NATO war strategy for Europe; the report also suggested that several suspected members of his network, which may have included a dozen others, had escaped prosecution for lack of evidence. Szabo, who had fled to Budapest in 1988, negotiated immunity from prosecution by the United States

and Germany in exchange for residency in Austria and his cooperation with American interrogators.

The wily Hungarian fulfilled his side of the bargain and gave a detailed account of his espionage, dating back to 1971, describing his recruitment of Conrad in 1975 and even admitting to having sold copies of Conrad's documents to the **Czech** intelligence service.

Szabo also implicated an Italian-born former U.S. Army paratrooper, Sgt. Tommaso Mortati, who was arrested in August 1988 at his home in Vicenza, where his American wife was working on the nearby NATO air base. According to Mortati's confession, after he had emigrated to the United States and acquired citizenship, in 1981 he had been recruited by Szabo, who arranged for him to undergo two weeks of espionage training in Budapest. Mortati had left the Army in 1987 but had been paid a retainer of \$500 a month by Hungarian intelligence, the AVH (Allami Vedelmi Hatosag), together with bonuses for additional information. A search of Mortati's home revealed a hidden radio, which he used to transmit his reports. Mortati pleaded guilty to charges of espionage and was sentenced to life imprisonment in Germany.

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TAGGING. Techniques developed to enhance the efficiency of physical surveillance on target individuals. During the Cold War, considerable research was undertaken to create chemical and other formulas that would serve to identify a quarry, sometimes known as a "rabbit," even when the person's appearance had been altered, by alerting watchers when the target passed through a channel or choke point, or that would enable tracking to occur from a distance safe enough not to compromise the surveillance. The East Germans experimented with substances that could be sprayed onto the shoes or clothes of a target to increase the scent available for specially trained dogs, while the KGB was known to have applied potentially dangerous toxins onto targets to aid detection by electromechanical devices. The use of potentially hazardous "spy dust" deployed in Moscow against selected Americans diplomats prompted a diplomatic protest in August 1985.

According to information supplied by a defector, Vitali Yurchenko, the KGB also experimented with insect pheromones, which caused a box of male insects to react when someone sprayed with female pheromones passed nearby.

Documents have also been the subject of tagging. For example, British Admiralty papers have been irradiated to enable sensors to monitor their removal from secure areas.

TAIWAN. See CHINA, REPUBLIC OF.

TAW. Code name for a secret **Central Intelligence Agency** operation initiated in 1979 which consisted of a sophisticated tape recorder placed in a sewer on the main landline cable that connected the KGB's headquarters in Moscow to its communications center at Troitsk, 25 miles south of the capital. Because the site was outside the travel limit imposed on foreign diplomats, the tapes had to be serviced in a black operation by CIA personnel who had to elude their surveillance and adopt a disguise to make the illicit visit. The Soviets discovered the equipment immediately after the first approach to the KGB in Washington, D.C., made by disaffected CIA officer Edward Lee Howard. When a CIA technician was sent to check the equipment in 1985, an integral antitamper device indicated that it had been interfered with, so it was abandoned, leaving the CIA to conclude that the KGB had allowed it to operate for the prior three years, presumably to protect Howard.

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS. A generic term used for technical surveillance, dependent on electrical equipment, usually denoting eavesdropping.

TELEMETRY INTELLIGENCE (TELINT). The interception and analysis of signals transmitted from test-fired missiles. Throughout a flight downrange, a test missile will broadcast information to engineers who monitor its performance. Before the introduction of international verification procedures, countries often encrypted the telemetry to prevent interception. Initially TELINT was picked up by ground stations or surface platforms such as warships, but the development of **satellite** surveillance technology enabled interception to be conducted from orbiting RHYOLITE platforms.

TENET, GEORGE. The son of Greek immigrant parents who settled in New York and opened a restaurant, Tenet was appointed **director of central intelligence** by President Bill Clinton in July 1997 upon the resignation of John Deutsch. Formerly a congressional staffer, Tenet proved much more popular than his predecessor but was the subject of criticism when he was slow to investigate allegations of security breaches committed by Deutsch, who retained classified material on his home laptop which was connected to the internet. Tenet retained his post when George W. Bush was elected to the White House but resigned in 2004. His former press spokesman, Bill Harlow, was to have ghostwritten his autobiography, but following his awarding by President Bush of the Medal of Freedom, Tenet announced that he had postponed the project indefinitely.

TERRORISM. Modern terrorism, including suicide bombings and attacks on civilian targets, has its origins in the campaign conducted by the Irgun and the Stern Gang against the British Mandate in **Palestine**. Both organizations benefited from information provided by the Haganah, the Jewish Agency's intelligence branch, and combat experience with the British army during World War II, when a Jewish Brigade was raised and armed to fight the Nazis.

The pattern of anticolonialist movements adopting terrorist tactics was to be established by Chinese Communist insurgents in Malaya, who had received wartime training with the Far East branch of **Special Operations Executive**, Force 136. During the **Malaya Emergency**, the terrorists depended on weapons donated originally by Force 136 to fight the **Japanese** occupation, but the insurgency was successfully suppressed with the application of unorthodox strategies, including the deployment of **countergangs**, developed in Palestine.

The era of anticolonialist terrorism effectively ended with the defeat of the Mau Mau Uprising in Kenya, settlement in **Cyprus**, and the British withdrawal from **Aden**, but political radicalism in Europe at the end of the 1960s created a climate in which the Irish Republican Army (IRA), dormant since the previous upsurge in sectarian vi-

olence in **Northern Ireland** in 1956, reemerged. During the 1970s, anarchist groups in **Germany**, Japan, **Italy**, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and **France** engaged in uncoordinated terrorism, which manifested itself in political **assassination**, bomb atrocities, and abductions. Although the **Central Intelligence Agency** suspected some of the most notorious terrorist leaders—such as Ilych Ramirez Sanchez, **alias** "Carlos the Jackal"; Dr. George Habbash; and Abu Nidal—were receiving **Soviet** sponsorship, there was never sufficient evidence to persuade the CIA's professional analysts, despite intensive studies and political pressure during President Ronald Reagan's administration.

The university-based terrorist groups of the 1970s, including the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Italian Red Brigade, Action Directe in France, the Angry Brigade in London, the Weather Underground in the **United States**, and N17 in Greece, all of which had vague political motives, eventually succumbed to law enforcement. However, the separatist movements with territorial objectives—from Armenia (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), the Basque Country (Euskadi ta Askatasuna), Brittany (Armée Revolutionnaire Bretonne), Corsica (Armée de Libération Nationale Corse), Croatia (Croatian Freedom Fighters), Molluca (Mollucan Liberation Front), Quebec (Front de Libération du Québec), Scotland (Scottish Liberation Army), and Wales (Meibon Glyndr)—proved more enduring.

Factionalism within the **Palestinian Liberation Organization**'s Al-Fatah spawned numerous extremist groups, such as **Black September**, Force 17, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, which in 1970 globalized their activities by seizing airliners, a tactic borrowed from **Cuba**, which had pioneered a policy of offering sanctuary to the hijackers of U.S. aircraft. Having witnessed the success of air piracy and the strategy of taking passengers hostage, extremists with territorial grievances copied the tactic in such disparate areas as Indonesia, Kurdistan, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and Kashmir. The terrorists saw the advantages of making their disputes international, and often the economic implications encouraged the adversaries to engage in negotiations. Political accommodations achieved peace in Uruguay with the Tupamaros, in **Argentina** with the Montoneros, in Peru with the Shining Path, in

Turkey with the Grey Wolves, and in Northern Ireland with the **Provisional IRA**. Uneasy truces have also been reached with the Tamil Tigers and the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers Party) but in **Colombia** narcoterrorism—with ostensibly political movements such as MI9 and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) taking control of entire provinces to enhance drug production—contaminated successive legitimate governments with corruption.

Whereas conventional, state-sponsored terrorism could be combated by the application of sanctions to those countries such as Libya, Iran, and Syria proven to have supported terrorist groups, transnational movements without any obvious refuge have been impossible to eradicate. While terrorists with territorial goals can be persuaded to abandon the armed struggle through political compromise, those with global cultural or religious motives are harder to contain or eliminate, although following the attack on Manhattan and Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001, the **United States** partially neutralized **Al-Qaeda** in April 2002 by leading an international coalition that invaded **Afghanistan**, deposed the Taliban regime, and destroyed Osama bin Laden's training camps.

The extent to which the war on terrorism declared by President George W. Bush in 2002 really succeeded remains hard to evaluate, but in the four years that followed, a high proportion of the Al-Qaeda leadership was killed or detained, its communications disrupted, its financial support networks dismantled, and its safe havens eliminated. With the West's huge intelligence advantage gained through the examination of captured documents and computers, the interrogation of prisoners, and the comprehensive intercepting of telephone, email, and internet communications, the Al-Qaeda structure was virtually decapitated, leaving individual sympathizers to develop their own cells and act independently. Major atrocities committed in the four years following 9/11 in Casablanca, Bali, Madrid, Istanbul, and London demonstrate that while the United States has escaped any significant terrorist incident on its own territory, interdicting several attempts, Islamic extremists continued in a campaign fueled by a religious zealotry that has taken root in immigrant ghettoes, especially among alienated Muslim youth in Europe. In addition, the continuing

insurgency concentrated in the Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad has served to attract jihadists from across the globe, possibly diverting attention away from the American homeland.

Public attitudes to terrorism have altered since the African National Congress (ANC), founded as a political movement in 1912, embraced sabotage during the apartheid period in **South Africa**, and when the organization was banned in April 1961 it engaged in terrorism through a surrogate, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). However, as a means of achieving power democratically, the ANC renounced political violence. Counterterrorism agencies have also altered their perspective, and now categorize animal rights extremists, white supremacist militias, and some fringe antiabortion campaigners as terrorists.

TET OFFENSIVE. The surprise Vietcong offensive on the Vietnamese New Year in 1968 took the Americans completely unawares and is regarded as a classic example of an intelligence failure, where clear signs of an impending attack were misinterpreted by analysts.

TEUFELSBERG. A major signals **intercept** station located during the Cold War in the British Sector of Berlin, strategically situated on the summit of a man-made mountain constructed over what was intended to be the Third Reich's military academy. Bombed into total destruction in 1945, the site was used to dump the rubble from 800,000 buildings, and it proved to be an ideal site for a joint National Security Agency-GCHQ listening post which, by virtue of its isolation from the city, offered an almost ideal electronic environment, free from interference. With its tall aerials, it was able to receive signals from Czechoslovakia and 50 miles into Poland to collect Warsaw Pact traffic. The U.S. Army Security Agency Field Station began operating in 1957, when it was known as the 280th ASA Company, and proved its worth by monitoring the military VHF traffic generated by 600,000 Soviet troops during the Prague crisis of 1968. The number of masts and distinctive golfball antennas increased continuously until 1977, when the site was absorbed into the NSA as the U.S. Air Force's 6912th Electronic Security Group, with more than a thousand Americans and a hundred British technicians from the RAF's No. 26 Signal Unit and No. 13 Signal Regiment maintaining 24-hour cover in three shifts on **East German** and **Soviet** telephone, telex, and radio circuits.

THOMPSON, ROBERT. In June 1957 Airman First Class Robert G. Thompson, assigned to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations in West Berlin, volunteered to sell information to the **Soviets**. He continued to do so until he was transferred to Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, Montana. Even after he was discharged in 1958, he remained in contact with the Soviets. Thompson was finally arrested in 1965 in New York and was sentenced to 30 years in prison, having admitted to selling between 50 and 100 documents every fortnight for about three months in 1957.

After his imprisonment, Thompson claimed to be a Soviet **illegal** and pressed for his release in a **spy swap**, which was eventually granted in July 1969 when he was exchanged for Anatoli Shcharansky. Thompson was **resettled** in East Berlin under the **alias** Gregor Best and was employed by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung as a **false flag** recruiter, posing as a **Central Intelligence Agency** officer supposedly anxious to seek help in conducting investigations into the staff of NATO member **embassies**.

TOLKACHEV, ADOLF. Code-named AE/BLIP by the **Central Intelligence Agency**, Tolkachev volunteered hugely important aeronautical data from "Phastron," the Research Institute of Radiobuilding, to the CIA in Moscow by leaving a note in a car belonging to a CIA officer. Tolkachev was ideologically motivated and initially had limited himself to distributing subversive literature. When ordered to improve the MiG-25's avionics following the **defection** of Lt. **Viktor Belenko** with his Foxbat Mach-3 high-altitude interceptor to Hakodate in Japan in September 1976, he seized the opportunity to inflict some real damage on the regime by compromising all the fighter's new avionics.

Later code-named AE/VANQUISH, Tolkachev was paid the equivalent of more than \$2 million, mainly in antique Russian jewelry which he pretended he had inherited from his grandmother, in return for details of Soviet radar, electronic countermeasures, and stealth technology, a veritable hemorrhage of secrets that effectively neu-

tralized the feared Foxbat superfighter. Tolkachev's rather unsubtle initial approach could easily have been a **KGB provocation**, but with **William Casey**'s encouragement, the CIA station chief, Gus Hathaway, took the risk and assigned a senior Russian-speaking case officer, John Guilsher, who had a Russian background (and was impressively experienced, having worked in London on the **Berlin Tunnel** material and transcribed the **Penkovsky** transcripts in 1962) and he ran the source with two successive case officers with great skill until May 1985 when the engineer was arrested, having been betrayed by an embittered former CIA officer, **Edward Lee Howard**.

TRADECRAFT. The specialist techniques used by intelligence professionals to conduct clandestine operations. Tradecraft procedures are used universally. They include the use of safe houses, dead drops, brush contacts, burst transmitters, surveillance countermeasures, the deployment of **decoys**, and other covert procedures. Tradecraft will vary, depending on the local security environment in which it is to be employed, and during the Cold War the challenging conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union led the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare a course, known as "pipeliners," for personnel assigned to operate in denied areas. The objective was to strike a balance between behavior that would identify an individual as an intelligence professional and the need to equip agents with gadgetry, either concealment devices or communications equipment, that would not instantly betray the owner upon discovery. Famously Boris Yuzhin was nearly compromised when he mislaid his cigarette lighter during a meeting in the San Francisco referentura, and it was found by a KGB colleague who, as the rezidentura's technical expert, recognized it as an ingenious concealment device, thereby indicating to him that there was a spy in the building. See also MOSCOW RULES.

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS. The discipline of studying wireless traffic to establish patterns and obtain intelligence, a component of **signals analysis** and **signals intelligence**. Traffic analysis includes techniques of direction-finding, call-sign analysis, and **discrimination**—the study of frequencies, wavelengths, and transmission lengths. Even without being able to solve **cryptographically** a ciphered text,

a skilled analyst may develop significant information about a particular source of radio broadcasts by monitoring the regularity of the signals, their length, frequency, call sign, and origin. For example, the sudden imposition of radio silence may indicate an imminent attack, and the movement of a particular operator may indicate a change in location for his unit.

Perhaps the most significant moment in the history of traffic analysis occurred in 1938 at the end of the Munich Crisis when the German battleship *Deutschland*, on a goodwill visit to Spain, continued its cruise with a crew of cadets and did not return to her home port. British direction-finding confirmed the ship's position, thereby confirming that war was not imminent.

TRIPLEX. The code name assigned to XXX material—information acquired from the illicit copying of the content of **diplomatic bags** sent to and from diplomatic missions in London during World War II. Conducted by a joint **MI5–Secret Intelligence Service** unit dedicated to gaining surreptitious access to the attaché cases carried by **diplomatic couriers**, TRIPLEX constituted a major breach of the Vienna Convention and therefore was considered an extremely sensitive source.

TURKEY. Soon after World War I Turkey established the MIT (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati/National Intelligence Organization), which continues to function despite a reorganization in 1976 that split the functions of collection and analysis. The MIT liaises closely with the internal Emniyet Genel Müdürlügü (General Directorate of Security) and its principal target is the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers Party), a **terrorist** movement which was decapitated temporarily in February 1999 with the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

TWENTY COMMITTEE. The British intelligence coordinating committee created in January 1941 to supervise the management of **MI5**'s **double agents** and give approval to information being passed to the enemy. The name comes from the Roman numeral XX, a visual pun on "**double cross**." The XX Committee met weekly and was chaired by J. C. Masterman, his secretary being another MI5 officer,

John Marriott. The other membership was made up of staff transferred from the Home Defence Security Executive, the **Secret Intelligence Service**, and the directors of military intelligence, naval intelligence, and the Home Forces.

During the course of World War II, the XX Committee met weekly 226 times and oversaw the operations of more than 40 controlled enemy agents until it was dissolved in December 1944. The existence of the XX Committee was revealed publicly in 1972 with the publication by Sir John Masterman of *The Double Cross System of the War of 1939–45*, a slightly abridged version of an account he had been commissioned to write for the Security Service in 1945.

– U –

U-2. The designation of the aircraft built by Lockheed for the **Central Intelligence Agency** as a high-altitude, single-engine reconnaissance aircraft. It flew for the first time in August 1955. The following year U-2s began overflights of **Soviet** territory from Adana in Turkey, Lakenheath in England, and Giebelstadt in Germany, concentrating on the missile test sites at Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam. Following the destruction of a U-2 near Sverdlovsk in May 1960, and the capture of its CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers, President Dwight D. Eisenhower banned further intrusions into Soviet airspace. Altogether two American U-2 planes were shot down, the other being a flight over **Cuba** in October 1962, killing the pilot, Maj. Rudolf Anderson. In addition, six Taiwanese U-2s were destroyed over the **Peoples' Republic of China** between 1962 and 1969.

The **imagery** captured by the U-2 overflights, processed by the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and code-named IDEALIST, was considered invaluable, serving to undermine the "**bomber gap**" theory. It was later replaced by photographs from CORONA **satellites** beginning in August 1960 and from SR-71 **Black-birds** in January 1964. A total of 106 U-2s were built, and it remains an effective **surveillance** aircraft, still in service around the globe.

UB. The UB (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa/Security Office) was a shortened form of the official name Urzad Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego (Public

Security Office), which was set up in early September 1944 in liberated territory of **Poland** by a team of NKVD agents parachuted into the country, later to be supervised by the NKVD *rezident*, General Selianovsky, thereby setting a standard of **surrogacy** that was to be copied across Eastern Europe as the NKVD inserted its own personnel or nominees into the newly created security structures.

In July 1946 the Ministry of Public Security was divided into eight departments, of which five dealt with operational matters: I, Counterintelligence; II, Technical Operations and Technology; III, Antiopposition; IV, Protection of the Economy; and V, Counterinfiltration and Counter-Church Influence. Early in 1948 Department VII, handling general intelligence, was created and in June the following year the powerful and highly secret Biuro do spraw Funkcjonariuszy (Officer's Office) was set up as an internal counterintelligence section in order to maintain surveillance and investigate and control ministry personnel.

On 2 March 1950 the Biuro Specjalne (Special Office), which became Department X in November 1951, was established to provide surveillance and to investigate senior Communists and their cronies. At the peak of its power two years later, the security service employed 33,200 officers, with the Ministry of Public Security controlling 57,500 Citizens Militia (MO); 41,000 crack troops of the intensely loyal Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego (KBW, Internal Security Corps); 32,000 Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza (WOP, Frontier Guards); and an armed Industry Guard (SP, Straz Przemyslowa) to protect industrial plants against sabotage. In addition the regime could rely on 10,000 Straz Wiezienna (SW) prison guards and the 125,000-strong Ochotnicza Rezerwa Milicji Obywatelskiej (ORMO, Citizen's Militia Voluntary Reserve), which consisted of low-level informers who in emergencies were armed with batons or guns and deployed against unarmed protesters. All these despised plainclothesmen were known as "ubeks" by the general population, which did not distinguish between the security service and the rest.

After Josef Stalin's death, the power of the Ministry of Public Security diminished and in June 1954 the feared Department X was disbanded, with other changes limited to the removal of a dozen or so most compromised officers. On 7 December 1954 the Ministry of Public Security was divided into the Ministerstwo Spraw

Wewnetrznych (MSW, Ministry of Internal Affairs) and subordinated to the Komitet do spraw Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego (KBP, Cabinet Committee for Public Security). Thus the MSW gained control over the MO, ORMO, WOP, KBW, SP, and SW, leaving the KBP as a de facto security service operating independently and outside the departmental structure of the previous Ministry of Public Security.

In September 1955 the KBP was reinforced by an amalgamation of the Informacja Wojskowa (Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service) and the Wojska Wewnetrzne, an internal military unit designed to prevent mutiny within the armed forces. Previously both had been subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense, but no announcement was made to explain the extension of the KBP's power. An order made in September 1955 committed the security service to support Informaca Wojskowa, and vice versa.

Following the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow, at which Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin, and the Poznan riots, the Polish Communist party disbanded the KBP as of November 1956. The Public Security Offices (UBPs) were dismantled and the hitherto informal security service was reduced in number and power, streamlined, and incorporated into Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), where it was named officially the Security Service, the Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB); the nickname "ubek" was so deeply rooted in the public mind, however, that it survived despite some competition from the new acronym "esbek."

U-BOAT. In both world wars, the **German submarine** fleet attempted to enforce a blockade on **Great Britain**, with the intention of starving the country into submission—and in both wars was prevented from doing so. The Kriegsmarine fleet suffered appalling losses during the Battle of the Atlantic, largely due to the skillful exploitation of enemy wireless traffic enciphered on the **Enigma machine**, along with Allied technical developments such as radar and sonar.

The German Type XXI diesel submarine, brought into service at the end of the war, proved to be an exceptional weapon at the time, and its design was adopted as the basis of the **Soviet** Zulu and Whiskey classes, as well as the later Foxtrot class, the mainstay of the postwar Red Banner Fleet. Although noisy and easy to detect, a total of 75 Foxtrots were built before production ended in 1983. They were

exported to India, Cuba, Libya, and Poland, and two were lost in accidents. The Foxtrot B-37 was lost in a torpedo explosion at Polnariy in 1962, and the B-33 sank off Vladivostok in 1991.

- **UKUSA.** The acronym for the United Kingdom–United States of America Security Agreement signed in 1947 to enhance the **BRUSA** pact of May 1943, which set the terms for the exchange of **signals intelligence** between British and American **cryptographic** agencies.
- **ULTRA.** The classification assigned to **signals intelligence** emanating from **intercepted** enemy wireless traffic enciphered on the **Enigma** machine in 1942. Previously the code name had been BONIFACE. Later in the war ULTRA came to be used as a generic term and included other enemy cipher machines, such as the Siemens *Geheimschreiber*.
- UNIT 8200. The military intelligence cover designation of Israel's signals intelligence organization which failed to interpret the increase in signal traffic between Damascus, Amman, and Cairo in 1973 as an indication of an imminent attack. Until recently commanded by Brigadier Pinhas Bulhris, Unit 8200 is responsible for all communications intelligence and cryptography and the development of new intercept techniques.
- UNITED NATIONS (UN). As the United Nations does not possess its own independent intelligence organization, it is heavily dependent on support supplied by contributing countries. However, the UN has inadvertently provided diplomatic cover in New York, London, and Geneva for the intelligence agencies of member countries. During the Cold War, several Eastern Bloc countries took advantage of the UN's headquarters in Manhattan to establish legal rezidenturas. The extent of this abuse, well known to personnel deployed in surveillance duties, was authoritatively confirmed by Arkadi Shevchenko in April 1978 when he defected to the Central Intelligence Agency. As an assistant general-secretary, Shevchenko was the most senior Soviet diplomat ever to defect, and he identified members of the UN Secretariat and the Soviet mission whom he knew to be undercover KGB and GRU officers.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Devoid of a centralized organization to supervise the collection, collation, analysis, and distribution of intelligence until 1947 when the National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States developed a massive bureaucracy during the Cold War to develop a capability to acquire intelligence from human and technical sources. Thus the size of the intelligence community has expanded to include the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation's intelligence division, and other government departmental intelligence branches, among them the Treasury and State departments, Coast Guard, and Department of Energy, together with the four separate military intelligence organizations of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Until the establishment of the director of national intelligence (DNI) in 2005, responsibility for coordinating all the component parts of the community rested with the director of central intelligence (DCI). To reduce overlap, waste, and poor cooperation among the rival agencies, highlighted by the terrorist attack on New York and Washington, D.C., in September 2001, the **Department of Homeland Security** consolidated 23 of the domestic organizations, including Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, Border Patrol, the Secret Service, and the Transportation Security Agency into five directorates. Nevertheless, many constituent parts of the intelligence community retain their own analytical staffs, and there are still 15 official U.S. government intelligence agencies, all engaged in competing for a greater share of the expanding federal intelligence budget.

UNSUB. The term applied in espionage cases where the culprit has not been identified positively, from the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** abbreviation for "unidentified subject."

- V -

VANUNU, MORDECHAI. The son of an immigrant family from Marrakech, Morocco, Vanunu abandoned his studies as a physicist and joined the Dimona Nuclear Research Center in 1977, working as a

technician. He was laid off in 1985, having applied to join the **Israeli** Communist party, but in 1986 attempted to sell information and photographs he had taken from inside the plant to a journalist in **Australia**. Vanunu was brought to London by the *Sunday Times* to have his story verified, and a rival newspaper, the *Sunday Mirror*, identified him as a hoaxer and claimed that his supposedly illicit photographs of a secret underground plutonium processing unit were actually of a car wash or an egg-packing factory. Dismayed but undeterred, the *Sunday Times* obtained independent corroboration of Vanunu's bona fides and in September 1986 published his assertion that Israel had developed a sizeable atomic arsenal of free-fall bombs and nuclear land mines.

Meanwhile the **Australian Security Intelligence Organisation** had learned of Vanunu's intention to make disclosures regarding his former employment and informed the **Mossad**, which conducted an operation in London to lure him to Italy. He encountered, seemingly accidentally, an attractive American girl while window shopping, and she invited him to Rome for the weekend. When he flew to Italy, he was immediately abducted and returned to Israel for trial. He was convicted in March 1988 of treason and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment. Released on parole in 2004, he converted to Christianity but was quickly rearrested for breaching the terms of his release, which included a ban on interviews with foreign journalists and on travel abroad.

VARENIK, GENNADI. Code-named GT/FITNESS by the **Central Intelligence Agency**, Varenik, the son of a senior **KGB** officer, was under journalistic **cover** when he was recruited in March 1985 in Bonn and revealed details of a KGB plan to plant **terrorist** bombs. After he had been identified as a spy by **Aldrich Ames**, he was arrested in November 1985 and shot in February 1987.

VASILIEV, VLADIMIR. Colonel Vasiliev, a GRU officer, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in Budapest in 1983 and given the code name GT/ACCORD. He identified a GRU network in which a U.S. Army sergeant, Clyde Conrad, had been active in West Germany. Vasiliev enabled the Swedish security police to arrest Conrad's controllers, Dr. Sandor Kercsik and his younger brother

Imre, and to roll up a large Hungarian military intelligence network headed by a retired warrant officer, **Zoltan Szabo**. Although Vasiliev tipped off the CIA in 1985 to the existence of Szabo's huge Hungarian spy ring, which extended into Italy, his role in the investigation had been skillfully concealed, so it was a surprise when he was suddenly taken into KGB custody in December 1986 and executed the following year.

VASSILENKO, GENNADY. A KGB "Line KR" counterintelligence officer identified as a Central Intelligence Agency spy by Robert Hanssen, Vassilenko had been unsuccessfully cultivated for years by the CIA's Jack Platt. In fact Vassilenko never succumbed to Platt's blandishments, but in January 1986, while on a visit to Havana, Vassilenko was arrested and taken by ship back to Moscow to face six months of interrogation in Lefortovo prison. Hanssen had read Platt's report of a trip he and his **Federal Bureau** of Investigation partner Don Rankin had taken the previous October to Georgetown, Guyana, to see Vassilenko, whom he had referred to only as "M," but both Hanssen and the KGB mistakenly believed that the recruitment of the target also code-named MONO-LIGHT (by the CIA) and DOVKA (by the FBI) had been successful. Fortunately for Vassilenko, he was released for lack of evidence after six months, but his career had been ruined. When Aldrich Ames was eventually arrested, it was the Vassilenko case that persuaded the **mole** hunters that their task was not over. Ames had been posted to Rome during the relevant period, and only the FBI had seen Platt's report on MONOLIGHT.

VENEZUELA. Controlled by the Ministry of the Interior in Caracas, the Dirección de Seguridad e Inteligencia Political (DSIP) is responsible for counterespionage, countersubversion, and counternarcotics operations throughout this oil-rich country and maintains links with liaison services. In May 2005 President Hugo Chávez replaced the DSIP director, Miguel Rodriguez, with an army officer, Col. Henry Rangel, following the escape from custody of a notorious drug trafficker, José Maria Corredor. The incident proved that following a reorganization in 2001, even DSIP was vulnerable to the drug corruption that has contaminated much of Venezuela's public services.

VENONA. The Anglo-American cryptographic project that succeeded in decoding more than 2,000 Soviet messages exchanged between Moscow and various diplomatic posts overseas between 1940 and 1949 had several code names but is generally known as VENONA. Altogether 750,000 telegrams were examined, including a batch from Sweden supplied in 1966, and an error in the construction of the Soviet one-time pads enabled fragments of the texts to be reconstructed. The traffic ranged from routine consular, trade, and diplomatic messages, to highly sensitive NKVD, GRU, and Naval GRU texts. The analytical work, which identified more than 300 spies, including Alger Hiss, Klaus Fuchs, Donald Maclean, Harry Dexter White, and the Rosenbergs, continued until 1979 but was not declassified until 1995. Although the translated, partially decrypted messages were not admissible in any criminal trial, they provided mole hunters with sufficient information to trace dozens of spies recruited and run by the NKVD and GRU during and after World War II. Although the traffic ceased in 1949, when William Weisband and Kim Philby both warned Moscow of the progress being made by the American and British cryptanalysts, prompting a change in Soviet cipher procedures, there was sufficient material for MI5 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to study in an effort to put real names to the often transparent code names used to protect the true identities of spies.

VERMEHREN, ERICH. The **defection** of **Abwehr** officer Vermehren and his deeply religious wife Elizabeth to the **Secret Intelligence Service** in 1944 in Istanbul proved to be the catalyst for the absorption of the Abwehr into the **German** Reich Security Agency. The Vermehrens were **cultivated** by an SIS officer, Nicholas Elliott, who eventually persuaded them to switch sides with a promise that their decision would remain secret. Unfortunately the news leaked almost as soon as the couple had been received and debriefed in Cairo and was broadcast by the BBC, forcing them to adopt new identities and be **resettled** in Switzerland.

VETROV, VLADIMIR. A **KGB** Line X scientific intelligence specialist, Vetrov had been posted to Ottawa, where he was **pitched** unsuccessfully by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Ser-

vice, before he was transferred to Paris where he was recruited by the **Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire** in 1980. The French ran him in Moscow with a military attaché sent for the purpose, who operated outside the usual **Direction Générale de Sécurité Extérieure** channels to protect the source, and gave him the English code name FAREWELL to imply that he was being handled by a foreign service. In February 1982 Vetrov was convicted of killing a man and stabbing his girlfriend and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. However, in 1984 the KGB learned that Vetrov had engaged in espionage, and he was executed.

In the short period he was active as a spy, FAREWELL provided the French with a wealth of information about technology transfer and the KGB's illicit acquisition of Western scientific and commercial secrets. This knowledge was traded by President François Mitterrand to the Americans to demonstrate that **France**'s reputation for high-level **penetration**, Communist influence, and poor security was no longer justified. Precisely how the KGB came to find out about Vetrov's espionage remains one of the **Cold War**'s unsolved mysteries.

VORONTSOV, SERGEI. Code-named GT/COWL, Vorontsov was a Second Chief Directorate officer who had volunteered to spy for the Central Intelligence Agency by dropping a sheaf of secret documents into the car of an American diplomat in late 1984. He was arrested by the KGB in March 1986, and his CIA contact, Michael Sellers, was detained while on his way to a rendezvous in Moscow and expelled. Vorontsov had been identified as a spy by Aldrich Ames.

– W –

WALKER, JOHN. Indicted in May 1985 on six counts of espionage, along with his son Michael, John Walker was a retired U.S. Navy warrant officer accused of having spied for the **Soviets** for 18 years, during which period he had held Top Secret **cryptographic** clearances and had handled the most sensitive coding equipment, including the key cards used to alter the daily settings on cipher machines. He is also credited with having compromised American sonar technology to the point that the Soviets altered their naval

tactics and designed the Akula class as a silent **submarine** undetectable by **SOSUS** passive acoustic arrays.

According to his confession, Walker had experienced financial difficulties in 1968 and had visited the Soviet **embassy** in Washington, D.C., where his offer to sell information had been accepted. After his retirement, embarking on a new career as a private detective, Walker had recruited his son who, at the time of his arrest, was a petty officer serving on the aircraft carrier USS *Nimitz* and was found to have 15 pounds of classified material in his locker.

In addition, John Walker had recruited his brother, Lt. Comdr. Arthur Walker, and another navy friend, Jerry Whitworth. In October 1985 father and son pleaded guilty and received two life terms plus 10 years, and 25 years' imprisonment, respectively, in return for John Walker's testimony against Whitworth, who surrendered to the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** in June 1985. A former navy communications expert, Whitworth was accused of having received \$325,000 from John Walker between 1975 and 1982 in return for classified data, and at his trial, which lasted three months, his assertion that he had not known the material was being passed to the Soviets was rejected, and he was sentenced in August 1986 to 365 years in prison and a fine of \$410,000. In his defense Whitworth claimed that he had been recruited under a **false flag** by Walker, who had claimed to have been passing information to the **Israelis**.

Arthur Walker claimed that he had engaged in espionage only in 1981 and 1982 when he had been employed as a defense contractor in Chesapeake, Virginia, and that the compromised documents were classified as Confidential and concerned ship construction. He was arrested in May 1985, and in October the same year was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of \$250,000. Two further U.S. Navy suspects, both believed to have been recruited by Walker, escaped prosecution because of insufficient evidence.

WALK-IN. The term applied to sources who volunteer their cooperation, often by literally making a direct approach to an intelligence service. In most examples, this behavior consists of a visit to a diplomatic mission and a request to see a representative of a particular agency. In such circumstances, an interview is likely to be conducted in a private room that may be wired for sound for retention of an

accurate record of the conversation. Some of the best intelligence sources have been from low-ranking individuals who, despite their status, may enjoy greater access to classified material than their superiors. For example, personnel responsible for the removal of burn bags and the destruction of classified waste may routinely handle far more documents than somebody in a far more elevated position.

WATCHER SERVICE. MI5's group of skilled surveillance experts are known as the Watcher Service and, working in teams, maintain covert observation on fixed targets, such as diplomatic missions. from permanent posts. They are also deployed against other terrorist and espionage suspects. The members are trained to a high standard and are considered among the most professional in the world. They rarely give evidence in prosecutions so as to avoid compromising their methods, but in September 1988 some were called as witnesses in the inquest conducted after Operation FLAVIUS in Gibraltar.

WEISBAND, WILLIAM. A Soviet spy who penetrated the U.S. Armed Forces Security Agency in 1944, Weisband had been born in Russia but claimed he had been born to Russian parents in Alexandria, Virginia. Before World War II he was servicing dead drops in New York; he was eventually identified by James Orin York as his prewar contact in California. Later Weisband was mentioned as having held a clandestine meeting with the NKVD's Aleksandr Feklisov in a Manhattan movie theater in 1940, and he is thought to have compromised the VENONA project as soon as he was granted access to it, as a Russian linguist, at Arlington Hall in 1948. Never convicted of espionage, Weisband was imprisoned in November 1950 for lying about his Communist Party of the United States of America membership and died in May 1967.

WHISTLE BLOWER. A term applied to insiders who go public with allegations of misconduct or illegalities. In the United States, individuals who make unauthorized disclosures of this type have statutory protection from retaliation from their employers and from associated litigation. Many intelligence agencies provide an alternative route for channeling internal complaints without risking the release of classified information. In Great Britain, the appointment of a staff counselor who can guarantee anonymity to personnel anxious to express concern about their duties was included in the 1989 Security Service Act which regulated **MI5** and placed the organization on a statutory footing for the first time since its creation in 1909.

"WILDERNESS OF MIRRORS." A memorable term coined by Central Intelligence Agency counterintelligence chief James Angleton and used by him in his 1975 testimony to the Church Committee to describe the counterintelligence environment in which Soviet espionage cases were never quite what they appeared to be. In the wilderness of mirrors, defectors have been planted deliberately, volunteer agents are deliberate provocations, and Machiavellian schemes have been plotted to mislead the West.

WIRETAPS. Slang term originally for the physical **interception** of telephone landlines but now generally meant to apply to all voice communications, whatever the carrier system. As a source of information this type of technical intelligence does not have a universally identical legal status, and in some countries such as Britain the material cannot be used in evidence in a criminal trial, whereas transcripts taken from recordings made under warrant in the United States, often granted under the terms of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, made be adduced in evidence.

WOLF, MARKUS. Born in Germany but brought up first in Switzerland then in Moscow, Wolf returned to Berlin in 1945 as a radio journalist and attended the Nuremberg War Crimes trials. In 1958, unaware that he had been photographed by the Allies in Nuremberg, he was appointed head of the East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA). Skilled at recruiting and motivating agents sent into the Federal Republic of Germany, he handled Gunter Guillaume, who penetrated Chancellor Willy Brandt's private office, and pioneered the cultivation of vulnerable secretaries with access to classified information by agents, sometimes known as Romeo spies, trained to seduce them

Wolf became increasingly disenchanted with the East German regime and retired in 1987. In 1993, following the reunification of Germany, Wolf was prosecuted and sentenced to six years' imprison-

ment for having conducted intelligence operations against the West, but his conviction was quashed in 1995. Rearrested on charges of having organized three abductions, he was given a suspended prison sentence of two years. Wolf subsequently wrote his memoirs, *Man without a Face*.

WRIGHT, PETER. Formerly a Marconi radio engineer, where he solved the SATYR puzzle, Wright joined the Security Service as a technician in July 1955. In 1963 he was indoctrinated into a mole hunt code-named PETERS intended to identify hostile **penetration** of MI5. Wright achieved considerable expertise in his study of Soviet espionage and in April 1964 was selected to conduct the debriefing of Anthony Blunt, who had accepted **immunity** from prosecution for his betrayal of British secrets during and after World War II. Wright pursued many of the leads provided by Blunt and was appointed a member of the Fluency Committee created jointly with Secret Intelligence Service to investigate possible moles. Although Wright interviewed numerous suspects, he obtained only one complete confession, that of Leo Long, who had been run by Blunt and had served in MI14 during the war, before he went into the film business. Blunt obtained partial confessions from Jenifer Hart, Iris Murdoch, Bernard Floud MP, and James McGibbon, but none were ever prosecuted. After retiring from MI5 in 1973, as one of a dozen assistant directors, Wright moved to Cornwall to breed horses, but was retained by MI5 as a consultant on a part-time basis, before finally leaving altogether at the end of January 1976 and emigrating to Tasmania later the same year.

When Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asserted in November 1979 that all the evidence of hostile penetration of MI5 could be attributed to Blunt, he believed she had been misled by the Security Service and collaborated with the veteran Fleet Street journalist Chapman Pincher to document his investigations in *Their Trade Is Treachery*. Disappointed with the book, Wright then coauthored *Spy-Catcher* with a television producer, Paul Greengrass, which resulted in a lengthy legal action brought by the British government in **Australia** to prevent publication. The final House of Lords judgment upheld the principle of the lifelong duty of confidentiality owed by MI5 personnel to their employer, but meanwhile the litigation had made

the book an international best-seller. Wright died in Tasmania in April 1995, having written two further books, neither of which enjoyed *SpyCatcher*'s success.

-X-

XX. See DOUBLE CROSS: TWENTY COMMITTEE.

- Y -

Y SERVICE. The interception of wireless signals is conducted by ground stations and other platforms that are referred to by the intelligence community by "Y," the letter which best illustrates the triangulation technique used by direction-finding equipment to identify the source of a target transmission.

YURCHENKO, VITALI. A senior KGB counterintelligence officer, Colonel Yurchenko had been attached to the KGB's Washington, D.C., rezidentura, and defected to the Central Intelligence Agency in July 1985 to escape from poverty and an unhappy marriage by requesting political asylum in Rome while on a mission to find Vladimir Alexandrov, a Soviet nuclear physicist who was missing. Yurchenko was flown to a CIA safe house in Vienna, Virginia, for a lengthy debriefing and there disclosed fabulous information, including evidence to identify a former CIA officer, Edward Lee Howard, and a former National Security Agency analyst, Ronald Pelton, as spies for the KGB. He was also able to clear up dozens of loose ends on other counterintelligence cases and reveal the KGB's latest tradecraft, including the deliberate brushing of CIA personnel in Moscow with a radioactive spy dust to enable their movements to be monitored. Unusually, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey met Yurchenko several times during his debriefings, entertaining him to dinner twice, and was quite unable to resist spreading the good news of the CIA's impressive coup. Yurchenko was also alarmed when he was told that he might be obliged to appear as a witness in an action brought against the U.S. government by Ewa Shadrin, the widow of the naval defector Nikolai Artamonov.

The rather unpersonable Yurchenko, who had been promised total discretion, was understandably dismayed by the leaks and disappointed by his treatment by his CIA Security Division handlers who had failed to show him the respect he felt he deserved, and he **redefected** to the **Soviet embassy** in Washington on 31 October 1985 and called a press conference four days later to complain that he had been abducted by the CIA and drugged.

The postmortem conducted by the CIA suggested that Yurchenko's considerable personal problems had not been properly appreciated when he approached the Rome station, as they most probably would have been if he had been recruited and run for a period before he simply turned up unexpectedly demanding political asylum and resettlement. The heavy-drinking counterintelligence expert had an exaggerated view of what was in store for him in the United States and was bitterly disappointed when he was rejected by his former girlfriend, Dr. Valentina Yereskovsky, a beautiful blonde pediatrician and the wife of the Soviet consul general in Montreal. The CIA concluded that it was highly likely that Aldrich Ames, who had been part of his debriefing team, had tipped off the KGB to Yurchenko's continuing interest in the woman with whom he had previously conducted a lengthy and passionate affair and in whom he remained besotted. Accordingly, when Yurchenko unexpectedly turned up on the doorstep of her apartment in Canada, she had almost certainly been warned to throw him out, which is precisely what she did, protesting that she had no intention of defecting with her two daughters.

Yurchenko's ludicrous claim to have been abducted and drugged was highly reminiscent of the assertions made by the journalist Oleg Bitov, who had gone unpunished after he abandoned his recent defection to England. Doubtless Yurchenko had calculated that the prospect of major political embarrassment would persuade the KGB to pretend that his feeble excuse had been accepted. This reckoning proved to be correct, for Yurchenko was never prosecuted and was allowed to live out the rest of his KGB career before falling on hard times and becoming a bank guard in Moscow.

YU ZHENSAN. The adopted son of Kang Sheng, the legendary head of the **People's Republic of China**'s Ministry of State Security (MSS) Foreign Bureau, Yu, known by the code name PLANESMAN,

defected to the **United States** in November 1986, having supplied information to the **Central Intelligence Agency** for the previous two years. Kang had been trained in espionage by the **Comintern** in the **Soviet Union** before World War II and devoted his career to foreign intelligence operations. An expert calligrapher, reputed to use both hands, he brought up Yu as his own son, a member of Beijing's elite.

Although never disclosed publicly, Yu was responsible for compromising Bernard Boursicot, a French Foreign Service officer who had been caught in a bizarre **honeytrap** in Beijing when posted to the French **embassy** in 1964 at the age of 20, forming a relationship with an actor, a male impersonator who later claimed to have borne him a child. When Yu identified Boursicot, the Frenchman was placed under **surveillance** by the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire and was found to be living with his son and the actor, who turned out to be a man. Boursicot, whose strange story was to become the subject of a book, a play, and a movie, was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, but was released after having served four years. Yu also provided the information leading to the arrest of **Larry Wu-Tai Chin**, who provided classified information from the CIA to China for more than three decades.

YUZHIN, BORIS. Code-named GT/TWINE by the **Central Intelligence Agency**, Yuzhin was a **KGB** officer who had been the TASS news agency correspondent in San Francisco in the 1970s and had returned to Moscow in 1982. He was arrested on 23 December 1986, sentenced to a term of imprisonment at Perm-35, and then released to live in the **United States**.

-Z-

ZHENSAN, YU. See YU ZHENSAN.

ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM. In January 1917 **German** foreign minister Arthur Zimmermann sent a secret telegram to his ambassador in Washington, D.C., Count Johann von Bernstorff, by three different routes, all encrypted in the same code. One was transmitted by radio from Nauen to Sayville, on Long Island; the second went via

the Swedish transatlantic cable from Stockholm; and the third was delivered to the U.S. **embassy** in Berlin for transmission on the American cable via Copenhagen. The text announced an intention to engage in unrestricted **U-boat** warfare beginning 1 February and directed the ambassador to approach the Mexican government with an offer of support if it attacked the **United States** to recover "lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona."

The **intercepted** text was decrypted in Room 40 at the Admiralty by the Reverend William Montgomery and Nigel de Grey and was passed to the U.S. embassy before being made public in March 1917. When challenged, Count Bernstorff confirmed the authenticity of the telegram, and as a direct consequence President Woodrow Wilson told Congress in April 1917 that America's neutrality would cease.

ZINOVIEV LETTER. This **Comintern** directive, from the chairman of the Third International, Grigori Zinoviev, and addressed to the Executive Committee of the **Communist Party of Great Britain** (CPGB) in September 1924 created a political furor in London when it was published by the *Daily Mail* four days before the general election because it advocated sedition on a grand scale and agitation within the armed forces.

The document had been received in London by the **Secret Intelligence Service**'s chief of production, Maj. (Sir) Desmond Morton, and then had been circulated routinely to the services, **MI5**, and the Foreign Office, although as was customary there was no indication of how or where SIS had acquired it. As a consequence, Ramsay MacDonald's first Labour administration, which had already lost a vote of confidence in the House of Commons and was losing its Liberal support, was portrayed as having been willing to tolerate the Kremlin's subversion, and Stanley Baldwin was swept into office in a land-slide victory. The fact that Zinoviev protested that he had never sent any such letter, and the CPGB denied ever having received it, was dismissed as typically, predictably, duplicitous and spurious.

In 1998 an investigation was conducted by the Foreign Office's chief historian, Gill Bennett, and her subsequent report, which drew on an earlier investigation conducted by Millicent Bagot of MI5, established the sequence of events that had followed safe receipt of the document from the SIS station in Riga. Bennett eventually

concluded that the letter itself was undoubtedly a forgery, although its composition was sufficiently skillful to persuade those who read it of its intrinsic authenticity. No blame could be attached to Ronald Meiklejohn for acquiring this tantalizing item and sending it to headquarters, and Major Morton acted quite properly by circulating it to SIS's clients.

As for who actually peddled the original Russian document in Riga, the Soviets, who were as interested as anyone else in who had been counterfeiting Comintern directives, concluded that it was a notorious White Russian forger, Vladimir Orlov, who had been Gen. Piotr Wrangel's chief of intelligence. Orlov had made a good living fabricating ostensibly plausible Soviet documents, mainly for propaganda purposes, and when the SIS contacted Meiklejohn to conduct investigations into his source, yet more supporting evidence conveniently materialized, including a record of the minutes of an emergency meeting of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), convened on 25 October 1924 to discuss the crisis in Great Britain and supposedly chaired by Leo Kamenev. This second document, containing admissions that the Zinoviev directive was genuine, was sent to London on 6 November and was seized on by the SIS chief Adm. Sir Hugh Sinclair as empirical proof, but this too had been forged by Orlov.

The issue of the letter's authenticity was to be decided by a Cabinet committee, chaired by Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, who conducted a secret inquiry and issued no concluding report. Sinclair supplied a five-point memorandum to prove the case for authenticity and claimed that the source run by the Riga station worked for the Comintern secretariat in Moscow and had access to the Comintern's secret files, whereas Meiklejohn had only ever claimed to have run an agent in Riga who was in touch with such an individual (whose identity was unknown to him). Sinclair also claimed that the letter's content was entirely consistent with what was known to be the Comintern's policies, but his fifth and final argument—that if the document had been a forgery, it would have been uncovered as such—seems bizarre and even desperate. Nevertheless, the committee reported to the full Cabinet on 19 November that they "were unanimously of the opinion that there was no doubt as to the authenticity of the Letter."

Z ORGANISATION. An alternative, independent intelligence-gathering network run by the Secret Intelligence Service prior to World War II in parallel to, but in isolation from, the conventional Passport Control Offices. Z personnel usually operated under commercial or journalistic cover across Europe. They were directed from offices in Bush House, on the Strand, and were attached to such businesses as Geoffrey Duveen & Co., Alexander Korda's London Films, and a travel company. In addition, Z's chief, Claude Dansey, succeeded in recruiting many of his personal contacts, among them some well-known foreign correspondents such as Geoffrey Cox, Frederick Voight, and Eric Gedye.

In September 1939, Z personnel were instructed to make themselves known to the local passport control officer (PCO), wherever they were, and to continue their intelligence-gathering activities in tandem. In reality many PCOs were skeptical about the quality of Z personnel and the reliability of their networks. When Capt. **Sigismund Best** was abducted at Venlo in November 1939, it was assumed that whatever advantage had been achieved by the Z Organisation had been compromised permanently.

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INTRODUCTION

One of the significant problems long associated with intelligence literature is the quantity of material published that is unreliable or speculative. Some is simply poorly researched, and an equal amount is outdated, containing information that has been superseded by recent releases from previously classified files. Then there is another entire category that is mistaken or even deliberately misleading. In recent years, documents from formerly secret British, Soviet, American, and Irish archives have been opened to public scrutiny, thereby allowing academics and other researchers access to evidence that either enhances or undermines earlier publications written without the benefit of such sources.

This select bibliography has been divided into five categories: reference works, countries, methodology, operations, and individual cases of espionage. The first includes the most reliable works available in this field and deliberately excludes a large number of encyclopedias that contain erroneous information. Over the past two decades, some 40 as-

sorted dictionaries, bibliographies, compendiums, and "who's who" collections have been published in the intelligence field, but only a relative handful are absolutely reliable, and the Scarecrow Press's current series of historical dictionaries on intelligence topics, which currently has volumes on Great Britain, Israel, Russia/Soviet Union, and the United States, with more to follow, is intended to provide an authoritative, dependable source.

The second group includes subheadings for national organizations, so Great Britain's entry has separate subsections for British Security Coordination, MI5, the Secret Intelligence Service, Special Operations Executive, and the Special Air Service regiment. Similarly, the United States entry includes subsections for the CIA, FBI, and Office of Strategic Services, while Russia/Soviet Union encompasses defectors, the GRU, the KGB, and the NKVD. As well as organizational histories, this section is heavily reliant on the personal memoirs of authors who participated in their country's clandestine operations.

The third, broader category is designated Methodology and includes subsections devoted to aircraft, cryptography, satellites, ships, signals intelligence, and submarines. These are the principal technical means of collecting intelligence, and accordingly these various topics are grouped together.

The fourth category, Operations, includes entries for atomic and biological espionage, deception, ULTRA, and VENONA. Each is a distinct area of operational activity with a considerable literature for each, but these selected titles contain authentic information and are acknowledged within the intelligence community to be the most reliable.

In the fifth group, there is a recommended reading list for individual cases of espionage. As in other categories, some of these personalities have accumulated an extensive literature, though not necessarily an entirely accurate one. Thus there are limited entries for George Blake, Klaus Fuchs, and Robert Hanssen, although numerous other books have been written about them.

The object of this recommended bibliography is to identify the titles that score highly for accuracy and generally have stood the test of time in an era when it has been possible to compare contemporaneous accounts with the declassified official files. As the internet is now a valuable research tool, there is a separate listing for websites that are considered reliable.

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The Illegals (Hodder & Stoughton, 1993)

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Mortal Crimes (Enigma, 2004)

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